The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has been a source of national pride as it participated in peacekeeping missions on the continent. This role will continue and government is looking into the resourcing of the SANDF mandate in line with the recently concluded Defence Review.

To take this programme of action forward, the Deputy President and I will be meeting with Ministers and Deputy Ministers to discuss the detailed implementation plans for each department.

Each Minister will sign a performance agreement with the President outlining what each department will do to deliver on the programme of action.
FOREWORD BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE & MILITARY VETERANS

It gives me great pleasure and pride to present the South African Defence Review 2015 to the President of the Republic of South Africa, the Honourable Jacob Zuma. A dedicated team of proud South Africans spent extensive time and energy to produce this important and overdue Defence Review, with utmost dedication and sublime professionalism.

This Defence Review is the second such policy review in the democratic South Africa, and it maps out the direction defence will be taking over the next 20 to 30 years. The issues that informed the 1996 White Paper on Defence and subsequently the 1998 Defence Review, centred on the transition to democracy and the resultant transformation of the Department of Defence. However, complex changes in the strategic environment, increasing continental peacekeeping obligations, the need to deepen democracy on the continent and the pursuit of our national interests have led to a review of our strategic posture and concomitant policy.

In an ever-changing and dynamic geopolitical environment, it is important for the government to ensure that its Defence Force is not only the Defence Force that South Africa needs, but also the Defence Force that the citizens want and can be proud of.

The Defence Review Committee, after extensive basic research, provided a draft which was publicly released on 12 April 2012. Starting with a briefing to the Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans on 18 April 2012, the Defence Review Committee proceeded with a consultation process throughout South Africa.

Over 350 consultative engagements were undertaken with Ministries, Government Departments, Agencies and Public Entities, key stakeholders and interested parties. One primary stakeholder was the Defence Force itself. Many organisations and experts were engaged internationally, such as the African Union Commission and the Southern African Development Community Secretariat. Contributions were received from all walks of life in South Africa, ranging from rural communities at grass-roots level to academics and military specialists in and outside South Africa.

These engagements enabled the Defence Review Committee to draw on a breadth of expertise, as well as to engage with views from a cross-section of the South African society to assist in pronouncing on the defence policy of South Africa and on what South Africans expect from their Defence Force. Following public consultation, and the consolidation thereof into the Defence Review, the document had to be further adapted in response to the ever-changing strategic environment, especially on the African continent.

The Minister of Defence & Military Veterans, the Honourable Ms Nosiviwe Noluthando Mapisa-Nqakula.
Following engagements at Cabinet level, the Commander-in-Chief, the Honourable President Jacob Zuma, personally provided additional strategic direction on South Africa’s future defence capabilities. He further instructed that the ‘defence strategic trajectory’ be included in the document.

This defence strategic trajectory is the pivotal chapter in the Defence Review. Departing from an acknowledgement of the currently declining state of defence capabilities, it posits the desired end-state of the Defence Force, and identifies the 20-year defence strategy to be pursued over four Medium-Term Strategic Framework periods. This strategy is founded on five milestones, each milestone specifying an estimated budget requirement, personnel targets, the required number of operational units, required capital programmes, and organisational interventions to be pursued. It further provides strategic guidelines for the development of SA Army, SA Air Force, SA Navy, SA Military Health Service and SA Special Forces capabilities.

Cabinet has endorsed the Defence Review 2015, and it has further been tabled in Parliament. I can therefore say that this document is truly a product for all South Africans by all South Africans.

Guided by the Defence Review 2015, the Chief of the Defence Force will present the Military Strategy to the Minister and Cabinet, this being inclusive of: force design; force structure; establishment table; capability strategy and acquisition plan; and key resource imperatives. The Defence Accounting Officer must translate the Defence Review into an extended long-term defence development plan, inclusive of an aligned funding trajectory, and integrate this into the government planning cycle.

Ndiyabulela

(N.N. MAPISA-NQAKULA)
MINISTER OF DEFENCE AND MILITARY VETERANS
CHAIRPERSON’S OVERVIEW

ABOUT THE DEFENCE REVIEW

1. The Minister of Defence and Military Veterans constituted the Defence Review Committee and mandated it to look critically at South Africa’s defence policy, given the rapid and fundamental changes that have occurred in the strategic environment over the last number of years. To this end, the Committee embarked on a diagnostic of the current defence function and analysed the strategic role that the Defence Force plays.

2. Whilst a number of the principles established during the 1998 Defence Review process remain relevant, current strategic circumstances call for a far greater Defence contribution towards the continuance of South Africa’s national security, the deepening of democracy on the continent and meeting South Africa’s international responsibilities. This Defence Review thus defines and expands on the guiding principles that will steer the Defence Force through the next twenty to thirty years.

3. Traditionally, Defence Forces have focused purely on the role that they play in the defence of the sovereignty of the nation-state. This Defence Review, however, discusses the broader role of the Defence Force within a developmental state. It does not purely focus on the ‘what the Defence Force is against’ but additionally provides the framework for the ‘what the Defence Force is for’ and consequently ‘what the Nation expects its Defence Force to do’. This includes the positive role it should play in support of nation building, as an adjunct to its traditional roles and functions.

NATIONAL SECURITY, FOREIGN POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST

4. South Africa’s national security is centred on the advancement of its sovereignty, democracy, national values and freedoms, and its political and economic independence. To this end it is clear that there is both a domestic and a regional dimension to national security.

5. Domestically, South African national security focuses on its sovereignty and the related priorities of: territorial integrity; constitutional order; the security and continuance of national institutions; the well-being, prosperity and upliftment of the people; the growth of the economy; and demonstrable good governance. As a developmental state, South Africa faces the onerous task of addressing a number of pressing developmental challenges, including poverty, unemployment, inequality and criminality.

the South African economy are further intrinsically dependent on enduring peace, stability, economic development and deepened democracy on the continent. Significant growth of the economy requires accelerated inbound and outbound trade (in particular higher-value products) as well as attracting significant volumes of foreign direct investment. Sustained value and volume of exports to traditional markets must be achieved. Continental and other high-growth emergent markets must be accessed.

7. Furthermore, security and development go hand in hand; the two are inter-linked and intertwined; and both are the continent’s biggest challenges. South Africa, in partnership with like-minded African states, has a vested interest in contributing to the rooting of democracy, the promotion of economic advancement and the pursuit of peace, stability and development on the African continent.

8. South Africa is undeniably a major power in Africa (with the leading economy, accounting for 24% of Africa’s GDP and 33% of that of Sub-Saharan Africa) and is obliged to play a continental leadership role, in conjunction with African partners, extending to matters such as conflict prevention, conflict resolution, post-conflict reconstruction and security-sector reform. This manifests in contributions to UN, AU and SADC security, democracy and good governance initiatives, as well as the conclusion of specific bilateral partnerships with other African states in the political, economic, social and security realms.

STRATEGIC CONTEXT

9. The international security context has changed dramatically since the previous Defence Review in 1998. The world in which we now find ourselves is becoming increasingly complex and more unstable, with increased risks to both international and domestic security.

10. Internationally, the security environment is characterised by a range of traditional and non-traditional threats. These include: persistent regional and local conflicts; violent political, ethnic and religious extremism; acts of terror; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the involvement of non-state actors in conflict; high levels of international crime; and cyber threats. Contemporary conflicts and insecurity in Africa derive mainly from: lack of political rights; weak and dysfunctional states; inadequate political and economic governance; the politicisation of ethnicity; the marginalisation of groups; inappropriate military involvement; and unconstitutional changes of governments. Other prominent drivers of African insecurity include: competition over scarce resources; poverty, under-development and poor human security; maritime insecurity; and endemic disease.

11. Nation states mitigate security risks through the coordinated application of a suite of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power interventions, including diplomatic initiatives, political interventions, economic measures and importantly, the deterrence value of the Defence Force, coupled to military interventions where appropriate. History demonstrates that stability is seldom achieved through dialogue and negotiation alone. The use of force, or at least the credible threat thereof, must at times secure constitutional order.

12. The policy principle of preventing armed conflict is achieved by taking all political, diplomatic, informational, societal and military measures to deter potential aggressors. South Africa’s international stature and balanced suite of defence capabilities contribute to overall deterrent capability and posture. This is characterised by credible combat forces, operational prowess, rapid force generation through trained Reserves, demonstrated ability in field training, technological and doctrinal competence, and the visible morale of personnel.

THE DEFENCE FORCE

sovereignty, freedoms, territorial integrity, national interests, people and values. Furthermore, certain defence functions are carried across from the interim Constitution (1993). These include service in: compliance with the international obligations of the Republic; the preservation of life, health or property; the provision or maintenance of essential services; upholding of law and order in support of the Police Service; and support of any department of state for the purpose of socio-economic development.

14. The Defence Force is a unique instrument and an important lever of power at the disposal of the State to pursue its national security and foreign policy priorities and is consequently at the core of South Africa’s national security. The deployment of the Defence Force must thus be coordinated with the full range of instruments which Government can bring to bear both domestically and regionally. However, the Defence Force provides the means of last resort when other instruments of state are unable to protect or defend South Africa.

15. South Africa has deployed its Defence Force widely in recent years – from counter-piracy in the SADC Maritime Area; to peace-missions across the African continent; to a return to border-safeguarding; to a range of other domestic security duties. Many of these operations have not required the Defence Force to engage in significant combat operations. But when the Defence Force has had to fight, these operations have been characterised by hard and dangerous combat in complex human and physical conditions. Defence commitments, having the potential to place South African forces in ‘harm’s way’, must be informed both by the role South Africa plays on the African continent and the pursuit of its national interests.

16. South Africa’s military capability must thus be commensurate with South Africa’s international status, strategic posture and its inescapable continental leadership role. The Defence Force must make a vital and unique contribution that complements South Africa’s diplomatic efforts and enhances South Africa’s influence within wider international developments. As South Africa expands its leadership role, it will concomitantly assume the obligation to provide experienced military leaders and proficient military forces for peace missions and other military operations on the African continent.

17. The Defence Force will be required to conduct a wide range of multi-dimensional military operations across a spectrum of complex, highly fluid and often lethal situations characterised by a wide variety of threats. Operations in the face of political, ethnic, cultural, tribal, linguistic and religious tensions will produce considerable human complexity. Future missions may range from non-combat operations (where the use of force will be absent or restricted to self-defence) to major combat operations with the application of potentially lethal force.

18. Strategically, South Africa has a defensive posture, but will maintain appropriate offensive military capabilities. The Defence Force will be maintained as a balanced, modern and flexible force employing advanced technologies appropriate to operations in the African environment.

19. The Defence Force will thus be appropriately equipped, resourced and multi-role trained to execute successful operations across the spectrum of potential conflict. Informed by the national security strategy, national interest and foreign policy, the four strategic defence goals and thirteen strategic defence tasks (Figure Overview-1) are focused on the attainment of the Defence Force’s constitutionally mandated functions and government’s national strategic goals and priorities.

20. The future force design will pursue a balance of capabilities that adhere to the strategic concepts of rapid reaction operations for interventions, expeditionary operations to project forces for protracted periods, complex war fighting within the human and physical dimensions of the battle space, interoperability of command and control capabilities, concurrency of operations in multiple theatres and joint, inter-agency, inter-departmental and multinational (J2I2M) operations.

21. The defence capability must be robust and flexible and able to project and sustain joint landward, air, maritime, Special Forces and military health operations over extended distances for protracted periods on the continent. The military operating attributes of: command and control; movement and manoeuvre; firepower; intelligence; protection and survivability; and sustainment must be embedded in all capabilities.

22. Joint Command and Control. South Africa requires a joint command and control capability to ensure joint action with respect to land, air, sea, information and space, which must be capable of integrating with multi-national, inter-departmental and inter-agency components to achieve synergy. Joint command and control must be enabled through a comprehensive situational awareness capability that provides integrated information acquired through liaison with allied and friendly forces and governments, local human intelligence, and static and mobile sensors for enhanced military decision-making. This must be pursued at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

23. Defence Diplomacy. South Africa’s contribution to the prevention and resolution of conflict will be enhanced through an integration of its diplomatic, military and other efforts in a complementary manner, and in instances supported by appropriate military capabilities that strengthen South Africa’s capacity to influence international developments. This requires a defence
24. **Special Forces.** South Africa’s increasingly complex and unstable security environment dictates an increasing reliance on Special Forces in defence operations, indicating an expansion of the current Special Forces capability in the landward, airborne and amphibious operational domains. Special Forces capabilities must be suited to: strategic reconnaissance; ordered strategic special tasks; deep reconnaissance in support of the combat services; and the execution of Special Forces-unique operations, including (inter alia) hostage rescue and urban and anti-terror operations.

25. **Special Operations Forces.** Continental leadership responsibilities and the requirement to protect own vital national interests require South Africa to configure and maintain a specialised, highly mobile combat capability (closely linked to that of the Special Forces) to rapidly deploy to remote areas for specific preventative and intervention operations. Such Special Operations Forces must be able to conduct joint and supported airborne, air-landed and sea-landed assault operations, with air- and sea-deployable firepower, protection and manoeuvre. Special Forces and Special Operations Forces will be supported by joint defence capabilities, and will normally be followed-on by more robust combat forces, specifically tailored to the mission.

26. **Medium-Combat Forces.** The larger portion of South Africa’s landward defence capability must be configured and maintained as a projectable, multi-rolled medium-combat capability with enhanced firepower, manoeuvre and protection making it suitable for a range of contingencies. Such medium-forces would be the bulk of South Africa’s contribution to enduring multinational operations, own safeguarding operations and other directed tasks. These medium-combat forces will be self-supporting, having embedded armour, artillery, engineer, communications, intelligence, logistics, medical support and other requirements. This medium capability may be further augmented by heavy-combat capabilities. These forces also have the contingent obligation to support civil authority and the Police Service, and protect critical infrastructure if so required.

27. **Heavy-Combat Forces.** The configuration and maintenance of a heavy-combat capability is required to deter South Africa’s potential adversaries and conduct landward operations in high-threat situations. It must be maintained at a core-growth level within a self-supporting armour brigade comprising: armour, mechanised infantry, artillery, combat engineering, communications, intelligence, logistics, medical support and other requirements. Although relatively small, this heavy-combat capability must be able to augment the combat requirements of other multi-rolled medium and special operations capabilities, specifically where the threat situation dictates enhanced protection, firepower and manoeuvre. This core must be able to expand in response to changes in the strategic environment.

28. **Maritime Operations.** South Africa has a maritime-dependent economy and significant maritime interests which it must defend and protect through the configuration and maintenance of a versatile littoral maritime capability, a credible deep-ocean capability and effective maritime domain awareness. This maritime capability must be able to provide an enduring presence in South Africa’s areas of maritime interest. This presence will be pursued through a maritime defence concept involving deterrence and powerful intervention through surface, sub-surface and air capabilities. This will be pursued in concentric layers that are focused on South Africa’s ports, territorial waters, trade routes and marine resources. In support of the landward strategy, the maritime capability must be able to conduct riverine and inland water operations and augment firepower when so required. It must also be capable of strategic reach and joint rapid response across the spectrum of conflict, supporting the sustenance of protracted joint operations over long distances.

29. **Air Operations.** South Africa requires a responsive and agile air defence capability to defend and protect the integrity of South Africa’s airspace through the application of air power, and to support the landward and maritime strategies. The air defence capability must provide deterrence and powerful intervention during joint operations, specifically through comprehensive air domain awareness, air combat, combat support and air mobility capabilities. Deployed landward and maritime forces must be supported through appropriate airspace control, reconnaissance, close-air support, augmentation of firepower and inter- and intra-theatre air mobility in complex operational circumstances. The air defence capability must also be capable of strategic reach and joint rapid response across the spectrum of conflict, supporting the sustenance of protracted joint operations over long distances.

30. **Military Health Support.** South Africa requires a comprehensive deployable military health protection capability for deployed forces through sustained, layered military health support to protracted operations over long distances, including both force health protection and force health sustainment.

31. **Expeditionary Operations.** South Africa requires an expeditionary projection and sustainment capability to support protracted operations in distant theatres, including forward-basing, the prepositioning of forces and equipment and the ongoing supply and support of deployed forces. Projection and sustainment of expeditionary operations will be supported by strategic air-lift, strategic sea-lift, and the use of rail and road networks.
32. **Information Warfare.** South Africa requires the protection of its cyber-domain, through (inter alia) a comprehensive information warfare capability, integrated into its intelligence-related information systems at the international, national and defence levels. Both defence and wider-government capabilities must be enhanced to secure vital networks.

**CURRENT STATE OF THE DEFENCE FORCE**

33. Defence expenditure is often expressed in terms of a percentage of the GDP that is allocated to defence. The real significance of this measure of defence spending is that it is an indicator of national will. It is a clear indication of how seriously a country takes its security, of how seriously it takes commitments it has undertaken in respect of regional defence and security arrangements, and of how willing it is to face up to unexpected threats to itself or its region.

34. South Africa at present spends less than 1.2% of its GDP on defence, translating to less than 5 cents out of every Rand of total budget being expended on defence\(^1\). The Defence Force is effectively 24% underfunded\(^2\) (in respect of its current size and shape). The Defence Force is in a critical state of decline, characterised by: force imbalance between capabilities; block obsolescence and unaffordability of many of its main operating systems; a disproportionate tooth-to-tail ratio; the inability to meet current standing defence commitments; and the lack of critical mobility. The current balance of expenditure between personnel, operating and capital is both severely disjointed and institutionally crippling.

35. Left unchecked, and at present funding levels, this decline will severely compromise and further fragment the defence capability. It is clear that certain defence capabilities, if not addressed now, will be lost in the very near future. The longer this prevails, the greater the effort, time and cost will be to restore the Defence Force.

36. There must be either a greater budget allocation or a significantly scaled-down level of ambition and commitment which is aligned to the current budget allocation. In short, there are two strategic options available for government: budget must be determined by policy or budget must drive policy. The reality will most probably lie somewhere in between. Nonetheless, the fundamental principle remains that the force design must match the level of commitment, without compromising the necessary ratio between personnel, operations and capital, and the balance between Regulars and Reserves.

37. Even with an immediate intervention, it could take at least five years to arrest the decline and another five years to develop a limited and sustainable defence capability. The longer the neglect is perpetuated, the greater the effort, time and cost that would be necessary to arrest the decline and restore the minimum capabilities required to safeguard South Africa’s borders, protect its maritime trade routes, conduct peace missions and humanitarian interventions, safeguard South Africa and its people and defend and protect the country against external aggression.

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THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE TRAJECTORY

38. An immediate intervention is required to: (firstly) arrest the areas of critical decline and create a firm foundation to (secondly) develop a sustainable defence capability appropriate to South Africa’s international status, strategic posture and inescapable continental leadership role (Figure Overview-2).

39. The Defence Force is required to undertake a detailed military strategic planning process to develop the future trajectory to achieve the identified targets (Figure Overview-3). As first-order guidelines, the following critical milestones are proposed to assist in such planning, namely:

a. **Planning Milestone 1**: Arrest the decline in critical capabilities through immediate and directed interventions.

b. **Planning Milestone 2**: Reorganise and rebalance the Defence Force as the foundation for future growth.

c. **Planning Milestone 3**: Create a sustainable Defence Force that can meet ordered defence commitments (interim end-state of the Defence Review).

d. **Planning Milestone 4**: Enhance the Defence Force’s capacity to respond to emerging threats (end-state of the Defence Review).

e. **Planning Milestone 5**: Defend the Republic against an imminent or dire threat.

40. The results of the strategic military planning process and the implementation trajectory will serve as the foundation for an extensive discourse between the Defence Force, Cabinet and Parliament. Critical will be a Cabinet decision on:

a. South Africa’s responsibilities in the region and on the continent, and the level of defence effort required.

b. The capability priorities to be addressed in the Defence Force.

c. The manner/methodology/approach to determine future funding of defence.

REQUIRED HIGH-IMPACT INTERVENTIONS

41. **Civil Control of Defence.** The Constitution positions the Minister of Defence as being responsible for civil control over defence matters and providing political direction to defence. Furthermore, the Constitution specifically stipulates that the command of the Defence Force must be exercised in accordance with the directions of the Minister, under the authority of the President. The Minister must consequently be appropriately capacitated to perform these duties, through positioning the Defence Secretariat to perform the constitutional imperative to: ‘function under the direction of the Cabinet member responsible for Defence’.

42. **Primary Object of the Defence Secretariat.** As the primary tool and resource for the Minister to exercise civil control, the consequent primary object of the Defence Secretariat must extend to the following in support of the Minister: enhancing civil oversight; establishing and controlling instruments through which the employment of the Defence Force for service is authorised and mandated; setting high-level policy and strategy; setting governance, accountability and risk parameters; setting the defence international engagement agenda; engaging
with defence stakeholders; managing intra-governmental liaison; and performing services related to Cabinet and Parliamentary processes.

43. **Defence Accountability Concept.** The Defence Accounting Officer and Head of Department remains accountable for all defence resources. Linked to the organisational renewal imperative hereunder, the current defence accountability concept must be re-assessed, and if necessary, adjusted in order that the Defence Accounting Officer and Head of Department is able to fully meet his or her statutory accountability responsibilities and obligations.

44. **Renewal of the Defence Organisation.** The following suite of interventions is needed to address critical deficiencies, improve efficiency and refine defence procedures:
   a. **Military Strategy and Military Doctrine.** Guided by the Defence Policy, and using a rigorous military planning process, a military strategy will be developed under authority of the Chief of the Defence Force and the necessary operational-level military doctrine established in support of the military strategy. The military strategy will culminate in the force design, force structure, establishment table and key resource imperatives. The renewed military doctrine will in turn lead to renewed military tactics, techniques and procedures.
   b. **Blueprint Force Design.** The Chief of the Defence Force will present the ensuing blueprint force design to the Minister and Cabinet for approval and this will serve as the basis for all aspects of future planning. The achievement of the blueprint force design will be critically informed by available resources and developments in the strategic environment. Resource constraints will be ameliorated by adjusting levels of readiness, balancing core-growth with operational necessity and through a careful mix of Regulars and Reserves within the one-force approach.
   c. **Defence Force Capability Strategy and Technology and Capital Plans.** Concurrent to the development of the Military Strategy and the Blueprint Force Design, will be the development of the long-term Defence Force Capability Strategy and the publishing of prioritised ten-year Defence Force Technology and Capital Plans. Predicated on the desire to achieve heightened levels of efficiency, effectiveness and economy with commensurately reduced bureaucracy and shorter delivery time-frames, the acquisition agent will ensure efficient and timeous acquisition of those defence systems specified by the military command as well as the through-life-support of defence systems. In addition, and in collaboration with the Chief Defence Scientist, it will assist and support defence research and development.
   d. **Organisational Structure.** Pursuant to the determination of the Military Strategy and the Blueprint Force Design, the Defence Force structure and establishment table will be adjusted to ensure the establishment of cohesive military combat formations, embedded with own organic support capabilities established ‘under command’ to the lowest possible functional level. Such support capabilities will include: personnel, finance, information and logistics (equipment, procurement, maintenance and technical services).
   e. **Extended Long-term Defence Development Plan.** The Defence Accounting Officer must capture the intent of the Military Strategy, Force Design, Force Structure, Capability Strategy and Technology and Capital Plans into an extended long-term defence development plan, inclusive of an aligned funding trajectory, and integrate this within the government planning cycle.
   f. **The Military Command Line.** The line of command authority prescribed in the Constitution remains crucial to the effective functioning of the Defence Force and the successful execution of military tasks. On-going organisational renewal must recognise the hierarchical nature of the Defence Force and must clearly distinguish between command and staff lines, erasing any ambiguity that may exist.
   g. **Mission Command.** The military leadership philosophy will be that of mission command, which implies that military commanders, at whichever level, must be invested with the absolute responsibility to act or, in certain circumstances, to decide not to act, within the framework of a superior commander’s intent.
   h. **Empowerment of Military Commanders.** Military commanders must have the necessary authority and administrative delegations to execute their assigned mandates. A comprehensive defence delegation regime must be established in law whereby powers and duties can be delegated down the command line – one step at a time down the command line – with commanders at all levels being responsible and accountable for their resources and actions.

45. **Renewal of the Personnel Component.** The following suite of interventions must be implemented to ensure that the future Defence Force is advantaged through the quality of its people:
   a. **Future Defence Leaders.** The Defence Force is
recognised as a key institution for the development of leadership within the wider South African society. There will be no compromise on the education, training and development of the future Officer, Warrant Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer; to do so will have dire implications for the operational success of the Defence Force. With regard to officers, a unique and dedicated officer recruitment programme must be established that attracts the best young men and women South Africa has to offer. The military professional education, training and development of young officers will be founded in a broad-liberal education at the Defence Academy and the subsequent education, training and development programmes within the Defence Force.

b. **Future Soldiers.** Future operational success remains critically dependent on the quality and calibre of the future soldier – and the development of responsible, value-driven and disciplined soldiers. The Defence Force recruitment system will be devolved to Services and pursued on a decentralised basis. The future soldier will be a skilled, healthy, fit, and highly disciplined military professional imbued with a high level of morale and sense of duty. The Defence Force will be an equitable, broadly representative and gender-aligned national asset. A through-life assessment and selection system will be established to inform merit-based career advancement for all soldiers, coupled to education, training and development achievement.

c. **Military Discipline.** Rigorous military training develops self-control, discipline, character and integrity. Sound military discipline, founded upon respect for, loyalty to, and properly constituted authority is the cornerstone of a professional and functional Defence Force. Military commanders remain responsible for the conduct of their subordinates and must thus have appropriate mechanisms at their disposal to address failures in discipline. A revised and cohesive military disciplinary system, a minor corrective measures system and consequent administrative measures are required to meet the constitutional imperative that “the defence force must be structured and managed as a disciplined military force”.

d. **Future Defence Civilians.** Attention will be given to the development of a competent civilian component at all levels in defence. Civilian education, training and development programmes will be tailored to integrate with domestic and foreign learning opportunities. Particular focus will be given to the high-level analytical and strategic competencies required of defence personnel serving in the Defence Secretariat. A merit-based career advancement system will be established, coupled to education, training and development achievement.

e. **Multiple mechanisms** are required to place defence members who no longer conform to post and mustering requirements in other departments or agencies, or to honourably exit such members from the Defence Force.

46. **Supporting Defence.** The following suite of interventions must be implemented to ensure that the Defence Force receives effective functional support:

a. **Defence Industry Sector Strategy.** A defence industry sector strategy must be developed to meet critical defence needs. The success of the defence industry will be its integration into mainstream South African industrial policy as a distinct and supported sector in the wider industrial base. Defence will work together with all stakeholders towards the proper integration of the defence industry sector into the Industrial Policy Action Plan 3, and any subsequent amendment thereto. A National Defence Industry Council will be established to ensure close coordination between the Defence Force and the industry.

b. **Defence Technology Programme.** Defence must remain abreast of developments in defence technology and other potentially relevant technologies required developing, manufacturing and supporting complex defence systems. A broad range of technical and technological skills and capabilities must be established over the long term. A Chief Defence Scientist will have responsibility for defining, coordinating and maintaining diverse defence research and development requirements, including policy analysis capacities.

c. **Defence Enterprise Information System.** An integrated defence enterprise information system, linked to the National Treasury’s Integrated Resource Management System, is required as the backbone information system to drive both defence administration and defence command and control. It must integrate and optimise all other defence information sub-system requirements and serve as a basis for ensuring standardisation, compatibility, connectivity and interoperability. It will be established as the foundation for all defence business processes and activities.

47. **Sustainable Future Force.** Irrespective of the future level of funding allocated to defence, the inviolable principle of maintaining the 40:30:30 ratio in the corporate Defence Budget (between the funding of personnel, operating and capital) should
inform all defence planning, notwithstanding that some components are technology-heavy and others personnel-heavy. The ‘compensation for employees’ portion should not exceed 40% of the Defence Budget, and must include an overall minimum of 8% of the personnel allocation directed to the development and utilisation of the Reserves. The 30% capital portion of the defence allocation should be directed at urgent equipment requirements to meet defence operational commitments and the maintenance of a core conventional defence capability with the necessary critical mass to expand when so required. The 30% operating portion of the defence allocation must ensure day-to-day functioning. Unforeseen tasking of the Defence Force must be funded additionally to the base-line allocation.

48. **Strategic Communication Intervention.** The Defence Force is an important pillar of the South African state and should be respected by the people of South Africa and the international community alike for the standard of military professionalism it cultivates and maintains. A deliberate communication intervention is required to pursue a national consensus on defence matters, whereby the people of South Africa are comprehensively informed that their Defence Force stands ready to: defend and protect South Africa; safeguard South Africa and its people; contribute continental security and human development; and provide support in times of crisis and disaster. Specific emphasis must be placed on the developmental role of the Defence Force.

**DEFENCE CAPABILITY RENEWAL PRIORITIES**

49. **Milestone 1 Capability Enhancement**
   a. Identify and direct preservation-funding to those conventional defence capabilities at extreme risk.
   b. Enhance the strategic awareness capability; restore an effective intelligence capability at the strategic, operational and tactical levels; and establish a corps of professional analysts.
   c. Expand and enhance the Special Forces capability and the concomitant ability to insert, support and extract such forces.
   d. Optimise the border safeguarding capability, and acquire tailored equipment and weapon systems.
   e. Establish a permanent forward base.
   f. Reestablish/extend a tactical airfield unit capability and a naval port-operating capability.
   g. Ensure troop-contribution obligations are maintained at the standard whereby reimbursement is guaranteed. Specific emphasis is to be placed on the optimal serviceability of capabilities during operational missions.
   h. Improve stock-levels, with specific emphasis on:
      i. Replacement of field support equipment, including water purification, field kitchen, field accommodation, field workshop and field hospital equipment.
      ii. Rejuvenation of workshops, mobilisation stores, gun and vehicle parks, depots and magazines, and the Naval Dockyard; the establishment of a naval base on the east coast and the development of facilities at naval stations.
      iii. Restocking of munitions, spares and general stores to levels that allow the conduct of effective training and effective combat operations.

50. **Milestone 2 Capability Enhancement**
   a. Development of a special operations joint rapid response intervention capability with the rejuvenation of airborne and air-landed and sea-landed assault forces and associated equipment.
   b. Simultaneous and critical renewal of the medium and light airlift capability, the in-flight refuelling capability, and the military air-ambulance capability, and the enhancement of the medium rotary-wing lift capability.
   c. Enhancement of air domain awareness, including static, mobile and airborne surveillance and tracking systems together with associated interdiction capabilities.
   d. Enhancement of maritime domain awareness and the extended maritime protection capability, inclusive of patrol vessels, reconnaissance aircraft, unmanned surveillance systems as well as static, ship-borne and airborne surveillance and tracking systems.
   e. Renewal of the hydrographic survey capability to both support maritime operations and ensure the international hydrographic, nautical charting and maritime warning obligations of South Africa.
   f. Extended maritime protection capability, inclusive of inshore and offshore patrol capability with organic, combat-enhanced maritime helicopters able to repel symmetric and asymmetric threats.

51. **Milestone 3 Capability Enhancement**
   a. Renewal of the landward combat capability.
      i. Retention and renewal of the ‘core-growth’ heavy-combat capability to augment peacekeeping in high-risk situations, peace enforcement, and to provide an essential component of the deterrent capability.
      ii. Renewal of the larger medium-combat capability.
      iii. Renewal of the landward logistic, related vehicles and field ambulance capability in
an integrated manner to support all military operations.

iv. Establishment of a rapidly deployable indirect fire-support capability to augment the combat capability of deployed forces.

b. Enhancement of the air combat capability through aerial weapon augmentation, including:
   i. Beyond-visual-range air-to-air, precision air-to-ground and anti-ship capabilities for the light fighter.
   ii. Close-range air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities for the lead-in fighter trainer.

52. **Milestone 4 Capability Requirement**
   a. Enhanced and expanded ground-based air defence capability to protect bases, static installations and landward forces.
   b. Renewed heavy combat capability, specifically armour and medium artillery capabilities within the core growth.
   c. Enhanced combat engineer capability, inclusive of mine-detection and clearing, field earth-moving, bridge-laying and other engineering combat support tasks.

53. **Milestone 5 Capability Requirement**
   a. Should all other deterrence and preventative measures fail, the reorganisation and enhancement of all existing capabilities into a ‘war force’ able to counter significant insurgency or engage in limited war.
   b. The focus would be the defence of South Africa and the Defence Force will withdraw from other commitments.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD
Foreword by the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans i

CHAIRPERSON’S OVERVIEW
About the Defence Review ii
National Security, Foreign Policy and the National Interest ii
Strategic Context iv
The Defence Force iv
Defence Capability and Force Generation Requirements v
Current State of the Defence Force vii
The Strategic Defence Trajectory viii
Required High Impact Interventions viii
Defence Capability Renewal Priorities xi

TABLE OF CONTENTS xiii
LIST OF FIGURES xxiv
LIST OF ACRONYMS xxvii
GLOSSARY OF TERMS xxxiii

INTRODUCTION
The Defence Mandate 0-1
Mandate for the Defence Review 0-1
Why a new Defence Review? 0-2
What is the Defence Review? 0-5
Developing the Future Defence Policy 0-6
Overarching Defence Principles 0-7
Development of the Defence Review 0-8

THE SOUTH AFRICAN STATE – ‘A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE’
Introduction 1-1
Geography & Topography 1-2
Form of Government and Legal System 1-2
- Form of Government 1-2
- Legal System 1-3
- Economic System 1-3
Science, Engineering and Technology Base 1-4
People and Society 1-4
South Africa as a ‘Democratic Developmental State’ 1-5
- Poverty 1-6
- Income Inequality 1-6
- Unemployment 1-6
- Education 1-7
- Criminality 1-7
- Skewed Land Distribution and South Africa’s Agri-Potential 1-8
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td><strong>THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inter-State and Intra-State Dimensions of Conflict</td>
<td>2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inter-State Conflict</td>
<td>2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intra-State Conflict</td>
<td>2-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Strategic Importance of Africa</td>
<td>2-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Africa’s Strategic Importance</td>
<td>2-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Persistent Conflict and Instability Hamper African Development</td>
<td>2-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drivers of Global and African Insecurity</td>
<td>2-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An Inequitable Balance of Global Power</td>
<td>2-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Capacity of States for Unilateral Acts of Force</td>
<td>2-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Scramble for Energy, Minerals and Scarce Resources</td>
<td>2-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maritime Insecurity</td>
<td>2-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acts of Terror</td>
<td>2-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction and other Lethal Weapons</td>
<td>2-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-State Actors</td>
<td>2-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mercenaries and Private Security Companies</td>
<td>2-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Climate Change and Natural Disasters</td>
<td>2-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poverty, Underdevelopment and Poor Human Security</td>
<td>2-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Food Security</td>
<td>2-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Endemic Disease</td>
<td>2-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Large-Scale Population Movement and Migration</td>
<td>2-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crime, Syndicated Criminality and Domestic Security</td>
<td>2-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cyber-Security</td>
<td>2-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Complexity of Future Conflict</td>
<td>2-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International Defence Expenditure</td>
<td>2-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>2-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Global Defence Expenditure</td>
<td>2-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>African Defence Expenditure</td>
<td>2-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Defence Expenditure</td>
<td>2-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Natural Resources and Defence Expenditure</td>
<td>2-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arms Transfer Trends</td>
<td>2-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Implications</td>
<td>2-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defending South Africa’s Territorial Integrity and Sovereignty</td>
<td>2-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protecting Vital National Interests</td>
<td>2-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Safeguarding Territorial Borders</td>
<td>2-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Safeguarding South Africa’s Cyberspace</td>
<td>2-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promoting Continental and Regional Peace and Stability</td>
<td>2-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protecting South Africa’s People</td>
<td>2-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td><strong>DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Transition of South Africa’s Security</td>
<td>3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sovereignty &amp; National Posture</td>
<td>3-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
<td>3-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Posture</td>
<td>3-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Interest and National Security</td>
<td>3-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Interest</td>
<td>3-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Security</td>
<td>3-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Application of ‘Soft’ and ‘Hard’ State Power</td>
<td>3-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Defence Mandate</td>
<td>3-5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defence Responsibility</td>
<td>3-6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity</td>
<td>3-6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vital Interests</td>
<td>3-6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Security</td>
<td>3-7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continental Peace and Stability</td>
<td>3-8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Layered Defence Approach</td>
<td>3-10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Integrated Suite of Defence Effects</td>
<td>3-10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterrence</td>
<td>3-11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anticipation</td>
<td>3-11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td>3-11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>3-12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention</td>
<td>3-12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilisation and Normalisation</td>
<td>3-13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Mission, Goals and Tasks</td>
<td>3-13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prioritisation of Defence Goals and Tasks</td>
<td>3-13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing a Balanced Suite of Defence Capabilities</td>
<td>3-13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRECTING DEFENCE</td>
<td>4-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Defence Force</td>
<td>4-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Control and Civil Oversight</td>
<td>4-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Command and Control</td>
<td>4-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levels of Decision-Making</td>
<td>4-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The National Strategic Level</td>
<td>4-5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Military Strategic Level</td>
<td>4-6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Operational Level</td>
<td>4-7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Tactical Level</td>
<td>4-8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment of the Defence Force for Service</td>
<td>4-8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary Oversight</td>
<td>4-10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary Committees in Operation</td>
<td>4-10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary Committees not yet in Operation</td>
<td>4-11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEFEND AND PROTECT SOUTH AFRICA</td>
<td>5-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>5-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Tenets</td>
<td>5-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task 1: Deter and Prevent Conflict</td>
<td>5-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Effect</td>
<td>5-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended Deterrence and Deterrence in Partnership</td>
<td>5-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task 2: Protect National Interests</td>
<td>5-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Effect</td>
<td>5-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaborative Protection</td>
<td>5-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberate Protection</td>
<td>5-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
<td>5-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task 3: Defend South Africa</td>
<td>5-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Effect</td>
<td>5-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventive Self-Defence Against Imminent Threats</td>
<td>5-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberate Self-Defence</td>
<td>5-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
<td>5-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>SAFEGUARD SOUTH AFRICA</td>
<td>6-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>6-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Task 4: Safeguard Borders</td>
<td>6-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Land Border</td>
<td>6-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Border</td>
<td>6-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maritime Border</td>
<td>6-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Task 5: Safeguard Critical Infrastructure</td>
<td>6-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Task 6: Cooperation with the Police Service</td>
<td>6-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Effect</td>
<td>6-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major Events</td>
<td>6-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperation with Specialist Police Task Forces</td>
<td>6-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Threats to Civil Order</td>
<td>6-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Task 7: Ensure Information Security</td>
<td>6-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Effect</td>
<td>6-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>REGIONAL AND CONTINENTAL PEACE AND SECURITY</td>
<td>7-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>7-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Key Tenets</td>
<td>7-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Task 8: Promote Strategic Influence</td>
<td>7-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Effect</td>
<td>7-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Directing and Managing Defence Diplomacy</td>
<td>7-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elements of the Defence Diplomacy Strategy</td>
<td>7-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Task 9: Contribute to Peace and Stability</td>
<td>7-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Effect</td>
<td>7-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intervention under Grave Circumstances</td>
<td>7-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peace Missions and Reconstruction</td>
<td>7-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
<td>7-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General Military Assistance Missions</td>
<td>7-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>DEVELOPMENTAL AND OTHER ORDERED TASKS</td>
<td>8-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Task 10: Execute Relevant Treaty Obligations</td>
<td>8-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Effect</td>
<td>8-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International Hydrographic and Nautical Charting Obligations</td>
<td>8-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maritime and Aeronautical Search and Rescue Obligations</td>
<td>8-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law (IHL) Obligations</td>
<td>8-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Arms Control Obligations</td>
<td>8-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Task 11: Ordered Presidential Tasks</td>
<td>8-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presidential Tasks</td>
<td>8-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Task 12: Assist Civil Authority as Ordered</td>
<td>8-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Effect</td>
<td>8-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Domestic Support to Civil Authority in Times of Need</td>
<td>8-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in the Region</td>
<td>8-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anti-Poaching Measures</td>
<td>8-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Ordered Defence Operations</td>
<td>8-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Task 13: Contribute to the Developmental Agenda</td>
<td>8-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Effect</td>
<td>8-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Developmental Agenda</td>
<td>8-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Development and the Defence Force</td>
<td>8-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Broad Concepts</td>
<td>8-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td>TITLE</td>
<td>PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td><strong>THE DEFENCE STRATEGIC TRAJECTORY</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South African Defence Spending</td>
<td>9-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Budget Trends</td>
<td>9-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Impact on Defence Capabilities</td>
<td>9-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Impact on Readiness</td>
<td>9-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strategic Stock Reserves</td>
<td>9-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Facilities</td>
<td>9-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Impact on Personnel, Operating and Capital</td>
<td>9-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Restoring the Defence Capability</td>
<td>9-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Required Defence Capability</td>
<td>9-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Five Planning Milestones to Restore the Defence Capability</td>
<td>9-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planning Milestone 1: ‘Arresting the Decline’</td>
<td>9-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary Focus</td>
<td>9-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deliverables</td>
<td>9-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Targets</td>
<td>9-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Value-Proposition</td>
<td>9-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planning Milestone 2: ‘Rebalance the Defence Force’</td>
<td>9-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary Focus</td>
<td>9-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deliverables</td>
<td>9-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Targets</td>
<td>9-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Value-Proposition</td>
<td>9-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planning Milestone 3: ‘Capacitate the Defence Force’</td>
<td>9-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary Focus</td>
<td>9-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deliverables</td>
<td>9-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Targets</td>
<td>9-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Value-Proposition</td>
<td>9-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planning Milestone 4: ‘Responding to Strategic Challenges’</td>
<td>9-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary Focus</td>
<td>9-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deliverables</td>
<td>9-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Targets</td>
<td>9-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Value-Proposition</td>
<td>9-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary Focus</td>
<td>9-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deliverables</td>
<td>9-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Targets</td>
<td>9-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Achieving the Defence Strategic Trajectory</td>
<td>9-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy Options Available to Government</td>
<td>9-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Consequent Military Strategy and Blue-Print Force Design</td>
<td>9-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Restructuring the Defence Organisation</td>
<td>9-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Capability Planning</td>
<td>9-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extended Long-Term Defence Development Plan</td>
<td>9-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Defence Planning Imperative</td>
<td>9-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Balance Between Regulars and Reserves</td>
<td>9-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Defence Budget</td>
<td>9-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td>TITLE</td>
<td>PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>FORCE GENERATION GUIDELINES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Definition of Terms</td>
<td>10-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Broad Force Generation Considerations</td>
<td>10-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strategic Defence Concepts</td>
<td>10-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Complex War-Fighting within Complex Environments</td>
<td>10-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interoperability</td>
<td>10-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rapid Reaction</td>
<td>10-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expeditionary</td>
<td>10-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Concurrent Operations of a 'Campaign Quality'</td>
<td>10-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint, Inter-Agency, Interdepartmental and Multinational (JI²M) Operations</td>
<td>10-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Operating Systems</td>
<td>10-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td>10-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Movement and Manoeuvre</td>
<td>10-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Firepower</td>
<td>10-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>10-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>10-4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sustainment</td>
<td>10-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overarching Defence Capabilities</td>
<td>10-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Diplomacy Capability</td>
<td>10-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Command and Control Capability</td>
<td>10-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence Capability</td>
<td>10-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Standing and Surge Military Capability</td>
<td>10-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expeditionary Capability</td>
<td>10-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Science, Engineering and Technology Capability</td>
<td>10-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General Force Generation Guidelines</td>
<td>10-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General Force Generation Requirements</td>
<td>10-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South African Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army Capability</td>
<td>10-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army Force Design</td>
<td>10-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Army Migration Priorities</td>
<td>10-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South African Air Force</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Air Force Capability</td>
<td>10-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Force 'Force Design'</td>
<td>10-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Force Migration Priorities</td>
<td>10-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South African Navy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Navy Capability</td>
<td>10-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Navy Force Design</td>
<td>10-15</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Navy Migration Priorities</td>
<td>10-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South African Military Health Service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Health Capability</td>
<td>10-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Health Force Design</td>
<td>10-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Health Migration Priorities</td>
<td>10-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South African Special Forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Special Forces Capability</td>
<td>10-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Special Forces 'Force Design'</td>
<td>10-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Special Forces Migration Priorities</td>
<td>10-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information Warfare</td>
<td>10-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Balancing Principles</td>
<td>10-21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE REVIEW 2015
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>FUTURE MILITARY LEADERS</td>
<td>11-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Military Education, Training and Development Imperative</td>
<td>11-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Imperatives</td>
<td>11-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Requirement</td>
<td>11-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guiding Defence Principles</td>
<td>11-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education, Training and Development Principles</td>
<td>11-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effects</td>
<td>11-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Applied Education and Training Concepts</td>
<td>11-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Broad-Liberal Education Concept</td>
<td>11-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional Military Education Concept</td>
<td>11-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Training Concept</td>
<td>11-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foundational Military Education and Training Concept</td>
<td>11-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Functional Military Development Concept</td>
<td>11-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recruitment Concept</td>
<td>11-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leadership Concept</td>
<td>11-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Balancing Concept for Education, Training and Experience</td>
<td>11-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Life-Long Learning Concept</td>
<td>11-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accredited Learning Concept</td>
<td>11-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bottom-Up vs Top-Down Learning Concept</td>
<td>11-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education and Training Partnership Concept</td>
<td>11-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint and Service-unique Education, Training and Development Concept</td>
<td>11-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education, Training and Development Linked to Defence Doctrine</td>
<td>11-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Growing Future Officers</td>
<td>11-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development of the Officer Corps</td>
<td>11-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional Skills Required of the Officer Corps</td>
<td>11-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training, Education and Experience Required of the Officer</td>
<td>11-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Further Education and Training of Officers</td>
<td>11-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officer Career Path</td>
<td>11-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Growing Future WOs and NCOs</td>
<td>11-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development of the WO and NCO Corps</td>
<td>11-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional Skills Required of the WO and NCO Corps</td>
<td>11-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training, Education and Experience Required of the WO and NCO Corps</td>
<td>11-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WO and NCO Further Education and Training</td>
<td>11-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WO and NCO Career Path</td>
<td>11-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Growing Future Defence Civilians</td>
<td>11-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development of Civilians</td>
<td>11-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Education and Training Approach</td>
<td>11-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Defence Education and Training Philosophy</td>
<td>11-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foundational Military Education and Training</td>
<td>11-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional Military Education and Training</td>
<td>11-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Function-Orientated Education and Training</td>
<td>11-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint Education, Training and Development</td>
<td>11-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Future Defence Academy</td>
<td>11-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Establishment of the South African Defence Academy</td>
<td>11-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Programmes of the Defence Academy</td>
<td>11-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Basic Tenets of the Defence Academy</td>
<td>11-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Functional Principles of the Defence Academy</td>
<td>11-14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Academy Organisation</td>
<td>11-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Defence Academy Curriculum</td>
<td>11-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Graduation and Commissioning of Officers</td>
<td>11-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Career-Long Civic Education</td>
<td>11-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>MILITARY DISCIPLINE</td>
<td>12-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Disciplinary System and Related Measures</td>
<td>12-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Requirement for Military Discipline and Related Measures</td>
<td>12-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Discipline</td>
<td>12-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minor Corrective Measures System</td>
<td>12-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Disciplinary System</td>
<td>12-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Courts</td>
<td>12-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commanding Officer’s Disciplinary Hearings</td>
<td>12-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Courts of Senior Military Judges and Military Judges</td>
<td>12-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Courts of Military Appeals</td>
<td>12-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Review by a High Court</td>
<td>12-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civilian Court</td>
<td>12-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>DEFENCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS</td>
<td>13-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Integrated Defence Information System</td>
<td>13-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Requirement</td>
<td>13-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Command and Control</td>
<td>13-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personal Mobile Connectivity of Defence Personnel</td>
<td>13-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Performance Management</td>
<td>13-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organisational Performance</td>
<td>13-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Performance Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
<td>13-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Risk Management</td>
<td>13-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Organisational Structuring Principles</td>
<td>13-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Organisational Structuring</td>
<td>13-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Force Establishment Table</td>
<td>13-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>DEFENCE RESOURCE SYSTEMS</td>
<td>14-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>14-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overarching Defence Service Support Doctrine</td>
<td>14-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Combat Service Support Principles</td>
<td>14-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Support at the National Level</td>
<td>14-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Concepts to Enhance Defence Combat Service Support</td>
<td>14-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strategic Resource Alignment</td>
<td>14-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Key Defence Resource Management Tenets</td>
<td>14-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Principles</td>
<td>14-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Accountability and Delegation Regime</td>
<td>14-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resource Management in the Defence Force</td>
<td>14-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Personnel System</td>
<td>14-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Definition of Term</td>
<td>14-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Requirement</td>
<td>14-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Personnel System</td>
<td>14-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Personnel Budget Threshold</td>
<td>14-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct Defence Personnel Management</td>
<td>14-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Execute Defence Personnel Management</td>
<td>14-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Personnel Information System</td>
<td>14-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td>TITLE</td>
<td>PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquisition of Defence Personnel</td>
<td>14-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Career Management</td>
<td>14-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintenance of Defence Personnel</td>
<td>14-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Personnel Separation</td>
<td>14-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wider Spectrum of Defence ‘Rank and Scale’</td>
<td>14-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comprehensive Health Programme</td>
<td>14-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personnel Priorities</td>
<td>14-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Reserve Component of the ‘One Force’</td>
<td>14-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Requirement</td>
<td>14-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tenets</td>
<td>14-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Programming and Budgeting</td>
<td>14-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Logistics System</td>
<td>14-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Requirement</td>
<td>14-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Logistics System</td>
<td>14-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct Defence Logistics</td>
<td>14-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Execute Defence Logistics</td>
<td>14-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Logistics Doctrine</td>
<td>14-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Logistics Information System</td>
<td>14-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logistics Expertise</td>
<td>14-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Logistics Priorities</td>
<td>14-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Procurement</td>
<td>14-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Finance Management System</td>
<td>14-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Requirement</td>
<td>14-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Finance Management</td>
<td>14-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct Defence Finance Management</td>
<td>14-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Execute Defence Finance Management</td>
<td>14-20</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Finance Management Doctrine</td>
<td>14-20</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Defence Finance Information System</td>
<td>14-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Finance Expertise</td>
<td>14-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Finance Management Priorities</td>
<td>14-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Information and Communication System</td>
<td>14-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Requirement</td>
<td>14-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Information and Communication System Principles</td>
<td>14-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Information and Communication System Objectives</td>
<td>14-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Information Systems Framework and Strategy</td>
<td>14-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct Common Defence Information and Communication Systems</td>
<td>14-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Execute Common Defence Information and Communication Systems</td>
<td>14-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Defence Footprint</td>
<td>14-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Facilities</td>
<td>14-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Defence Land Requirement</td>
<td>14-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Repair and Maintenance of Defence Facilities</td>
<td>14-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Co-use of Defence Facilities</td>
<td>14-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Land Restitution</td>
<td>14-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disposal of Defence Facilities</td>
<td>14-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Environmental Management</td>
<td>14-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental Management Approach</td>
<td>14-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Global Environmental Change</td>
<td>14-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental Contingent Liability</td>
<td>14-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental Cooperative Governance</td>
<td>14-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Graves and Burial Sites</td>
<td>14-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td>TITLE</td>
<td>PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clean-Up and Remediation of Defence Training Areas</td>
<td>14-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Environment for Military Operations</td>
<td>14-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental Security</td>
<td>14-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>DEFENCE INDUSTRY POLICY AND STRATEGY</strong></td>
<td>15-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>15-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Defence Industry Council</td>
<td>15-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy Intent</td>
<td>15-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Background</td>
<td>15-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Requirement for a Defence Industry</td>
<td>15-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Long-Term Relationships</td>
<td>15-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Force/Defence Industry Relationship</td>
<td>15-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Industry Focus Areas</td>
<td>15-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Areas of Competence</td>
<td>15-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Key Technology Domains</td>
<td>15-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Acquisition and Procurement Policies</td>
<td>15-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World-Class Acquisition Policy</td>
<td>15-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revised Procurement Policy</td>
<td>15-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Industrial Participation</td>
<td>15-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Export Support</td>
<td>15-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Science, Engineering and Technology</td>
<td>15-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technology Context</td>
<td>15-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technology Focus</td>
<td>15-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technology Support to Defence</td>
<td>15-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Industry Ownership</td>
<td>15-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South African Defence Company</td>
<td>15-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partly South African-Owned Defence Company</td>
<td>15-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South African Based Defence Company</td>
<td>15-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign-Controlled Defence Companies in South Africa</td>
<td>15-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign Defence Companies</td>
<td>15-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State Controlled or Owned Defence Companies</td>
<td>15-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Denel</td>
<td>15-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armscor</td>
<td>15-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Intellectual Property</td>
<td>15-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technology Spin-Off</td>
<td>15-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Industry Strategy</td>
<td>15-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defence Strategic Trajectory – Five Milestones</td>
<td>15-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phases for the Defence Industry Strategy</td>
<td>15-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phase 1: Secure Existing Capabilities</td>
<td>15-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phase 2: Sustain Existing Capabilities</td>
<td>15-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phase 3: Support the Turn-Around</td>
<td>15-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phase 4: Support Future Development</td>
<td>15-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phase 5: Reposition Sovereign Capabilities</td>
<td>15-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Key Industry Capability Areas</td>
<td>15-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td>TITLE</td>
<td>PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equipment and Systems Support</td>
<td>15-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support to Military Operations</td>
<td>15-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Critical Munitions and Related Matters</td>
<td>15-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Rate-of-Use Spares and Critical Stores</td>
<td>15-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>System Integration</td>
<td>15-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equipment Modernisation and Upgrade</td>
<td>15-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Critical Equipment and Systems</td>
<td>15-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Optimised Equipment and Systems</td>
<td>15-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unmanned Systems</td>
<td>15-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Large-Scale Acquisition of Civilian-Standard Equipment</td>
<td>15-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chemical, Biological and Radiological Defence</td>
<td>15-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General Commodities</td>
<td>15-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>15-22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ANNEXURES**

**ANNEXURE A**  Defence Review Committee Terms of Reference  A-1

**ANNEXURE B**  Defence Review Consultation Programme & Public Participation Process  B-1

**ANNEXURE C**  Public Submissions made on the Defence Review  C-1

**ANNEXURE D**  Determining the Level of Defence Ambition  D-1
**LIST OF FIGURES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overview-1</td>
<td>Defence Goals and Tasks</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview-2</td>
<td>Strategic Trajectory Aligned to Three MTSF Cycles</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview-3</td>
<td>Key Targets for the Defence Strategic Trajectory</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intro-1</td>
<td>Defence Mandate Unpacked</td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intro-2</td>
<td>Size of Africa Relative to States in other Continents</td>
<td>0-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intro-3</td>
<td>Colonisation of Africa as at 1930</td>
<td>0-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intro-4</td>
<td>Defence Policy within the Hierarchy of National Policy</td>
<td>0-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1</td>
<td>Inter-State Conflict</td>
<td>2-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-2</td>
<td>Intra-State Conflict</td>
<td>2-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>Africa’s Major Sea Routes</td>
<td>2-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4</td>
<td>Distribution of African Natural Resources</td>
<td>2-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-5</td>
<td>Agrarian Production in Africa</td>
<td>2-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-6</td>
<td>Key Water Basins in Africa</td>
<td>2-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-7</td>
<td>National Borders and Ethnic Boundaries</td>
<td>2-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-8</td>
<td>Continental ‘Hotspots’</td>
<td>2-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-9</td>
<td>Belts of Minerals &amp; Scarce Resources in Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>2-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-10</td>
<td>Incidence of Piracy</td>
<td>2-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-11</td>
<td>South Africa’s Major Trade Routes</td>
<td>2-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-12</td>
<td>Climate Change Vulnerability in Africa</td>
<td>2-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-13</td>
<td>Human Development Index 2012</td>
<td>2-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-14</td>
<td>Impact of Climate Change on Agrarian Activities</td>
<td>2-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-15</td>
<td>Major Disease Incidence in Africa – January to August 2014</td>
<td>2-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-16</td>
<td>Migration Flows in Africa</td>
<td>2-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-17</td>
<td>Cross-border crime, service delivery and illegal fishing hotspots</td>
<td>2-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-18</td>
<td>The Spectrum of Military Operations</td>
<td>2-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-19</td>
<td>World Military Expenditure Trends: 1988 - 2011</td>
<td>2-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-20</td>
<td>Comparative Defence Spending on Selected Countries (2009)</td>
<td>2-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-21</td>
<td>Military Expenditure in Africa 1988 - 2009</td>
<td>2-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-22</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa Regional Defence Expenditure as Percentage of GDP</td>
<td>2-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-23</td>
<td>African Defence Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP</td>
<td>2-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-24</td>
<td>Defence Expenditure in East and Southern Africa (1999 to 2008)</td>
<td>2-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-1</td>
<td>Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity</td>
<td>3-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-2</td>
<td>The Ability to Trade</td>
<td>3-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-3</td>
<td>Strategic Resources</td>
<td>3-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>Peace and Stability on the Continent</td>
<td>3-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>The Defence Mission</td>
<td>3-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-6</td>
<td>Defence Goals and Tasks</td>
<td>3-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-1</td>
<td>Levels of Decision-Making</td>
<td>4-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-1</td>
<td>Task 1 - Deter and Prevent Conflict</td>
<td>5-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIGURE</td>
<td>TITLE</td>
<td>PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-2</td>
<td>Task 2 - Protect National Interests</td>
<td>5-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-3</td>
<td>Task 3 - Defend South Africa</td>
<td>5-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-4</td>
<td>Concepts for Defending South Africa</td>
<td>5-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-1</td>
<td>Task 4 – Border Safeguarding</td>
<td>6-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-2</td>
<td>South Africa’s Borders</td>
<td>6-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-3</td>
<td>South Africa’s Safeguarding Domains</td>
<td>6-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-4</td>
<td>South Africa’s Exclusive Economic Zone and Extended Continental Shelf Claim</td>
<td>6-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-5</td>
<td>Task 6 - Support to the South African Police Service</td>
<td>6-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-6</td>
<td>Task 7 - Ensure Information Security</td>
<td>6-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-7</td>
<td>National Information Infrastructure</td>
<td>6-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-8</td>
<td>Defence Information Infrastructure</td>
<td>6-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-1</td>
<td>Task 8 - Promote Strategic Influence</td>
<td>7-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-2</td>
<td>South Africa’s current SADC Standby Force Pledge</td>
<td>7-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-3</td>
<td>Task 9 - Contribute to Peace and Stability</td>
<td>7-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-1</td>
<td>Task 10 - Execute Relevant Treaty Obligations</td>
<td>8-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-2</td>
<td>South Africa’s Hydrographic and Nautical Charting Area of Responsibility</td>
<td>8-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-3</td>
<td>South Africa’s Search and Rescue Areas of Responsibility</td>
<td>8-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-4</td>
<td>Task 11 - Ordered Presidential Tasks</td>
<td>8-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-5</td>
<td>Task 12 - Assist Civil Authority as Ordered by Government</td>
<td>8-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-6</td>
<td>Task 13 - Contribute to the Developmental Agenda</td>
<td>8-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-1</td>
<td>Defence Budget as a Percentage of GDP</td>
<td>9-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-2</td>
<td>Recent Defence Allocations</td>
<td>9-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-3</td>
<td>Relative Force-Levels over Time</td>
<td>9-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-4</td>
<td>Lifecycle Costs of Defence Systems</td>
<td>9-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-5</td>
<td>Personnel, Operating and Capital Expenditure in Recent Years</td>
<td>9-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-6</td>
<td>Personnel, Operating and Capital as Portions of the Defence Budget</td>
<td>9-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-7</td>
<td>Defence Personnel over time</td>
<td>9-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-8</td>
<td>Defence Goals and Tasks</td>
<td>9-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-9</td>
<td>Core Defence Capabilities</td>
<td>9-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-10</td>
<td>Special Forces Operations Capability</td>
<td>9-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-11</td>
<td>Army Operations Capability</td>
<td>9-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-12</td>
<td>Naval Operations Capability</td>
<td>9-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-13</td>
<td>Air Operations Capability</td>
<td>9-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-14</td>
<td>Military Health Operations Capability</td>
<td>9-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-15</td>
<td>The Defence Strategic Trajectory</td>
<td>9-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-16</td>
<td>Targets for Milestone 1</td>
<td>9-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-17</td>
<td>Defence Capability for Milestone 1</td>
<td>9-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-18</td>
<td>Targets for Milestone 2</td>
<td>9-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-19</td>
<td>Defence Capability for Milestone 2</td>
<td>9-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-20</td>
<td>Targets for Milestone 3</td>
<td>9-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-21</td>
<td>Defence Capability for Milestone 3</td>
<td>9-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-22</td>
<td>Targets for Milestone 4</td>
<td>9-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-23</td>
<td>Defence Capability for Milestone 4</td>
<td>9-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-24</td>
<td>Defence Capability for Milestone 5</td>
<td>9-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-25</td>
<td>Targets for Milestone 5</td>
<td>9-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIGURE</td>
<td>TITLE</td>
<td>PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-26</td>
<td>Policy Options broadly aligned to Three MTSF Cycles</td>
<td>9-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-27</td>
<td>The Force Design Process</td>
<td>9-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-28</td>
<td>Balancing the Funding Trajectory</td>
<td>9-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-1</td>
<td>SA Army Land Command</td>
<td>10-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-2</td>
<td>SA Air Force Air Command</td>
<td>10-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-3</td>
<td>SA Navy Fleet Command</td>
<td>10-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-4</td>
<td>SAMHS Medical Command</td>
<td>10-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-5</td>
<td>Special Forces Capabilities</td>
<td>10-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-6</td>
<td>Information Warfare Capabilities</td>
<td>10-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-1</td>
<td>Attributes of a Broad-Liberal Education</td>
<td>11-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-2</td>
<td>Balancing Education, Training and Experience</td>
<td>11-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-3</td>
<td>Defence Doctrine - the interplay between Operations, Research and Training</td>
<td>11-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-4</td>
<td>Broad Officer Career Development Path</td>
<td>11-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-5</td>
<td>Broad WO and NCO Career Development Path</td>
<td>11-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-6</td>
<td>Education and Training Pathways</td>
<td>11-11</td>
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<td>Defence Academy Organisation</td>
<td>11-14</td>
</tr>
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<td>Broad Defence Academy Programme</td>
<td>11-16</td>
</tr>
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<td>Next Generation Enterprise Architecture</td>
<td>13-2</td>
</tr>
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<td>Overarching National Planning, Budgeting and Reporting Cycle</td>
<td>13-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-3</td>
<td>Integrated Performance Management Cycle</td>
<td>13-4</td>
</tr>
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<td>Monitoring and Evaluation Process</td>
<td>13-5</td>
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<td>Support Functions Cross Impacted against Core Capabilities</td>
<td>14-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-2</td>
<td>Direct-Orchestrate and Control Support</td>
<td>14-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-3</td>
<td>Defence Personnel Management Value Chain</td>
<td>14-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-4</td>
<td>Strategic Focus Areas of Defence Information and Communication</td>
<td>14-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-5</td>
<td>Military Environmental Management Model</td>
<td>14-29</td>
</tr>
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<td>15-1</td>
<td>Key Targets across the Defence Strategic Trajectory</td>
<td>15-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-1</td>
<td>Defence Review Command, Staff and Communication Structure</td>
<td>A-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-1</td>
<td>Defence Intent Framework: Inter-State Dimension</td>
<td>D-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-3</td>
<td>Risk Assessment: Illustration</td>
<td>D-6</td>
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# LIST OF ACRONYMS

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<td>Weapon of Mass Destruction</td>
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## GLOSSARY OF TERMS

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<td>Accountability</td>
<td>The liability and obligation to answer to a superior for the proper use of delegated responsibility, authority and resources.</td>
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<td>Acquisition</td>
<td>The process by which defence matériel is obtained, such process involving (inter alia): requirements planning, operational research, technology acquisition, design and development, operational qualification, quality assurance, industrialisation, production, commissioning, maintenance and disposal.</td>
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<td>Amphibious</td>
<td>Military operations characterised by attacks launched from the sea by naval and landing forces against hostile shores. Landing of expeditionary forces on a shore or at a port already secured by friendly forces is not usually included in the concept.</td>
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<td>Asymmetrical warfare</td>
<td>Violent conflict between a formal military and an informal, poorly-equipped, but resilient opponent. Respective tactics differ. Conflict may (inter alia) assume the nature of ‘unconventional warfare’, which extends to irregular force operations such as ‘guerrilla warfare’, ‘insurgency’ and ‘acts of terror’, and antithesis regular force operations such as ‘counter-insurgency’ and ‘counter-terrorism’.</td>
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<td>Battalion</td>
<td>Tactical army formation. In South African infantry doctrine normally comprises three rifle companies and a support company. In United Nations doctrine, the same comprises four rifle companies and no support company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion Group</td>
<td>See Combat Group hereunder.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue-Water Navy</td>
<td>Maritime force capable of sustained operation across the deep waters of open oceans. A blue-water navy allows a country to project power far from the home country and usually includes one or more aircraft carriers. It implies force protection from sub-surface, surface and airborne threats and a sustainable logistic reach, allowing a persistent presence at range. A hallmark of a true blue-water navy is the ability to replenish at sea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridging Training</td>
<td>Training to address previous shortcomings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade</td>
<td>(1) Formation of fighting units with supporting arms and services, normally commanded by a brigadier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Unit normally smaller than a division, to which are attached groups, battalions and smaller units to meet anticipated requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broad-Liberal Education</td>
<td>A broad education that empowers individuals with broad knowledge and transferable skills, and cultivates a strong sense of values, ethics, and civic responsibility. It is more a way of studying than a specific course or field of study. In this instance the curriculum is based on a programme of core military sciences with detailed specialisation in at least one military academic discipline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign</td>
<td>A controlled series of simultaneous or sequential operations designed to achieve an operational commander’s objective, normally within a given time or space.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Quality</td>
<td>The ability to win decisive combat operations and to sustain those operations for as long as necessary while quickly adapting to unpredictable changes both in the context and the character of the conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Oversight</td>
<td>Adherence of the Defence Force to elected authority as may be primarily expressed through the Commander-in-Chief, the Executive and the Legislature.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Glossary of Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TERM</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collaborative Protection</td>
<td>In the external context, means the protection of national interests in collaboration with the host state where the interest may lie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Group</td>
<td>A combat group is a composite tactical force:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Which is permanently structured, or which may be temporarily formed for a particular purpose.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Of which the largest element is not bigger than a unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Normally formed around the HQ of a unit so as to have embedded command and control, intelligence and sustainment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Remaining under command of the unit commander around which it is formed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Which is reinforced by combat support and combat service support elements as required for enhanced firepower, manoeuvre and protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• That may have a joint nature, in that it may be reinforced by attached elements from the combat services, supporting arms and any other specialist military capability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The term ‘combat group’ conceptually includes: 1) a ‘battalion group’ normally formed around an infantry battalion; 2) a composite combat force formed around an armour regiment; 3) any other composite combat force formed around a unit-sized organisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Helicopter</td>
<td>An armed helicopter equipped with suitable electronic, self-protection systems and precision-guided munitions, including optical and/or electronic systems to locate and identify treats and targets while outside the threat-envelope in order to conduct both offensive and defensive operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command</td>
<td>The legal and constitutional authority vested in an individual of the military, for the direction, coordination and control of military forces, and encompasses the authority, responsibility and duty to act (chain of command). It includes:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The authority to employ forces operationally at a specific level, but does not in itself include administrative responsibility for the forces concerned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The lawful authority every officer has over men &amp; women in his/her charge by virtue of his/her rank and appointment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Service Support</td>
<td>Elements, such as logistic support, technical services and military health support, provide service support to combat forces as part of a theatre, command, or task force formed for combat operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Support</td>
<td>Elements, such as artillery, air defence artillery, signals and military engineers, provide fire-support and other support to the combat forces as part of a theatre, command, or task force formed for combat operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compound Warfare</td>
<td>Occurs where states and non-state actors choose to exploit all modes of war simultaneously and use a mix of advanced conventional weapons, irregular tactics, mercenarism, piracy, acts of terror, disruptive criminality, etc, to destabilise an existing order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency Stock Level</td>
<td>Ensuring the availability of resources (equipment and personnel) of appropriate quality and quantity as per reserve stock policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserves</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>The process through which the commander, assisted by assigned military staff, organises, regulates and coordinates the activities of the force (Staff Line) and includes:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Administrative Control, which is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organisations in respect to administration and support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Functional Control, which is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinates or other organisations in respect to functional support to the commander.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERM</td>
<td>DESCRIPTION</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conventional Warfare</td>
<td>Armed military conflict in which nuclear weapons are not employed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blended Learning</td>
<td>A mix of methodologies and delivery methods to bring about learning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Establishment</td>
<td>Refers to the entire defence organisation consisting of: the Ministry of Defence and Military Veterans; the Defence Secretariat; the Defence Force; any Auxiliary Service and Defence Public Entities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Intellectual Property</td>
<td>Any intellectual property that is created exclusively or partially with defence funds, and may be found in, or take the form of, books, manuscripts, reports and notes, computer software, inventions, drawings and designs, data items, data packs, specifications, models, photographs, trademarks and other graphical images.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Matériel</td>
<td>Any material, equipment, facility or service used principally for military purposes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Personnel</td>
<td>Inclusive of the Regular Component, the Reserve Component, the Civilian Component of the Defence Force, the Defence Secretariat and the Ministry of Defence and Military Veterans, as well as any member of an Auxiliary Service that may be established in terms of Section 16 of the Defence Act, 2002 (Act 42 of 2002).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberate Protection</td>
<td>In the external context, means the unilateral protection of an interest in a host state where the host state is unable or unwilling to collaboratively protect the specific interest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>Major and tactical unit formation combining in itself the necessary arms and services required for sustained combat larger than a regiment/brigade and smaller than an army corps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry Lease System</td>
<td>Under a dry lease system, the UN is responsible for equipment maintenance (either through a commercial contract, by UN personnel, or from another contingent), and the supply of spare parts (contract or Letter of Agreement) while the Troop Contributing Country is responsible to deploy with serviceable equipment [up to 10% over the levels agreed upon in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to cover shortfalls].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual-Use Items</td>
<td>Capabilities relating to technology, expertise, service, material, equipment and facilities which can contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but which can also be used for other purposes, including conventional military, commercial or educational use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e-Learning</td>
<td>Learning conferred or delivered by electronic means and methodologies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expeditionary Force</td>
<td>Able to deploy and sustain operations over protracted distances and time. Normally with organic logistic support. Supported with strategic inter-theatre and intra-theatre lift.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Generation Rule</td>
<td>The requirement for the sustained deployment of a defence capability, specifically the ratio between rest, training and deployment of the defence capability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1:2 - For every unit deployed, there are two units in a state of rest and preparation for further deployment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1:3 - For every unit deployed, there are three units in a state of rest and preparation for further deployment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1:4 - For every unit deployed, there are four units in a state of rest and preparation for further deployment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force in Being</td>
<td>The ever-changing day-to-day force, comprising as it may at a given time of Regulars, Reserves, Civilians and Auxiliaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Staff System</td>
<td>An organisational concept within a military headquarters that denotes staff functionality, as opposed to command responsibility, across key functional disciplines.</td>
</tr>
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## GLOSSARY OF TERMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TERM</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Security</td>
<td>The broadened conceptualisation of security that encompasses political, social, economic and environmental dimensions of threats and sources of insecurity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybrid Warfare</td>
<td>Characterised by the operational fusion of conventional and irregular capabilities at the strategic, operational and tactical levels in wars where one, or both sides, blends and fuses the full range of methods and modes of conflict into the same battle space.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdiction Operations</td>
<td>Planned operations aimed at destroying or neutralising an enemy's military potential and disrupting the movement of its forces into, out of and within the battle area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular Forces</td>
<td>Irregular forces are military forces not part of a regular military organisation or not formed as a regular military organisation. Such irregular forces may also be described using terms such as 'group' or 'force' or be known as a 'guerrilla', 'militia', 'revolutionary' or 'insurgent'. Irregular forces often lack the higher-level organisation, training and equipment characteristic of a regular military organisation. Irregular forces may or may not further use irregular tactics, focusing on small group tactics and conflict and avoiding large-scale combat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinetic</td>
<td>Measures using force or technology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large-Scale Deployment</td>
<td>Military deployment normally at the level of a battalion group or which could be greater than a battalion group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead Nation/Framework</td>
<td>That nation with the will and capability, competence, and influence to provide the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning, mounting, and execution of a coalition military operation. Within the overarching organisational framework provided by the Lead Nation, other nations participating in the coalition may be designated as Functional Lead Agent(s) to provide and/or coordinate specific critical sub-functions of the operation and its execution, based on national capability. These constructs may apply at the strategic, operational, and/or tactical levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2 Hospital</td>
<td>A UN term – one of four levels of facility in a UN peacekeeping operation: it aims to provide second-line health care, emergency resuscitation and stabilisation, life-saving surgical interventions, basic dental care and casualty evacuation to the next medical level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 3 Hospital</td>
<td>A UN term – a specialist hospital in the four levels of facility in a UN peacekeeping operation. It aims to provide second-line health care, emergency resuscitation and stabilisation, life-saving surgical interventions, basic dental care and casualty evacuation to the next medical level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 4 Hospital</td>
<td>A UN term – provides advanced and multi-specialty hospital facility under one roof; comprising of Medical Centres, Departments and Units that provide emergency medical services, outpatient specialist services, in-patient ward facility including intensive care unit, and diagnostic and treatment facilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Forces</td>
<td>Denotes units lacking heavy weapons and armour or with a reduced vehicle footprint. Light infantry units lack the lethality, tactical mobility and survivability of heavy units, but possess greater operational mobility and the ability to execute missions under restrictive terrain and weather that may otherwise impair a heavy unit's mobility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>The set of activities by appointed personnel to acquire, direct, integrate or allocate resources to accomplish goals or tasks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Domain Awareness</td>
<td>The effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of South Africa or its forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministerial Control</td>
<td>Authority exercised in accordance with Section 201(1) and Section 202(2) of the Constitution, 1996.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERM</td>
<td>DESCRIPTION</td>
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</table>
| **Mission Command** | (1) Commanders, at whichever level, have the absolute responsibility to act or, in certain circumstances, to decide not to act, within the framework of a superior commander’s intent.  
(2) Decentralised command, freedom and speed of action and initiative are promoted yet tempered, and necessarily responsive to superior direction.  
(3) Subordinates understand the intent of a higher commander and their own contribution to the plan.  
(4) Missions are carried out with the maximum freedom of action and appropriate resources.  
(5) Delegation of authority and agility in the execution of a mission with an appropriate balance between direction and delegation. |
| **Non-Kinetic** | Measures not using force, such as information warfare. |
| **Operational Control** | Authority given to a commander to control forces which are allocated to him/her so that he/she is able to execute specific tasks which are limited in time and place, and to allocate or retain operational control over deployed units. |
| **Operational Level** | The level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations. |
| **Other Ranks** | Privates, Non-Commissioned Officers and Warrant Officers and their naval equivalents. |
| **Procurement** | The action or process of acquiring or obtaining matériel, property, or services at the operational level, for example, purchasing, contracting, and negotiating directly with the source of supply. |
| **Safeguard** | Protecting South Africa’s people, territory, islands, territorial waters, exclusive economic zone, extended continental shelf, vital interests, resources and critical infrastructure. |
| **Special Forces** | Military personnel with cross training in basic and specialised military skills, organised into small multi-purpose detachments to conduct guerrilla warfare, counter-insurgency and unconventional warfare operations. |
| **Special Operation** | Uncommon, exceptional operation with a limited and specific tactical or strategic objective or goal. |
| **Special Operations Force** | Composite force composed for a secondary or supporting operation which may be adjunct to various other operations and for which no one arm of service is assigned normal primary responsibility. |
| **Spectrum of Conflict** | Range of military operations that a military force has to contend with, extending from supporting Civil Authority, to Military Operations Other Than War, to Major Combat Operations. |
| **Squadron** | (1) An organisation consisting of two or more divisions of ships, or two or more divisions (Navy), or flights of aircraft. It is normally, but not necessarily, composed of ships or aircraft of the same type.  
(2) The basic administrative aviation unit of an army, navy, marine corps and air force. |
| **Standing and Surge Military Capability** | The standing military force contains the necessary capabilities and capacity to execute standing defence commitments and provides the platform for a surge in force levels for contingent defence commitments as may be required. The standing force will comprise both Regulars and Reserves at differing readiness levels. The Reserves are the predominant provider of an affordable surge capacity. The Reserves are maintained at a sufficiently large scale to provide capacity on a day-to-day level and for force level surges when required. |
| **Stand-off Weapons** | Weapons which may be launched at a distance sufficient to allow attacking personnel to evade defensive fire from the target area. |
## Glossary of Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Level</td>
<td>Higher level management concerned with the broad, open and more global state of affairs and the implications thereof, usually on a long-term basis, for the effective functioning and the attainment of over-all objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>The management of defence capabilities throughout their total life cycle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symmetric Warfare</td>
<td>Conflict between two powers that have similar military capabilities and resources and rely on tactics that are similar overall, differing only in details and execution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Level</td>
<td>The level at which battles and engagements are planned and executed in order to achieve operational level objectives. It is at this level that military forces are deployed directly for combat by the individual Component Commanders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer Payment</td>
<td>Any transfer payment made in terms of Section 38(1)(a)(i) of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (as amended) and Chapter 8.4 of the Treasury Regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit-Level</td>
<td>The lowest level of self-accounting military organisation, normally a Battalion or equivalent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virement</td>
<td>The transfer of money from one account to another or from one section of a budget to another, and may at times include the transfer of a surplus from one account to cover a deficit in another.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wet Lease System</td>
<td>Under a wet lease system, the UN provides warehouse and maintenance facilities, water, sewage and electric power while the Troop Contributing Country provides forces with serviceable equipment [up to 10% over levels agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to cover shortfalls], maintains its own equipment, including repair, replacement, labour, resupply, and shipping, and maintains a link to its national support channels.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

THE DEFENCE MANDATE

1. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa mandates the Defence Force, as the only lawful military force in the Republic, for the protection and defence of the Republic, its sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interests and people, in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force.

2. Schedule 6, Section 24 of the 1996 Constitution provides that the following “Functions of the National Defence Force”, as originally established in Section 227 of the 1993 Interim Constitution, “continue in force as if the previous Constitution had not been repealed”:
   a. For service in the defence of the Republic, for the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
   b. For service in compliance with the international obligations of the Republic with regard to international bodies and other states.
   c. For service in the preservation of life, health or property.
   d. For service in the provision or maintenance of essential services.
   e. For service in the upholding of law and order in the Republic in cooperation with the South African Police Service under circumstances set out in a law where the said Police Service is unable to maintain law and order on its own.
   f. For service in support of any department of state for the purpose of socio-economic upliftment.

3. Furthermore, the Defence Act, 2002 [Sec 18(1)(d)] provides that Defence Force may be employed to effect national border control.

4. The Defence Mandate logic is unpacked as per Figure Intro-1 below.

5. In the Defence Budget Speech on the 4th of May 2010, the following direction was given for a defence policy framework:

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1 Constitution, 1996, Chapter 11, Article 200(2), page 113.
INTRODUCTION

“Major changes, both dramatic and evolutionary, have taken place in the defence environment over the past 15 years. The policy review and strategy would of necessity take this into consideration and will be informed by a clear-eyed assessment of what we want our foreign policy to achieve, the potential threats facing us, and socio-economic interests in what is a very uncertain era of growing competition among new major powers. The new environment requires new thinking and new approaches. To this end, we remain committed to creating a dependable, agile and flexible Human Capital base in the defence force.

We had a Defence Workshop from 19 to 21 March 2010 to review the work done in this respect and are of the view that we need to give this added impetus. It will enable long-term planning in terms of force levels, force structure and equipment needs.

For the SANDF and in particular the SA Army to remain successful, it will have to take into account the complexities of African politics. The size of the continent, its geographic and climate complexity, as well as the lack of transport infrastructure, problems engendered by economic under-development and the diverse military challenges it may encounter, will necessitate the SANDF to be well and appropriately equipped and trained for both its external and internal roles as prescribed by the Constitution.”

6. In response to the above requirement, work continued towards the development of a new policy and strategy for Defence. In the 13 April 2011 Defence Budget Speech it was stated:

“We promised to deal with a number of issues of policy review and we have done that. The long overdue Defence Review is here. We have a (departmental discussion document) draft that we would like to present to the Parliamentary Committees at their earliest opportunity. Thereafter we would like to embark on a public consultative process before we submit the final Defence Review to Parliament.”

7. Subsequently, the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans (hereafter referred to as ‘the Minister’) constituted a Defence Review Committee whose mandate it was to both prepare a consultative document and engage in a comprehensive public consultation process with key stakeholders, interested parties and civil society. The Defence Review Committee met for the first time at the Castle of Good Hope on 14 July 2011, when the Minister provided the Committee with its Mandate and Terms of Reference (Annexure A). The Minister stated that the Defence Review is required to:

a. Validate and confirm the defence mandate as prescribed in the Constitution and other statutes.

b. Provide a defence policy that is supportive of government’s strategic intent.

c. Describe the complete spectrum of defence responsibility.

d. Indicate the strategic defence concept, broad capability requirements and high-level defence doctrine.

e. Posit a level of defence effort that should be funded by government and pursued by the Defence Organisation.

f. Provide policy guidance for the development of the blueprint design and structure of the Defence Organisation.

g. Provide a high-level first order discussion on the funding principles for Defence.

8. The Defence Review Committee thus developed the draft Defence Review as an accurate reflection of the results of a comprehensive diagnostic analysis and a transparent consultation process.

WHY A NEW DEFENCE REVIEW?

9. The 1996 White Paper on Defence and the 1998 Defence Review were seminal documents negotiated with the wider South African public, including three consultative conferences under the auspices of Parliament. The focus was on the political transition from apartheid to a democratic South Africa, and the concomitant integration of diverse statutory and non-statutory armed forces into a single Defence Force. Subsequent emergent imperatives made it necessary to review the conclusions of the 1996 White Paper on Defence and the 1998 Defence Review, through a new Defence Review process.

GROWING REGIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

10. Nearly fifteen years later, there are inevitably new challenges and new opportunities. South Africa’s political and economic integration into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU) has led to greater involvement on the continent. This includes vibrant engagement through a new regional and continental security architecture: the AU Peace and Security Council; the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security; and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact.

11. South Africa’s strategic environment remains fluid and challenging, regionally and on the continent as a whole. Increasingly, there are non-traditional security threats, non-state actors and non-conventional manifestations of insecurity and instability. There is a further growing requirement for international intervention in conflict areas.

12. The United Nations (UN) has become more assertive in African peacekeeping. At the same time, regional and sub-regional organisations are expected to take more responsibility
14. South Africa has committed forces to peace missions across the continent, commencing with a peace support operation in which over 1 000 troops were deployed to help stabilise the conflict in Burundi. This commitment increased to the extent that South Africa at one stage became the 10th largest troop contributor to UN peace missions – a far cry from the deployment of one battalion at any time that was envisaged in 1998.

15. Figure Intro-2, reflecting the size of the African continent in relation to other states, illustrates the physical magnitude of regional and sub-regional responsibilities.

16. Whereas Figure Intro-2 demonstrates complexity due to the relative size of Africa when compared to other countries, Figure Intro-3 illustrates the fragmentation that arose from the former colonisation of Africa. Consequent incipient instability was created by colonial boundary commissions and the resultant fragmentation of families, communities, clans, tribes and nations.

GROWING DOMESTIC RESPONSIBILITY

17. The internal role of the Defence Force has also progressively changed since 1998. Cabinet initially withdrew the Defence Force from supporting the SA Police Service in border safeguarding and routine safety and security operations. Consequently, the Army Territorial Reserve Units (Commandos) were progressively phased out, to be disbanded or converted to other roles. Light infantry units were withdrawn from the borders and converted into motorised infantry.

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Figure Intro-2: Size of Africa Relative to a Selection of States in other Continents

2 Open source diagram from Creative Commons. No rights reserved.
18. In 2010 Cabinet ordered the return of the Defence Force to border duties, with primary responsibility for safeguarding land, air and maritime borders. This has significant implications, due to the extent of these borders:

a. South Africa’s land area of 1,219,090 km² has 4,471 km of land borders. Effective protection of these borders requires sustained deployment of significant numbers of army units, light aircraft and helicopters.

b. South Africa’s land area has an air border of 7,660 km. Effective protection of this border requires sustained electronic surveillance, with air and land reaction forces always available to counter illegal intrusion.

c. South Africa’s coastline is 3,924 km at the high water line, with an economic exclusive zone of 1,553,000 km² (of which Marion Island and Prince Edward Island comprise 474,400 km²). Sustained air and maritime patrols are needed to protect this coastline and the economic zone.

19. Domestically, the priorities of Government are the reduction of poverty and the creation of conditions for economic growth and social development. From the 1990s, when the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was launched, through to current priorities identified in the Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF), Government policy has emphasised the role of the State in meeting development needs. Other examples include the Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa (ASGISA) and Vision 2030. Consequently, the role of the Defence Force in a developmental state needs to be expressed in policy alongside the traditional defence functions. This should not distract the Defence Force from its mandated functions, but policy should express how the execution of these functions and other initiatives can also contribute to the development of our people.

20. It can be concluded that:

a. The global shift in focus regarding threats and sources of insecurity has necessitated a review of defence and security policies worldwide. South Africa cannot escape this and must clearly contextualise the defence contribution to national security, with particular emphasis on achieving national goals and defending vital interests.

b. Regional and continental socio-economic integration is the foundation for Africa’s socio-economic development, and essential for South Africa’s own prosperity. South Africa’s national security strategy, foreign policy and defence policy cannot be viewed in isolation from one another. South Africa’s domestic security is further inextricably linked to that of regional security, and vice versa. The
struggle for a better life in South Africa is intertwined with the pursuit of ‘a better Africa in a better world’. 

d. Africa is at the centre of South Africa’s foreign policy. South Africa must therefore continue to support regional and continental processes to respond to and resolve crises, strengthen regional integration, significantly increase intra-African trade and champion sustainable development and opportunities in Africa. Peace, stability and security are essential preconditions for development. South Africa must consequently continue to play a leading role in conflict prevention, peace-enforcement, peacekeeping, peace-building, and post-conflict reconstruction.

e. South Africa’s growing peacekeeping commitment on the African continent has compelled the need to re-examine and reprioritise defence roles and functions accordingly in pursuit of the “African Agenda”.

f. The significant responsibility to properly safeguard South Africa’s vast land, air and sea borders and combat maritime crime and piracy requires a fresh look at the methods of doing so and the defence capabilities required.

g. Defence will be called upon, both through its collateral capabilities and also through dedicated initia-

21. The above requires a thorough assessment of what part the Defence Force is expected to play in maintaining national and regional security, and in supporting the intended regional and continental role of South Africa as a country. This in turn requires an assessment of what defence capabilities are required. It is clear that the current defence capabilities are not adequate. The assumptions against which the 1998 Defence Review Force Design was constructed quickly became invalid. In any case, the selected force design was never attained and remained out of reach within a dwindling defence budget.

WHAT IS THE DEFENCE REVIEW?

22. Chuter⁴ indicates that “national security policy is the process of maintaining, coordinating and employing the assets of the security sector so that they contribute optimally to the nation’s strategic goals”. Chuter concomitantly indicates that “defence policy is the process of maintaining, coordinating and employing the assets of the defence sector so that they contribute optimally to the nation’s security policy goals”. Chuter identifies the in-

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⁴ Presentation by Dr David Chuter, an independent security analyst, on 24 November 2011 at the Minister’s inaugural “Defence Review Public Engagement Seminar”.

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Figure Intro-4: Defence Policy within the Hierarchy of National Policy
separable linkage between national security policy, foreign policy and defence policy by stating that: “Defence Forces exist primarily to underpin the domestic and foreign policies of a state” and positions defence policy as: “a national-level policy which fits into a policy hierarchy, converting government security policy objectives into orientations and tasks for defence, projecting a policy with a coherent set of aims and objectives and supported by the appropriate human and matériel resources to put them into practice“. This is illustrated diagrammatically in Figure Intro-4.

23. Defence policy is thus understood as that body of public policy that a government pronounces as its guidelines for the defence objectives and functions of its armed forces. To this end, defence policy defines the defence or military scope of national security, the strategic posture, defence capabilities, defence alliances, and security institutions or mechanisms (both national and international) that govern the utilisation of the Defence Force. The national defence policy also clearly identifies the possible threats to a country’s national security and its society, economy, territory and environment, and provides options to government on how the Defence Force should deal with such threats.

“As far as the Defence Review is concerned, we note that defence policy has a broad impact on society, and it is an important consumer of taxpayer’s money. Future defence policy will therefore have an impact on a broad range of interests. It will have an impact on our region, amongst others. Besides the direct issues, such as the purposes to which defence can be turned: peacekeeping, maritime protection, antipiracy, disaster relief, defence against foreign aggression, and the balance of all of these, it will additionally affect areas such as employment, industrial development, etc. It is therefore vitally important that we make those important values, needs and interests known in the formulation of this review”.

Dr Gavin Bradshaw – Department of Political and Development Studies, NMMU

24. In essence, national defence policy defines the strategic intent of government regarding Defence. Therefore, a country’s defence policy, given these characteristic features, must be subjected to periodic review and update so as to reflect factors that have influenced a change in Government’s guidelines for the defence function.

25. The Defence Review is not a prediction of the future. The Defence Review recognises that the future remains uncertain and unpredictable and thus defence capabilities must be sufficiently robust to respond to a number of plausible deviations from the expected defence trajectory. Faced with a persistently troubled peace and an uncertain future, an analysis of possible contingencies can only be based on an assessment of the key characteristics and trends of the security environment and the trajectories along which the security environment could develop. There is, however, no guarantee that the future will develop along that trajectory, and thus defence planning should be robust enough to allow for some deviation from the baseline, but cannot be completely unconstrained. The Defence Review posits the defence ways and means to deliver on national security priorities. It indicates where effort must be directed and where resources must be focused. It expresses itself on what further policies and strategies are required. It sets a clear target for the defence capabilities that are to be established over the next 30 years and charts a course for getting there. The Defence Review, as a long-term and extended long-term policy document, seeks to:

a. **Firstly**, set a long-term policy and strategy agenda for Defence that will set the stage for the next 30 years of defence effort. This does not mean that the Defence Review will not be reviewed and augmented in the next decade, but that it provides a stable base against which long-term plans can be set and budgets aligned with its intent.

b. **Secondly**, be comprehensive and detailed by engaging defence matters at a strategic level without digressing into the operational and tactical level of debate.

c. **Thirdly**, pronounce sufficiently on the continuum of policy, strategy, force design and structure needed to set a stable long-term defence planning agenda.

d. **Fourthly**, express high-level defence doctrine.

e. **Fifthly**, require the Defence Force to unpack the Defence Review into concrete long-term plans and programmes.

f. **Sixthly**, provide a series of planning milestones to guide discussions on future defence funding.

DEVELOPING THE FUTURE DEFENCE POLICY

26. The Defence Review takes its lead from the national security construct, national posture and national interests. This is augmented by South Africa’s foreign policy obligations and aspirations. The Defence Review draws on the Constitution and other Statutes, establishes fundamental principles and tenets and cascades these to a future-orientated, concept-driven, effects-based defence policy and strategy.
27. This effects-based approach examines what defence and other national capabilities must be applied to realise strategic outcomes in peace, conflict and war. The effects-based approach establishes the clear and unambiguous future mission, goals and tasks for Defence.

28. The Defence Review adopts a straightforward internal logic comprised of:

a. An understanding of the South African State, its people, its systems and geography and posits the unique challenges facing South Africa as a Developmental State.

b. An understanding of the global, continental, regional and domestic security trends and the implications thereof for South Africa. The future spectrum of conflict is posited, expressing a range of contingencies which may arise.

c. The emergent national security strategy is expressed as a construct and the national interests and vital interests of South Africa are posited. This culminates in six strategic national security effects which must be pursued by the Defence Force.

d. The Defence Mandate, Mission, Strategic Goals and Tasks are systematically unpacked to determine the scale of defence effort required for each and the concomitant defence capability requirements. This scale of effort will remain the fundamental basis for the development of the force design. Many countries would describe the scale of defence effort as the "level of defence ambition" (Annexure D).

e. Force generation guidelines are given, concomitant supporting defence concepts posited and high-order defence capabilities expressed.

f. The development of future defence leaders is discussed, including the development of Regulars, Reserves and Defence Civilians. A reconstructed Defence Academy is posited.

g. Contemporary defence expenditure is unpacked at the global, continental and regional levels.

h. The Defence Strategic Trajectory is posited as the strategic-level guideline to develop the Defence Force for the next 15-20 years across the five planning milestones.

i. Lastly, the fundamentals of the future defence and procurement strategies are provided, with the focus areas and strategic and niche areas identified, and the future positioning of the defence industry is discussed.

OVERARCHING DEFENCE PRINCIPLES

29. The Defence Review advances certain principles which the Defence Force, as a representative and trusted non-partisan national asset, must pursue, namely:

a. **Principle 1:** The Defence Force will be subject to the Constitution, national statutes, national policy and the national regulatory framework. Emphasis will be placed on the Defence Force’s compliance with international law, specifically international humanitarian law, and other binding instruments or regimes regulating armed conflict, the use of force or the control, prohibition or use of certain weapons.

b. **Principle 2:** The Defence Force will be subject to sound civil control by Cabinet and robust civil oversight by Parliament. Due cognisance will be given to the unique nature of the Defence Force relative to the wider public service.

c. **Principle 3:** The Defence Mandate, Mission, Strategic Goals and Tasks will be focused on the attainment of the Defence Force’s constitutionally mandated functions and government’s national strategic goals and priorities. Strategically, the Defence Force will adopt a defensive posture, but will maintain offensive operational capabilities.

d. **Principle 4:** The Defence Force must stand ready to: defend and protect South Africa; safeguard South Africa and its people; contribute to regional and continental security; and provide support in times of crisis and disaster - both domestically and regionally, man-made or natural. As an important pillar of the South African state, the Defence Force will contribute to national development.

e. **Principle 5:** The Defence Force will strive to be seen as a representative, equitable and gender-aligned national asset. Defence Force members will be skilled, healthy, fit, and highly disciplined professionals imbued with a high level of morale and sense of duty. The Defence Force should be respected by the people of South Africa and the international community alike for the standard of military professionalism it cultivates and maintains.

f. **Principle 6:** The Defence Force will be maintained as a balanced, modern and flexible force employing advanced technologies appropriate to operations in the African environment. It will thus be appropriately equipped, resourced and multi-role trained to
execute successful operations across the spectrum of potential conflict. All defence capabilities will be embedded with command and control, intelligence, firepower, protection, manoeuvre and sustainment.

g. **Principle 7**: The Defence Force will be organised into military combat capabilities and formations. There will be a clear distinction between command and staff lines. Command lines will be clear and unambiguous. Commanders will have the necessary delegations to execute their assigned mandates, have commensurate responsibility and authority over all resources assigned, and will account for their resources and actions. The Defence Force will be enabled through a single overarching information technology infrastructure.

h. **Principle 8**: Mission Command will be the leadership philosophy. Leadership and professionalism will be the cornerstone of future strategic, operational and tactical success.

### THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEFENCE REVIEW

30. On reflection on its mandate, the independent Defence Review Committee designed a nine-phase process to develop a new South African Defence Policy. These phases are:

a. **Phase 1**: A diagnostic and orientation process took place from July to October 2011.
   i. A comprehensive assessment of the present state of the Defence Force was made and pressing defence issues were identified. In this phase, 103 engagements took place with elements of the Defence Force, Government Departments and other identified stakeholders.
   ii. A number of international benchmarking engagements took place and identified Defence Force deployments were visited, both within the borders of South Africa and at the external mission areas.
   iii. A comprehensive list of diagnostic engagements is found at [Annexure B](#).

b. **Phase 2**: During the first half of October 2011, the Committee reflected on its afore-mentioned engagements and defined the fundamental defence principles, crafted the key thematic areas for the Defence Review and determined the initial document architecture.

c. **Phase 3**: From mid-October 2011 to mid-March 2012 the Committee engaged in the drafting of the initial concept document.

d. **Phase 4**: From mid-March to mid-April 2012 the Committee engaged in refining the initial concept document and developed it into the ‘Consultative Draft Defence Review’ for public release and public engagement.

e. **Phase 5**:
   i. On 12 April 2012 the Minister conducted a public launch of the ‘Consultative Draft Defence Review’ and by so doing launched the process of public engagement on the document.
   ii. A website was launched ([www.sadefencereview2012.org](http://www.sadefencereview2012.org)) which provided the document in PDF format, made available key research essays used in the development of the draft document and indicated the upcoming public engagement process. Links were further launched on Facebook and Twitter.

f. **Phase 6**: The Committee launched a comprehensive public participation process which stretched from 18 April until end-July 2012. During this process a number of public engagements were conducted across South Africa in which members of the public were invited to deliver comment on their expectations of Defence and the ‘Consultative Draft Defence Review’. These events ([Annexure B](#)) included:
   i. Information briefings to Parliamentary committees.
   ii. Imbizos at the grass-roots level in all nine provinces of South Africa.
   iii. Engagements with academics and NGOs hosted by various university bodies, academic ‘think-tanks’, and with identified stakeholders which included the Military Command and the Defence Secretariat Board.
   iv. Individual or organisational written submissions were received by the Committee ([Annexure C](#)).
“The South African National Defence Force appreciates the professional and cordial relationship it has with the Defence Review Committee. The spirit of constructive and robust engagement on the content of the Draft South African Defence Review 2012 is welcomed by the Military Command Council and we appreciate the opportunities it has been afforded to engage on the content of the document.”

**General S.Z. Shoke – Chief of the SA National Defence Force**

g. **Phase 7:** During late-July and throughout August 2012, the Committee embarked on a process of consolidating its work through:
   i. Reflecting on the outcomes of the public engagements listed above and the submissions received.

ii. Substantively reorganising and augmenting the independent report, after due consideration of the outcome of the public consultation and evaluating the merits of all the submissions received.

h. **Phase 8:** Thereafter, the Committee prepared its final Defence Review Report for formal presentation to the Minister.

i. **Phase 9:** Commencing in February 2013 the Committee assisted the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans with driving the Defence Review through the Executive and the Legislature approval processes, including the development of adjustments to the document and focused presentations for specific target groups.
1. Following free and fair elections in April 1994, South Africa became a vibrant democracy. It has a Constitution which outlaws discrimination, enshrines fundamental rights, and emphasises openness and accountability in the affairs of government.

2. This fundamental shift has been accompanied by a dramatic change in the strategic environment at domestic and regional levels. The salient fact is that the government is no longer unrepresentative and at war with its own people and neighbouring states in Southern Africa. At national level the objectives of security policy therefore encompass the consolidation of democracy; the achievement of social justice, economic development and a safe environment; and a substantial reduction in the level of crime, violence and political instability. Stability and development are regarded as inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing.

3. The ending of apartheid and the establishment of democracy have given rise to dramatic changes to South Africa’s position in the external strategic environment. After two and a half decades of isolation, South Africa has been welcomed back into the international community and has joined a host of important regional and international bodies. The country’s international relations have been transformed from an adversarial mode to bilateral and multi-lateral cooperation. The country is no longer isolated internationally. It has been welcomed into many international organisations, most importantly the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

4. At an international level the objectives of South Africa’s security policy include the defence of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the South African state, and the promotion of regional security.
5. Security is an all-encompassing condition in which individual citizens live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being.

6. The defence focus in recent years was on the political transition from apartheid to a democratic South Africa, and the concomitant integration of diverse statutory and non-statutory armed forces into a single Defence Force. The Constitution establishes a framework for democratic civil-military relations. In terms of this framework the Defence Force is non-partisan; it is subject to the control and oversight of the duly elected and appointed civilian authority; and it is obliged to perform its functions in accordance with law.

7. The above is further outlined in Chapter 3 of this Defence Review where the Defence and National Security Interface is discussed more comprehensively.

**GEOGRAPHY & TOPOGRAPHY**

8. South Africa holds an important strategic position in the world. Geographically, it is at the southern tip of Africa between the Atlantic Ocean to the west and the Indian Ocean to the east. Topographically, it has an extensive coastline with mountain ranges separating the southern and eastern coastal plains from the interior plateau. It contains large areas of arid semi-desert to savannah in the north-west, with sub-tropical and tropical vegetation in the south-east and north-east of the country.

9. South Africa is a medium-sized coastal state and has a land surface of 1 219 090 km². Only 11% of this area is classified as arable. The coastline as measured at the high water line is 3 924 km and the air border is 7 660 km. South Africa shares land borders with Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Swaziland and Lesotho totalling 4 471 km. Marion Island and Prince Edward Island are 298 km² and 47 km² in extent, with coast lines of 134 km and 32 km respectively.

10. South Africa has an economic exclusion zone of 1 553 000 km² of which the areas around Marion and Prince Edward Islands comprise 474 400 km². The Atlantic Ocean borders the west coast, the Indian Ocean borders the east and south coast and the Southern Ocean surrounds Marion and Prince Edward Islands. South Africa has tabled its claim to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea for the extension of the continental shelf for the purpose of securing additional resources. This implies that South Africa will have to exercise control and enforce state authority over 4 340 000 km² of maritime territory.

11. Like much of the eastern part of the African continent, South Africa’s landscape is dominated by a high plateau in the interior; surrounded by a narrow strip of coastal lowlands. Unlike most of Africa, the perimeter of South Africa’s inland plateau rises abruptly to form a series of mountain ranges before dropping to sea level. These mountains, known as the Great Escarpment, vary between 2 000 meters and 3 300 meters in elevation. The coastline is fairly regular and has few natural harbours. Each of the dominant land features, the inland plateau, the encircling mountain ranges, and the coastal lowlands, exhibits a wide range of variation in topography, vegetation and natural resources.

12. South Africa’s climatic conditions generally range from Mediterranean in the south-western corner of South Africa to temperate in the interior plateau, and subtropical in the north-east. A small area in the north-west has a desert climate. Most of the country has warm, sunny days and cool nights. Rainfall generally occurs during summer (November through March), although in the south-west, around Cape Town, rainfall occurs in winter (June to August). Temperatures are influenced by variations in elevation, terrain, and ocean currents more than by latitude.

**FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND LEGAL SYSTEM**

**FORM OF GOVERNMENT**

13. South Africa is a constitutional state comprising an Executive President, a legislature consisting of a National Assembly and a National Council of Provinces, and a Constitutional Court as the highest court in the land. The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Force in terms of the Constitution.

14. A combination of proportional and constituency representation is used. The National and Provincial electoral systems are based on proportional representation, whilst local elections combine both a proportional representation with a ward representation. South Africa has been a constitutional democracy since 1994. The bicameral Parliament consists of:

   a. The National Council of Provinces (NCOP), which has 90 seats with 10 members elected by each of the nine provincial legislatures for five-year terms. The NCOP has special powers to protect regional interests and safeguard cultural and linguistic traditions.

   b. The National Assembly, which has 400 seats with members elected by popular vote under a system of proportional representation to serve five-year terms. This is achieved through a system of party-list proportional representation.

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1 Constitution, 1996: Section 202(1).
15. After each parliamentary election, the National Assembly elects one of its members as President; hence the President usually serves a term of office the same as that of the Assembly, normally five years. No President may serve more than two terms in office. The President appoints a Deputy President and Ministers, who form the Cabinet. The President and the Cabinet may be removed by the National Assembly by a motion of no confidence.

16. South Africa has three capital cities: Cape Town is the seat of Parliament and is the legislative capital; Pretoria is the seat of the President and Cabinet and is the administrative capital; and Bloemfontein is the seat of the Supreme Court of Appeal and is the judicial capital.

**LEGAL SYSTEM**

17. South Africa has a mixed legal system of Roman-Dutch law, English Common Law and Customary Law. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, is the supreme law of the Republic and provides the foundation for the rule of law. The Constitution entrenches a comprehensive set of inalienable rights. These rights include, inter alia, the right to equality before the law and equal protection and benefit of the law; to be treated with dignity and respect; to freedom and security of the person; to freedom of religion, belief and opinion; to freedom of expression; to freedom of association; and to peacefully demonstrate.

18. South Africa has an independent judiciary and enjoys the rule of law. Chapter 8 of the Constitution (1996) defines the structure of the South African judicial system. This Chapter also guarantees the independence of the courts and requires other organs of the state to assist and protect the courts in order to ensure their “independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness”. In addition, Chapter 2 of the Constitution guarantees every person the right to have a dispute or trial heard by a fair, impartial and independent court. Courts comprise the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal, High Courts, Magistrates’ Courts, and other courts established or recognised in terms of an Act of Parliament. The Magistrates’ Courts hear lesser criminal cases and smaller civil cases; the High Courts are courts of general jurisdiction for specific areas; the Supreme Court of Appeal is the highest court in all but constitutional matters; the Constitutional Court is the ‘apex’ court and hears constitutional and specific other matters.

**ECONOMIC SYSTEM**

19. South Africa is classified as a middle-income, emerging economy, affluent in natural resources with well-developed legal, communications, financial, energy and transport sectors. Agriculture contributes 9% to the gross domestic product, with industry and services contributing 26% and 65% respectively.

20. South Africa has by far the largest and most sophisticated economy on the African continent. South Africa has the 25th largest gross domestic product (GDP) in the world accounting for 25% of Africa’s GDP and 33% of the sub-Saharan GDP, and has been ranked as the 32nd largest importer and 37th largest exporter. More than 50% of the economy is trade-related, with mining, manufacturing, services and to a lesser degree agriculture as the mainstays of the economy. Most of the nine provinces have economies that are larger than most African states, with the Gauteng province lying in third place to Egypt and Algeria. The bulk of exports and imports are transported via sea lines of communication with the Port of Durban, one of the busiest in the Southern Hemisphere.

21. South Africa has the 18th largest stock exchange in the world. The Rand is the most actively traded emerging-market currency in the world and belongs to a distinguished group of 15 currencies that form the continuous linked settlement system, where foreign currency transactions are settled immediately, lowering the risk of transacting over time zones.

22. South Africa is ranked 121st in its economic growth. The growth in the economy in recent times has been dramatically reduced on the back of the economic challenges faced by South Africa’s main trading partners. The economy is expected to have a medium-term growth trajectory of 4% and a long-term 40-year growth average of 5%. South Africa has a relatively small domestic customer base and economic growth is largely reliant on growth in the exportation of goods and services.

a. South Africa’s global economic strategy remains focused on Africa and on a strong developmental agenda.

b. The value of trade in the SADC region has increased substantially over the last decade and constitutes the bulk of trade on the African continent. Botswana, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Nigeria and Zambia are South Africa’s largest trade partners in Africa.

c. South Africa has recently joined the Brazil, Russia, India and China economic alliance (now BRICS), positioning itself for new trade growth and market access into the future.

d. The trade, development and cooperation agreement with the European Union is pivotal to economic development as well as contributing to South Africa’s reconstruction and development agenda.

e. Germany, USA, Japan, UK, Italy, China, and Switzerland are amongst the top ten export destinations. In South America, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Colombia and Peru are the major trading partners.
23. South Africa’s economic infrastructure includes ten international airports and eight international seaports. These hubs provide excellent connections for international travel and trade. The number of containers moving via land, sea and air continues to grow year on year.

24. Unemployment continues at high levels, in excess of 25%. Domestically 33% of the labour force is employed in the informal economy, which traditionally is the sector that evades taxation and circumvents labour legislation. This informal sector has grown by more than 7% in recent times. Analysis suggests that the formal labour market is threatened by the high levels of illegal immigration.

25. It is expected that Government will continue with financial reforms to ensure sound economic fundamentals to support sustained growth.

26. Among African and other nations at a similar stage of development, South Africa is unique in that it has a well-developed science, engineering and technology (SET) base that supports its broader industrial base. The SET base is further bolstered by a well-developed Further Education and Training system that produces the required human capital of engineers, technicians and scientists that feed into the National System of Innovation. Research and early technology development are well established within the Universities and Universities of Technology. This research feeds into national research institutions like the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), where technology is further developed to a level of readiness where it can be absorbed by industry and used in further research and development leading to product development.

27. South Africa possesses a number of specialised capabilities in the public and the private sectors that have the potential to maintain its position at the forefront of science and technology on the continent, as well as to improve its standing in the world, in various fields such as:
   a. Nuclear fuel.
   b. Aerospace technologies.
   c. Safety and security, including defence.
   d. Biotechnology including human and animal health.
   e. Chemistry.
   f. Information technology.

28. The Defence Force has been a major investor in science, engineering and technology over the years and this has led to the existing Defence Science Engineering and Technology (DSET) capability which supports the Defence Force in a variety of ways throughout defence system lifecycles and at all levels of the defence systems hierarchy.

29. Demographically South Africa comprises four major race groupings that speak one or more of the eleven official languages. Over the last 15 years English has become the most common language for correspondence by government, the public and business communities.

30. The approximately 50.6 million population of South Africa consists of about 79.5% black (African) and 9.0% white (European), with about 9.0% people of mixed white and black descent (formerly called “Coloured”), and a small 2.5% minority of South and East Asian background. Ten to fifteen percent of the population may be illegal immigrants.

31. South Africa has eleven official languages, nine of which are indigenous - isiZulu, isiXhosa, Setswana, Sesotho, Seswati, Tshivenda, isiNdebele, Sepedi, and Xitsonga. Many South African people also speak Afrikaans2 (the first language of about 60% of the whites and the majority of those of mixed race) or English (the first language of most of the rest of the non-Africans). About 80% of the population is Christian: major groups include the African Instituted Churches, Pentecostal, Roman Catholic, Methodist, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Dutch Reformed, and Anglican churches. There are smaller minorities of Muslims, Hindus, Jews, and followers of African Traditional Religions.

32. Demographically, South Africa is a ‘young country’ with a disproportionate youth bulge - two-thirds of the population is under the age of 35 of which 50% is under the age of 15. However, South Africa is expected to experience some significant changes over the next 20 years due to a slowing of the population growth rate, with declining fertility rates and the impact of HIV/AIDS. A negative population growth rate is forecast from 2040 onwards. An increasing gender-ratio of male to female is expected, as is a higher female mortality-rate due to HIV/AIDS. Increasing proportions of black Africans relative to other race groups and an ageing of the population as life expectancy increases and the impact of HIV/AIDS declines, are expected3. Migration from rural to urban areas is expected to continue.

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2 Afrikaans is recognised by the African Union as an indigenous African language.
3 City of Cape Town, Demographics Discussion Paper, 2010.
33. The commitment to constructing a 'democratic developmental state' is a recurring theme in government policy. Government has determined in its policy analysis of developmental challenges facing the country that a 'democratic developmental state' is able to intervene in order to meet national challenges, including economic growth, unemployment, inequality, and poverty. In this model, the State is interventionist, an agent of development and takes up the mandate to accomplish national development. This 'democratic developmental state' is characterised by state-led macro-economic planning and strong state-led intervention that focuses on addressing social and economic challenges in society. Good governance and adherence to developmental values are crucial.

34. In seeking to establish South Africa as a democratic developmental state, Government wishes to influence the direction and pace of economic and social development and to prioritise and promote national development issues. This is characterised by Government leading a strong, concerted drive for economic growth and ensuring mobilisation of national resources towards developmental goals. These may include:
   a. Economic growth with development being prioritised through a sustained policy climate that fosters productive investment, exports, growth and human welfare.
   b. Transformation of the economic base by promoting productive, income-generating economic activities, and by ensuring that economic growth has the effect of improving the living conditions of the majority of the population.
   c. Policy having clearly defined socio-economic objectives, including, inter alia, "alleviation of absolute and relative poverty, the correction of glaring inequalities of social conditions ... and the tackling of looming threats to environmental degradation"4.
   d. The organisational structures of the State being used to promote and achieve better economic performance, with specific relation to surrounding social structures.
   e. The State using its capacity to promote and sustain development - namely the combination of steady and high rates of economic growth and structural change in the productive system.
   f. Coherent state agencies able to express and promote measurable developmental goals.
   g. The State being embedded in a structure of alliances and partnerships with key societal groups to facilitate the achievement of its societal goals.

35. Furthermore, South Africa faces a pressing need to ‘prioritise the priorities’, such priorities being deeply rooted in the vital national interests of the country, so that the developmental agenda has a clear, finite set of identifiable objectives that are supported by the concomitant effort of all stakeholders. This requires institutional and organisational attributes that enable the achievement of growth and development objectives, productive investment, exports, growth and human welfare. As such, South Africa has developed innovative strategies to promote social cohesion on:
   a. A comprehensive, integrated and participatory anti-poverty strategy, which promotes national unity, shared value systems and citizen identity.
   b. Sustainable solutions for the prioritised quality delivery of basic services, particularly to marginalised and vulnerable groups.

36. The developmental agenda translated to the lives of all South Africans seeks to manifest in:
   a. Reduced levels of poverty.
   b. Meaningful and sustainable jobs.
   c. Living within safe & secure borders.
   d. Benefit from good service delivery.
   e. Benefit from global peace, stability, security & prosperity, especially on the African continent.

37. South Africa and the region continue to be stricken by chronic underdevelopment, inadequate health services and the attendant problems of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment. These human security and developmental problems continue to impact negatively on the region in the form of a range of non-military threats, namely:
   a. Endemic cycle between poverty and violence.
   b. Marginalisation of vulnerable groups of society.
   c. The spread of diseases.
   d. The flow of refugees.
   e. The illicit cross-border trafficking in drugs, goods, small arms and light weapons.
   f. Environmental destruction.

38. As such, "security is a prerequisite for development, and there can be no development without commensurate security – one of the primary contributions of Defence is, together with other security departments, creating the security conditions for development to take place"5. South Africa has conceptualised a ‘Human Security’ approach which identifies the need for a shift

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5 Presentation by Dr David Chuter, an independent security analyst, on 24 November 2011 at the Minister’s inaugural “Defence Review Public Engagement Seminar”.
in focus from solely securing the state by military means, to the provision of security for its people by addressing critical political, socio-economic and environmental problems.

POVERTY

39. Poverty has many dimensions that shape people’s lives. Poverty in South Africa is most evident in the lack of opportunities for economically active citizens to earn a wage. Income poverty affects individuals and households in ways that are often degrading and lead to precarious lifestyles. However, the linkages between income poverty and deprivations in health care, education and social infrastructure are direct, with devastating consequences for individuals and society. Deprivations in health and education are also linked to a lack of access to other assets such as housing, land, social infrastructure (such as clinics, schools, libraries and cultural resources) and services such as credit facilities. Without access to quality health and education and income-earning opportunities, the lives of the vast majority of the poor wage a daily struggle to simply survive.

40. South Africa does not have a single official poverty line. Government uses US$2 a day or R524 a month per person (in 2008 prices, updated to 2010) as a rough guide. Using this indicator, the proportion of people living below the poverty line was about 53% in 1995; the figure subsequently varied, reaching 58% in 2001 and declining to 48% in 2008. By international standards, this is a very high level of poverty. Poverty among women-headed households is higher than the average and women continue to earn less than men, even though differences in years of education have largely been narrowed. About 61% of women live in poverty, and 31% live in destitution, compared with 39% and 18% of men respectively. The decline in poverty since 1995 has been relatively small given rising per capita income, a growing economy and significant social policy interventions.

INCOME INEQUALITY

41. There is good reason to be concerned about rising income inequality. Research shows that unequal societies tend to do worse on a range of socioeconomic indicators, including life expectancy, mental illness, obesity, educational performance, teenage births, homicides, imprisonment rates, levels of trust and social mobility. Other research shows strong relationships between levels of inequality and violence and crime, as well as the propensity for conflict and civil war. Inequality in South Africa is reflected in the following ways:

a. In 1995, the poorest 20% of people earned an average of R1 010 a year (in 2008 prices) and the richest 20% earned an average of R44 336 a year. In 2008, the poorest 20% of people earned R1 486 a year and the richest 20% earned an average of R64 565 a year.

b. In 1995, the poorest 20% of the population earned just 2.3% of national income, while the richest 20% earned 72%. By 2008, these figures had barely changed, with the poorest earning 2.2% of income and the richest earning 70%.

c. In 1995, median per capita expenditure among Africans was R333 a month compared to whites at R3 443 a month. In 2008, median expenditure per capita for Africans was R454 a month, and for whites R5 668 a month.

42. Within South Africa, extremely high unemployment and underemployment have a particularly severe impact on those under the age of 35. Millions of working-age adults are structurally unemployed and live in households with no income. As a result, a great many South Africans depend on a relatively small number of wage earners, so that most working people live in poverty. The HIV/AIDS pandemic continues to take a tremendous toll. These factors, in combination with internal migration from rural areas to urban centres, and increasing regional labour migration, place pressure on limited social infrastructure and state capabilities to provide essential services.

UNEMPLOYMENT

43. Employment is one of the most effective ways of fighting poverty, tackling inequalities and enabling people to improve their quality of life. The lack of jobs is a major cause of poverty and inequality.

44. Despite the improvement in job creation between 1997 and 2008, unemployment remains very high. Employment increased from 11.1 million in 2001 to 13.6 million in 2008, and declined thereafter as a consequence of the global recession (The Presidency 2009). One of the biggest challenges facing South Africa today is that there is a very small number of working people (41%) in the adult population. In addition, earnings from work are low relative to the cost of living. High unemployment results in high dependency ratios, with many people relying on few wage earners. This results in a situation where the majority of working families live near or below the poverty line.

45. At 25%, South Africa’s official rate of unemployment is ex-

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6 Verbatim extract from the National Planning Commission Diagnostic Report 10 June 2011.
7 Verbatim extract from the National Planning Commission Diagnostic Report 10 June 2011.
8 Verbatim extract from the National Planning Commission Diagnostic Report 10 June 2011.
to ensure a realisation of the MDGs. South Africa has done well South Africa has implemented a number of progressive policies (MDGs) and features prominently in South Africa’s Constitution. 49. Education is one of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and features prominently in South Africa’s Constitution. 46. The inability of the economy to create jobs for young people directly threatens the delicate balance between the constitutional imperative for redistribution, the need to escape the shadow of the past, and the need to build inclusivity for all – both black and white. Many young whites perceive the Employment Equity Act as exclusionary legislation. This is in spite of the fact that statistics show that black workers take longer to be absorbed into the workforce, and are generally the first to be retrenched during a downturn. Black people generally experience higher levels of unemployment and the participation of white males is more or less unaffected by business cycle fluctuations. 47. Unemployment rates are higher for black youth than they are for whites, especially at younger ages. Similarly, despite the positive increase of women actively seeking employment, high unemployment rates among women adds to social exclusion and entrenches the poverty trap, especially when considering the fact that many of the poorest households are headed by women. 48. Education is a key factor in development. Good education provides access to the top end of the labour market and facilitates social mobility, while poor education perpetuates the skills shortage at the top end, causing a wage premium. The large number of low-skilled workers depresses wages at the bottom end. This combination contributes to the exceptionally high level of income inequality in South Africa. Investment in education is also important in developing responsive and active citizens who can play a role in local governance, community development and other local initiatives. 49. Education is one of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and features prominently in South Africa’s Constitution. South Africa has implemented a number of progressive policies to ensure a realisation of the MDGs. South Africa has done well in extending access to education and has met MDG targets in this regard. Education receives the single largest share of total government expenditure. As a proportion of GDR South Africa’s expenditure on education in 2010/11 will be 5.8% (R165 billion) up from 5.1% (R105 billion) in 2007/08. 50. About 1 million young people exit the schooling system annually, of whom 65% exit without achieving a Grade 12 certificate (JET 2011a). Half of those who exit the schooling system do so after Grade 11, either because they do not enrol in Grade 12 or they fail Grade 12. However, only a small number of those who leave the schooling system enrol in Further Education and Training (FET) colleges or have access to any post-school training. The net effect of this is that access to post-school education and training is limited for school leavers. CRIMINALITY 9 51. Crime levels are high in South Africa. Violent crime, contact crime and property crime are so common that many South Africans live in fear. When people feel unsafe it makes it harder for them to pursue their personal goals, and to take part in social and economic activity. Feeling unsafe can result from having been a victim of crime, knowing people who have been victims of crime, or hearing crime reported in the community or the media. 52. A 2010 study by the Centre for Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) shows that, although violent crimes take place in all settings, it is predominant in metropolitan areas. Major forms of violent crimes identified include: assaults linked to arguments, anger and domestic violence; rape and sexual assault; and robbery and other violent property crime. According to the crime statistics for the period April 2009 to March 2010, the largest number (31.9%) of all 2.1 million crimes were contact crimes, followed by property crimes (26.1%) and other serious crimes (25.5%). Although there has been a decline in murders, the high proportion of contact crimes is bound to raise fears among citizens. 53. In discussing crime, there is always the danger of focusing too much on policing as a solution. There is no doubt that more visible policing gives citizens a sense of protection, but reducing crime will require a combination of interventions, including those originating from outside the criminal justice system. The speed with which the police investigate and arrest perpetrators, and how effectively the prosecution is carried out by the criminal justice system, are critical to how safe citizens feel.

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54. The National Prosecuting Authority has reported an increase in the percentage of convictions, from 80% in 1999/00 to 85.9% in 2007/08, and a reduction in the number of cases withdrawn from 414,211 in 2002/03 to 225,407 in 2007/08. However, the high number of cases that are withdrawn affects citizens’ confidence in the criminal justice system.

55. The CSVR study identifies the following factors as sustaining the culture of crime: (1) inequality, poverty, unemployment, social exclusion and marginalisation; (2) perceptions and values relating to violence and crime; (3) the vulnerability of youth, linked to inadequate child rearing and inappropriate socialisation; and (4) weaknesses in the criminal justice system.

56. The six pillars of violence prevention (WHO 2002, cited in Matzopolous 2011) are: investing in early interventions, increasing positive adult involvement, strengthening communities, challenging social norms that entrench violence, reducing income inequality, and improving criminal justice and social welfare. An effective, integrated strategy is needed to address the pervasive problem of violence.

57. South Africa’s rural space is wracked by a triptych of policies that reach back to the union of the country at the turn of the previous century. The Land Act of 1913 and its successors separated black from white farmers, communal lands from private property, and in many cases individuals from their families; the ‘betterment’ process in the former homelands separated black people from their means of sustenance; and the Marketing Act of 1937 became the main cause of the flight of rural non-farm business from the white platteland with its favouring of big farms and big business over small and of the urban over the rural economy. Until these overlapping distortions are recognised and addressed, rural job creation and the creation of an environment that will support rural entrepreneurs, whether on or off-farm, remains a chimera.

58. The current economic structure of South Africa, as a result of this historical process and phenomenon, has produced, and continues to produce, net factors which combine to undermine the creation of conditions which are conducive to fostering social cohesion and development amongst those historically dispossessed of their land. An improved land reform trajectory has been mooted in the Green Paper on Land Reform which attempts to: a. Improve on past and current land reform perspectives, without significantly disrupting agricultural production and food security; and,

59. While achieving equitable distribution of land remains a fundamental policy of government, there is an even more urgent need to ensure that land reform is measured not only through equity but also through productivity, leading to enhanced food security for all, job creation and skills training among beneficiaries.

60. The potential for agri-transformation and the development of sustainable agri-businesses in South Africa remains significant. South Africa currently cultivates about 13 million ha of agricultural land, while available arable land amounts to approximately 15 million ha; some 2 million ha are available for expansion of agricultural production, mostly in the former homeland areas. Furthermore, South Africa has the potential to irrigate a conservatively estimated further 500,000 ha of land within a 20-year planning horizon, or an expansion of a third over the current area.

61. As a result, it has been estimated that more than 300,000 employment opportunities can be created in the communal areas among those households that already have access to land, and that the stimulation of industries within agriculture (in the communal and the commercial farming areas) with a proven track record of growth and employment creation can potentially create almost 200,000 on-farm jobs. The industries with the largest potential contribution to the creation of jobs are citrus, avocados, vegetables, macadamia and pecan nuts, and olives. Furthermore, the less labour-intensive field crop and livestock industries can also contribute to employment creation. Finally, the creation of employment opportunities in primary agriculture will stimulate the creation of at least half as many jobs in those industries that supply the means of production to farmers, and that take farm produce from the farm and turn it into consumable products at the time and place, and in the form, desired by consumers.
INTER-STATE AND INTRA-STATE DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT

INTRODUCTION

1. As the world becomes more complex and more unstable, and as it consequently presents increased risks to both international and domestic security and conflict, it is useful to identify the expanding spectrum of conflict that is evident in the global security environment. This spectrum of conflict is best understood in terms of both its inter-state (between states) and intra-state (within a state) dimensions.

INTER-STATE CONFLICT

2. Large-scale inter-state conflict is currently constrained by the interdependency of economies, international security cooperation within established alliances and the multilateral mechanisms established for the prevention and resolution of conflict. Although this growing interdependency among countries helps deter inter-state conflict, there remains competitive demand among all nations for raw materials and strategic resources, compounded by the quest for power, dominance and influence. This will thus continue to trigger inter-state disputes and regional conflicts, similarly undermining global multilateral institutions established to regulate world order and peace.

3. Conflict along ideological lines has largely been superseded by conflict motivated by the economic interests of states, and for which both major combat and asymmetrical capabilities are utilised. The potential spectrum of inter-state conflict that may manifest is indicated below in Figure 2-1.
THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

INTRA-STATE CONFLICT

4. The vast majority of armed conflicts occur within states, rather than between them. Such intra-state conflicts will continue to feature prominently in the underdeveloped and developing worlds, due to reasons including political intolerance, competition for resources, ineffective governance, corruption, extreme poverty and underdevelopment. Territory that lacks proper governance and infrastructure further tends to provide safe-havens for criminals, terror-groupings, armed guerillas and armed insurgents.

5. Although occurring within states, intra-state conflicts also negatively affect inter-state relations. The consequences of such conflicts in terms of displaced persons, refugees, the trafficking of small arms and light weapons, and the disruption of transport hubs and trade will have profound spill-over effects on neighbouring states. At the same time neighbouring states can, and often do, become involved in an intra-state conflict, giving rise to regional disputes.

6. Furthermore, various international flashpoints remain unresolved and continue to generate instability in their respective regions. Iraq, Afghanistan, the Sahel region, the African Great Lakes and Somalia continue to experience intra-state conflict. The conflict in the Middle East between Israel and Palestine remains unresolved, as do tensions around the nuclear ambitions of certain states.

7. The potential spectrum of intra-state conflict that may manifest is indicated below in Figure 2-2.

8. It is significant to note that merely a century ago, 90% of casualties in conflicts were male soldiers. In today’s conflicts, the majority of the casualties are civilians, and 75% of these are estimated to be women and children. This is indicative of the trend
away from major combat operations to asymmetrical activities where the population is placed at risk and is increasingly vulnerable.

THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF AFRICA

AFRICA’S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

9. Africa is strategically important for three main reasons: firstly, its geo-strategic position—there are five maritime choke points adjacent to the continent, namely the Strait of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aden, the Mozambique Channel and the Cape of Good Hope (Figure 2-3); secondly, it possesses vital resources, especially strategic minerals, oil and gas; and thirdly it has the agrarian capacity to expand and influence global food production.

10. Fifty percent of Africa’s oil is produced in the Gulf of Guinea off West Africa, with the rest mainly in North Africa and some in the east. The main West African producers are Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea. Southern and Central Africa is regarded as the main mineral depository of the world, including rare and valuable minerals such as coltan (75% of world stock in the DRC), platinum in South Africa and Zimbabwe, and uranium in South Africa, Namibia and the DRC (Figure 2-4).
THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

11. Notwithstanding the predominance of subsistence-based agricultural activity and the very limited large-scale commercial agricultural production in Africa (Figure 2-5), the agrarian potential of the continent is significant, especially given growing global food insecurity. Sub-Saharan Africa in particular has all the basic elements required for sustainable commercial agriculture production should this be harnessed through commercial agri-businesses. A number of African countries in the sub-region individually have the potential to provide most of Africa’s food requirements.

12. In addition to Africa’s significant oil and gas deposits, Africa has the potential to provide significant alternative energy in the future, some of these being hydro-electricity, bio-fuels, and solar and wind energy. The distribution of the main water basins is indicated in (Figure 2-6).

PERSISTENT CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY HAMPER AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT

13. Africa’s vulnerability to socio-economic deprivation, armed conflict and political instability hampers its growth and development. Human security in a number of African countries thus remains precarious. A constant high level of instability exists in various parts of Africa that emanates from (inter alia): lack of political rights; weak and dysfunctional states; inadequate political and economic governance; border and territorial disputes; conflict over scarce resources; the politicisation of ethnicity (Figure 2-7); religious extremism; the marginalisation of groups; the inappropriate involvement of the military in political and economic
affairs; unconstitutional changes of governments; and maritime crime and piracy. In addition, advancing climate change, poverty and disease continue to exacerbate the social and economic vulnerability of many communities.

14. This humanitarian situation is evident from the plight of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) and food riots in some African countries. Conflict and hardship, and the resulting displaced populations, will remain an important trigger for migration to other regions and countries, including South Africa.

15. While Africa has experienced relatively few inter-state conflicts in recent years, various intra-state conflicts continue to have a wide-ranging impact on inter-state relations, mainly be-
cause of refugees, cross-border crime and support to insurgent groups from neighbouring countries. Some of these conflicts are based on longstanding disputes, while others have recent origins and are exacerbated by ineffective governance, the politicisation of ethnicity and the legacy of colonial borders (Figure 2-7).

16. From 1997 to 2012\(^2\) over 65 000 conflict events have been recorded in Africa (Figure 2-8) with the following breakdown: 40% are battles between governments, rebels, and militias; 34% are events in which civilians are directly targeted and harmed; 18% are riots and protests; and 7.5% is non-violent activity including rebel recruitment, arrests or base establishment. From 1997 to 2012, riots, protests and violence against civilians have increased, while the frequency of violent battles has decreased.

**DRIVERS OF GLOBAL AND AFRICAN INSECURITY**

17. Both the international and the continental strategic environments are extremely fluid and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. This is a factor of both national actors and non-state groups - ideological, political and criminal - playing varying roles that have the potential to impact on stability and security.

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The result is an ever-evolving palette of potential challenges, risks and threats that can directly or indirectly affect Africa, but more specifically, Southern Africa. Recent acts of terror in parts of Africa and the escalation and spread of maritime criminality in African waters are merely two examples of this.

AN INEQUITABLE BALANCE OF GLOBAL POWER

18. Conflict and war have mostly been the result of states pursuing their interests to the detriment and insecurity of others. The global balance of power and the global structures that gave effect to it are undemocratic, inequitable and in many cases inimical to the interests of the developing world.

19. Furthermore, globalisation (being characterised by increased economic, cultural, social and political global interdependence) has not brought the expected reduction of geopolitical, religious, ethnic or ideological struggles. It has rather contributed to the growing economic disparity between the richest and poorest countries. This inequality gap will be a source of tension and potential conflict, being particularly acute in Africa, especially in those African countries which are either not well integrated into the world economy or which have weak or failing governance structures.

20. In the next decade there will be important challenges to the current balance of power. Examples include:
THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

a. The economic growth of emerging powers with increased leverage, driven by the demands of their growing populations.
b. Growing regional collaboration, such as in Europe, Africa and the Americas.
c. Emerging multilateral alliances, characterised by the emerging significance of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) countries.

THE CAPACITY OF STATES FOR UNILATERAL ACTS OF FORCE

21. Although political and economic integration has made progress in recent years, states jealously guard their national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and will continue to secure and protect these through the maintenance of powerful military capabilities. Significantly, military power continues to be exercised alongside both economic and political power.

22. While most states in the post-Cold War era have reduced their military spending, some have strengthened and expanded their conventional capacity, allowing traditional major powers to sustain their military dominance. Accordingly, military strength continues to provide powerful states with the means to embark on unilateral acts of force and even armed aggression in pursuit of their own national interests. The military capacity of the major powers and certain regional groupings is unlikely to be contested in the near future.

23. Moreover, such acts in violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states are undertaken against the basic tenets of international law and the fabric of collective security mechanisms, such as the UN system. South Africa and its people are not immune from such international security dynamics.

THE SCRAMBLE FOR ENERGY, MINERALS AND SCARCE RESOURCES

24. The global security environment is significantly influenced by the competition for strategic resources, in particular energy products such as oil, gas and strategic minerals that are essential for high-technology industries. Rapid population growth in some developing economies and growing consumption in the developed world will increase competition for energy, water, minerals and land.

25. Energy markets will be exposed to short-term fluctuations in supply and delivery. Import-dependent countries with weak economies will be especially vulnerable. Tensions and even conflict could possibly arise between states pursuing control over dwindling supplies. Securing access to energy, food, water and strategic minerals...
THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

will continue to remain a global priority, with both state and non-state actors playing increasingly prominent roles in African security affairs.

26. Oil production on the African continent has increased in recent years, thereby stimulating competition for this strategic resource. Africa will remain a major source of raw materials and strategic minerals for foreign powers and corporations (Figure 2-9).

27. Of particular concern is the exchange of arms for strategic minerals and the risk of military intervention to secure access to these resources. On a positive note, foreign involvement in sourcing the continent’s raw materials could lead to investment, job creation, economic growth and prosperity. Some countries have altruistic motives and try to alleviate poverty and suffering on the continent.

MARITIME INSECURITY

28. The substantial increase in acts of maritime crime along Africa’s coastline threatens the security and stability of the continent. Both the SADC Maritime Security Strategy (MSS) and the African Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050 (AIMS-2050) recognise the threat to human security arising from acts of maritime piracy and criminality.

29. Although the current piracy hotspots are off the east and west coasts of Africa, namely the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Guinea (Figure 2-10), pirates have extended their activities to over 1 100 km offshore and have moved into Seychelles and Tanzanian waters, even reaching the Indian coast. Somali pirates have operated as far south as the Mozambique Channel and as far east as 72° East towards the Maldives. As a direct consequence of the piracy along the east coast, many shipping companies have had to use the Cape Sea Route instead of the Suez Canal.

30. The Southern African region also faces the challenge of ensuring maritime security, specifically combating piracy and the smuggling of weapons, contraband, people and goods. Of particular importance is the protection of maritime trade and resources, including fisheries, seabed minerals and energy resources. These maritime threats are primarily trans-national and trans-oceanic, thus requiring the capabilities for surveillance over the sea and for effecting search and seizure at sea. Many littoral states, however, lack the capacity to monitor their maritime areas.
31. South Africa’s geographical location can be characterised as a medium-sized coastal state. South Africa has a coastline of almost 3,924 km on a strategic international maritime trade route, with international obligations for providing safety of navigation and ships, ensuring freedom of the seas and security of shipping and the marine environment.

32. South Africa has in essence an ‘island economy’ that is almost totally dependent on maritime transport. The bulk of the country’s GDP is generated through trade, with 90% of exports and imports being transported by sea (Figure 2-11). As such South Africa has an “obligation to cooperate with other maritime nations to uphold the freedom of the seas and to protect its national interests”.

33. Recent maritime security incidents, together with requests from foreign governments and multilateral organisations, have compelled South Africa to respond to such security threats. This requires domestic law to be aligned with international conventions and treaties, and thus harmonised within South African domestic law, the SADC region and on the African continent in order to prosecute transgressors. This matter remains urgent.

ACTS OF TERROR

34. Acts of terror have become less territorially defined and more global. No country can be considered immune from international acts of terror that are difficult to counter owing to the international networks involved, and which may be perpetrated by individuals not affiliated to a specific country or group, but to an ideological cause.

35. On the African continent, acts of terror by diverse militant extremist groups remain a threat, at present in mainly North, East and West Africa. These include Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and to a lesser extent the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta and the Lord’s Resistance Army. Al Shabaab and Boko Haram have been the most violent armed groups in Africa in recent years. This is reinforced by the number of fatalities that can be attributed to both groups. While Boko Haram is responsible for far more fatalities per event than Al Shabaab,

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South African Defence Review 2015

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

this is in part due to how Al Shabaab uses unidentified groups to perpetrate much of its violence against civilians.

36. Increased security at military and strategic facilities will drive extremists to attack ‘softer’ targets such as private citizens and commercial interests. Terror incidents will tend to occur in urban centres, often capitals. The characteristics of effective terror organisations make them difficult intelligence targets. Countering acts of terror will remain a prime focus of major powers’ security policies.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND OTHER LETHAL WEAPONS

37. The threat posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs\(^5\)), including Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons, is of enduring concern. Major role players regard the proliferation of WMDs and their delivery systems as a priority threat. Proliferation of WMDs is evident in certain states that have not signed or do not adhere to international control treaties.

38. Nuclear conflict between two evenly matched powers is unlikely in the near future, but not impossible. Miscalculation in regional crises or the actions of a belligerent state could spark conflict that could plunge several military powers into war. In addition, the use of a radiological device, or so-called “dirty bomb”, is probably the most serious WMD threat posed by non-state groups. International efforts pursue the control of WMDs, delivery systems, supplies of fissionable matériel, chemical precursors and biological agents. The international focus is on preventing newcomers (state and non-state) from attaining WMDs. Much less success is being attained in reducing present WMD stocks. International attention will thus focus on potential nuclear transgressors.

39. The globalisation of technology is leading to the diffusion of military technology. Advantages will accrue to states with the adaptability to link civilian technologies successfully to defence programmes, and the foresight to anticipate future warfare requirements accurately. Free trade in weapons and easy global migration of skilled military and scientific personnel can result in countries rapidly acquiring a strategic aggressive capacity. At the same time, technology and highly competitive arms markets result in weapons that are less expensive, more portable, destructive, widely available and easier for non-state actors to use.

40. The possibility of non-state actors, such as terror groups, acquiring WMDs is strong, as this matériel and technology become more readily available. Chemical and biological weapons are generally easier to develop, hide and deploy than nuclear weapons. Chemical and biological weapons could well be used in a regional conflict or a terror attack.

NON-STATE ACTORS

41. Most conflicts in Africa over the last ten years have involved rebel and armed groups opposing governments by means of guerrilla warfare. This has been characterised at times by external state-sponsored support to non-state actors, and internal state-sponsored violence for political ends. These rebel groups may consist of warlords, militias, paramilitary groups, armed guerrillas, terror organisations, religious extremists and insurgents. They rely mainly on small arms and light weapons already available, or on private companies and individuals who supply them with first and second-generation weapons.

42. Their modus operandi is to establish safe base areas in remote parts of a country or in a neighbouring state, where there is no effective administrative or security presence. From there they expand the territory under their control and establish their own administration to enable them to obtain revenue through ‘taxes’ and the exploitation of natural resources. Logistic supply systems are rudimentary and consist mainly of pillaging from the local population and living off the land.

43. Their military focus areas, apart from territorial expansion, are the disruption of, inter alia, road and rail communication lines, economic ventures that supply the government with revenue, urban centres and ultimately the national capital. Control over airfields that can be used for logistic supply and the export of exploited natural resources is an important prerequisite for success.

MERCENARIES AND PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES

44. The participation of mercenaries and private security companies in armed conflicts is controversial, especially when military services are provided in violation of international law or to sustain illegitimate regimes. Attempts to address this issue are complicated by the difficulty of achieving a universal and concise definition of mercenarism (as opposed to the legal activities of private security companies). Notwithstanding, mercenarism is understood to be a manifestation of unregulated foreign security assistance and has the potential to undermine legitimate governments.

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\(^5\) WMDs are generally grouped into nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological capabilities.
45. A further complicating factor is the increasingly blurred relationship between military and non-military aspects of conflict resolution. As more comprehensive approaches to conflict resolution are adopted, it is expected that private security companies will in future undertake a wider range of activities, some of which were until recently carried out by armed forces and official military personnel.

46. Properly regulated private security companies may indeed have a force-multiplication value\(^6\) in certain situations. This may include theatres such as peace missions where, for example, civilian contractors may provide services such as logistical support, weapons maintenance, sanitation and even training to ex-combatants during their integration into national defence forces.

47. Several South African private security companies continue to be contracted by foreign countries to operate in conflict zones, usually protecting prominent individuals, critical infrastructure, property and strategic resources. Such private security companies may employ both South Africans and non-South Africans and may also possess significant arms and ammunition.

48. The challenge to the South African Government remains the effective regulation of South African private security companies and to ensure that their activities are not inconsistent with law or regulation and to enforce compliance therewith. South Africa’s initial attempt to regulate this industry was through the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act, 1998 (Act No 15 of 1998).

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Figure 2-12: Climate Change Vulnerability in Africa
49. However it became apparent that this legislation lacked adequate substance. Consequently the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of Armed Conflict Act (Act No 27 of 2006) was assented to by the President in 2007. Although the Act has been assented to the President has not brought it into force pending the development of the Regulations thereto.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND NATURAL DISASTERS

50. The consequences of climate change (Figure 2-12) pose some of the most serious threats to humanity, including an increase in the frequency and severity of floods, hurricanes, cyclones and wildfires. Prolonged droughts and rising desertification may cripple food production and increase famine. Climate change will over time also result in rising sea levels, threatening low-lying areas and certain island states. Tectonic events, including volcanic eruptions and earthquakes that could result in tsunamis, are ever-present environmental risks that could result in major humanitarian disasters. While Southern Africa is geologically stable, other parts of Africa such as the Rift Valley and North Africa are more exposed to such events.

51. Climate change in the SADC context can be expected to manifest in floods and droughts, resulting in SADC Member States seeking assistance within the region. The continent generally lacks civil capacity to manage disasters and will continue to rely on defence capabilities for disaster management. As weather patterns become more erratic and natural disasters more frequent, South Africa must possess both the technical expertise and hardware to render assistance within SADC. The Defence Force would in particular be expected to maintain a capacity to play a significant supportive role in addressing the consequences of such events.

POVERTY, UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND POOR HUMAN SECURITY

52. Of the 39 countries worldwide that are currently facing food emergencies, 23 are in Africa. Population growth and increases in consumption on the continent will continue to strain the ability of poorer nations to alleviate conditions of poverty and underdevelopment. It is estimated that the population of Sub-Saharan Africa will exceed 1.3 billion by 2035 and that 45% of the continent’s population will live in urban areas by 2015, increasing to 54% by 2025. The implication will be increasing overpopulation and substantial growth in unplanned and random informal settlements within and around urban areas.

53. In addition much of Africa and the SADC region continue to be stricken by chronic underdevelopment, inadequate health services and the attendant problems of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment (Figure 2-13). These human security and devel-

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opment problems continue to impact negatively on the region in the form of a range of non-military threats, namely: the spread of diseases; the flow of refugees; the illicit cross-border smuggling in drugs, goods, small arms and light weapons; and environmental destruction\(^8\). This feeds the endemic cycle between poverty and violence.

54. Overpopulation and human settlement trends will have significant implications for defence forces. The increasing number of armed combatants and unarmed non-combatants in a combat zone will add significantly to the complexity of undertaking successful military operations. It is also likely that unregulated urbanisation will result in future adversaries having urban survival and combat skills. Consequently, they might choose to pursue their objectives and conduct operations in sprawling towns and cities which will already have experienced endemic lawlessness and high levels of violence\(^9\).

**FOOD SECURITY**

55. The continent will face growing water scarcity and stress, thereby increasing the propensity for conflicts over this vital resource for human survival (Figure 2-14). The population growth of the continent, the uneven distribution of available resources and the concomitant rise in consumption levels will also result in a greater demand and competition for essential natural resources, especially water, food and land.

56. More than 75 million Africans are expected to be affected by the impacts of climate change, especially small-scale and subsistence farmers. This may be characterised by water scarcity, desertification and soil erosion. The UN estimates that by 2020, agricultural yields from some rain-fed crops will be reduced by 50%. This subsistence-bias towards food production, in which farmers largely produce for their own consumption and only sell their surplus, coupled to the vagaries of climate change, is likely to place increased strain on food security of particularly urban populations. The population of the Horn of Africa, for example, has increased almost five-fold since 1960, placing severe pressure on available resources.

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57. The Continent must progress towards large-scale farming practices and the establishment of sustainable agri-businesses in order to meet future food production demands.

**ENDEMIC DISEASE**

58. Pandemics and outbreaks of communicable diseases will continue to have a significant impact on human development. Health is a key driver in social stability (Figure 2-15). The deterioration in the health status or the perceived health status of a community can stimulate social upheaval.

59. Like many middle-income countries, South Africa has to grapple simultaneously with the diseases of poverty and affluence, but the inequalities in access to health care mean that relatively more is spent on the diseases of affluence. Supportive measures to enhance health, such as ensuring safe drinking water, effective sewage processing plants and control over vector diseases, are inadequate. This places an increasing burden on mainly the public health infrastructure, but also on the military health infrastructure in the country.

60. A quadruple health burden undermines the social well-being of the South African community, including the military community. These are the pandemic of HIV/AIDS; the increasing injury patterns of both accidental and non-accidental injuries; outbreaks of communicable diseases including re-emerging diseases (such as tuberculosis, diarrhoea and pneumonia, which interact in vicious negative feedback loops with malnutrition and HIV); and the growing incidence of lifestyle diseases related to affluence.

61. Conflict in Africa is generally of low intensity, but is extensive and destructive. This is especially evident from the large number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), of which Africa (with 15% of world population) has 20% and 40% respectively of the world total. Conflicts in the Maghreb, Chad, Eastern DRC, Somalia and Sudan, as well as an increase in political violence and unconstitutional changes of power in some countries, are important causes of migration.

62. South Africa remains a destination of choice for many foreign migrants because of real and perceived opportunities and stability, in contrast to the instability and deprivation in other

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12 Data provided by Defence Intelligence (Health Intelligence).
13 The number of IDPs in Africa remains stable at 11.6 million. Sudan has the largest number of IDPs of about 4.9 million. Other countries with large numbers of IDPs are the DRC and Somalia, with 1.9 million and 1.5 million respectively. Refugees in Africa total 2.1 million, a decline from 3.4 million in 2000. Kenya has the largest refugee population of 360,000, followed by Chad with 314,000.
areas of the continent. The irregular migration to South Africa and the attendant smuggling of humans and other goods have critical domestic security implications, particularly as they relate to linkages with extremist organisations and the furtherance of the illicit economies of Southern Africa. Porous borders are exploited by those intent on cross-border crime, particularly: arms proliferation; drug trafficking; vehicle smuggling; the smuggling of precious stones, metals, ivory and endangered species; and the illegal importation of cigarettes, clothing, alcoholic beverages and other goods. Key migratory trends are indicated in Figure 2-16.

63. Many migrant populations engage in a range of illicit and illegal activities, out of which some formal businesses grow. Business enterprises include spaza shops, cell phone and internet cafés, motor spares and mechanic shops, refrigeration and household electrical goods shops and hair salons, in many cases undercutting the prices charged by locals due to joint wholesale purchasing and distribution of goods. Illicit economic activities include fraud, money laundering, FOREX violations, contraband, counterfeiting and tax evasion. These are done on a cash basis without credit cards, lay-bys, receipts, any form of accounting or record keeping. There is therefore no registration of the goods, non-filing of the requisite documentation, non-declaration of the contents and non- or under-reporting to the Revenue Services.

64. The management of migratory flows will remain an acute challenge for the relevant departments and agencies. The phased return of the Defence Force to border safeguarding is a positive step and measures will have to be put in place to ensure that it is suitably guided and capacitated in terms of managing particularly illegal crossing of the borderline. Continued deficiencies in both Border Line Control and Border Post Management (land, sea and air borders), including insufficient human and logistical resources, will continue to be exploited by illegal migration and trans-national crime syndicates.

65. The levels of international organised crime will grow in volume, organisation and profitability as criminals target new and developing trans-national markets. Criminals will aggressively exploit the weaknesses in security systems, control measures, sea routes and harbours of emerging markets. This will present ma-
violent property crime. Although violent crime constitutes mestic violence; rape and sexual assault; robbery and other identified include assaults linked to arguments, anger and do-

68. South African society has been persistently affected by crime, especially violent crime. Major forms of violent crimes identified include assaults linked to arguments, anger and dom-

67. The regional dimension of the illicit economy is also a cause for concern. Factors that have allowed for the illicit economy to thrive in the region are mainly illegal border controls, a lack of capacity to enforce existing legis-

66. Africa’s peace, security, stability and development are similarly being undermined by trans-national crime that targets the trafficking in small arms, light weapons, contraband, drugs and humans, as well as both being the base of certain terror groups and the target of their activities. As example, Africa has seen the emergence of two syndicated phenomena, namely illegal mining and illegal bunkering of crude oil, including illegal gold mining in South Africa and illegal oil bunkering in the Niger Delta and the Gulf of Guinea.

69. Large-scale drug-trafficking continues to be the most visible form of serious organised crime. South Africa has been identified as a regional hub and transit zone for illicit drugs. There has been a marked increase in the flow of drugs into South Africa in recent years, with international syndicates playing a prominent role in this regard. Substance abuse, particularly drug use, is a key factor driving youth-based crime in South Africa.

70. The illicit economy must be addressed; as it is estimated that South Africa’s economy is losing 10% of its GDP to illicit trade in areas like mining, tobacco and textiles. Economic crime is widespread by sector, particularly in finance, manufac-

turing, mining, retail, and government procurement and tenders. A broad typology of economic crime includes trade in arms, drugs and humans; counterfeiting; smuggling; corruption; trade in contraband; fraud; money laundering and tax evasion.

71. Social protest and disruptive industrial action have been on the increase, accompanied by an increase in levels of violence. Protest and strike action have often turned violent, threatening stability in parts of the country. In general, causes of riots and demonstrations are extremely diverse: there is no single-issue driver of protests and demonstrations, although a large share of events are concerned with various work and industry-related strikes and stoppages. Most incidents of violence against civilians are typically linked to demonstrations and riots, either through participants in demonstrations targeting nearby, unarmed civilians, or police forces engaging protesters.

72. Growing dissatisfaction associated with service delivery will continue to cause major disruptions, threaten the stability of some communities and possibly the country, and jeopardise the provision of essential services. In general, the underlying causes of protest action include income inequality, unemployment and poverty. This is compounded by the prices of food and energy.

73. Intolerance and violence against foreign nationals remain a concern, but cannot be linked to any single causal factor. It is rather the result of a combination of factors, several of which can be linked to competition over scarce resources and the accompanying dynamics of human behaviour. Other causes of anti-foreigner violence in South Africa include entrenched negative perceptions and stereotypes about foreigners, business rivalry, criminality, population density and pressure on scarce resources, particularly where perceptions of relative deprivation are sharpened by high unemployment and strong migratory pressure.

74. Youth unemployment plays a prominent role in both pro-
test action and in attacks against foreign nationals. The epicen-
tres of protest are areas where inequality is highest, with high population pressure and higher-than-average levels of unem-

75. Cyber-security is an ever-present concern for all spheres of South African society. Reports on violations of information systems and infrastructure litter the information landscape, with commerce, banking, government and private information having fallen victim to the perpetrators of cyber-crime. The threat exists in an environment that is rapidly evolving and changing, specifically with significant amounts of personal information being freely available on social networking sites. It involves four discrete manifestations:

a. **Cyber-espionage** involving, inter alia, the silent gathering of classified information without the permission of the holder of the information.

b. **Cyber-crime** involving, inter alia, malware, viruses, identity theft, intentional and unauthorised access, modification to and/or interception of computer data or programmes, computer-related extortion, fraud and forgery.

c. **Cyber-warfare** involving, inter alia, offensive information operations.

d. **Cyber-terror** involving *inter alia* Internet-based attacks in terror activities by individuals and groups.

76. Malicious cyber activity has caused damage to large-scale real-world infrastructure. Cyber insecurity continues to pose a prominent threat to the critical information infrastructure of the state and pertinently to the country’s economic security. Cyber-attacks have led to the theft of state funds at both the national and provincial levels by criminal syndicates.

77. An increased reliance on information and communication technology networks has in effect exposed the state’s cyberspace to ever-increasing vulnerability, in particular the integrity of key national infrastructure, including financial and commercial institutions.

78. Advancements in information and media technologies have enabled the proliferation of national and global social networks which are increasingly being used to mobilise support for common causes both nationally and internationally. These technologies have also enabled radical militant groups to recruit people, as well as plan and fund acts of terror in various countries. As national economies are increasingly information-based, the use of information warfare is becoming a serious threat facing governments.

79. The threat is particularly malicious as the perpetrators misuse freely available tools and commercial infrastructure, remain largely anonymous and are exposed to very little personal risk due to limited cyber-related legislation and jurisdictional differences when legislation is in place. In addition, the technical infrastructure of the Internet allows the targeting of multiple victims in multiple locations, irrespective of time zones, with little additional effort and resources. Cyber-crime thus remains difficult to prove and is consequently difficult to prosecute.
THE COMPLEXITY OF FUTURE CONFLICT

80. In the present global security environment the traditional boundaries between fighting a war and stabilisation operations have become blurred. It is probable that defence forces will have to execute a mixture of conventional and unconventional operations while adopting symmetric and asymmetric approaches – indicating that the future security environment will be characterised by complex war fighting.

81. Military operations will span the spectrum from participation in disaster relief and support to government departments, to combat operations such as counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations, to lethal combat in responses to threats to national interests or threats to democracy. Certain types of operations can rapidly escalate from traditional peacetime interventions to major combat operations.

   a. Some military operations will be conducted largely in support of other state departments or agencies, where those departments or agencies have the overall executive responsibility for the operation. Such operations will generally not entail the use of military force.

   b. Military operations in defence against a military threat will largely be a Defence Force responsibility, although cooperation with and the involvement of other departments and agencies will always be required.

82. The spectrum of military operations will therefore include non-combat operations where the use of force will be absent or restricted to self-defence, to those where there is an implicit or explicit threat of military force, to major combat operations that cannot be conducted without the use of lethal force (Figure 2-18).

83. Future military operations will always carry the uncertain risk of escalation, scale, intensity, duration, complexity and asymmetry. Some types of operations can rapidly escalate from benign interventions to major combat operations. Many military operations may have to be conducted and sustained over long distances and for protracted periods of time.

84. Defence forces will further be required to operate in complex, highly fluid and often lethal environments, with physical and human complexity being an important characteristic. Future conflicts will thus be characterised by uncertainty, complexity and an increase in asymmetry.

   a. The physical terrain may include urban areas, dense bush, forests, mountains and areas dominated by river systems, swamps and deserts. Difficult terrain will become the contested battle space, with adversaries seeking to hold or exploit ground for political, social and military purposes.

   b. Ethnic, cultural, tribal, linguistic and religious diversity, and operations in the face of such tensions and conflicts, will produce considerable human complexity. The Defence Force will therefore be required to have knowledge of culture, customs and language as well as being master of sophisticated weapons and systems.

   c. It will be increasingly difficult to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants and to distinguish between groups of adversaries, either by their appearance or through the equipment and tactics that they use.

![Figure 2-18: The Spectrum of Military Operations](image-url)
85. The source of such threats may be continental or external to the continent. The projection of threat from beyond Africa would, however, be an extreme event, requiring major power involvement, or the collaboration of major powers, with considerable inter-continental military and logistic sustainment capabilities.

86. Future military operations will thus span a complex spectrum in terms of the potential or actual use of force, the nature and capability of opposing forces, scale, intensity, duration, and environmental variables such as location, demographics, climate and terrain. Cooperation with other government departments and agencies, and requirements for international cooperation will further influence the complexity of operations.

87. In addition to the inter-departmental, inter-agency nature of operations, operations can also be conducted in a multinational context, especially where security issues transcend national borders. Figure 2-18 again illustrates this relationship.

88. It is important that in the planning of any of the peace-building processes, cognisance should be taken of the fact that women, men and children are affected differently by conflict. The integration of gender perspectives in all aspects thus constitutes an important strategy to support inclusive and sustainable peace in post-conflict environments.

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**INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE EXPENDITURE**

**INTRODUCTION**

89. Defence expenditure data is important for four reasons:18

a. Firstly, it promotes democratic discussion of the role and tasks of the military.

b. Secondly, it facilitates discussion of resource allocation within a national budget between the military and the civil sectors.

c. Thirdly, its disclosure should form part of early-warning systems and confidence-building measures to prevent military tension, arms races and armed conflict. Increased defence-spending can be a prominent indicator of a military build-up prior to armed conflict, as war requires the diversion of resources for the purchase of arms, munitions and other logistics.

d. Fourthly, it can be used as a tool to discuss common security needs between states, as well as burden-sharing within alliances and coalitions.

90. Below is a broad overview of the main defence expenditure and arms transfer trends at the international, continental and regional levels.

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GLOBAL DEFENCE EXPENDITURE

91. Towards the end of the Cold War, international defence expenditure declined and remained stable up until 1998 (Figure 2-19). By 1999, international defence expenditure started to increase significantly and rose even more rapidly with the commencement of the War on Terror in September 2001. By 2009, international defence expenditure reached defence spending levels associated with the Cold War-era.

92. The sub-regions with the largest growth in defence expenditure since 2000 were:
   a. North Africa (107%).
   b. Eastern Europe (88%).
   c. North America (75%).
   d. East Asia (71%).
   e. South Asia (57%).

93. Algeria is the biggest military spender in North Africa and on the African continent. The strong growth in Eastern Europe is accounted for by the Russian Federation, whose armed forces are going through a significant modernisation programme up to 2020.

94. The strong defence expenditure trend in North America is attributed to the United States, whose defence budget increased from 3.1% to 4.9% of GDP and by approximately 75% in real terms, remaining the highest international spender on defence. The United States spent 43% of the world’s defence spending in 2009, followed by China (6.6%), France (4.2%), the United Kingdom...
(3.8%) and Russia (3.5%). In contrast, during the Cold War (1986), the US spent only 28% of the world total on defence\textsuperscript{21}.

95. Western and Central Europe were the two sub-regions that had the lowest growth in defence spending over the same period. The decrease in Western European defence spending is an indication of how many countries in this region reverted to an emphasis on “soft power” rather than military power.

96. Figure 2-20 is a comparative graph of selected countries that demonstrates their 2009 defence expenditure is constant US$ across the three planes of actual budget, percentage of GDP and percentage of government expenditure.

AFRICAN DEFENCE EXPENDITURE

97. In the new millennium, Africa enjoyed unprecedented economic growth of between 5% and 6% p.a. in terms of real GDP until 2008\textsuperscript{22}. The continent was, however, hard hit by the global financial crisis as commodity prices decreased and economic growth declined to 3.1% in 2009 but is expected to steadily recover into the next decade. Africa’s defence expenditure mirrored economic growth, increasing by 51% over the period 1988 to 2009 (see Figure 2-21), largely driven by Algeria’s 97% increase in defence spending\textsuperscript{23}. In the rest of Africa, defence spending is relatively low by international standards.

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\textsuperscript{22} African Economic Outlook, at www.africaneconomicoutlook.org.


\textsuperscript{24} Military Balance 2010.
SUB-SAHARAN DEFENCE EXPENDITURE

98. Although Africa’s defence spending increased in real terms, sub-Saharan Africa’s defence spending declined from an average of 1.75% of GDP in 2004 to 1.24% in 2008 (Figure 2-22).

99. Figures 2-23 and 2-24 below demonstrate East and Southern Africa’s defence expenditure from 1990 to 2010 indicating that South Africa and Angola spend most on defence in Southern Africa, while Kenya and Ethiopia spend most in East Africa. Nigeria spends the most on defence in West Africa. It needs to, however, be kept in mind that a large volume of armament and prime mission equipment transfers are conducted in secret or even bartered.

![Table showing defence expenditure in East and Southern Africa from 1990 to 2010](image-url)
NATURAL RESOURCES AND DEFENCE EXPENDITURE

100. Another trend over the last decade is a rapid increase in defence expenditure by countries in many different regions through revenues from natural resources and particularly oil and gas\(^\text{26}\). The rapid increase in defence expenditure was enabled by high commodity prices, new discoveries and exploitation. Algeria is the biggest military spender in North Africa and the African continent. Countries with the highest growth in military spending include: Chad (663%), Azerbaijan (471%), Kazakhstan (360%) and Ecuador (241%).

ARMS TRANSFER TRENDS

101. Since the end of the Cold War there has been a steady decline in global arms transfers which reached a low-point in 2002. Since 2002 there has been a steady increase in arms transfers up until 2007, with a decrease in 2008 (Figure 2-25) which has not reversed the overall upward trend.

102. Between 1980 and 1984, the top five biggest arms suppliers were the Soviet Union, the US, France, the United Kingdom and Germany. This list changed very little in the following decades and the post-Cold War era. The top suppliers and recipients are indicated in Figure 2-26\(^\text{27}\).

- a. Between 2004 and 2008, the largest arms suppliers were the US, Russia, Germany, France and the UK and they accounted for 78% of all arms exports.
- b. The top five recipients of conventional weapons between 2004 and 2008 were China, India, the UAE, South Korea and Greece.

103. African states accounted for 7% of international imports of major conventional weapons over the period 2004 to 2008\(^\text{28}\). Over this period, Algeria and South Africa were the largest arms importers in Africa and accounted for 35% and 27% of imports respectively. Sudan was the third largest recipient of conventional weapons with 8% of imports. The arms imports of Chad (Sudan’s neighbour) increased five times over the period 2004 to 2008 than from 1999 to 2003.

104. Countries with increased revenues from natural resources such as oil and gas are generally spending more on defence. African oil-producing countries such as Algeria, Chad, Angola and Sudan can therefore be expected to significantly increase their military inventories over the short, medium and long term.

\(^\text{27}\) Between 2005 and 2009, combat aircraft accounted for 27% of all arms transfers.
105. South Africa and its people exist within an international system of states that co-exist through cooperation and interdependence. There is a myriad of factors that produce challenges and threats to South Africa’s national security, emanating from the political, socio-economic, environmental and military aspects of national life and international relations. These security challenges do not remain constant; they change over time in response to new developments that impact both on the internal structures of states, as well as the global environment. Moreover, such security challenges do not exist in isolation, but impact on and reinforce one another and if unmitigated will give rise to new challenges and threats.

106. Africa cannot continue to expect the rest of the world to solve its problems; it has to become the architect of its own destiny. South Africa is undeniably a major power in Africa (with the leading economy accounting for 24% of African GDP) and as such, undeniably has a vested interest in contributing to the rooting of democracy, the promotion of economic advancement and the pursuit of peace, stability and development on the African continent. That in turn requires a balanced Defence Force with the requisite strength and the appropriate spread of capabilities and depth of personnel and material resources to handle a diverse and evolving set of challenges, some of which are as yet unknown.

DEFENDING SOUTH AFRICA’S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY

107. From a defence perspective, the core tenet of national security means freedom from attack or threat of attack, the preservation of the state’s territorial integrity, the maintenance of sovereignty, independence and physical survival. It is within this context that South Africa’s constitutional requirement for a Defence Force capable of responding to an external threat, is not only justifiable but also remains an imperative.

108. The Defence Force is a unique instrument and an indispensable lever of power at the disposal of the State to pursue its national security and foreign policy priorities and is consequently at the core of South Africa’s national security. The deployment of the Defence Force must thus be coordinated with the full

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Figure 2-26: The Suppliers and Recipients of Major Conventional Weapons (2004-2008)

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range of instruments which Government can bring to bear both domestically and regionally. However, the Defence Force provides the means of last resort when other instruments of state are unable to protect or defend South Africa.

109. The defence of South Africa against any threat to its sovereignty, territory, national interest or peoples will remain the primary defence priority. All other defence responsibilities will be executed and managed according to priorities dictated by circumstance at the time. Defence of South Africa’s territorial integrity and sovereignty would most likely be a response to external armed threats from either state or non-state actors. Such threats would probably remain within the threshold of:

a. Firstly, at an inter-state level, that of defence against an overt military threat or the conducting of a limited war; and,

b. Secondly, at the level of non-state actors, defending against threats to the constitutional order and/or insurgency.

**PROTECTING VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS**

110. South Africa’s domestic security focuses on the interrelated priorities of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, constitutional order, the security and continuance of national institutions, the well-being, prosperity and upliftment of the South African people, the growth of the economy, and demonstrable good governance. These interests are pursued in a coordinated manner by all entities of the State, including the Defence Force.

111. The Defence Force would be required to maintain the capabilities to:

a. Ensure the freedom of South Africa to trade, including the free use of land, air and sea routes, good order at sea and in the airspace, and the safety and security of trade and transport hubs.

b. Ensure the security, domestically and externally, of fundamental resources, such as minerals, energy and water, including the safe and secure delivery, processing and distribution thereof.

c. Ensure the safety and security of domestic and external strategic installations.

d. Ensure the safety and security of the South African people, both within national territory and abroad.

**SAFEGUARDING TERRITORIAL BORDERS**

112. South Africa’s borders are the physical manifestation of its national sovereignty. These comprise the land, air and maritime spaces that are internationally recognised to be under the physical control and political authority of the South African government. Prominent security challenges to South Africa’s borders reflect inadequate control and monitoring to prevent amongst others, the smuggling of small arms and light weapons, the activities of criminal syndicates trafficking in stolen goods and property, the illegal sale of South Africa’s natural resources, infiltration by terror groups, and cross-border migration issues such as disease control.

113. Deficiencies in both Borderline Control and Border Post Management (land, sea and air borders) continue to pose a prominent risk to South Africa’s national security.

**Safeguarding South Africa’s Land Borders**

114. South Africa remains a destination of choice for some foreign migrants because of perceived opportunities and relative stability. It has become increasingly clear that illegal migration impacts broadly on South Africa in terms of social instability, the importing of foreign conflicts into society, the financing of terror activities, a range of criminal activity, the creation of no-go areas and the hollowing out of the rule of law in parts of the country.

115. The main challenges confronting South Africa’s landward ports of entry and borderline control continue to be the lack of systems to ensure tighter security control, inadequate infrastructure, insufficient human and logistical resources and some elements of corruption. South Africa’s land borderline remains exploited due to the poor state of electric and sisal fences, as well as inadequate monitoring and uncoordinated departmental activities. In many instances the actual physical borderline does not exist as there are no border fences. This is compounded by the lack of communication equipment, reconnaissance capacity and surveillance sensors for the security of the land border. As a result, increased volumes of goods and persons are not managed efficiently; land ports of entry continue be used as a conduit for smuggling commodities and people; and weak border-line security has facilitated illegal migration and crimes such as rhino poaching.

**Safeguarding South Africa’s Airspace**

116. South Africa’s airspace forms part of the country’s territoriality that must be secured. In the aviation environment challenges continue in areas such as airport controls at landing facilities, transit management and in the general security processes regarding migration management at international airports. Consequently the exploitation of aviation cargo centres for the movement of illegal goods remains a security challenge.

117. The greater part of South African airspace has not been covered by radar, highlighting the security challenge with monitoring small to medium aircraft. Erratic radar coverage has con-
stutted uncontrolled airspace. At present there is no primary or secondary coverage of some aviation borders. Consequently, illegal cross-border air traffic has been used to smuggle contraband, including diamonds, via South Africa to foreign destinations. The Defence Force's limited primary radar capacity leaves some of the airspace vulnerable.

**Safeguarding South Africa’s Maritime Territory**

118. Like other coastal states, South Africa's economy is dependent on trade. 50% of the country’s GDP comes from trade and 95% thereof is maritime trade. In addition, 30% of the world's oil supply passes the Cape annually. Some of South Africa’s major sources of wealth and political influence are the resources in its economic zones, on its continental shelf or in its coastal waters. At present South Africa’s ability to exercise sea-power is limited both in intensity and scope.

119. There are direct maritime threats (including maritime piracy and terrorism, armed crimes and illegal activity at sea such as illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing) and indirect threats which include extreme weather and loss of marine biodiversity. The most significant threat in the maritime domain remains the illegal movement of people and goods. The continued and increased illegal exploitation of South Africa’s natural maritime resources will lead to increased crime and instability, which poses a risk to stability in certain coastal regions of South Africa.

120. It is therefore important for South Africa to be able to:
   a. Exercise sovereignty within its territorial waters and enjoy certain sovereign rights on its continental shelf and exclusive economic zones.
   b. Perform blue-water naval tasks and off-shore territorial control on the open ocean, beyond the reach of littoral forces, shore-based aviation and land-based defence systems.
   c. Secure the right of innocent passage for merchant shipping, and the principle of the freedom of the seas.
   d. Perform international maritime obligations, such as: maritime search and rescue; hydrography; maritime charting; and the naval control of merchant shipping when necessary.

**SAFEGUARDING SOUTH AFRICA’S CYBERSPACE**

121. South Africa must be vigilant with regard to cyber-security. Due to the increased proliferation of technology within all realms, especially within the defence environment, Defence needs to adapt with the rapidly changing electronic environment. The daily dependence on technology solutions reinforces the need for appropriate security measures to be cyber-

secure, especially due to the borderless nature of cyberspace.

122. South Africa has established a National Cyber-Security Policy Framework whose purpose it is to create a secure, dependable, reliable and trustworthy cyber environment that facilitates the protection of critical information infrastructure whilst strengthening shared human values and understanding of cyber-security in support of national security imperatives and the economy. The National Cyber-Security Policy Framework sets out a number of tasks directly aligned to the Department of Defence:
   a. Address national security threats in cyberspace.
   b. Combat cyber-warfare, cyber-crime and other cyber ills.
   c. Develop, review and update existing substantive and procedural laws to ensure alignment.
   d. Build confidence and trust in the secure use of information and communication technologies.

123. The National Cyber-Security Policy Framework aims to strengthen all processes related to preventing and addressing cyber-crime, cyber-terrorism and cyber-warfare. It puts in place the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster (JCPS) Cyber-Security Response Committee to coordinate all South African cyber-security activities. The establishment of the necessary structures as described in the National Cyber-Security Policy Framework will contribute significantly to achieving the objectives described in the policy. It is also important that Defence is involved in all these structures to ensure that cyber-security is adequately addressed.

124. In addition, the Policy Framework states that Defence has overall responsibility for the coordination, accountability and implementation of cyber defence measures in South Africa as an integral part of its National Defence mandate. Defence must therefore spearhead the development of policies, strategies and systems pursuant to this mandate.

**PROMOTING CONTINENTAL AND REGIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY**

125. Since the advent of democracy in South Africa, the Southern African region has undergone substantial change. Progress has been made towards resolving long-standing internal conflicts and the institutionalisation of democratic practices. However, post-conflict reconstruction has posed many challenges, particularly in socio-economic development, the integration of former combatants and the consolidation of democracy. Of notable concern is the constant level of insecurity in the African Great Lakes. The pervasive state of instability in this region has negatively impacted on the broader security of contiguous states.

126. South Africa is in every way an integral part of the interna-
tional community and, particularly, of the African continent and Southern Africa. It is clearly in South Africa’s interests to work towards peace, security and stability in Africa. This will at times require the deployment of elements of the Defence Force for a wide range of missions, in addition to its core mission of defending and protecting South Africa and its interests.

127. South Africa must further, both in terms of its continental leadership role and its own national interest, and in partnership with other like-minded African states, play a leading role in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, post-conflict reconstruction and security sector reform. This will manifest in contributions to UN, AU and SADC security initiatives, as well as the conclusion of specific bilateral partnerships with other African states in the political, economic, social and security realms.

128. Consequently South Africa’s future military capability must be commensurate with its international status, its strategic posture and its inescapable continental leadership responsibilities. South Africa’s military capability must ultimately be able to support and enable this leadership role, as well as the pursuit of its own national interest.

129. As South Africa increasingly assumes this leadership role, it will similarly increasingly assume the obligation to provide experienced military leaders and proficient and well-led military forces for peace missions and other military operations on the African continent. These may range from non-combat operations to major combat operations potentially utilising extreme and deadly force.

130. The Defence Force must make a vital and unique contribution that complements South Africa’s diplomatic efforts, enhances South Africa’s influence within wider international developments, and promotes regional security, specifically through the application of military capabilities to pressing African security issues.

PROTECTING SOUTH AFRICA’S PEOPLE

131. The constitutional terminology of “defend and protect” does not only entail engagement in combat operations but also includes military operations other than war, including peace missions, as may be ordered by Government and as provided in law. This highlights the defence responsibility to support other government departments and the people of the country against environmental and non-military threats. There are four main security challenges to the South African people that would require a defence response, namely social stability, organised and violent crime, acts of terror and natural disasters.

Social Stability

132. Poverty and inequality remain potent drivers of social instability in South Africa. In general the underlying causes of protest action include widening income inequality, unemployment and poverty, encouraging conflict over access to scarce resources, creating social undercurrents along ethnic, racial and xenophobic lines, and increasing violent behaviour and criminal activity.

133. This has important implications for the operations of the Defence Force in the creation of an enabling environment for development. Some incidents will require Defence Force assistance to the Police Service and other State departments to counter their impact. Other functions that the Defence Force may undertake would include: bridge building in various areas, supplying water to drought-stricken areas and assisting with water purification, administering medical assistance in the case of pandemics such as cholera outbreaks, and assisting with search and rescue operations both at sea and on land.

134. South Africa’s internal stability needs to be constantly reviewed and assessed. The defence mandate requires the Defence Force to be capable of dealing with such unrest in cooperation with the Police Service under particular circumstances. As such, it has a direct implication for the long-term planning of the Defence Force in defining operational theatres, command structures, location of military bases, specific training and doctrine development, and all the other factors that will empower the Defence Force to achieve its mandate.

Organised and Violent Crime

135. Organised and violent crime threatens the legitimacy and integrity of the state and the functioning of its institutions. Crime also undermines development and social cohesion. South Africa faces the threat of the institutionalisation of crime. The longer the crime persists, the more embedded it becomes, and the more difficult it becomes to dislodge and neutralise. This requires a broad-based range of social development and security interventions, including specific cooperation between the Defence Force, the Police Service and other government departments.

Acts of Terror

136. Acts of terror and extremism, as posed by both foreign and domestic extremist and terror groups, continue to present a threat to the national security and stability of South Africa. This threat is strongly influenced by developments outside the borders of South Africa. Although it is in many cases indirect in nature, it continues to require vigilance and the attention of the intelligence and security agencies.
137. The four main security risks that terrorism poses to South Africa remain:
   a. the possibility of terror groups exploiting South African territory to mount an attack in another state;
   b. the possibility of South African soil being used as a conduit or transit zone for the movement of terror groups;
   c. an attack against a foreign target on South African soil; and
   d. an attack against a South African vital interest, either domestically or externally.

138. South Africa’s advanced communications, financial and transport infrastructure encourages individuals linked to acts of terror to exploit South African soil for logistical and support purposes, including the transfer of funds, money laundering, recruitment and the distributing of propaganda.

139. South Africa’s response to the threat of terrorism ought to address: perceptions and allegations of complacency by certain foreign powers, countering possible existence of sleeper cells inside South Africa due to uncontrolled migration and other factors; counter-terrorism operations by foreign intelligence services on South African soil; the radicalisation of local communities; terror-financing; and possible imported terror-related issues arising from émigré communities.

140. The Defence Force will be required to render specialised counter-terror assistance to other Security Services.

Natural Disasters

141. The consequences of climate change pose some of the most serious threats to humanity, including an increase in the frequency and severity of floods, hurricanes, cyclones, wildfire, prolonged droughts and rising desertification.

142. As weather patterns become more erratic and natural disasters more frequent, Defence would be expected to maintain a capacity to play a significant supportive role in addressing the consequences of such events. In the long term there is a need for a comprehensive audit of the disaster management capacity of the country as a whole. This audit is critical given the increase in incidents of extreme weather, which cause damage to lives and infrastructure. Latent human disasters are also a concern, particularly as earth tremors in deep mines in our country exceed earth movements in certain earthquake regions.
1. Following the political transition in 1994, South Africa faced a new set of situational imperatives. These included the fundamental restructuring of its social, political and economic sectors. It had to create a democratic society, develop its constitutional imperatives, remove economic inefficiencies and under-development, and turn an inward-looking focus outward. South Africa had to harness its economic resources and liquidity to ensure the competitiveness of the economy and its reintegration into the global economy. Restructuring of the private and public sectors was also a strategic imperative. South Africa had to change the terms of its incorporation into the global system, and reintegrate itself into the political economy of the continent with the aim of positively engaging the African political and economic environment. South Africa in essence needed to rehabilitate itself in the family of nations.

2. This process of rebuilding and reshaping society was informed and animated by the liberating vision of striving to overcome the legacy of apartheid and colonialism and the building of a non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society. On the international front, the building of just, equitable and cooperative relations with the rest of the world was a necessary condition for the realisation of South Africa’s national policy goals.

3. Post 1994, one of the government’s policy priorities was the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The RDP was seen as the long-term means of promoting the well-being and security of citizens and, thereby, the stability of the country. The RDP focused on addressing the basic needs of the people, developing human resources, building the economy and democratising the state and society, and is thus viewed as part of the broader national security agenda. While the RDP has been overtaken by later policy initiatives, the fundamental principles of the RDP endure and are embedded in our understanding of human security as a component of wider national security.

4. Constitutional provisions clearly prescribe a fundamental break from the tradition of military involvement in politics that characterised South Africa pre-1994. Furthermore, Cold War
national security had a narrow military and security focus that emphasised the physical protection of the state against external military threats. The security concept has now shifted to a broader concept encompassing the safety and security of all citizens.

5. This broad safety and security perspective, emphasising the wellbeing of the citizenry, extends by implication the political, economic, social and environmental security domains. The personal security of the individual extends to matters such as education, health, freedom of movement, protection of human rights, freedom from gender-based violations and individual, political, economic and democratic development. It further extends to the rights of political and cultural communities.

6. This understanding of security does not replace the security of the state with the security of the people. It sees these as mutually dependent. The state retains the obligation to facilitate, if not create, the necessary conditions and environment for the fulfilment of human security. Within this conceptualisation, Defence is but one of the elements of state power that promote and ensure national security. Although Defence contributes to human security, this should not distract the Defence Force from its mandated functions. Policy should rather express how the execution of mandated defence functions and other specific initiatives can in certain circumstances contribute to the development of South Africa’s people.

SOVEREIGNTY & NATIONAL POSTURE

SOVEREIGNTY

7. South Africa is one sovereign and democratic state that is a parliamentary republic. The Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled. National security has at its crux the protection and continuance of the sovereignty of South Africa, its political and economic independence, and the protection of its institutions, values and freedoms.

8. South Africa’s sovereignty is, inter alia, characterised as follows:
   a. The Constitution is the supreme law and authority.
   b. Ultimate political authority is vested in the people of South Africa who play an active role in shaping and deciding policy through the expression of a general public will and the aggregate civil interest of society.
   c. The people are democratically represented by a parliamentary representation system which in turn elects the Head of State.
   d. The Rule of Law is applicable, obeyed and enforced and the independent legal system is free from interference.
   e. South Africa possesses and exercises full authority and jurisdiction over its territory, claimed areas and resources, as well as the conferred rights in exclusive zones.
   f. South Africa is free from outside interference, intimidation or coercion upon its basic prerogatives and is free to pursue relations with other states.
   g. South African citizens are protected and are entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits of citizenship; and equally subject to the duties and responsibilities of citizenship.
   h. The democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom are affirmed and are protected, promoted and fulfilled by the State.
   i. Order and peace are maintained and sanction for the violation of laws is enforced.
   j. Government manages the affairs of the State and pursues the interests and welfare of its citizens.

NATIONAL POSTURE

9. South Africa is a multifaceted, multicultural and multiracial nation. It is further a developing nation, its domestic and foreign policies being driven by the developmental needs of its people. The cornerstone of South Africa’s future prosperity is sustainable economic growth and development, both domestically and in the region.

10. South Africa is consequently a sovereign and peaceful country with no aggressive intentions towards any other state. It seeks to live in peace with its neighbours and actively pursues the principles of non-intervention in the affairs of other nation-states. It seeks to promote peace and security, prevent and deter conflict, pursue the peaceful resolution of conflict and deepen systems of democracy and global governance. South Africa further recognises the interdependence of states and will seek to promote cooperation over competition and collaboration over confrontation.

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1 Constitution 1996: Section 1.
3 Constitution, 1996: Section 2.
4 Constitution 1996: Section 3(2)(a).
5 Constitution 1996: Section 3(2)(b).
6 Constitution 1996: Section 7(1).
7 Constitution 1996: Section 7(2).
11. South Africa thus recognises that its own prosperity and sustainability are inextricably entwined with those of the continent, and the converse thereof is also true. South Africa positions itself as an integral part of the African continent and sees its own growth and development as being intrinsically linked to Africa’s stability, unity, and prosperity.

12. Similarly, the security of South Africa and the security of the region are inextricably entwined. A secure South Africa contributes to a secure region; and a secure region contributes to a secure South Africa. Consequently, the concept of national security cannot exist independently from the concept of regional security and, concomitantly, South Africa’s National Defence Policy must be cognisant of the role that the Defence Force must play in the promotion of regional security.

13. Africa is at the centre of South African policy. South Africa recognises its responsibility to contribute significantly to the advancement of the continent. South Africa has significant diplomatic, economic and military capabilities that position it to make a unique contribution to the resolution of many pressing African issues. To this end, South Africa’s leadership in collaboration with other significant and able partners will provide momentum to African issues. South Africa specifically strives to:
   a. Eradicate poverty, inequality and opportunity deprivation as the sources of instability.
   b. Resolve conflicts through dialogue and negotiation, rather than through the use of force.
   c. Promote and consolidate freedom, the hard-won rights that have been gained, and the strengthening of the institutions that have been created.
   d. Deepen democracy and globalise associated rights, freedoms and democratic institutions wherever and whenever possible.
   e. Promote the belief that the future of the world is based on the shared destiny of all peoples.

14. South Africa actively supports regional and continental processes that respond to and resolve crises. South Africa’s evolving international work recognises two canons, namely Pan-Africanism and South-South solidarity. This importantly means that national security is rooted in:
   b. South-South solidarity as a firm opposition to colonialism and neo-colonialism in all their forms.

15. South Africa seeks to build an environment in which it can realise its political, security and economic interests, thus seeking to champion collaboration, cooperation and the building of partnerships in Africa.

16. South Africa envisages that, as a major power in Africa, it will play a leading role in conflict prevention, peace-building, and post-conflict reconstruction.

NATIONAL INTEREST AND NATIONAL SECURITY

NATIONAL INTEREST

A Collective Concept

17. National interest is a collective concept that defines the aggregate of things that ensure national sovereignty and which guarantee the survival and development of a nation. National interest has been described as a broad "sixth sense" that evolves with a nation’s history, national experience and strategic context and is most often asserted by the formal authority, the State.

18. National interests are by their very definition not static, but are subject to periodic change and to differing interpretations by various sectors of society. States determine their national interest at strategic moments in their development when the structural conditions that give rise to the national interest change in a fundamental way. It is not every day that the national interest is re-defined because the conditions that give rise to it are normally not volatile, but of longer duration. National interest, due to its broad and shifting nature, cannot be decreed in statutes.

19. National interests are therefore essential and indispensable to the sovereignty of a state. It must be noted that national interests may, in some instances, be counter-posed to the interests of other states, thus informing the development of foreign policy.

20. Debate on national interest always gives rise to differences of opinion and approaches. Overall, there will be those who do not accept the prevailing view of the national interest. Furthermore, national interest and broad public interest should not be confused with the immediate self-interest of individuals or organisations.

South Africa’s Interests

21. South Africa’s national interests are evolving and maturing in pace with its emergent nationhood, requiring that cohesion and unity be forged around a common consensus on these matters.

22. South Africa’s national interests will reflect its long-term goals, values and aspirations, provide the ongoing purpose to be served, provide strategic direction to policy makers, and provide consistency to South African policy-making. South Africa’s
national interests will reflect its collective endeavour, using national resources to advance the well-being and contentment of the nation people, inclusive of ensuring the survival, safety and well-being of its people and institutions.

23. The well-being and development of the South African people form the cornerstone of the national interest. The Constitution holds the interests of South Africa’s people at its core and enjoins a people-centred approach in the activities of the State. South Africa consequently emphasises human development and human security within and beyond its borders. The national interest is thus informed by a people-driven perspective that prioritises protecting and promoting the human rights of its citizens; enabling them to live free from fear and want; eradicating poverty; and building a society in which every citizen has access to adequate shelter, health care, education, security, work and opportunities to generate an income.

24. South Africa’s overarching national interest is to secure and advance the wellbeing of its citizens. In the South African context, national interests may be quantified as:

Those cardinal interests that, if threatened or removed, would compromise the sovereignty, independence, survival, continuance or liberty of the Republic and therefore are considered vital for the functioning of the state, the security and well-being of the people and the preservation of the South African way of life.

NATIONAL SECURITY

25. National security will be pursued through the coordinated application of all means of state-power (political, diplomatic, information, economic, social and military) to meet national goals and objectives and the political, economic, social, environmental and cultural rights and aspirations of South Africa’s people.

26. Section 198 of the 1996 Constitution requires that:

a. National security must reflect the resolve of South Africans, as individuals and as a nation, to live as equals, to live in peace and harmony, to be free from fear and want and to seek a better life;

b. The resolve to live in peace and harmony precludes any South African citizen from participating in armed conflict, nationally or internationally, except as provided for in terms of the Constitution or national legislation;

c. National security must be pursued in compliance with the law, including international law;

d. National security is subject to the authority of Parliament and the National Executive.

27. South Africa believes that addressing the causes and consequences of insecurity promotes an environment conducive to human development. This people-centred approach to national security thus places a legitimate, credible and cohesive developmental state at the centre of driving the overarching agenda of building a better South Africa, a better and safer Africa and a better world for all peoples. South Africa thus pursues three main objectives (Triple-Ps):

a. Promoting the well-being, development and upliftment of the people so as to free them from fear and want.

b. Protecting the planet and managing climate change to ensure the sustainability for future generations of resources of energy, water and food.

c. Ensuring the prosperity of the country, the region and the continent, through sustainable economic growth and development.

28. South Africa, together with like-minded partners, remains committed to continental and regional peace, stability and development. South Africa will thus give preference to acting in partnership, both within multilateral structures or through diplomatic and political efforts, to:

a. Defuse contentious issues or situations before they give rise to serious dispute or potential for conflict;

b. Resolve disputes and conflicts that do arise by means of diplomacy, mediation or negotiation; and

c. Develop and entrench regional and continental collaborative systems and means, including alliances and pacts, to reduce the potential for tension and conflict and to increase the potential for the peaceful resolution of disputes and conflicts that do arise.

29. However, as a responsible government amongst the community of nations, South Africa reserves the right of self-defence against aggressors and will equally protect the state and its people from threats to its sovereignty, independence and interests. South Africa has and will continue to employ, inter alia, the following principal strategies within the auspices of the National Security Council:

a. Political, economic and military co-operation with other states. In this context, a common security regime, regional defence cooperation and the pursuit of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) in Southern Africa are particularly important.

b. The prevention, management and resolution of conflict through nonviolent means. Conflict resolution, in the form of diplomacy, mediation or arbitration, may take place on a bilateral basis or under the auspices of an international or regional body.
These diplomatic efforts may include efforts of the SADC Organ, the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council.

c. **The Use of Force.** The use of force, or the threat of the use of force, against external aggression is a legitimate measure of last resort when political and other interventions have been exhausted.

**THE APPLICATION OF ‘SOFT’ AND ‘HARD’ STATE POWER**

30. The complexity of the global security environment is arguably greater now than at any previous time in history, being characterised by a wide variety of complex threats and greater uncertainty. The current global security environment has been described as a ‘persistent troubled peace’.

31. The power of the South African State is vested in the integrated application of its political, diplomatic, informational, economic, social and defence sectors and it may use these domains of ‘state power’ to successfully mitigate threats to its own national interests and threats to democracy on the continent. South Africa, as a major power on the continent, may be required to respond to circumstances of political, security or societal conflict, including the potential for such conflicts to rapidly escalate to armed conflict.

32. This is to be achieved through the coordinated application of a suite of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power interventions, using all the domains of ‘state power’ indicated above, including the deterrence value of the Defence Force, coupled to military interventions where appropriate. Furthermore, improved cross-government, multi-agency and regional cooperation will provide Government with increased options to manage future insecurity and conflict.

33. History demonstrates that stability is seldom achieved through dialogue and negotiation alone. The use of force, or at least the credible threat thereof, must at times be applied to secure peace and stability. Soft power interventions will be far more effective if backed up by a credible military force that is well able to conduct complex operations. The proliferation of conflict may thus require a range of concurrent security responses, including concurrent military responses.

**THE DEFENCE MANDATE**

34. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa⁸ establishes the Defence Force; requires it to “be structured and managed as a disciplined military force”; and provides the “primary object” of the Defence Force as being to “defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force”.

35. Schedule 6, Section 24 of the 1996 Constitution provides that the following “Functions of the National Defence Force”, as originally established in Section 227 of the 1993 Interim Constitution, “continue in force as if the previous Constitution had not been repealed”:

   a. For **service in the defence of the Republic**, for the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity;
   b. For service in **compliance with the international obligations** of the Republic with regard to international bodies and other states;
   c. For service in the **preservation of life, health or property**;
   d. For service in the **provision or maintenance of essential services**;
   e. For service in the **upholding of law and order in the Republic in co-operation with the South African Police Service** under circumstances set out in a law where the said Police Service is unable to maintain law and order on its own; and
   f. For service in **support of any department of state** for the purpose of socio-economic upliftment.

36. Section 201(2) of the 1996 Constitution provides that “only the President, as head of the national executive, may authorise the employment of the Defence Force –

   a. in co-operation with the Police Service;
   b. in defence of the Republic; or
   c. in fulfilment of an international obligation.”

37. Furthermore the Defence Act, 2002 [Sec 18(1)] provides that “in addition to the employment of the Defence Force by the President as contemplated in section 201(2) of the Constitution, the President or the Minister may authorise the employment of the Defence Force for service inside the Republic or in international waters, in order to –

   a. preserve life, health or property in emergency or humanitarian relief operations;
   b. ensure the provision of essential services;
   c. support any department of State, including support for purposes of socio-economic upliftment; and
   d. effect national border control.”

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⁸ Constitution, 1996, Chapter 11, Article 200(2), page 113.
DEFENCE RESPONSIBILITY

38. South Africa’s national security focuses on the interrelated priorities of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, constitutional order, the security and continuance of national institutions, the well-being, prosperity and upliftment of the South African people, the growth of the economy, and demonstrable good governance.

SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

39. The core defence responsibility is to ensure the protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the South African State: its national territory, islands, territorial waters, exclusive economic zone and extended continental shelf responsibilities (Figure 3-1).

40. The defence of South Africa against any threat to its sovereignty, territory, national interest or its peoples will remain the primary defence priority. All other defence responsibilities will be executed and managed according to priorities dictated by circumstance at the time.

41. South Africa will seek to firstly prevent and deter threats and to secondly succeed against the threat should all other measures fail. Understanding that there will be threats that cannot be defused or countered by peaceful means, South Africa will:
   a. Regularly review and update defence policy and strategy to ensure alignment, relevance and utility to the strategic environment.
   b. Maintain a defence posture that is strategically defensive and operationally offensive, and
   c. Maintain an adequate and appropriate Defence Force matched to the requirements of a continually evolving strategic situation.

42. The Defence Force is a unique instrument and an important lever of power at the disposal of the State and is consequently at the core of its national security. The Defence Force provides the means of last resort when other instruments of state are unable to protect or defend South Africa. Should peaceful means and deterrence fail or the level of aggression preclude a peaceful resolution, South Africa may consider the use of appropriate and focused force.

VITAL INTERESTS

43. In the spirit of the peaceful resolution of conflict, South Africa will follow an incremental approach to the protection of its external national interests. Threats to South Africa’s interests
will preferentially be dealt with at a bilateral or multilateral level. The concept of collaborative protection\(^9\) will be implemented first, and if necessary, followed by the concept of deliberate protection\(^10\). Nonetheless, the Defence Force must have the capability for autonomous intervention in defence of vital interests. Those interests and the level of autonomous action would be defined by circumstances at the time.

44. These interests and their sub-objectives are pursued in a coordinated manner by all entities of the State, including the Defence Force. These are outlined below\(^11\):

- **a.** Ensuring the state’s **independence of decision-making** on its core prerogatives and international relations.
- **b.** Ensuring the **freedom of South Africa to trade**, including the free use of land, air and sea routes, good order at sea and in the airspace, and the safety and security of trade and transport hubs (Figure 3-2).
- **c.** Ensuring the **security of internal and external strategic resources and infrastructure** such as minerals, energy and water, including the safe and secure delivery, processing and distribution thereof (Figure 3-3).
- **d.** Ensuring the **safety and security of the South African people**, both within national territory and abroad.
- **e.** Ensuring the **integrity and functioning of the core systems of the state**, including: the capacity and resilience of state institutions; the security of state and other information; and good governance and service delivery systems to provide a better life for all.

### DOMESTIC SECURITY

45. The Defence Force must have the capability to cooperate with the Police Service and civil authorities in dealing with general threats to security, and in countering civil threats to the constitutional order and sub-state threats such as terrorism and

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\(^9\) Collaborative protection, in the external context, means the protection of national interests in collaboration with the host state where the interest may lie.

\(^10\) Deliberate protection, in the external context, means the unilateral protection of an interest in a host state where the host state is unable or unwilling to collaboratively protect the interest.

\(^11\) Not an exhaustive list.
piracy. Greater cooperation with the Police Service and civil authorities would be required in countering a significant internal threat, including low-level insurgency.

46. Border safeguarding will require the Defence Force to deal with large numbers of illegal, mainly socio-economic, migrants as well as criminals from beyond South African borders, requiring cross-border cooperation to be pursued with defence forces of the neighbouring SADC states. Such cooperation may extend to assisting some neighbouring states with improving borderline control capabilities.

47. The security of critical South African infrastructure remains a Police Service responsibility, though this may be the subject of further political discourse and decision at some future point. Notwithstanding, the Defence Force has a contingent liability towards the securing of critical infrastructure.

48. The Defence Force will be increasingly employed in traditionally non-military roles owing to its readiness profile, training and capacity for organised action, often as a first response to natural disasters and other serious civil contingencies. This will accordingly require specialised training tailored to this expanded role, supported by current, validated and authoritative doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures, and an increased awareness of the legal implications of their actions.

CONTINENTAL PEACE AND STABILITY

49. South Africa recognises that its own security, prosperity and sustainability and that of the African continent are inextricably entwined, and therefore further understands its own national interest as being intrinsically linked to Africa’s stability, unity, and prosperity. Security and development go hand in hand, and both are the continent’s biggest challenges. South Africa, together with like-minded partners, has a vested interest in contributing to the rooting of democracy, the promotion of economic advancement and the pursuit of peace, stability and development on the African continent.

50. The growth and success of the South African economy is further intrinsically dependent on enduring peace, stability, economic development and deepened democracy on the continent. Significant growth of the economy requires accelerated inbound and outbound trade (in particular higher-value products) as well as attracting significant volumes of foreign direct investment. Sustained value and volume of exports to traditional markets must be achieved. Continental and other high growth emergent markets must be accessed.
51. South Africa is undeniably a major power in Africa (with the leading economy accounting for 24% of Africa’s GDP and 33% of that of Sub-Saharan Africa) and is obliged to play a continental leadership role, in conjunction with African partners, extending to matters such as conflict prevention, conflict resolution, post-conflict reconstruction and security sector reform. This will manifest in contributions to UN, AU and SADC security, democracy and good governance initiatives, as well as the conclusion of specific bilateral partnerships with other African states in the political, economic, social and security realms.

52. Since sources of insecurity transcend state borders, South Africa will have to pursue collective action within multilateral organisations to provide adequate responses and lasting solutions to conflict and insecurity. Government’s commitment to international peace and security and its manifestations at regional and continental levels enjoins it to continue its involvement in collective defence and security mechanisms on the continent, including participation in conflict resolution mechanisms, standby arrangements and other defence cooperation at the bilateral level.

53. South Africa must be able to participate in multinational peace missions on the continent, and should also be able to contribute to multinational peace enforcement operations in the case of significant inter-state or intra-state conflict. Such involvement and the scale thereof would be discretionary, being determined by the specific situation and subject to other priorities. Defence Force deployments beyond Africa will be exceptional and of a limited scale and duration. In general, threats to security closer to South Africa will enjoy priority.

54. In addition to its traditional conventional role, the Defence Force will be required to play a constructive role in post-conflict reconstruction efforts in collaboration with other government departments and other agencies through a Joint, Inter-Service/Division, Interdepartmental, Inter-agency and Multinational (JI2M) approach. Particular focus will be placed on the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction as a firm foundation for sustainable development, especially in the areas of security-sector reform and the successful integration of belligerents into statutory armed forces. Once again, operations in complex post-conflict environments may be as dangerous as major combat missions.

55. Cognisance must also be taken of various international efforts to curb piracy and enhance maritime security in SADC and African waters. An increase in piracy and maritime insecurity would require the development of a strong SADC maritime capability which includes the development of an effective and efficient early-warning and rapid-response capability to counter the vulnerability of Southern Africa’s maritime areas.

Figure 3-4: Peace and Stability on the Continent
South Africa’s approach to regional security thus focuses on the interrelated priorities of the growth and development of the Southern African region, continental peace and stability and the creation of a just and equitable world order (Figure 3-4). These interests and their sub-objectives are pursued in a coordinated manner by all power bases of the State, including Defence. These may relate to:

a. Deepening democracy and promoting peace, stability, good governance and human security on the continent.
b. Creating an environment conducive to sustainable economic growth and development on the continent.
c. Supporting conflict prevention, peace-making, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction on the continent.
d. Strengthening and capacitating institutions of security, democracy and governance in SADC and the AU.
f. Strengthening partnerships with like-minded states in the region and on the continent in the political, economic, social and security sectors.

South Africa’s military capability must therefore be commensurate with South Africa’s international status, its strategic posture and its inescapable continental leadership role. The Defence Force must make a vital and unique contribution that complements South Africa’s diplomatic efforts, enhances South Africa’s influence within wider international developments, and promotes regional security, specifically through the application of military capabilities to pressing African security issues.

As South Africa expands its leadership role, it will concomitantly assume the obligation to provide experienced military leaders and proficient military forces for peace missions and other military operations on the African continent. The deployment of the Defence Force must thus be coordinated with the full range of instruments which Government can bring to bear both domestically and regionally.

Thus, the following layered defence approach will inform the future military strategy:

a. Layer 1:
   i. Firstly, to influence the international security agenda through integrated diplomacy efforts and the pursuit of national objectives.
   ii. Secondly, through strategic engagement of the UN and the African Peace and Security Architecture, to:
      (1) Pursue defined multilateral security objectives.

b. Layer 2:
   i. Firstly, to safeguard the South African State, its people and its territory.
   ii. Secondly, to collaboratively or deliberately protect vital national interests.
   iii. Thirdly, to contribute to South Africa’s developmental agenda.

c. Layer 3: To defend and protect the territory, sovereignty and people of the Republic of South Africa.

**AN INTEGRATED SUITE OF DEFENCE EFFECTS**

**DETERRENCE**

Deterrence is the cornerstone of South Africa’s national security and defence policies. Its purpose is to dissuade a potential adversary from adopting a course of action that threatens South Africa’s vital interests.

Deterrence may be described as a potential adversary’s perception of South Africa’s national will, resolve and ability to deny strategic objectives and to impose severe and unacceptable consequences against any threat posed. Deterrence is thus an overarching national concept that links the military and other instruments of national power, and other external measures such as alliances and treaties, to deter and counter specific threats to national security, and to support and advance national interests and to mitigate conflict.

Deterrence is only likely to succeed if the envisaged combination of threats and incentives is credible and deliverable, and its potential is communicated unequivocally to those in a position to assess it. Effective deterrence also depends upon a demonstrable contingent capability and overt preparedness, such that potential adversaries conclude, from their own evaluations, that the benefit to be gained from pursuing a particular course of action is not worth the risk associated with the possible or probable consequences.

Deterrence demands the capacity for a focused, prompt, rapid and flexible national response to disparate threats, with the Defence Force being a key component of South Africa’s overall deterrent capability. The defence contribution to deterrence is thus based upon credible forces; rapid force generation capability; operational record; demonstrated ability in field-
training; technological and doctrinal competence; and the visible morale of personnel.

ANTICIPATION

64. Priority must be given to the anticipation of future threats in order to develop contingencies and responses to any increased instability in the strategic environment. This requires appropriate strategic intelligence comprehension and a constant monitoring of risk, so as to provide adequate early warning for the development of appropriate capabilities required.

65. Anticipation thus culminates in a strategic intelligence comprehension, which in turn facilitates prediction, responsiveness, contingency and capability development and the preparation of appropriate and flexible responses. The collective effort of South Africa’s intelligence services, including the intelligence capability of the Defence Force, constitutes the national anticipation capability.

66. Defence must be able to effectively contend with a more complex, rapidly changing world through timely collection, processing and dissemination of actionable intelligence in order to accurately anticipate and respond appropriately. This requires strategic awareness and the restoration of an effective defence intelligence capability that provides integrated information acquired through liaison with allied and friendly forces, local human intelligence and the use of static and mobile sensors for enhanced military decision-making. This must be pursued at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

67. South Africa’s national security cannot be viewed in isolation from regional and continental security, thus requiring that a premium be placed on the regional and continental early warning systems.

PREVENTION

68. Emphasis is placed on the prevention of conflict through peaceful means by enhancing cooperation and collaboration on security matters. Prevention requires a national ability to peacefully reduce, defuse or resolve potential conflict and disputes through primarily political and diplomatic means. The spectrum of preventative efforts may extend from that of cooperation and collaboration between parties or states to that of negotiation or arbitration.

69. South Africa’s prevention capability is primarily vested in the political, legal, diplomatic and intelligence dimensions of state authority. South Africa’s national security depends on sound international relations and responsive security institutions, thus necessitating a robust contribution to the strengthening and capacitation of the African Peace and Security Architecture and playing a rightful and appropriate role in the UN security structures.

70. South Africa’s contribution to the prevention and resolution of conflict will be enhanced through an integration of its diplomatic, military and other efforts, in a complementary manner that strengthens South Africa’s capacity to influence international developments. Defence diplomacy efforts will further support South Africa’s strategic agenda, extending to:
   a. maintaining strategic bilateral relationships;
   b. engagement of international security issues;
   c. active participation in multilateral security processes;
   d. establishing collective security mechanisms; and
   e. strong representation in international defence and security institutions.

71. In the domestic context Defence can, in support of civil authority, contribute to the prevention of social disruption by increasing the resilience of the population through various programmes and initiatives.

PROTECTION

72. South Africa will protect and secure its sovereignty, territory, national interests and people through harnessing the cumulative capacity of all elements of state power. Notwithstanding the vast contribution made by all other organs of state, the Defence Force plays a pivotal role in this regard with most defence capabilities organised towards the defence and protection of South Africa, its territory and its people. The defence responsibility will, inter alia, extend to aspects such as:
   a. Defending the Republic against armed aggression and threats to the constitutional order.
   b. The execution of national tasks, such as border safeguarding, maritime security, cyber-security and airspace defence.
   c. The protection of vital maritime, air and land trade routes, good order at sea and in the airspace, and the safety and security of trade and transport hubs.
   d. Fulfilling South Africa’s international treaty obligations.
   e. The safeguarding of South Africa’s key infrastructure.
   f. Assisting civil authority with the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of public order and security.
73. The Defence Force must be maintained as a robust, balanced, modern and flexible force with capabilities and technologies appropriate to operations in the African environment. The Defence Force must be appropriately equipped, capacitated and resourced to execute and sustain required landward, air, maritime, Special Forces, information and military health operations in the protection and defence of South Africa.

74. The mandate of Defence requires the maintenance of comprehensive defence capabilities. Many capabilities need not be maintained at a high level, nor is the full spectrum of potentially required capabilities affordable or sustainable at full readiness. Capabilities will therefore, wherever possible, be maintained to ensure expansion to the required levels as and when needed.

INTERVENTION

75. South Africa’s intervention capability is the comprehensive coercive capacity of the State, within the rule of law, to influence, interrupt, intrude or force change in the outcome of events, developments or contingencies that demonstrably threaten South African interests. An intervention may also extend to a collaborative effort with other allies or multilateral organisations. Such intervention may thus extend to:
   a. **Collaborative protection** of threatened interests beyond South Africa’s borders with the host nation state.
   b. **Deliberate protection** of threatened interests beyond South Africa’s borders if there is a lack of capacity or will to intervene by the host nation state.
   c. Conducting operations to **protect** South African territory abroad and either protect or evacuate South African diplomats and citizens in areas of conflict.
   d. An **intervention** in the wider interest, such as an intervention in the case of grave circumstances or human rights violations, to establish or re-establish the international rule of law, or to separate belligerents in a conflict.

76. The Defence Force must be appropriately equipped, resourced and multi-role trained to execute a wide spectrum of intervention operations, through a balanced suite of capabilities that adhere to the strategic concepts of rapid reaction, expeditionary ability to project forces for protracted periods, complex war fighting in the human and physical dimensions of the battle space, interoperability of command and control systems, concurrency of operations in multiple theatres and joint, inter-agency, inter-departmental and multinational cooperation.

STABILISATION AND NORMALISATION

77. Stabilisation and normalisation relate to the immediate and extended intent to improve circumstances, restore equilibrium and create the conditions for the sustainment of stability, security and the rule of law in a former area of conflict or instability. This is a collective effort, in which government departments, business, labour, multilateral organisations and the spectrum of non-governmental organisations have a role to play in assisting efforts to promote stable political, economic and social development and the rule of law.

78. Defence Forces are repeatedly called on to contribute to post-conflict reconstruction and emergency relief in the event of a man-made or natural disaster. Although the responsibility for these activities primarily lies in the civilian domain, the circumstances sometimes require the use of defence assets. Such stabilisation operations often require years and sometimes decades of military involvement.

79. The defence contribution to the stabilisation effect will be diverse in nature, but would focus primarily on the reconstruction of the security sector through the demobilisation of belligerent parties and the establishment and training of the respective legitimate, statutory defence forces. Defence expertise is often required to advise and train security agencies in post-conflict areas. The Defence Force can make the following contributions:
   a. International **peace support operations**.

Figure 3-5: The Defence Mission
DEFENCE MISSION, GOALS AND TASKS

80. The defence policy takes its lead from South Africa’s national security, national posture and national interests. The adoption of an effects-based strategy approach allows for a threat-independent determination of capabilities required, based on government’s intended level of defence capability. This approach elucidates a clear and unambiguous understanding of South Africa’s defence mission (Figure 3-5), and identifies four strategic defence goals and thirteen strategic defence tasks (Figure 3-6).

81. The strategic defence tasks provide a future-focused framework for detailed defence planning on the size, shape and capabilities of the Defence Force and the development of its force design, force structure, establishment table and capability strategy.

PRIORITISATION OF DEFENCE GOALS AND TASKS

82. The Defence mandate, as derived from the Constitution, provides a legal statement of purpose, covering the full spectrum of possible defence employment. The functions listed in the Constitution stipulate the purposes for which the Defence Force may be employed. Furthermore employment of the Defence Force will be considered against environmental circumstances, national security policy, government priorities and the availability of resources.

83. It is extremely important to note that the above goals and tasks are not prioritised, but present the full spectrum of defence activity necessary to attain the intent of the Constitution (1996) and the stated Defence Mission. The prioritisation of goals and tasks, informed by the primary object of the Defence Force, is the prerogative of the President and the Cabinet according to an ongoing assessment of South Africa’s strategic environment. This assessment must inform the strategic reserves as a measure of national effort.

DEVELOPING A BALANCED SUITE OF DEFENCE CAPABILITIES

84. South Africa requires a significant and credible defence capability to confront diverse challenges. Undoubtedly, the Defence Force will have to operate in complex, highly fluid and often lethal environments that are characterised by a wide variety of threats and lethality. The challenge will be to strike an effective and sustainable balance of defence capabilities that enable the conducting of successful operations across the spectrum of conflict.

85. Defence capabilities must support and enable South Africa’s continental and regional leadership responsibilities and the protection and furtherance of its national interest.

86. The complex, highly fluid and highly unpredictable security environment requires the careful development of South Africa’s future defence capabilities, in turn requiring the Defence Force to constantly adapt doctrine, tactics and training to suit the tactical demands of the operational situation. The Defence Force
will increasingly require highly integrated levels of command and control, protection, mobility, firepower, sustainment and situational awareness.

87. Heightened levels of domain awareness and appropriate decision-making and leadership will therefore be the critical factor in determining the appropriate preparation for and responses to emerging security trends. A strong and effective information acquisition and analysis capability together with an effective defence long-term planning capability is critical to building a significant and credible defence capability able to confront all challenges presented.

88. Dealing with such diverse and adaptive threats will demand more investment in the selection, education, training and development of high-calibre leaders who will be able to contend with future complexity.

89. It is imperative that short-term contingencies do not dictate the long-term and ultimate force design of the Defence Force. As such, the likelihood of an external conventional threat to South Africa must be constantly reviewed and assessed in relation to the more immediate threats to our country and its citizenry, which are of a non-conventional and human security nature\(^\text{12}\). The challenge for the Defence Force will be to decide upon a Force Design and Structure that is sufficiently balanced to provide a long-term credible and sustainable capability.

\(^{12}\) Human Security refers to the broadened conceptualisation of security that encompasses political, social, economic and environmental dimensions of threats and sources of insecurity.
CHAPTER 4

DIRECTING DEFENCE

THE DEFENCE FORCE

1. There is a single Defence Force\(^1\) which is the only lawful military force in the Republic\(^2\) and which is structured and regulated by national legislation\(^3\). The Defence Force is organised, commanded and administrated according to the following fundamental prescripts:
   a. Is structured and managed as a disciplined military force\(^4\).
   b. Consists of a Regular component, a Reserve component\(^5\) and a Civilian component.
   c. Includes any auxiliary service established by the Minister\(^6\).
   d. Will act, and teach its members to act, in accordance with the Constitution and the law, including customary international law and international agreements binding on the Republic\(^7\).

2. The Chief of the Defence Force:
   a. Is appointed by the President\(^8\) in the President’s capacity as Head of the National Executive and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Force\(^9\).
   b. Is the Commander\(^10\) of the Defence Force and has full command of subordinate units and any assigned auxiliary service, and as such:

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\(^1\) Constitution, 1996, Section 199(1).
\(^2\) Constitution, 1996, Section 199(2).
\(^3\) Constitution, 1996, Section 199(4).
\(^4\) Constitution, 1996, Section 200(1).
\(^5\) Defence Act, 2002 (Act No 42 of 2002), Section 11 (a) & (b).
\(^6\) Defence Act, 2002 (Act No 42 of 2002), Section 16(1).
\(^7\) Constitution, 1996, Section 199(5).
\(^8\) Defence Act, 2002 (Act No 42 of 2002), Section 13(a).
\(^9\) Constitution, 1996, Section 202(1).
\(^10\) Defence Act, 2002 (Act No 42 of 2002), Section 13 & 14.
Directing Defence

i. Is subject to the political authority of the Minister.

ii. Defines the roles and relationships of senior officers and officials in the Defence Force.

iii. Establishes, controls and directs the activities of the Defence Force.

iv. Provides military forces to be placed at the disposal of Government.

c. Is the primary adviser to the Minister on military matters, including on the use of the military capabilities developed within the Defence Force.

d. Exercises command of the Defence Force in accordance with the directions of the Cabinet member (hereafter referred to as the Minister) responsible for defence, under the authority of the President.\textsuperscript{11, 12, 13}

3. The Chief of the Defence Force:

a. Exercises powers vested in accordance with any direction of the Minister.\textsuperscript{14}

b. Executes any delegation conferred or any duty assigned by the Minister in terms of general powers\textsuperscript{15} or specific powers arising from the Defence Act, 2002.

4. The following key defence principles inform the organisation and configuration of the Defence Force:

a. The Defence Force is a balanced, modern and flexible force employing advanced technologies appropriate to the African environment, and supported by science, engineering and technology capabilities.

b. The Defence Force is structured in combat formations.

c. The Defence Force is appropriately equipped to execute successful operations across the spectrum of conflict with combat forces having embedded command and control, firepower, protection, manoeuvre, sustainment and intelligence. Some combat forces will be multi-roled.

d. Command lines are clear and unambiguous with a clear distinction between command and staff functions.

e. The Defence Force cultivates and maintains a high standard of military professionalism.

f. Soldiers are skilled, healthy, fit, and highly disciplined professionals imbued with a high level of morale, sense of duty and pride in themselves, their capabilities and their equipment.

g. Soldiers are led by exemplary, competent, ethical and dynamic leaders. Mission command is the foundation of the defence leadership philosophy.

h. Commanders have the required delegations to discharge their duties and responsibilities. Commanders are accountable and responsible for the execution of their assigned mandates and the resources allocated.

i. Due consideration and cognisance are given to the unique nature of the Defence Force relative to the wider public service.

5. Consequently, the Defence Force will be structured and organised according to command and staff lines to facilitate functional liaison and promote effective command and control.

6. The Chief of the Defence Force retains command over the Defence Force and confers operational control over assigned forces to operational level headquarters for the conduct of authorised operations. The Chief of the Defence Force may establish such temporary task force, group, element or unit as may be required for military exercises or operations, and may, for that purpose, establish such number of temporary headquarters as may be required.\textsuperscript{17}

7. The Defence Force, across capabilities and at all levels, will be structured in recognised combat formations adhering to the axiom: 'We train as we fight'. Consequently, the Chief of the Defence Force will have the following under command:

a. A permanent operational-level command and control capability.

b. A landward defence capability.

c. An air defence capability.

d. A maritime defence capability.

e. A military health capability.

f. A Special Forces capability.

g. A logistics execution capability.

h. A training and doctrine execution capability.

i. An information and communication systems execution capability.

8. The General Staff, assisting the Chief of the Defence Force with functional control over specific resource ar-

\textsuperscript{11} Constitution, 1996, Section 202(2).

\textsuperscript{12} Defence Act, 2002 (Act No 42 of 2002), Section 4.

\textsuperscript{13} Constitution, 1996, Section 201(1).

\textsuperscript{14} Defence Act, 2002 (Act No 42 of 2002), Section 4.

\textsuperscript{15} Constitution, 1996, Section 201(1).

\textsuperscript{16} Defence Act, 2002 (Act No 42 of 2002), Section 80.

\textsuperscript{17} Defence Act, 2002 (Act No 42 of 2002), Section 12(2)(b).
will provide the staff capacity by which the Chief of the Defence Force can set strategic direction for that resource area through the establishment of outcomes, outputs and targets and which enable the planning and the allocation of resources. To this end, the respective General Staff Components will direct, orchestrate and control the management of their specific resource areas throughout the Defence Force, coordinating through the functional lines of control (staff lines).

9. Consequently, the Defence Headquarters will comprise the Chief of the Defence Force, a Chief of Staff (CoS) and the following staff functionalities in a manner to be later organised and structured:
   a. Personnel.
   b. Intelligence.
   c. Operations.
   d. Logistics.
   e. Planning.
   g. Training.
   h. Finance.
   i. Specialist Staffs.

10. The fundamental tenet of military command and control is ‘mission command’ which implies:
   a. Commanders, at whichever level, have the absolute responsibility to obediently act or, in certain circumstances, to decide not to act, within the framework of a superior commander’s intent.
   b. Decentralised command, freedom and speed of action and initiative, are promoted, yet tempered and necessarily responsive to superior direction.
   c. That subordinates understand the intent of a higher commander and their own contribution to the plan.
   d. Carrying out missions with the maximum freedom of action and appropriate resources.
   e. Delegation of authority and agility in the execution of a mission with an appropriate balance between direction and delegation.

11. National Security. It is required that national security must be pursued in compliance with the law\(^{18}\), including international law. National security is further subject to the authority of Parliament and the national executive\(^{19}\). Consequently the defence sector is subject to civil control by the National Executive and civil oversight by Parliament. The hierarchy of authority between the Executive, Parliament and the Defence Force\(^{20}\) is prescribed in the Constitution, 1996\(^{21}\). Civil control and oversight in South Africa are enforced by the following principles:
   a. The supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law.
   b. Adherence to domestic and international law, including International Humanitarian Law.

12. Civil Control. The defence sector is subject to civil control by the President and the National Executive, as represented by the Minister of Defence in that:
   a. The President is the head of State, head of Executive and Commander-in-Chief.
   b. The President as head of the National Executive appoints the Military Command.
   c. Only the President may authorise the employment of the Defence Force in certain instances.
   d. A member of Cabinet must be responsible for Defence.
   e. The command of the Defence Force must be exercised in accordance with the directions of the cabinet member responsible for Defence.
   f. The Minister may authorise the employment of the Defence Force in instances other than reserved for the President in the Constitution.
   g. A civilian Secretariat for Defence is established to function under the direction of the Cabinet member responsible for Defence.

13. Civil Oversight. Civil oversight refers to the civil oversight role of Parliament. Parliament consists of the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, who participate in the legislative process in the manner set out in the Constitution.
   a. The National Assembly is elected to represent the people and to ensure government by the people under the Constitution. It does this by choosing the President, by providing a national forum for public consideration of issues and by scrutinising and overseeing executive action.
   b. The National Council of Provinces represents the provinces to ensure that provincial interests are taken into account in the national sphere of government.
   c. The legislative authority of the national sphere of government is vested in Parliament, as set out in

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\(^{18}\) Constitution, 1996, Section 198(c).

\(^{19}\) Constitution, 1996, Section 198(d).


\(^{21}\) Refer to Sections 198(d), 199(8), 200(2), 201(2) and (3), 202(1) and (2), 203(1) and (3) and 204 of the Constitution, 1996.
section 44 of the Constitution, including to pass legislation with regard to any matter in a functional area.

d. The National Assembly must provide for mechanisms to hold national organs of state accountable to it and to maintain oversight over National Executive authority and the implementation of legislation.

e. Parliamentary committees, established from the body of elected public representatives, play an important oversight role with regard to the security services. This is reflected in Parliament’s responsibility to approve:
   i. The finances for the security forces.
   ii. The legislation governing activities of the security forces.
   iii. The policy framework within which the security forces will function.

14. It is thus important that the Defence Force and its members:
   a. Are fully conversant with the features of the democratic system.
   b. Adhere to elected authority.
   c. Avoid politics and apply functional military expertise.
   d. Understand the integrated contribution Defence makes in terms of government’s key policy initiatives.
   e. Are able, on a discursive basis, to interact with the elected civil authority around a range of issues critical to the Defence mandate.

DEFENCE COMMAND AND CONTROL

LEVELS OF DECISION-MAKING

15. Defence forces around the world have identified the need to understand the task of providing defence direction at various identifiable levels of responsibility and detail. The identification of a hierarchy of defence direction, command and control does not necessarily intend dogmatic and rigid obedience thereto, but rather provides a practical construct to assist with complex decision-making and judgement by all concerned within a continually evolving and fluctuating environment.

16. The framework hierarchy of defence direction found hereunder is a tool for organising and considering strategic defence decisions, for the planning and execution of military operations, and for organising and considering political/military activity. The four levels of decision-making (Figure 4-1) refer to:
   a. The National Strategic Level, which equates to National Security Policy, Cluster Strategies and the Defence Policy.
   c. The Operational Level, at which the military strategy is implemented through Campaign Plans, including assigning missions, forces and resources to operations.
   d. The Tactical Level, which equates to the planning and conduct of military operations, activities and engagements.

![Figure 4-1: Levels of Decision-Making](image)
THE NATIONAL STRATEGIC LEVEL

17. The national strategic level coordinates the application of the full spectrum of the capacity of the State to achieve policy objectives and pursue national interests. The national strategic level is the domain of the President and the National Executive. The Defence Force is one component of national power available to Government in the pursuit of strategic interests.

18. The President of the Republic of South Africa.
   a. The executive authority of the State is vested in the President of the Republic of South Africa (hereafter referred to as the President). Such executive authority is exercised, together with other members of Cabinet, by:
      i. implementing national legislation;
      ii. developing and implementing national policy;
      iii. coordinating the functions of State departments and administrations;
      iv. preparing and initiating national legislation; and
      v. performing any other executive function provided for in the Constitution or any other national legislation.
   b. The President is ascribed specific authority as the Head of State, Head of the National Executive and Commander-in-Chief.
   c. It is in terms of the President’s authority as Head of the National Executive that:
      i. The President exercises executive authority as Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Force.
      ii. The President must appoint the Military Command of the Defence Force.

19. The Minister. The Constitution requires that a member of Cabinet must be responsible for defence. The following principles consequently apply:
   a. Command of the Defence Force must be exercised in accordance with the directions of the Cabinet member responsible for defence, under the authority of the President.
   b. The Minister of Defence (hereafter referred to as the Minister) is responsible for the powers and functions assigned by the President.
   c. The Minister must act in accordance with the Constitution.
   d. The Minister exercises civil control and provides political guidelines on defence matters.
   e. The Minister sets the defence policy framework and strategic priorities, is responsible for the effective implementation of Government’s policy directions, the execution of approved programmes and acquires the resources required for the defence of the Republic of South Africa.
   f. The President and the Minister formally confer on matters of defence and the Minister advises Cabinet on defence- and security-related matters.
   g. The Minister is accountable to Parliament for the exercise of his/her powers and the performance of his/her functions and must provide Parliament with full and regular reports concerning matters under his/her control.

20. It is important to note that Section 24(1) of Schedule 6 of the 1996 Constitution continues-in-force Section 225 of the 1993 Interim Constitution “as if the previous Constitution had not been repealed” and which states that the executive military command shall be exercised by the Chief of the Defence Force “subject to the directions of the Minister responsible for defence and, during a state of national defence, of the President”.

21. The National Policy on Defence. The President, as Head of State, Head of the Executive and Commander-in-Chief, works collaboratively with Cabinet Ministers to initiate and decide on policy and coordinate the efforts of the State. In so doing:
   a. Cabinet determines national policy objectives and the concomitant national strategy to be pursued.
   b. Cabinet provides resources for policy objectives and strategy according to the priorities of Government. Funds are appropriated by Parliament by means of a vote.

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22 Constitution, 1996, Section 85(1).
23 Constitution, 1996, Section 85(2).
24 Constitution, 1996, Section 84(a).
25 Constitution, 1996, Section 202(1).
26 Constitution, 1996, Section 202(1).
27 Constitution, 1996, Section 201(1).
28 Constitution, 1996, Section 201(1).
29 Constitution, 1996, Section 202(1).
30 Constitution, 1996, Section 92(1).
31 Constitution, 1996, Section 92(3)(a).
32 Constitution, 1996, Section 92(3)(b).
c. The Cabinet determines the National Policy on Defence.
d. There is thus a dynamic relationship between the national policy objectives and the defence policy.
e. Military considerations will, in turn, also shape policy. This is especially true when the conflict is largely military in nature.

22. **Management of Security at the Strategic Level.** At the highest level, the management of security and the resolution of conflict reside with the President and Cabinet, either individually or in committee.

a. At the strategic level Cabinet controls all the means and power bases of the state (political, diplomatic, information, economic and military) to resolve insecurity and conflict. In accordance with national posture, the use of military force is the means of last resort.

b. Each and every incident of insecurity and conflict will be different, thus there is no single template for the resolution of such. The President and Cabinet will exercise judgement on the most effective approach to tackling a particular situation. This may well be through a National Security Council, a Committee of Cabinet or any other committee specifically set up for this purpose. The leadership may well vary depending on the nature of the crisis.

c. Cabinet may consider developing, deploying, sustaining, recovering and re-deploying the Defence Force for the attainment of national objectives. Cabinet is assisted in this work by intelligence estimates, intelligence briefs and strategic awareness.

i. Cabinet further determines the quantity, quality and level of strategic national resources required (e.g., oil, ammunition, strategic lift).

ii. Strategic sustainment is planned and coordinated interdepartmentally with role-playing departments responsible for various national strategic resources and industry. This sustainment may further be coordinated with international partners.

ii. Cabinet will, if necessary, provide the means to augment the capacity of the Defence Force in accordance with changes to the strategic environment.

23. **National Council on Defence.** The establishment of a National Council on Defence is proposed and which may be provided in law whereby:

a. The mandate and functions of the National Council on Defence will relate to:

i. Matters of National Defence.

ii. Defence policy.

iii. Placing the Defence Force in service.

iv. Strategic matters related to the defence function.

b. The President, the Minister, the Secretary for Defence and the Military Command will comprise the National Council on Defence.

c. The President may appoint or co-opt any other person as it may be deemed necessary.

d. The National Council on Defence will meet at least every quarter.

e. The Military Command will present quarterly reports and an annual report on the readiness of the Defence Force.

**THE MILITARY STRATEGIC LEVEL**

24. Defence Headquarters is both a departmental headquarters and a military headquarters, and is instrumental as the interface between the strategic level and the operational level. Co-located with the Ministry of Defence, the interaction between the Minister of Defence, the Secretary for Defence, the Chief of the Defence Force and Chiefs of Services and Staff Divisions is facilitated to support the formulation of defence policy and the attainment of the military strategy and objectives.

25. The military strategic level of decision-making is orientated to the interface between the defence policy, the military strategy and the theatre of operations strategy.

26. **Secretary for Defence.** The Secretary for Defence is the primary tool and resource for the Minister to enable him/her to exercise civil control. As the formal policy advisor to the Minister, the Secretary for Defence:

a. Enhances the Minister’s ability to exercise civil control over the defence function.

b. Performs such functions as may be entrusted by the Minister, in particular those necessary or expedient to enhance civil control and civil oversight by:

i. The Minister over Defence.

ii. Parliament over Defence.

iii. Parliamentary committees having oversight over Defence.

c. Exercises powers vested through the Constitution and other statutes, subject to and in accordance with any direction of the Minister without fear, favour or prejudice.

d. Assists and supports the Minister in contributing to the formulation of the government’s security policy and further assists and supports the Minister in devel-

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33 Defence Act, 2002 (Act 42 of 2002), Section 4.
34 Defence Act, 2002 (Act 42 of 2002), Section 8(d).
e. As one of the key mechanisms of civil control, is responsible to the Minister in coordinating and compiling all relevant instruments through which either the President or the Minister may authorise the employment of the Defence Force and further direct such service as required by the Constitution (1996) or any other statute. This would extend to:
  i. The coordination and compilation of the Presidential Minute and Explanatory Memorandum, any necessary Cabinet Memorandum and any Ministerial Directive directing the Defence Force to conduct such service, and any consequent instruction or direction thereto.
  ii. Identifying the legal implications, both domestic and international, of any employment.
  iii. Identifying the financial implications of any employment.
  iv. Maintaining a system to monitor and evaluate any employment.
  v. Maintaining a system to administrate, record and maintain the currency of any employment.

f. Is responsible to the Minister in determining ministerial priorities and strategic guidelines on defence matters. This extends to setting the following strategic direction for the Minister’s subsequent authorisation:
  i. Ministerial strategic priorities, ministerial strategic guidelines, ministerial directives and ministerial planning instructions.
  ii. Ministerial policy options for the MTSF/MTEF processes.
  iii. Ministerial policy research and direction.
  iv. Ministerial defence diplomacy framework, direction and engagement.
  v. Setting defence resource priorities.
  vi. Requirements in terms of defence governance, accountability, control and risk frameworks required for the accountable management of defence resources.

g. Is responsible to the Minister in determining strategic direction, accountability mechanisms and oversight over all defence public entities, including the Defence Acquisition Agent and the acquisition/procurement of defence matériel.

h. Advises the Minister on any matter referred by the Minister.

i. Provides the Minister with parliamentary and cabinet administrative and coordination services, including the coordination of:

i. The cabinet and parliamentary programme on defence.
ii. Parliamentary questions.
iii. The defence legislative programme.

j. Provides the Minister with legal services (excluding the Military Justice System) which will entail, inter alia, legislation, litigation and legal advice.

k. Engages with defence stakeholders and manages intra-governmental liaison at the national-strategic and military-strategic levels.

27. **Chief of the Defence Force.** The Chief of the Defence Force:

a. Is the Commander of the Defence Force and is the military strategic authority.

b. Formulates the military strategy and doctrine in coherence with Government policies and strategic objectives.

c. Provides the military strategic context and direction for operations, including priorities, parameters, command and control and any limitations, inter alia, political, legal and financial.

d. Designates the theatre of operations and assigns forces and directs resources and reserves to a number of differing and (potentially) concurrent military operations.

28. **Operations Staff.** The Chief of the Defence Force’s operations staff provides the Chief of the Defence Force with staff assistance in the provision of military strategic direction to the Operations Headquarters for the conduct of operations.

29. **Service and Division Chiefs.** Service and Division Chiefs generate combat-ready capabilities for assignment by the Chief of the Defence Force.

**THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL**

30. The key difference between the military strategic and operational levels is that the military strategic level is concerned with allocating objectives and resources and setting necessary limitations, while the operational level plans and orders the activities of assigned forces.

31. The operational level is thus concerned with the planning and conducting of operations. It is at this level that the military strategy and theatre of operations strategies are implemented by assigning missions, forces and resources to operations.

32. The permanent joint operations headquarters, at the operational level, is responsible for the planning and execution of joint and combined military operations and joint and combined

35 Defence Act, 2002 (Act No 42 of 2002), Section 8(b) & (c).
exercises. Thus the permanent Joint Operations Headquarters exercises operational control over assigned forces as directed by the Chief of the Defence Force.

**THE TACTICAL LEVEL**

33. At the tactical level, military activities and engagements are planned and executed in order to achieve operational-level military objectives. Tactical-level command will be provided by land, air or maritime joint tactical headquarters provided by Services, and placed under command of the permanent Joint Operations Headquarters.

**EMPLOYMENT OF THE DEFENCE FORCE FOR SERVICE**

34. **Mandate.**
   a. Only the President may authorise\(^{36}\) the employment of the Defence Force in cooperation with the Police Service, in defence of the Republic, or in fulfilment of an international obligation\(^{37}\).
   b. The President, or the Minister, may authorise the employment of the Defence Force inside the Republic or in international waters, in order to: preserve life, health or property in emergency or humanitarian relief operations; ensure the provision of essential services; support any department of state, including support for purposes of socio-economic upliftment; or effect national border control\(^{38}\).
   c. The process and instruments for Presidential authorisation of operations are prescribed in the Manual on the Executive Acts of the President\(^{39}\). This is exercised together with the Minister\(^{40}\) through the signing of a Presidential Minute\(^{41}\).

35. **Parliamentary Procedure.** Parliamentary procedures to be followed when authorising the deployment of the Defence Force are indicated hereunder:

   a. Section 201(3)\(^{42}\) and 201(4)\(^{43}\) of the Constitution, 1996 state that:

   (3) When the defence force is deployed for any purpose mentioned in subsection (2), the President must inform Parliament, promptly and in appropriate detail, of:

   (a) the reasons for the employment of the defence force;
   (b) any place where the force is being employed;
   (c) the number of people involved; and
   (d) the period for which the force is expected to be employed.

(4) If Parliament does not sit during the first seven days after the defence force is employed as envisaged in subsection (2), the President must provide the information required in subsection (3) to the appropriate oversight committee.

b. Section 18 of the Defence Act, 2002 further states that:

   (2) When the Defence Force is employed for any purpose contemplated in paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (d) of subsection (1), the President or Minister, as the case may be, must inform Parliament promptly and in appropriate detail of the –

   (a) reasons for such employment;
   (b) place where the Defence Force is being employed;
   (c) number of people involved;
   (d) period for which the Defence Force is expected to be employed; and
   (e) expenditure incurred or expected to be incurred.

(3) If Parliament does not sit during the first seven days after the employment of the Defence Force as contemplated in subsection (2), the President or Minister, as the case may be, must provide the information required in that subsection to the appropriate oversight committee of Parliament on Defence.

(4) If the Defence Force is employed by the President for any purpose contemplated in section 201(2) of the Constitution, the President must also comply with subsection (2)(e).

(5) Parliament may by resolution within seven days after receiving information contemplated in subsection (2) from the President or the Minister –

   (a) confirm any such authorisation of employment;
   (b) order the amendment of such authorisation;

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36 Constitution, 1996, Section 84(1).
37 Constitution, 1996, Section 201(2).
38 Defence Act, 2002 (Act 42 of 2002), Section 18(1).
39 Manual on the Executive Acts of the President, Chapter 2, par 2.8(e).
40 Constitution, 1996, Section 85(2).
42 Constitution, 1996, Section 201(3).
43 Constitution, 1996, Section 201(4).
(c) order the substitution for such authorisation of any other appropriate authorisation; or
(d) order the termination of the employment of the Defence Force.

(6) An order contemplated in subsection (5)(b), (c) or (d) does not affect –
(a) the validity of the authorisation up to the moment of the passing of the resolution by Parliament;
(b) the validity of anything done by virtue of the authorisation up to the moment that the amendment, substitution or termination of the authorisation takes effect; or
(c) any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred as a result of the authorisation for the employment of the Defence Force, up to the applicable moment contemplated in paragraph (b).

(7) (a) If authorisation by the Minister in terms of subsection (1)(a) cannot be obtained in time to avert imminent danger to life, health or property, the Secretary for Defence, with the concurrence of the Chief of the Defence Force, may, in accordance with a standing arrangement delegated by the Minister in this regard, authorise the employment of the National Defence Force for purposes of that subsection.

(b) The Secretary for Defence must inform the Minister as soon as possible of such authorisation and provide the Minister with the information referred to in subsection (2).

(c) The Minister may cancel the authorisation if he or she disagrees, in which case subsection (6) applies with the necessary changes.

(d) If the Minister agrees with the authorisation, subsections (2), (3), (5) and (6) apply with the necessary changes.

36. **State of National Defence.** The 1996 Constitution however provides that the President should summon Parliament when declaring a state of national defence [Section 203(2) and (3)]:

If Parliament is not sitting when a state of national defence is declared, the President must summon Parliament to an extraordinary sitting within seven days of the declaration.

A declaration of a state of national defence lapses unless it is approved by Parliament within seven days of the declaration.

37. **Principles to be considered when committing forces to military action abroad.** The following basic principles should be considered when committing the Defence Force to military action abroad:

a. South Africa should not commit its forces to military action abroad, unless it is vital to the national interest.

b. If forces are committed to military action abroad, it must be done with a clear intent and with clearly defined and realistic objectives.

c. There must be reasonable assurance that military actions to be taken will have the support of the South African people and their Parliament.

d. Even after all the above tests are met, forces should only be committed to military action abroad as a last resort, when no other choice is available.

e. Committed forces must have the necessary resources and support to succeed in the face of such military action.

38. **Possible Amendment of Legislation and Procedure.** Recent experience has demonstrated a necessity for the review of legislation and procedure with regard to putting the Defence Force into service. Therefore amendment is needed as follows:

a. Clarify levels of authority to put the Defence Force in service as provided in Section 18(1) of the Defence Act, 2002.

b. The authorisation of operations of a sensitive and/or secret nature and the informing of Parliament thereof.

c. Providing in law for the task of protecting of South African citizens and assets abroad.

d. A more streamlined approach will be sought to facilitate the authorisation of a Presidential Minute when the Defence Force is put into service in support of the Police Service.

e. A standing proclamation for the Defence Force to render immediate assistance in times of disaster or civil emergency.
PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT

PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES IN OPERATION

39. Section 199(8) of the 1996 Constitution gives effect to the principles of transparency and accountability by providing for multi-party parliamentary committees which have oversight of the security services in a manner determined by national legislation or the rules and orders of Parliament.

To give effect to the principles of transparency and accountability, multi-party parliamentary committees must have oversight of all security services in a manner determined by national legislation or the rules and orders of Parliament.44

40. The Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD). The JSCD has been established with broad powers of oversight that can be used to investigate and make recommendations regarding the budget, functioning of defence, acquisition and procurement policy, and the state of readiness of defence. It may perform other functions relating to Parliamentary supervision of the armed forces as prescribed by law.

a. The JSCD derives its powers and functions for oversight of the Defence Force in terms of the Interim Constitution of 1993.45 Section 228 was retained as one of the transitional arrangements46 carried over from the 1993 Interim Constitution:

i. Section 228 of the 1993 Interim Constitution provides that a Joint Standing Committee of Parliament on Defence shall be established, consisting of members of all political parties holding more than 10 seats in the National Assembly and willing to participate in the committee.47

ii. The Joint Rules of Parliament (Rule 120A) further make provision for the establishment of the JSCD stating the following: There is a Joint Standing Committee on Defence as required by section 228(3) of the Constitution of 1993.48

b. The mandate of the JSCD is found in section 228 (3)(d) of the 1993 Interim Constitution: The committee shall be competent to investigate and make recommendations regarding the budget functioning, organisation, armaments, policy, morale and state of preparedness of the National Defence Force and to perform such other functions relating to parliamentary supervision of the Force as may be prescribed by law. The JSCD therefore has a unique and important role pertaining to armaments and the preparedness (readiness) of the Defence Force.

41. The Portfolio Committee on Defence (PCD). The PCD is responsible for monitoring, scrutinising and investigating defence business. It consequently makes recommendations on the functions, budgetary allocations, rationalisation and restructuring of the defence organisational structure, policy formulation and any other relevant matters. It is also empowered to deal with legislation tabled in Parliament.

a. The PCD derives part of its mandate from that of the overall National Assembly as contained in Section 55 of the Constitution, 1996 which states that:

(1) In exercising its legislative power, the National Assembly may:
   (a) consider, pass, amend or reject any legislation before the Assembly; and
   (b) initiate or prepare legislation, except money Bills.

(2) The National Assembly must provide for mechanisms:
   (a) to ensure that all executive organs of State in the national sphere of government are accountable to it; and
   (b) to maintain oversight of:
      (i) the exercise of national executive authority, including the implementation of legislation; and
      (ii) any organ of State.

b. The Rules of the National Assembly (Rule 201) explain the functions of portfolio committees by stating that such committees:49

(a) must deal with bills and other matters falling within its portfolio as are referred to it in terms of the Constitution, legislation, these Rules, the Joint Rules or by resolution of the Assembly;

(b) must maintain oversight of —
   (i) the exercise within its portfolio of national executive authority, including the implementation of legislation;
   (ii) any executive organ of State falling within its

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44 The Constitution, 1996, Section 199(8).
45 1993 Interim Constitution, Section 228.
46 1996 Constitution, Schedule 6, Section 24(1).
(iii) any constitutional institution falling within its portfolio; and
(iv) any other body or institution in respect of which oversight was assigned to it;
(c) may monitor, investigate, enquire into and make recommendations concerning any such executive organ of state, constitutional institution or other body or institution, including the legislative programme, budget, rationalisation, restructuring, functioning, organisation, structure, staff and policies of such organ of state, institution or other body or institution.

c. The PCD, as a committee of the National Assembly, is responsible for, inter alia, legislative matters relating to defence; ensuring oversight of Defence as part of the Executive; and ensuring that the Defence Force is held accountable for its activities. The PCD is responsible for monitoring Defence, and scrutinising and investigating what it does. It subsequently makes recommendations on the functions, budgetary allocations, rationalisation and restructuring of the defence organisational structure, policy formulation and any other relevant matters. It is also empowered to deal with legislation tabled in Parliament.

d. The oversight powers of the PCD are furthermore contained in Section 56 of the 1996 Constitution:

The National Assembly (the NCOP and therefore the JSCD excluded) or any of its committees may- (a) summon any person to appear before it to give evidence on oath or affirmation, or to produce documents; (b) require any person or institution to report to it; (c) compel, in terms of national legislation or the rules and orders, any person or institution to comply with a summons or requirement in terms of paragraph (a) or (b); and (d) receive petitions, representations or submissions from any interested persons or institutions.

42. Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI). The JSCI is established by the Intelligence Services Oversight Act, 1994 (as amended), exercises oversight functions in relation to the intelligence and counter-intelligence functions of the Security Services, and reports thereon to Parliament.50 The function of the JSCI is, inter alia, to review and make recommendations regarding interdepartmental cooperation and the rationalisation and demarcation of functions relating to intelligence and counter-intelligence between the State Security Agency, the Defence Force and the Police Service.51

43. The Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA). SCOPA exercises oversight over all executive structures and constitutional institutions of the State on behalf of the Legislature to ensure accountability for resources and financial management in accordance with the requirements of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999, as amended.

44. The Select Committee on Constitutional and Security Affairs (SCOSCA). The SCOSCA in the National Council of Provinces has an oversight role on all defence-related legislation and policy. This oversight role largely focuses on the implications for the nine provinces of South Africa.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES NOT YET IN OPERATION


a. Its envisaged functions are as follows:

The Joint Committee has oversight of the South African National Defence Force and the South African Police Service to give effect to the principles of transparency and accountability as envisaged in section 199(8) of the Constitution, and for that purpose the Committee must meet at least once a year to do an annual review of the security service concerned, including a review of (a) the budget, functioning, organisation, armaments, policy, morale and state of preparedness of the South African National Defence Force; and (b) the budget, functioning, organisation, policy and morale of the South African Police Service.53

b. Joint Rule 119 further states that:

Rules 117 to 119 will have to stand over until section 228 of the 1993 Constitution is repealed. Until such repeal the Joint Standing Committee on Defence established by that section must perform the oversight function concerning the South African National Defence Force.

50 Intelligence Services Oversight Act, 1994 (Act No 40 of 1994) (as amended), Section 2.
51 Intelligence Services Oversight Act, 1994 (Act No 40 of 1994) (as amended), Section 3(e).
INTRODUCTION

1. Defence carries the Constitutional obligation to defend and protect the Republic, its sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interests and people against direct threats. The force design, force structure and establishment table of Defence will reflect a balance of capabilities required to achieve this, vested in, inter alia, skilled and appropriately equipped personnel.

2. The defence and protection of South Africa and its vital interests are the cornerstone of the defence mandate. Provision must be made for contingencies, however unlikely, that could develop relatively quickly and for those that would take longer to develop, particularly high-impact contingencies. The level of defence must therefore be expressed for both a “force-in-being” (short-term force requirement) and a “future-force” (long-term force requirement) which maintains core defence appropriate to the inherent unpredictability of the future. Such capability cannot be created from scratch if the need suddenly arises. The fundamental characteristics will be:
   a. a balanced and sustainable nucleus;
   b. an effective intelligence capability to ensure early warning of potential conflicts and crises;
   c. the ability to deal with a range of small-scale contingencies of a short-term nature;
   d. the balance to deal with a spectrum of military operations; and
   e. the continuous enhancement of leadership, people, doctrine and equipment in the Defence Force.

3. The defence and protection of South Africa involve the following tasks: deter and prevent conflict; defend national interests and defend South Africa.

KEY TENETS

4. South Africa must be able to defend and protect itself autonomously without having to rely on another country. The Defence Force will thus be maintained as a formidable, combat-effective and healthy fighting force that can decisively and successfully defend and protect South Africa’s land, air, sea and cyber spaces, vital interests and strategic lines of communication.
5. Defending and protecting South Africa will take place in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

6. A balance of comprehensive defence capabilities will be maintained. The design of these capabilities will be shaped to achieve the balanced suite of integrated defence effects identified in Chapter 3. Some will be maintained at a lower level and expanded once early warning predictions indicate their impending need.

7. The Defence Force will be a well-trained, well-equipped and professional combat-ready force operating within the boundaries set by domestic and international law and ethical standards.

8. Recognising the immense cost and destruction inherent in armed conflict, South Africa will endeavour to:
   a. Act proactively, in partnership or autonomously, to defend itself by neutralising a dangerous threat before it can develop into physical aggression towards South Africa or the region.
   b. Pursue the principle of forward defence as far as is practically possible.
   c. Employ operations to defeat an opposing force while keeping collateral damage to an absolute minimum.
   d. Bring any conflict to early closure, employing forces and strategies appropriate to achieving this end.
   e. Undertake or support immediate post-conflict reconstruction of areas affected by military operations, thus minimising the impact on the civilian population.

9. The policy principle of preventing armed conflict is achieved by taking all political, diplomatic, informational, societal and military measures to deter potential aggressors. South Africa’s international stature and balanced suite of defence capabilities contribute to overall deterrent capability and posture. This is characterised by credible combat forces, operational prowess, rapid force generation through trained Reserves, demonstrated ability in field training, technological and doctrinal competence, and the visible morale of personnel. (Figure 5-1).

10. The SADC Mutual Defence Pact enjoins the State Parties to:
    a. Develop “individual and collective self-defence capability” (Article 4); and to
    b. Meet an armed attack against a State Party with “immediate collective action” (Article 6).

11. Deterring aggression is preferable to defending against aggression. Extended deterrence is essentially the extension of a protective ‘deterrent umbrella’ to include neighbours or allies. Deterrence in partnership will require closer strategic and military cooperation within SADC, with interoperability ensured at the operational and tactical level. This requires operational and strategic air, sea, road and rail mobility throughout the region.

12. South Africa’s national security is ensured through the protection of its national interest both inside and outside its territory. Threats to national interests are countered through an incremental approach to their protection with the use of force as the means of last resort. Protection of external national interests is firstly pursued in collaboration with the host countries and fol-
12. Followed, if necessary, by deliberate protection through expeditionary forces able to deploy to distant theatres for protracted periods of time, capable of conducting operations in complex environments during independent and semi-autonomous deployments. Expeditionary force projection is promoted via air, sea, road and rail capabilities. (Figure 5-2).

13. Threats to South Africa’s external national interests could arise within a conflict between South Africa and another state or as a consequence of conflict between other states or as a result of domestic conflict within a state. This could include threat manifestations to the level of limited war or civil war. An intra-state conflict external to South Africa may imply a multilateral or collaborative initiative or a unilateral initiative to protect a national interest that is threatened by such conflict.

14. Threats to external national interests remain both plausible and possible. South Africa would seek to first resolve such threats politically and diplomatically, relying heavily on defence diplomacy and defence intelligence capabilities. Should the use of force be necessary, South Africa would prefer to do so collaboratively within a multilateral context. However, unilateral rapid response to direct or indirect threats to South Africa’s external national interests must be possible as a last resort. The response would be tailored to the level of the assessed threat. South Africa must therefore be in a position to exercise appropriate military force projection and intervene unilaterally should it be necessary to protect national interests. These interests and the maximum level of unilateral action would be defined on a case by case basis.

15. It is envisaged that South Africa’s infrastructure will be thoroughly integrated with that of the rest of Africa in the near future. This may result in several vital key points located outside the national borders of South Africa requiring protection in time of instability and conflict. This may include infrastructure consisting of pipelines, railway lines and power lines spanning long distances.

16. The rescue, evacuation and hostage release of South African nationals abroad will also require joint capabilities permanently earmarked within the South African crisis management framework.

17. The protection of national interests is a standing Defence Force commitment.

18. The primary responsibility to guarantee the safety and security of external national interests ultimately rests with the state in whose territory such interests are located. If such interests are threatened beyond the capability of the host state, South Africa will follow a collaborative and incremental approach to assist the host state in protecting such interests. Collaboration will be conducted within the context of bilateral agreements and under the auspices of the regional, continental and international security structures, as applicable.

19. If national interests are threatened beyond the capability of a host state, a joint intervention force will protect such interests. Such operations will require the rapid deployment of forces capable of operating over the spectrum of conflict.

20. Forces will be tailored for the specific operation. Highly mobile, task-specific early-entry forces will be required to provide a rapid response, and will usually be followed-on by medium-combat forces. Heavy-combat forces may in some cases be required to counter a particular threat. The focus will be on protection, using offensive tactics as required. Operations will normally be protracted. Maximum use of intelligence, local reconnaissance and surveillance and organic firepower, particularly precision indirect firepower, will be required. Forces will be capable of projecting and sustaining combat power in hostile territories, with support provided over long distances and the possible forward positioning of logistics. A combination of air, sea, rail and road lift will be required. Support via internal waterways may also be required.
DEFEND AND PROTECT SOUTH AFRICA

TASK 3
DEFEND SOUTH AFRICA

DEFENCE EFFECT

21. South Africa’s 1,219,090 km² land surface area is defended in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force, including a broad and expanding strategy of forward defence informed by the defence posture. Defence may extend to preventive self-defence if South Africa must take the initiative to prevent an attack or to deliberately defend when an aggressor exercises the initiative. (Figure 5-3).

PREVENTIVE SELF-DEFENCE AGAINST IMMINENT THREATS

22. International law recognises the right of states to act in self-defence, provided that a threat is imminent and that the actions taken are proportional to the threat, thus avoiding the use of excessive force. South Africa will exercise this right as a means of last resort:
   a. after all other practicable means of preventing conflict have failed; or,
   b. when the threat poses immense strategic risk.

23. The aim of such preventive operations will be to prevent or destroy the threat before it can fully manifest itself. Operations will be focused and of limited duration using small, balanced, modular force packages of special operations forces employing focused tactics and high strategic, operational and tactical mobility, and maintaining a high operational tempo. Such operations would typically comprise raids and strikes by highly trained light forces, but particular circumstances may require a shift to medium and heavy forces.

24. Operations against, inter alia, acts of terror, insurgen-cy and organised crime will generally rely heavily on Special Forces¹. Interdepartmental cooperation between State departments, specifically the security forces, will be vital. Such operations will be conducted on the basis of confirmed and verified intelligence.

DELIBERATE SELF-DEFENCE

25. Deliberate self-defence will be conducted when aggression cannot be deterred or discouraged by political, diplomatic or other means, when preventive self-defence has failed or when South Africa cannot avoid entering a state of National Defence. Forces must be able to deploy simultaneously throughout the theatre in day/night and all weather situations to create operational shock and to shatter the aggressor’s cohesion. South Africa will seek to dominate the airspace and the electromagnetic spectrum and maintain superior situational awareness.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

26. The deliberate defence of South Africa will take predominance over all other tasks and is a standing Defence Force commitment. The level of defence required is aligned to circumstances found in overt armed conflict and limited war.

27. Should the spectre of a military threat manifest against South Africa, South Africa would seek to either take the initiative to prevent an attack or embark on deliberate self-defence when an aggressor is able to exercise the initiative. In either case the conduct of operations will be characterised by a strategy of forward defence. The operational concept will include fluid, high-mobility and high-tempo manoeuvre, predominantly offensive operations at the tactical level, maximum use of superior command and control, intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance systems and information operations, and flexible, responsive sustainment support.

Figure 5-3: Task 3 - Defend South Africa

¹ Military personnel with cross-training in basic and specialised military skills, organised into small multi-purpose detachments to conduct guerrilla warfare, counter-insurgency and unconventional warfare operations (SANDF Military Dictionary, p 337).
Combat Support Elements, such as artillery, air defence artillery, signals and military engineers, provide combat support to the combat forces as part of a theatre, command, or task force formed for combat operations.

Combat Service Support Elements, such as logistic support, technical services and military medical support, provide service support to combat forces as part of a theatre, command, or task force formed for combat operations.

28. Major landward combat forces, comprising tactical combat formations, will primarily be deployed by means of road and rail to and from forward positions. Land forces will be supported by relevant air and maritime combat support capabilities.

29. **Operations in the Deep.**
   a. Deep operations will be executed with predominantly highly mobile forces ranging from Special Forces to special operations forces projected covertly by air and sea. This may be extended to include medium-combat and heavy-combat forces with the required combat support, joint firepower, intelligence, mobility and sustainment that contribute to deep strike capabilities.
   b. Maximum emphasis will be placed on stand-off and long-range precision attack.
   c. Air, land, sea and Special Forces capabilities will provide specialised combat capabilities from dispersed locations, using situational awareness and communications to seize the initiative, maintain momentum and exploit success.
   d. Appropriately protected combat service support will be agile and versatile and able to support operations along multiple lines amid rapidly changing support requirements.

30. **Close Operations.**
   a. The close battle will be fought mainly by heavy combat formations with the required combat support.
   b. All available forces will be used to find, fix and destroy the aggressor swiftly and decisively. This will be done by engaging the aggressor in the battle area and in the aggressor’s depth while protecting rear areas, employing manoeuvre to concentrate force at the key place and time, and conducting high-intensity and high-tempo operations.
   c. Air, land, sea and Special Forces capabilities will operate from dispersed locations, using space and air assets for situational awareness and communications to seize the initiative, maintain momentum and exploit success.
   d. Maximum emphasis will be placed on stand-off and long-range precision attack and rapidly executed long-range strikes.
   e. Combat forces will be sustained from prepositioned and reserve stocks. The support system will need to be agile and versatile, and able to support operations along multiple lines amid rapidly changing support requirements.

31. **Rear Operations.**
   a. Rear area operations will be conducted to defend areas behind the front line of own forces operating externally and/or behind the lines of own forces.
operating within South Africa’s borders. This could include elements from all combat services. Joint mission-trained task forces executing these operations will rely heavily on inherent and task-organised intelligence capabilities.

b. Rear areas and land, sea and air lines of communication (LOCs) in South Africa will be protected by tailored joint forces. Land LOCs will be protected by both mobile and static forces.
INTRODUCTION

1. The Constitutional imperatives to “defend and protect”\(^1\) extend beyond that of engagement in major-combat operations to that of safeguarding South Africa and its people in times of both conflict and peace. South Africa’s borders, strategic installations and air, maritime and cyberspaces must be safeguarded\(^2\) and other responsibilities ordered by government must be executed.

2. South Africa’s borders and strategic installations will be safeguarded by the Defence Force in conjunction with other departments. This extends to:
   a. Border safeguarding.
   b. Safeguarding of critical infrastructure.
   c. State authority may also be augmented by the Defence Force during major events, when the Police Service is unable to maintain law and order on its own, or when additional security capacity is required.

3. Present legislation needs to be reviewed to ensure that the rights and duties of defence members serving in the internal role, as called for in the tasks set out below, are adequately provided for and that sufficient protection is given in law for such members.

**TASK 4**

**SAFEGUARD BORDERS**

4. The Defence Force will assume full responsibility for land, air and maritime border safeguarding. This will be pursued with the Defence Force leading all collaborative efforts concerning safeguarding on the borderline and the immediate rear areas. The control of ports of entry remains the responsibility of other departments.

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\(^1\) Constitution, 1996, Section 200(2).

\(^2\) Safeguard South Africa includes its people, territory, islands, territorial waters, exclusive economic zone, extended continental shelf, vital interests, resources and critical infrastructure.
5. Border safeguarding will entail the enforcement of State authority with respect to South Africa’s land, air and maritime borders. Operations will not only be conducted on the land borderline, but will include rear-area operations to enhance operational manoeuvre. Border safeguarding will include the deployment of air assets to control the airspace and maritime assets for the control of South Africa’s maritime space. The critical safeguarding component of the defence mandate extends to the following:
   a. Control of South Africa’s 4 471 km land borderline and the immediate rear area.
   b. Control of South Africa’s 7 660 km air border and airspace over its 1 219 090 km² land surface area.
   c. Control of South Africa’s 3 924 km coastline (at the high water line), economic exclusive zone of 1 553 000 km² and 4 340 000 km² of maritime territory.

6. Border safeguarding, in cooperation with contiguous states and other State departments and agencies, will require self-supported and sustained joint mobile forces. Situational awareness, effective command and control and the sustainment of operations along extensive borders will be vital capability requirements. South Africa will further seek to declare a permanent “Air Border Identification Zone” (ABIZ).

7. Border safeguarding will thus be a standing Defence Force commitment.

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Marion and Prince Edward Islands comprise 474 400 km².
LAND BORDER

8. South Africa’s land area has 4,471 km of land borders (Figure 6-2), partly demarcated by rivers that are largely seasonal in their capacity to hamper illicit crossing, and partly running through areas of thick bush or mountainous terrain that are difficult to monitor or patrol.

9. These borders have proved vulnerable to a range of illegal activities, including rustling of livestock and the smuggling of narcotics and stolen and untaxed goods, and also to illegal migration. They are equally vulnerable to the future movement of illicit weapons or explosives by terror groups. There is thus a clear need to secure the land border.

AIR BORDER

10. South Africa’s land area has an air border of 7,660 km (Figures 6-2 and 6-3), although it is primarily the airspace over the land border and part of the north-western and north-eastern coastlines that are particularly vulnerable to illegal intrusion. Air transportation is growing rapidly with a consequent responsibility to ensure sound airspace awareness, control and protection.

11. There is evidence of smuggling by air (known to be a major problem in other parts of Africa and elsewhere in the world), particularly regarding narcotics smuggling and human trafficking. There is also the danger of terror groups moving explosives or weapons by air. There is thus a clear need to protect South Africa’s airspace against such intrusions and against possible terror actions such as have been seen in other parts of the world, particularly during major social and sporting events.

MARITIME BORDER

12. The maritime interests of South Africa are derived from its geographic location, economic infrastructure and geo-political aspirations and obligations as a regional maritime power. South Africa has one of the longest coastlines in Africa, stretching for about 3,924 km at the high water line, from the desert border with Namibia on the Atlantic coast, southwards around the tip of Africa and then north to the border with subtropical Mozambique on the Indian Ocean.

13. South Africa has an exclusive economic zone of 1,553,000 km² of which the areas around Marion and Prince Edward Islands comprise 474,400 km². The Atlantic Ocean borders the west coast, the Indian Ocean borders the east and south coast and the Southern Ocean surrounds Marion and Prince Edward Islands. South Africa has tabled its claim to the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea for the extension of the continental shelf. This implies that South Africa will have to exercise control and enforce state authority over 4,340,000 km² of maritime territory (Figure 6-4). This must also be seen in the context of South Africa being in effect an island economy:

a. directly dependent on seaborne trade for 50% of its GDP, and substantially more if one considers that 75% of the oil on which economic activity depends, comes by sea from the Middle East;
b. with an important fishing industry; and  
c. with potential for a growing offshore hydrocarbon sector.

14. South Africa lies along a strategic major international maritime trade route, is located far from its key trade partners whom it reaches largely by sea, and has international obligations for providing safety of navigation and ships, ensuring freedom of the seas and security of shipping, as well as the protection of the marine environment. South Africa’s national maritime interests include effective cooperation arrangements with neighbouring states and territories within and beyond the region and continent for the management of maritime domain and interests, oceans management and good order at sea.

15. Maritime piracy, once thought to be a scourge of a bygone age, has re-emerged in recent years as a serious threat to both crews and property on the high seas. It is rapidly becoming one of the most threatening maritime challenges of the 21st century. The threat levels and costs of maritime security call for a comprehensive approach to this global challenge, entailing short- and long-term initiatives, both onshore and offshore, involving all relevant public and private sector stakeholders.

16. The security of South Africa’s maritime trade routes, and South Africa’s consequent ability as a nation to trade, is a fundamental matter of national security. As a trading nation, with over 95% of its trade being reliant on maritime trade routes, the security of South Africa and its people is crucially dependent on the ability to trade, grow the economy, reduce poverty and provide meaningful work for South Africa’s people. Maritime security is also linked to commercial fishing and tourism. Consequently, the freedom of the seas, the right of innocent passage and the protection of the trade routes for merchant shipping are of vital national interest to the nation. Many SADC countries, including land-locked countries, are dependent on maritime trade for their economic prosperity. Piracy and maritime crime impact negatively on the economies of many African states.

17. The inter-relatedness of South African and African security implies that all African maritime trade routes, maritime zones, and where applicable the High Seas, remain an important securi-
ty consideration. The Defence Force maritime security responsibilities may thus extend beyond own national responsibilities.

18. Therefore it is recognised that South Africa will have to contribute significantly to the operationalisation of the SADC Maritime Security Strategy, the Djibouti Code of Conduct and the African Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050 in support of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 and the International Maritime Organisation Safety of Life at Sea Convention. By implication this will mean that the maritime security of South Africa, SADC and the continent will be ensured by the collective and integrated efforts of all national, regional and continental organisations charged with such responsibility. Furthermore alliances with regional, continental and international forces operating within the yet-to-be-created “Combined Exclusive Maritime Zone of Africa” (CEMZA), will act as force multipliers.

**TASK 5**

**SAFEGUARD CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE**

19. In terms of the National Key Points Act, 1980\(^4\), national key points are those state, parastatal or private installations and infrastructure whose security is declared to be vital to the functioning of the South African state, its economy and the wellbeing of its people. Current examples range from the Houses of Parliament to selected airports, sea ports, power stations, refineries, arms industry factories, and chemical and pharmaceutical plants. These installations are critical and must be protected accordingly.

20. The protection of national key points has been assigned to the South African Police Service, with the Defence Force playing a supportive role (Presidential Minute No 140 of February 2004).

21. Given that the security paradigm has radically changed since the introduction of the National Key Points Act (1980), a Cabinet decision is awaited on this matter, with concomitant legislative amendment if necessary. Specific attention would have to be given to the definition of a national key point as well as the necessary powers to proclaim critical infrastructure as national key points.

22. The outcome of this process may impact on the design, structure and size of the Defence Force. Should the Defence Force be required to play a more prominent role, the following would have to be considered:

a. Protection plans would have to be prepared for all proclaimed national key points and forces earmarked for their contingent and/or standing protection and required forces and readiness levels determined through collaboration with other security agencies and private companies on a case by case basis.

b. The administration, protection oversight, and at times physical protection of national key points would include the protection of information and/or intellectual property as a strategic resource.

c. Contingency plans would be required for all proclaimed national key points.

**TASK 6**

**COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE SERVICE**

23. The Constitution\(^5\) mandates that the Defence Force may be employed for service in the upholding of law and order in the Republic in cooperation with the Police Service under circumstances set out in law where the said Police Service is unable to

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\(^4\) National Key Points Act, 1980 (Act No 102 of 1980).

\(^5\) The Constitution, 1996, Schedule 6, Section 24.
maintain law and order on its own. South Africa and its people must be made to feel safe through the augmentation of state authority by the Defence Force should the Police Service be unable to maintain law and order on its own or under circumstances where the Police Service requires additional security capacity. (Figure 6-5).

24. The authorisation of the employment of the Defence Force in cooperation with the Police Service requires that the Minister of Police formally requests the Minister of Defence for such employment, or that the President instructs the Defence Force to be employed in cooperation with of the Police Service. Such employment must be authorised by the President as Head of the National Executive and can only be undertaken within the borders of South Africa. The Police Service is and will remain the lead department. Employed Defence Force elements will always remain under own command.

25. The practice of obtaining a Presidential Minute for cooperating with the Police Service will be dealt with in a new streamlined approval process to facilitate the provision of support to achieve urgent operational objectives.

26. Cooperation with the Police Service is a standing Defence Force commitment. Defence accordingly has a responsibility to cooperate with the Police Service and the other Security Services for major events and in the restoration of law and order when incidents of crime, violence and domestic unrest extend beyond the control of such Services.

27. Defence cooperation with the Police Service will focus primarily on major events and dealing with civil and sub-state threats to the constitutional order. Task-tailored forces may be formed to rapidly respond to situations, using centralised air or land mobile forces or forces co-located with the Police Service within allocated areas of responsibility.

28. Although the possibilities of general civil conflict and insurgency are remote, their occurrence would have high impact, requiring a significant and rapid response by the Defence Force to restore and maintain law and order.

29. The deployment of the Defence Force in cooperation with the Police Service requires existing legislation to be enhanced in order to ensure that Defence Force members are adequately protected when executing such tasks.

MAJOR EVENTS

30. From time to time the Police Service may require security support during the hosting of major public events. The Defence Force will provide forces to be co-located with Police Service elements and/or other departments within allocated areas of responsibility. Forces employed for this purpose will be tailored to the mission.

COOPERATION WITH SPECIALIST POLICE TASK FORCES

31. From time to time the Defence Force is required to work with the various Police Specialist Task Forces, both standing task forces and temporary task forces that are mission-specific, such as to counter rhino poaching. This cooperation with the Police Service may extend to reciprocal training initiatives related to task force activities. The short response times of such engagements require close coordination between the Defence Force and the Police Service.

THREATS TO CIVIL ORDER

32. The domestic security environment is characterised by normal political and economic competition found in a democratic and peaceful state.

33. The Defence Force may be constitutionally employed for service in instances where the Police Service is no longer able to uphold law and order. The Defence Force will primarily cooperate with the Police Service from its collateral capability and will not generally structure for this task. However, given the Defence Force’s role in Fighting-In-Built-Up-Areas (FIBUA), some specialised additional equipment will be needed.

TASK 7
ENSURE INFORMATION SECURITY

DEFENCE EFFECT

34. South Africa’s information and communication systems, technology and infrastructure are protected.

35. Information and communication systems and technology are tools enabling command and control to be exerted in warfare. They provide the infrastructure for weapon systems and...
sensors to exchange relevant data and allow decision-makers to use data, information and ultimately intelligence to visualise the battlefield and make successful military decisions (Figure 6-6). This is applicable in both weapon and administration systems, and enhanced by technology support systems like Health Informatics, Telehealth and Health Intelligence.

36. Although the terms cyber-warfare, cyber-defence or cyber-attack are often used in everyday language, the broad military concept used in this goal is Information Warfare, a term which covers a broad range of operations to be carried out within the Information Sphere (commonly also known as the InfoSphere). Military forces strive to achieve necessary information superiority so as to ensure own freedom of action and to ensure strategic dominance and success.

37. Information security is ensured by dominating the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) and the network information systems spectrums (also known as the cyberspace), as well as influencing human beliefs and behaviour in the physical, information and cognitive (psychological) domains. The following is achieved:
   a. Potential information onslaughts are deterred.
   b. Defence information and communication assets and processes are defended and protected and information superiority is achieved.
   c. Information and communication assets and processes of an opposing force are disrupted, destroyed, denied and exploited and own information superiority is enhanced.

38. Defence further plays a supportive role with other security agencies in the protection of government information and promotion of broader information security in the South African society. This supportive role is defined in the National Cyber-Security Policy Framework, which seeks to enable the development of an information society that takes into account the fundamental rights of every South African citizen to privacy, security, dignity, access to information, the right to communication and freedom of expression. The framework seeks to ensure that Government, business and civil society are able to enjoy the full benefits of a safe and secure cyberspace through working together to understand and address the risks, reduce the benefits to criminals and seize opportunities in cyberspace to enhance South Africa’s overall security and safety, including its economic wellbeing.

State Requirement

39. The risk of South Africa’s communications and electronic data being subjected to a cyber-attack remains a reality. The Protection of Information Bill refers to state information requiring protection against unlawful alteration, destruction or loss. It is of critical importance that the concept of Information Operations be established at national level to coordinate State activities in the InfoSphere (Figure 6-7). Information Operations can thus be applied as the coordinating body to ensure that the security cluster and civil society will collaboratively define national information security goals to protect information as a strategic resource.

40. The protection of state information against a cyber-threat is the primary responsibility of the State Security Agency through Electronic Communications Security (Pty) Ltd (COMSEC Pty Ltd). COMSEC was established in 2002 as a private company with the primary purpose of ensuring that critical electronic communications of the State are secure and protected. The functions of COMSEC are:
   a. Protect and secure critical electronic communications against unauthorised access or technical, electronic or any other related threats.

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7 Government Gazette 32999 dated 05 March 2010, Section 5(1).
8 Electronic Communications Security (Pty) Ltd Act, 2002 (Act No 68 of 2002), Sections 1 and 2.
b. Provide, with the concurrence of the National Intelligence Agency, verification services for electronic communications security systems, products and services used by organs of state.

c. Provide and coordinate research and development with regard to electronic communications security systems, products, services and any other related services.

d. Perform functions necessary for the effective functioning of COMSEC.

e. For purposes of these functions, COMSEC must:

i. Develop, design, procure, invent, install or maintain secure electronic communications systems or products and do research in this regard.

ii. Provide secure electronic communications services, systems and products.

iii. Provide cryptographic services.

iv. Train and support users of the electronic communications systems, products and related services.

v. Provide consultancy services on the security and protection of electronic communications services, systems and products.

41. The State Security Agency, the Department of Communications, the Police Service, Defence and the Department of Science and Technology must collaboratively seek to define and coordinate a multi-agency and interdepartmental initiative to provide the State’s information security.

a. The Department of Communications is the leading agency for coordinating policy and legislation on cyber-related matters.

b. The State Security Agency is the leading entity to implement the concept of Information Operations at national level. The State Security Agency has the overall responsibility and accountability for coordination, development and implementation of cyber-security measures in the Republic.

c. The Police Service is the leading agency for cyber-crime.

d. The Department of Science and Technology is the leading agency for the development, coordination and implementation of national capacity on cyber-security research.

e. Defence is the leading agency for Information Warfare.

42. The National Cyber-Security Policy Framework seeks to create a secure, dependable, reliable and trustworthy cyber environment that facilitates the protection of critical information infrastructure whilst strengthening shared human values and understanding of cyber-security in support of national security imperatives and the economy. This will enable the development of an information society which takes into account the fundamental rights of every South African citizen to privacy, security, dignity, access to information, the right to communication and freedom of expression.

43. In terms of the national cyber-security effort, Defence will contribute to the national Cyber-Security Response Committee and Cyber-Security Centre. These structures will effectively coordinate departmental resources in the achievement of common cyber-security safety and security objectives.

44. This will require expert service providers, such as Armscor and other public sector agencies, to play a significant role in the research, development and maintenance of specific strategic technologies and capabilities.
Defence Requirement

45. Critical defence networks become cyber targets as these networks run the command and control, administration, personnel, logistics and finance information systems. Consequently, appropriate information warfare capabilities are required to protect defence information systems, including the coordination of technology development not available in the open market.

46. Joint Information Warfare will be conducted to dominate the InfoSphere focusing on the electromagnetic spectrum, network information systems spectrums and the human domain to contribute towards information superiority. The following objectives will be pursued:
   a. To deter any potential information onslaught against Defence.
   b. To defend and protect defence information and communication assets and processes to enhance its information superiority.
   c. To disrupt, destroy, deny and exploit the information and communication assets and processes of the opposing force to enhance own information superiority.
   d. To support other activities primarily for the accomplishment of information superiority.

47. The national communications infrastructure is partially used to transport data to various defence users. Consequently, Defence must protect its data by applying end-to-end encryption on all network links (Figure 6-8).

48. Appropriate defence Information Warfare capabilities must be developed to enhance the protection of modern systems, including the coordination of technology development not available in the open market. The focus will be on the establishment of a centre of excellence with a core capability to satisfy Information Warfare requirements for the operational environment, inter alia:
   a. Information Warfare modelling and simulation technology for decision support.
   b. Information Warfare application and enabling domains research and development for operationalisation.

49. Joint Information Warfare will be structured to support the landward defence, air defence and maritime defence capabilities. Combat services and staff divisions have a distinct responsibility to develop or contribute to the development of Joint Information Warfare systems. In addition, Joint Information Warfare will be directed at influencing the beliefs and behaviour of humans in the physical, information and cognitive (psychological) domains.

50. Joint Information Warfare will be integrated within all levels of war and throughout the spectrum of conflict. Suitably trained and equipped Information Warfare forces and their means of deployment, sustainment and recovery will be provided by various combat services and staff divisions to meet defence strategic objectives.

Figure 6-8: Defence Information Infrastructure
CHAPTER 7

REGIONAL AND CONTINENTAL PEACE AND SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

1. The interdependent and uncertain 21st century world produces challenges which are complex and global in nature, threatening collective wellbeing and placing increased pressure on the global system of governance. These challenges encompass human security issues such as environmental sustainability, poverty alleviation, development, political and economic crises, human and gender rights violations, and the proliferation of small arms and weapons of mass destruction. Multilateral organisations remain committed to seeking equitable solutions to global problems.

2. In an era of globalisation and interdependency, many threats to peace and stability, such as global poverty, climatic change or acts of terror, cannot be effectively addressed unilaterally by individual states. States must collaborate in the pursuit and promotion of common security ideals and against threats to security. A shared concept of security, common threat analysis and an agreed-upon set of principles and/or rules, enable the collective resolution of conflict and the countering of security threats. Such collective action requires internationally-mandated initiatives that are legitimate, effective, sustainable and which share the cost and resource burden amongst states.

KEY TENETS

3. South Africa’s foreign policy, shaped by its own domestic priorities, seeks a “better Africa in a better world”. Economic integration, development, peace and security are cornerstones of this policy. South Africa will thus continue to support regional and continental conflict resolution, strengthen regional integration, significantly increase intra-African trade and champion sustainable development.

4. South Africa’s engagement with other states will be one of peaceful relations, adherence to international law on armed conflict and the pursuit of international treaties to which it is party. South Africa recognises that development and stability are
REGIONAL AND CONTINENTAL PEACE AND SECURITY

inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing, hence the commitment to the promotion of continental and regional security.

5. South Africa encourages the multilateral pursuit of global solutions. South Africa also remains committed to the international systems of global governance for the promotion and protection of human rights through equal emphasis on civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights.

6. South Africa’s resolve to promote peace, security and development on the continent will be demonstrated through unambiguous policy statements, the maintenance and employment of a credible intervention capability, the prepositioning of forces and the contribution of South African forces to various forms of peace missions.

7. International conflict prevention and crisis management require the provision of joint forces with escalation, enforcement and sustainment capabilities for operations in different operational theatres at the same time. External support will be relied on if necessary.

8. Multilateral Level. South Africa will consequently seek to enhance its strategic influence through shaping the multilateral security agenda, pursuing critical multilateral security objectives, developing regional and continental partnerships and directed participation in selected bilateral mechanisms. The following will be pursued:
   a. Promotion of peace, security and confidence-building through constructive dialogue aimed at nurturing sound diplomatic relations and pursuing South Africa’s foreign policy principles and objectives.
   b. Commitment to the resolution of conflict in terms of the UN Charter and international and customary international law and, as far as possible, employing military force within a multinational framework.
   c. Peaceful resolution of conflicts through recognised international instruments and mechanisms.
   d. Support to government diplomatic initiatives through participation in multilateral institutions such as the SADC, AU and UN.
   e. Particular diligence in furthering the objectives of International Humanitarian Law.
   f. Adherence to national responsibilities that arise from international instruments, especially during times of conflict.
   g. Protection of the civilian population and other non-combatants and the reduction of unnecessary suffering.
   h. UN peacekeeping within the voluntary UN Standby Arrangements System, in turn requiring South Africa to identify capacity that can be earmarked for the creation of joint multinational forces under a UN mandate. Similar arrangements may be pursued at the AU or SADC levels.

9. Continental and Regional Level. Since the security of South Africa is inextricably linked to that of the African continent and the developing world, South Africa must:
   a. Help shape the continental and regional security and developmental agenda through effective participation in security mechanisms.
   b. Seek UN Security Council or AU Peace and Security Council mandates for peace missions and concomitant security sector reform (SSR) and post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD).

TASK 8
PROMOTE STRATEGIC INFLUENCE

DEFENCE EFFECT

10. South Africa enhances its strategic influence through the execution of a strengthened defence diplomacy strategy which enhances South Africa’s ability to shape the multilateral security agenda, pursue critical multilateral security objectives, capacitate multilateral institutions, develop regional and continental partnerships and direct participation in selected bilateral mechanisms. (Figure 7-1).

DIRECTING AND MANAGING DEFENCE DIPLOMACY

11. South Africa’s contribution to the prevention and resolution of conflict will be enhanced through an integration of its diplomatic, military and other efforts, in a complementary manner, and in instances supported by appropriate military capabilities, that strengthen South Africa’s capacity to influence international developments. This requires a defence diplomacy capability whose strategy and main effort focus on those national priorities where defence can add the most value. Defence diplomacy efforts will further centre on fostering long-standing relationships with key African states and other strategic partners.

12. A defence diplomacy strategy will be developed to address defence bilateral and multilateral priorities. These will include:
   a. Pursuing the priorities of government as expressed in its Medium-Term Strategic Framework.
   b. Pursuing the priorities of the Executive Authority responsible for defence.
   c. Deployment of defence personnel into multilateral security institutions.
   d. The pursuit of identified multilateral security objectives.
REGIONAL AND CONTINENTAL PEACE AND SECURITY

   a. The Chief of the Defence Force will assign a chief executor to coordinate and manage the defence diplomacy strategy.
   b. Execution of the defence diplomacy strategy will take place across all levels of the Defence Force.
   c. Specific programmes and engagements will be established based on agreed programmes emanating from various multilateral and bilateral engagements.

ELEMENTS OF THE DEFENCE DIPLOMACY STRATEGY

Multilateral Security

16. South Africa recognises the need to enhance its international contribution through candidatures and the secondment of South Africans to positions in regional, continental and global governance institutions. Defence, in pursuit of the African Agenda, will prioritise enhanced representation at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the AU Peace and Security Council and the SADC Organ.
17. **The United Nations (UN).**
   a. The UN system, through its universal membership and broad mandate, occupies the central and indispensable role in the global system of governance. The UN constitutes the most prominent global organisation dedicated to the principles of collective security. In pursuit of enhanced continental and global security, South Africa will consequently remain a significant and responsible troop contributor to UN missions in Africa and will give consideration to participation in the UN Standby Arrangement System.
   b. South Africa will:
      i. Continue the trend of being a significant and responsible troop contributor to UN-mandated and -assessed missions, within the framework of government objectives and interests.
      ii. Seek to significantly enhance its representation in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

18. **The African Union (AU).**
   a. South Africa will continue to champion the role of the AU as the primary organisation for coordinating continental positions and coordination with development partners. The AU will be the primary mechanism for South Africa’s continental engagement.
   b. Security is promoted by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) through timely and effective response to conflicts and crises in Africa. The work of the AU PSC is promoted through its mechanisms: the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force (ASF), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Military Staff Committee (MSC), and the Peace Fund.
   c. South Africa will intensify its engagements in the AU and its structures towards building African security and the social and economic development of the continent. South Africa will specifically:
      i. Continue to support the AU PSC and its mechanisms, playing a specific role in the MSC, CEWS and the ASF.
      ii. Work with SADC and its member states to maintain the readiness of the SADC Standby Force (SADC SF).
      iii. Contribute to the capacity of the CEWS.

19. **The Southern African Development Community (SADC).**
   a. South Africa is committed to establishing SADC as the firm base for the engagement of the continent. The consolidation of the security structures and institutions of SADC is thus of paramount importance. Stability in SADC will be promoted through: the conclusion of treaties such as the SADC Mutual Defence Pact; the conclusion of individual bilateral agreements; and participation in SADC Standby Force activities. South Africa will pursue initiatives to create a firm SADC defence and security sector foundation.
   b. South Africa will enhance its contribution to the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), including the Defence Sub-Committee and its sub-committees and working groups.
   c. South Africa will continue its current contribution to the SADC Standby Force (Figure 7-2) and will put significant effort into establishing the SADC Standby Force as a standing multinational force in terms of South Africa’s pledges. South Africa will specifically advocate for the migration of the current Planning Element to a functional brigade headquarters capable of conducting regular force preparation, mobilisation of forces when required and execution of command and control over deployed forces. To this end South Africa will:
      i. Pledge continuous support to the SADC Standby Force.
      ii. Exchange and train personnel.
      iii. Offer to permanently supply the Brigade Tactical Headquarters to the SADC Standby Force.
      iv. Avail South African facilities for the planning and hosting of regional military exercises in pursuit of the SADC Standby Force and other security objectives.
      v. Establish a strategic relationship between the South African Peace Mission Training Centre in Thaba Tshwane and the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Harare, including the exchange of Directing Staff.
      vi. Significantly contribute to the establishment of the SADC Logistic Base.
      vii. Develop mutually compatible SADC doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures.
      viii. Attach or second subject-matter experts as may be required for periods of shorter duration, examples of potential subjects being doctrine development, maritime security, nuclear and biological defence and military health protection, amongst others.
      ix. Cooperate with regional defence industries to promote interoperability.
      x. Advocate the expansion of SADC’s Special

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1 Signed by the SADC Heads of State in August 2003.
Forces capability in order to create a “rapid reaction” capability within the regional and sub-regional AU peace, safety and security architecture. To this end:

(1) The establishment of a formal Special Forces structure in the Operations Sub-Sub-Committee of the ISDSC.

(2) The secondment of Special Forces planners to the SADC Standby Force HQ.

d. South Africa will actively contribute to the development of the Civilian Component of the SADC Standby Force, including but not exclusively, within the Planning Element in Gaborone.

Regional and Continental Partnerships

20. South Africa will continue to advance common African positions through its structured bilateral activities in the belief that regional defence partnership initiatives will further peace, stability and the broad security objectives and diplomatic initiatives of Government.

21. Defence cooperation within SADC, Africa and beyond, is viewed as a foundation for the achievement of peace and security. The signing and implementation of international defence agreements are thus a critical policy action and an important component of regional confidence building.

22. South Africa will play a supportive role to regional and continental partners. Defence will pursue cooperation in the fields of logistics, training and education, intelligence, combined exercises, secondment of personnel, and the development of common doctrine and operational procedures.

a. **Contiguous States.**

i. Defence will pursue specific security arrangements with countries with whom common borders are shared and with whom coordinated cooperation on matters such as defence, state security, immigration, civilian policing, customs and ports of entry is necessary.

ii. Specific cooperative operations may take place to counter imminent threats or wider criminality such as poaching, stock-theft, illegal movement of people and goods, as well as maritime security and piracy.

b. **Wider SADC.** Defence will similarly prioritise bilateral relations within the SADC region through the vigorous and robust pursuit of bilaterally agreed cooperation plans.

c. **Partnerships beyond SADC.**

i. Defence partnerships will also be pursued with like-minded states beyond SADC that are committed to the common values of democracy, human rights, peace and stability, and civil control of the armed forces.

ii. Defence will specifically seek strategic partnerships with countries which have the means to play a leadership role in their region or on the continent, who demonstrate the political will to be a force for good in the pursuit of these ideals, who promote peace, security and development and whose leadership role has international consequences or influence.

iii. Senior defence personnel may be deployed as representatives to such countries.

d. **Bilateral Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs).** Defence will thus pursue the implementation of CSBMs to provide for greater transparency and cooperation on regional
and continental military matters, thereby promoting collective confidence and stability. A range of defence CSBMs can be pursued with partner nations, including the following:

i. Defence and security agreements and cooperation mechanisms.

ii. Intelligence cooperation and exchanges, a (regional) communications network, a “crisis hotline”, and established procedures for dealing with unusual or unscheduled military incidents.

iii. Structured annual consultations and exchanges of information on threat perceptions, defence budgets, force structure, modernisation plans, general defence cooperation, high-level visits and troop deployments.

iv. Military assistance, exchanges and education and training cooperation.

v. Combined military exercises and/or on-site observation of military exercises and specified activities.

vi. Disaster and humanitarian assistance.

vii. Common procurement of defence systems and common technology programmes.

viii. Collaboration in the implementation of the AU and SADC Maritime Security Strategies.

Relationships beyond Africa

23. South Africa will seek to establish and maintain defence cooperation with key nations beyond Africa as identified in the context of foreign policy. This will be a balance of existing strategic partners in the Americas, the Middle East, expanded Europe and Asia, and the emergent powers of the South, in particular the BRICS countries. In addition to national foreign policy objectives, these initiatives will also be driven by the military requirement for lifecycle support to prime mission equipment, force preparation and force employment cooperation in terms of security objectives, defence education and training requirements and cooperation with partners on various military general assistance missions.

   a. It will be critical for South Africa to enhance its defence relations with key partners on the continent as well as with both the established developed partners and the emergent partners of the developing world.

   b. In terms of established partners, characterised mostly by traditional relationships and on a perceived common outlook on global issues, these well-established ties of friendship and mutual understanding will be strengthened through continued cooperation in bilateral and multilateral areas, with the emphasis being placed on interactions as equal partners.

   c. In terms of the emergent partners, the strategic focus will be aimed both at bilateral defence relations and at the deepening of trade and investment linkages in the defence industry sector, where there is potential for future growth and where synergies and complementarities in product and technologies exist.

Defence Industry Cooperation

24. Rigorous, focused, coordinated and visible government involvement and political support and commitment are necessary for the successful marketing of South African armaments and related equipment and services. Government will actively assist the domestic defence industry with the international marketing of armaments and actively support specific marketing initiatives by the defence industry. Domestic user participation, coordination and government export support measures will require collaborative government involvement.

25. Government has an obligation to exercise control over the defence industry as well as actively assist it in obtaining access to key markets. Government will thus assist the defence industry by facilitating initiatives that support political, economic and military objectives such as the maintenance of strategic defence technologies and capabilities.

26. The pursuit of joint procurement programmes in the SADC region will be an important initiative, with the emphasis on the acquisition of interoperable equipment as a stepping stone to regional interoperability and a functional SADC Standby Force.

Defence Attachés

27. South Africa’s future defence attachés will be stringently selected for their military knowledge and operational experience and their ability to champion South Africa and further foreign policy, defence diplomacy and international objectives.

TASK 9
CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE AND STABILITY

Defence Effect

28. South Africa’s resolve to promote peace, security and development on the continent is demonstrated through unambiguous policy statements, the maintenance and employment of a credible crisis-response capability, the prepositioning of forces and the contribution of South African forces to various forms of peace missions. South Africa, in appropriate circumstances, makes elements of its Defence Force available to peace support operations of the UN and AU, employs armed force to assist other countries faced with insecurity and conducts internationally agreed upon constabulary operations. (Figure 7-3).
29. The promotion of peace and stability in the region and on the continent is a key component of South Africa’s foreign policy. Ideally the risk of inter-state conflict on the continent will be managed collectively, preferably by diplomatic means, but if all else fails, intervention in the form of a peace mission may be required.

30. It is important to note that inter-state armed conflict within the wider SADC remains unlikely. However, general civil conflict in SADC is considered a higher risk contingency. Furthermore, Defence must be able to contribute to multinational peace missions to the level of peace enforcement in conflict involving African states outside of SADC in the sub-Sahara region.

31. In general, threats to security closer to South Africa will enjoy priority. Defence deployments beyond Africa will be exceptional, of limited scale and duration, and subject to other priorities.

32. Defence must be able to provide forces for a range of conflict that may occur on the continent. Where the use of force is required to maintain peace or to separate belligerent parties, South Africa may consider doing so in terms of a multilateral mandate, a specific Defence Pact or as part of a ‘coalition of the willing’ established under a UN or AU mandate in terms of Chapter 6, 7 or 8 of the UN Charter. Involvement is discretionary and will be determined in light of the specific situation and concurrent commitments. It may also include unilateral intervention should pressing circumstances so dictate. However, the commitment cannot be open-ended. Criteria for involvement in specific missions and a predetermined maximum level of involvement will be set by Government.

33. South Africa’s contribution may range from headquarters staff at various levels, observers and specialist military elements, to robust combat forces with inherent support capabilities. South Africa will plan to assume command of multilateral forces at the brigade level, where possible. In some instances where South Africa has specialist capabilities that are not readily available elsewhere, such as military engineering and military health, these force structure elements may be maintained at a higher level of capacity than normally would be required in the Defence Force.

34. In this context, regional and continental defence cooperation and the participation in collective defence measures and peace missions will enjoy significant priority as a standing Defence Force commitment.

35. South Africa, in appropriate circumstances, will make elements of its Defence Force available to the peace support operations of the UN and AU; employ armed force to assist other countries faced with insecurity; and conduct internationally agreed-upon constabulary operations. South Africa may thus consider contributing to:
   a. Shaping the international, continental and regional security agenda.
   b. Interventions under grave circumstances.
   c. Peace missions and post-conflict development.
   d. Reconstruction of the security sector.
   e. Regional humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
   f. General military assistance missions.
   g. Regional security initiatives, such as maritime security and anti-piracy operations.

36. Defence will continue supporting the UN and the AU through:
   a. Contributing headquarters staff, formed units and specialised elements to mandated and assessed missions.
   b. Providing technical and specialist support and facilitating industrial support to UN and AU forces.
INTERVENTION UNDER GRAVE CIRCUMSTANCES

37. The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states and the commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflict are enshrined in the UN Charter and the Constitutive Act of the AU. Military interventions in other states may, however, be justified in extreme circumstances where all attempts for the peaceful resolution of conflict have failed.

38. Unilateral action can only be justified in exceptional circumstances as defined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Circumstances that could legally justify such action include serious threats to international peace, severe intra-state violence and gross violations of human rights.
   a. Chapter 8 of the UN Charter accordingly provides for regional enforcement actions, which may include the use of force, to maintain or restore international peace and security where pacific measures have failed or are deemed inadequate.
   b. The AU Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, in pursuance of the Constitutive Act of the AU and the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the PSC, promotes cooperation among the Member States in the areas of non-aggression and common defence, the promotion of peaceful co-existence in Africa, the prevention of conflicts of inter-state or intra-state nature, the resolution of disputes by peaceful means and the definition of a framework under which the Union may intervene or authorise intervention, in preventing or addressing situations of aggression.
   c. The SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact likewise provide for enforcement action as a means of last resort where peaceful means of resolving significant inter- or intra-state conflict, as defined in the Protocol, have failed.
   d. South Africa will seek UN Security Council and/or AU Peace and Security Council endorsement of any collaborative or unilateral intervention that may be necessary. The timing of such endorsement may depend on the gravity and urgency of the intervention, and does not preclude urgent intervention in grave circumstances prior to multilateral endorsement.

39. While a single country might in some cases be the major contributor, such operations will almost invariably be joint, inter-departmental, inter-agency and multinational (J2M) in nature. In some cases South Africa may thus wish to exercise the option of assuming command responsibility as a framework nation and plan to provide defence combat capabilities across the entire task spectrum, into which contributions of other nations can be integrated in a flexible and synergetic manner.

40. Forces employed for a deliberate intervention should be tailored to the mission.
   a. Deployment to and build-up in theatre should be rapid to ensure a preponderance of power to deter the belligerents and provide the ability to operate simultaneously throughout the theatre.
   b. Intervention forces should be highly skilled and trained, with a capacity for network-enabled operations.
   c. While special operations forces can be used as early-entry forces, they should be augmented by medium- and heavy-combat forces as the situation requires.
   d. Superior command and control, protection, firepower (including non-lethal and precision capabilities), mobility and manoeuvre, information and intelligence, and sustainment are critical.
   e. Deployed forces should be capable of semi-autonomous and protracted independent operations. Air, sea and land force projection capabilities will be required to deploy and support such operations and such capabilities should be able to execute defence operations singularly or jointly.

PEACE MISSIONS AND RECONSTRUCTION

41. Peace missions include a wide spectrum of operations from the provision of observers, to peacekeeping under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter, to peace enforcement in a hostile environment under Chapter 7 of the Charter. A purely military approach to peace support operations, which ignores the developmental, economic and governance aspects of peace-building, will not effectively achieve lasting stability and conditions of human security. A multidimensional developmental approach will be pursued with military and civilian bodies cooperating to accelerate capacity-building and socio-economic development.

42. Defence will pursue reconstruction and create conditions conducive to long-term peace and security building in support of peacekeeping objectives. The process of providing critical humanitarian assistance and reconstruction capabilities during and immediately after military operations will enable and reinforce
43. Defence can contribute greatly to socio-economic development by employing its diverse capabilities, such as its planning capability, in parallel with peace-operation forces. This would usually deploy as part of the South African contingent forces but may in exceptional cases deploy on its own as part of the South African contribution to a multinational HQ. Its activities will in most cases be influenced by the civil component of an integrated multinational HQ.

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

44. South Africa believes that security is underpinned by the inter-related factors of peace and stability, development, democracy and good governance. South Africa undertakes security sector reform (SSR) within the Policy Framework for Reconstruction and Development of the AU and SSR guidelines of other relevant multilateral organisations, in particular the UN.

45. In countries emerging from conflict the security sector is often seriously deficient. South Africa accordingly views SSR as an indispensable aspect of conflict resolution and the creation of sustainable security. The security sector of a country, comprising the armed forces, police, intelligence services, judiciary and prisons services, plays a key role in maintaining peace, stability and the rule of law. The functionality of the security sector is thus of vital importance and the ultimate objective of SSR is thus to create a secure and stable environment that is conducive to:
   a. human-centred and infrastructural development;
   b. poverty alleviation and economic growth; and
   c. institutionalisation of representative, accountable and transparent governance that is based on the rule of law and democratic principles.

46. The aim of SSR is to reposition the security sector to provide security to the state and society in an effective and efficient manner, within the framework of democratic civilian principles.

47. Defence, together with the post-conflict country, its government and security organs, and other contributing countries will contribute to the reconstruction of the security sector through:
   a. disarmament;
   b. the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants;
   c. curbing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons; and
   d. training constituted forces to function as a professional military force within a democratic system.

GENERAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE MISSIONS

48. South Africa may consider the deployment of general military assistance missions on a bilateral level where training teams are deployed for specific tasks and specific periods. Training could range from bridging training, to basic training and to sophisticated training at all levels.
DEVELOPMENTAL AND OTHER ORDERED TASKS

CHAPTER 8

DEVELOPMENTAL AND OTHER ORDERED TASKS

TASK 10
EXECUTE RELEVANT TREATY OBLIGATIONS

DEFENCE EFFECT

1. South Africa’s treaty obligations falling within the jurisdiction of the Defence Force are honoured and professionally executed (Figure 8-1). This extends, inter alia, to:
   a. International hydrographic obligations.
   b. International maritime and aviation search and rescue obligations.
   c. International Humanitarian Law obligations.
   d. Arms control obligations.

2. Threats to the security of South Africa and its people arise primarily from human security and developmental challenges. The promotion of domestic peace, stability, growth and devel-
opment thus encompasses a variety of tasks falling within the constitutional mandate of the Defence Force. These include assistance to Government departments as may be required for emergency relief, the maintenance of essential services and a variety of contingent peacetime tasks.

3. Defence will support civil authority, on the basis of a written request between the respective Ministers, when a situation or an emergency is beyond the affected department’s capabilities. Other government departments will act as lead departments with Defence in support of their activities. Defence Force elements will remain under own command. Typical tasks in support of civil authorities are consequence management and relief after man-made and natural disasters, support to special events, the protection of life and property and the augmentation of vital services during strikes. Such support will be time-bound and subject to statute, executive controls and legislative oversight.

INTERNATIONAL HYdrographic and NAUTICAL CHARTING obligations

4. International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) promulgated the SOLAS. The SOLAS Convention (in its successive forms) is generally regarded as the most important of all international treaties concerning the safety of shipping. Through its accession to the SOLAS and its revisions, South Africa is bound to the obligations thereof.
   a. SOLAS Chapter V requires governments to ensure that all vessels are sufficiently and efficiently manned from a safety point of view. It places requirements on all vessels regarding voyage and passage planning, expecting a careful assessment of any proposed voyages by all who put to sea. Every mariner must take account of all potential dangers to navigation, weather forecasts, tidal predictions, the competence of the crew, and all other relevant factors. It also adds an obligation for all vessels’ masters to offer assistance to those in distress and controls the use of lifesaving signals and has specific requirements regarding danger and distress messages.
   b. SOLAS Chapter V, Regulation 4 informs South Africa’s responsibilities with respect to the promulgation of navigational warnings. In accordance with this regulation, South Africa will take all steps necessary to ensure that, when intelligence of any dangers is received from whatever reliable source, it will be promptly brought to the knowledge of those concerned and communicated to other interested governments. The South African Navy (Hydrographic Office) consequently assumes responsibility, on behalf of the State, to provide:
      i. Various hydrographic products, such as the consolidation of navigational, hazard or maritine warning data into regular formal navigational safety publications or promulgation as Navigational Warnings or Notices to Mariners.
      ii. A national tidal network of tide gauges where data sets are received in near real time from instruments and used to monitor sea level and refine tidal predictions for publishing as tide tables for South African and Namibian harbours.
   c. SOLAS Chapter V, Regulation 9 informs South Africa’s obligation in terms of hydrographic services to be provided. This entails the collection and compilation of hydrographic data and the publication, dissemination and keeping up to date of all nautical information necessary for safe navigation. The South African Navy (Hydrographic Office) consequently assumes responsibility, on behalf of the State, to carrying out the following nautical and hydrographic services, in the manner most suitable for the purpose of aiding navigation:
      i. Ensure that hydrographic surveying is carried out, as far as possible, adequate to the requirements of safe navigation.
      ii. Prepare and issue official nautical charts, sailing directions, lists of lights, tide tables and other official nautical publications, where applicable, satisfying the needs of safe navigation.
      iii. Promulgate notices to mariners in order to keep official nautical charts and publications up to date.
      iv. Provide data management arrangements to support these services.
      v. Ensure the greatest possible uniformity in charts and nautical publications and take into account, whenever possible, the relevant international resolutions and recommendations.
      vi. Coordinate their activities to the greatest possible degree in order to ensure that hydrographic and nautical information is made available on a world-wide scale as timeously, reliably and unambiguously as possible.

International Hydrographic Organisation (IHO).
   a. South Africa has been an IHO Member State since 1951. An agreement was consequently set up between the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Transport in 1954 wherein the South African Navy assumed responsibility for the hydrographic obligations of the Republic. This function is currently performed by the South African Navy Hydrographer, yet this arrangement has never been formalised in legislation.
   b. The IHO has allocated responsibility for IHO charting of Region H to South Africa, as well as contributing member responsibilities for IHO Charting Region
6. South Africa will, within the confines of the IHO, engage on the reapportionment of IHO charting responsibilities in the Southern African region.

7. South Africa’s international hydrographic and nautical charting obligations, responsibilities and liabilities must be brought into national law. Such national legislation must provide for:
   a. South Africa’s compliance with its international hydrographic surveying and nautical cartography obligations arising from its membership of the IHO and the IMO.
   b. The appointment of the South African Navy Hydrographer as the National Hydrographer of the Republic.
   c. The role and functions of the National Hydrographer.
   d. The hydrographic services to be provided.
   e. The setting of hydrographic standards and competence.
   f. Protection of survey marks and other hydrographic measures.
   g. The limitation of civil liability.
   h. Funding of the capability.
   i. Secondment of hydrographers to other countries and international hydrographic institutions.
   j. International cooperation on hydrographic matters.

MARITIME AND AERONAUTICAL SEARCH AND RESCUE OBLIGATIONS

8. The South African Maritime and Aeronautical Search and Rescue Act, 20021 provides that the Minister of Transport must by notice in the Gazette, as well as in relevant maritime and aeronautical publications, publish the search and rescue regions within which search and rescue services will be provided in terms of the responsibility of the Republic as laid down by the International Civil Aviation Organisation and the IMO (Figure 8-2).

9. The South African Search and Rescue Organisation (SASAR)2 ensures a coordinated and effective maritime and aeronautical search and rescue service within the South African search and rescue regions3. SASAR may, for purposes of any aeronautical or maritime search and rescue operation, request any military aircraft or vessel to assist in any operation4. Furthermore, diverse ad hoc search and rescue services are provided, where the situation merits, to entities such as emergency and rescue services.

10. South Africa will engage with the Republic of Brazil concerning bilateral cooperation in the western areas of South Africa’s responsibility.

11. Land, aeronautical, maritime and other ad hoc search and rescue support is a standing Defence Force commitment. The Defence Force must therefore pro-

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DEVELOPMENTAL AND OTHER ORDERED TASKS

provide land, aviation and maritime search and rescue capabilities when required. Such capabilities will generally be provided through its collateral capability.

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (IHL) OBLIGATIONS

12. The Defence Force is required to be a disciplined, professional, well-trained and well-equipped fighting force operating within the boundaries set by domestic and international law and ethical standards. Given that South Africa’s broad security goals include the protection of South Africa, its citizens, their property and its national interests, South Africa will comply with its obligations under international law and treaties. IHL is contained chiefly in the Geneva Conventions and other similar IHL instruments, which seek to regulate the conduct of armed conflict and the rights and duties of belligerent parties with reference to humanitarian concerns. The Geneva Conventions have been universally ratified, pending South Sudan’s accession.

13. A major part of IHL is contained in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which are regarded as customary international law and thus binding on all states. The Conventions have been developed and supplemented by further treaties, namely the two Additional Protocols of 1977. The third Additional Protocol of 2005 establishes the Red Crystal emblem with equal status to the Red Cross emblem, compelling that the emblem must be respected and protected.

14. South Africa has ratified the Geneva Conventions and has recently brought them into domestic law through the promulgation of the Implementation of the Geneva Conventions Act, 2012 (Act 08 of 2012). The Conventions are discussed briefly below:

a. **First Geneva Convention.** This Convention provides for the protection of wounded and sick combatants in the field, irrespective of their nationality. Wounded and sick combatants who fall into enemy hands are recognised as prisoners of war.

b. **Second Geneva Convention.** This Convention closely follows the provisions of the first Geneva Convention in structure and content, but contains provisions specifically applicable to war at sea (eg hospital ships). This Convention is an extension of the First Geneva Convention (wounded and sick on land), the terms of which apply to maritime warfare. In addition to the protection of the wounded and sick, this Convention protects combatants and other personnel who are at sea and who are shipwrecked.

c. **Third Geneva Convention.** This Convention protects persons entitled to prisoner of war status. The Third Geneva Convention provides that prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated, and precisely defines, inter alia, requirements for conditions and places of captivity, particularly with regard to the labour of prisoners of war, their financial resources, the relief they receive, and judicial proceedings instituted against them. It furthermore provides that any unlawful act or omission by the detaining...
power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited and will be regarded as a grave breach of the Convention. Prisoners of war are entitled in all circumstances to respect for their person and their honour.

d. Fourth Geneva Convention. This Convention protects civilians during wartime. Treaties which had been adopted before 1949 were concerned with combatants only, and did not address the protection of civilians. The large-scale collateral damage amongst civilians during World War II demonstrated the disastrous consequences of the absence of a convention for their protection in wartime. As such, this Convention was added to the existing three Geneva Conventions in 1949.

e. Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions.
   i. Protocol I extends the applicability of the Geneva Conventions during international armed conflict.
   ii. Protocol II extends the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to internal conflict occurring within the borders of a state between government armed forces and armed dissidents, or between two or more armed dissident groups where the dissidents are under responsible command, and exercise such control over parts of the territory to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement the Protocol.


16. Defence will be bound by IHL and all other conventions and treaties pertaining to armed conflict and to which South Africa is a party.

17. Defence will continue to support the fulfilment of South Africa’s IHL obligations. Acknowledging that within the constraints of IHL, the choice of weapons and the methods of warfare are not unlimited, Defence will consequently:

   a. Ensure defence compliance with IHL obligations.
   b. Demonstrate particular diligence in furthering the objectives of IHL which define the conduct and responsibilities of belligerent nations, neutral nations and individuals engaged in warfare.
   c. Have due regard for the civilian population, non-combatants, neutral parties, protected persons and emblems.
   d. Ensure that collateral damage deemed excessive in relation to the military advantage gained from operations is prevented.
   e. Not use restricted weapons outside of agreed parameters.
   f. Not employ weapons that are prohibited.
   g. Offer protection for certain persons (those not participating in hostilities) and property.
   h. Protect all cultural property and the environment during armed conflict.
   i. Be compliant with reporting obligations arising in terms of binding instruments.
   j. Pursue a specific relationship with, amongst others, the International Committee of the Red Cross to assist where required in the integration of IHL in defence programmes.

Scale of Defence Effort

18. The Defence response to IHL obligations will be to:

   a. Focus on interventions across all levels of command and staff functions.
   b. Reflect IHL obligations at all levels of defence doctrine so as to avoid overt contradiction between defence doctrine and international treaty obligations.
   c. Reflect IHL in military training curricula, commencing with basic military training and elaborating such training per category of ranks.
   d. Reflecting IHL obligations in all defence training manuals.
   e. Ensuring an effective sanction mechanism to explicitly cover IHL breaches and violations.

NATIONAL ARMS CONTROL OBLIGATIONS

19. As a responsible arms trading nation, South Africa has instituted rigorous legislation and regulations regarding conventional arms transfer, including export of conventional arms, under the auspices of the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) which is competent to regulate the transfer of conventional arms.
20. Defence must adhere to arms control regulations within its own field of endeavour and assist with conducting review, compliance and verification services, when so required by the NCACC.

21. Defence has a further responsibility to be represented on the Non-Proliferation Council (NPC) housed at the Department of Trade and Industry, and to assist the NPC in its tasks related to the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related dual-use items.

**TASK 11**

**ORDERED PRESIDENTIAL TASKS**

**PRESIDENTIAL TASKS**

22. Defence provides specific support related to the execution of presidential duties. The support is primarily in the areas of air transport, close protection and medical services and extends to the President, the Deputy President, the Minister of Defence and other identified persons. (Figure 8-4). This support will be a standing commitment.

23. The President, as Commander-in-Chief and as the Head of the National Executive, may from time to time order the Defence Force into service for other identified tasks.

24. Under a standing Presidential employment authority, the Defence Force will provide the following for support to the President, VIPs and other identified persons:

   a. Command and control arrangements.
   b. Close protection.
   c. Air transport and associated medical and security support for domestic, continental and inter-continental travel.
   d. Search and rescue and combat search and rescue missions.
   e. Rapid reaction support.

**TASK 12**

**ASSIST CIVIL AUTHORITY AS ORDERED**

**DEFENCE EFFECT**

25. In times of crisis or great need South Africa and its people are secured through the Defence Force’s assistance to civil authority in the maintenance of essential services, the protection of life, health and property and the execution of any other services that may be ordered by Government (Figure 8-5).

**DOMESTIC SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITY IN TIMES OF NEED**

26. Defence may be called upon to assist civil authority with a range of tasks when capacity has become strained, when a situation or an emergency is beyond the latter’s capabilities or in the event of an imminent crisis. Typical tasks may include: consequence management and relief after man-made and natural disasters, support to special events, the protection of life and property and the augmentation of vital services in times of need. Defence may thus render assistance with the prevention of the spread of diseases affecting humans and livestock, the transportation and distribution of food or water during droughts, fighting major fires, search and rescue operations during floods and relief operations after earthquakes or floods, to name but a few examples. Humanitarian assistance operations may be necessary when people are suffering severe threat or deprivation and normal civil assistance is hampered or prevented.

27. Task-organised elements may be detached to other departments as required. This may include mobile forces to quickly deal with the particular situation, using centralised air-mobile forces or decentralised
forces moving by road. Defence will have a permanent pool of equipment (cargo carriers, tents, water bunkers and strategic medicines) available on standby to support the three levels of government. The organisation thereof will be determined in the force design.

28. Currently, other government departments will act as the lead department, with Defence in support of their activities. In many cases, Defence provides the ‘backbone’ command and control capability for the management of disasters and emergencies. A policy discourse and a consequent Cabinet decision on the Defence role in disaster management are expected in the near future, with a possible concomitant statutory amendment should it be so necessary.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF IN THE REGION

29. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief interventions may take place throughout and beyond the African continent. Operations will preferably be launched through regional, continental and international security structures, although specific operational requirements and the degree, extent and urgency of the humanitarian crisis may necessitate independent action.

30. Humanitarian assistance operations cover a wide range of actions which may include the deployment of troops to prevent the spread of diseases affecting humans and livestock, the transportation and distribution of food or water during droughts, fighting major bush fires, search and rescue operations during floods and relief operations after earthquakes or floods, to name but a few. Humanitarian assistance operations may be necessary when people are facing a severe threat or deprivation and civilian assistance is hampered or prevented. These operations combine the demands of humanitarian assistance operations with stability operations to protect the population, relief teams and their stores, and to ensure free movement and the free distribution of supplies.

31. Defence, as authorised by Government, will use its collateral capabilities to provide rapidly deployable forces to stabilise such situations prior to the deployment of follow-on forces and the humanitarian agencies required to enable and execute relief operations.

ANTI-POACHING MEASURES

32. The collateral capability of the Defence Force will be utilised to support civil authority in combating the illegal poaching of South Africa’s flora and fauna, with specific attention being given to the protection of the rhinoceros and abalone populations in the short-term. This may be extended to other flora or fauna that may require protection in times to come. Specific short-term operations will be conducted on the basis of a Memorandum of Agreement between the Minister of Defence and the relevant Executive Authority. This support will have the three-fold objective of disrupting, preventing and deterring poaching.

OTHER ORDERED DEFENCE OPERATIONS

33. Defence will execute any other services that may from time to time be ordered by Government within the parameters of domestic and international law.

TASK 13
CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEVELOPMENTAL AGENDA

DEFENCE EFFECT

34. Development is enhanced by the collaborative and incremental defence contribution to the developmental agenda.
THE DEVELOPMENTAL AGENDA

35. Objectives. Government has set the following objectives as the broad path for growth and development that will accelerate economic growth, reduce poverty and include the marginalised in the mainstream economy:

a. The growth of the economy as the central and main intervention.
b. Decisive State intervention to promote involvement of the marginalised in economic activity.
c. Targeted intervention in the second economy to ensure socio-economic inclusion and increase social cohesion.

36. Challenges. The challenges faced by Government to meet these objectives include:

a. Intensification of the work of Government to meet these objectives.
b. The massive infrastructure outlay required to reduce the cost of doing business.
c. The requirement to develop capital goods and supplier industries.
d. An industrial programme to meet significant domestic demand, increase exports and create jobs.
e. Development programmes to meet skills requirements in the economy and increase domestic employment.

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE DEFENCE FORCE

37. The primary functions of any defence force are deterrence, defence and the protection of key national interests; a defence force is not a social agency, nor a prime economic investment. But due to the nature of the defence force it can, without detriment to its primary functions:

a. Serve a valuable social role, particularly in a diverse society;
b. Provide an economic boost to targeted areas of the country; and

c. Leverage the establishment and development of some sectors of industry.

38. A defence force can, thus, be an important agent of national development, which has been and continues to be demonstrated in several countries, outstanding examples being Brazil and Pakistan.

39. In general, a defence force contributes to development by creating the peace and stability conditions whereby growth and development may take place. This it achieves by addressing the military dimensions of conflict and insecurity and by maintaining peace and stability. As a major national asset, the defence force may also be tasked to contribute more directly to national developmental ends in collaboration with all other departments and agencies, through the use of its collateral utility without detriment to its primary role or resource allocation (Figure 8-6).

40. The broad defence contribution to national development may include the following aspects:

a. Youth Development. Millions of young South Africans in the age bracket 15 to 25 years lack employment, skills, discipline and educational opportunities. This provides Government with a huge developmental challenge. The collateral utility of the Defence Force can be used to improve the employability of South African youth by means of skills development and community service through targeted interventions. These interventions will not constitute military training and will therefore not contribute to the militarisation of the youth. The focus of these in-
interventions will be citizenship, discipline, teamwork and self-actualisation with the national youth development programme and any other tailored youth programmes. Should specific funding become available, the Defence Force will be able to expand the youth leadership and character-building programme in partnership with government and other entities.

“Patriotism is not the exclusive domain of the military, but the Defence Force remains and provides a perfect template and platform from which to begin to address patriotism in South Africa.”

Submission by Tebogo Kebotlhale - MKMVA Chairperson: North West

b. Spatial Dispersion of Defence Infrastructure. Military bases in outlying areas provide employment and improve the economic profile of rural communities. Defence will seek to enhance its rural dispersion and will promote employment from the local communities. Defence Force bases in rural areas will also prioritise procurement from local business and industry.

c. Reserve Utilisation. The utilisation of Reserves from rural communities augments the income streams of poorer households. Reserves with specialised skills and experience can also be utilised to assist in development projects. The expansion of the Reserve system in rural areas will consequently be prioritised.

d. Employment. Defence is committed to the continuous 100% filling of all funded vacant posts and an increased utilisation of its Reserves. Entry level recruitment to the Defence Force will be done through advertisements in the local and national media, and contact sessions at schools and tertiary education institutions, followed by country-wide selection boards.

e. Community Services. The Defence Force can be tasked to render specific community services in areas where other authorities are unable to render the required support. Defence Force facilities may be utilised for the education, training and development of local communities. Such initiatives will be executed in collaboration with the relevant authorities and stakeholders.

f. Critical Infrastructure Interventions. As a principle defence will not generally compete with the private sector in the provision of infrastructure. However, the collateral capability of defence may be tasked to enhance critical infrastructure in rural and inaccessible areas. These actions will allow for the sourcing of labour from remote communities and will assist in skills development and upliftment in such communities.

“The Army must always be available to assist and support government action in the planning, provision and maintenance of infrastructure. The infrastructure planning and development must first and foremost serve the needs of the Army for its rapid mobility, operations and maintenance of that Army. The infrastructure planning and provision must go beyond the horizon of that Army to ensure sustainability and future requirements of that Army as it develops further. It will always be possible to have trickling down effects and for civilians and sundry to benefit from this infrastructure development.”

Submission by Tebogo Kebotlhale - MKMVA Chairperson: North West

Inherent Potential

41. The inherent potential of the Defence Force to support national development can be realised almost automatically as a direct result of its normal peacetime activities, although some minor steering can enhance this effect without detriment to its primary functions and with appropriate additional resources and time to establish capabilities to this effect.

42. The Defence Force’s potential in this respect can be realised without detriment to its primary functions, and with appropriate additional resources and time to establish necessary capabilities.

43. The Social Role – Developing the Person. Military service, even quite brief periods, can play an important and valuable role in:

a. Maturing and socialising young adults;

b. Providing a stable environment in which to enhance the education of young people from disadvantaged backgrounds;

c. Developing in young people from different communities and social sectors a national consciousness and cohesion; and

d. Enhancing and deepening the integration of minority groups in the wider community.

44. The Socio-Economic Role – Supporting Local Communities. There is considerable potential for the Defence Force to support socio-economic development in, par-
DEVELOPMENTAL AND OTHER ORDERED TASKS

particularly, rural communities and towns. This arises from the fact that any military unit:

a. Will inject resources into the surrounding community, through:
   i. Its personnel spending their salaries locally;
   ii. Local purchases (eg food, fuel, cleaning materials, stationery);
   iii. Procuring certain services locally (eg glazier, plumber);
   iv. Hiring locally to fill certain civilian posts within the unit; and
   v. Recruiting from among the local population.

b. Can provide assistance from certain units in emergencies – medical, fire-fighting, support to police, repair of critical machinery (eg emergency vehicles, generators, pumps).

c. Can enhance or provide certain community health services.

45. **Economic Role.** The Defence Force has an inherent ability to support economic activity within the country, arising from its need:

a. To procure normal consumables, both locally and at the national level (for its reserve stocks), which can be procured from the business community;

b. For uniforms and general field equipment, which can be manufactured by the business community;

c. To purchase some commercial-standard equipment and vehicles that can be supplied and supported by the business community;

d. To procure certain commercially available services (construction, civil engineering) that can be cost-effectively contracted to the business community; and

e. To acquire locally produced and integrated defence systems and high-end technology.

46. **Industrial Role.** Finally the Defence Force has an inherent ability to support development of the industrial sector, arising from its requirement for:

a. The maintenance, repair, overhaul, modernisation and upgrading of military equipment, which will not always justify in-house capability, thus creating commercial opportunity;

b. The manufacture of equipment required on a scale that justifies local manufacture, as well as the manufacture of munitions and spares; and

c. The development of optimised equipment.

47. **Science, Engineering and Technology.** The Defence Force’s requirements can also stimulate the national science, engineering and technology base in a range of technical fields, which will:

a. Spin-off into other sectors of industry, thereby broadening the country’s industrial base; and

b. Attract young people to engineering, science and technology, thereby expanding and deepening the country’s technical skills base.

**Potential for Directed Development Support**

48. In addition to its inherent potential, and given appropriate additional funding and time to ramp-up and improve specific capabilities, the Defence Force also has the potential to, without detriment to its primary function, carry out a range of directed activities in support of national development. It can also support the civil authorities and police in dealing with natural and man-made disasters.

49. **Service Systems.** Short-term and medium-term service systems can be structured to include further education or training that prepares the member for a career outside the military. This approach can assist young people from disadvantaged backgrounds to obtain an education or training they could otherwise not obtain, while providing the Defence Force with its junior personnel for a period of service that may be prescribed by the Defence Force. Support could incorporate:

a. Bursaries for degrees or training to be followed by a period of contracted service during which the member will gain experience in a field where the Defence Force has a particular need;

b. post-service bursaries for university or technical courses;

c. in-service training additionally focused on preparing members for a later civilian career in a related field; and

d. pre-discharge vocational training.

50. Such education and training programmes can range from flight training through to medical and engineering education and training to artisan training in most fields.

51. **Defence Force Skills.** The Defence Force has a wide range of skills that can be applied to national development projects. Again, given appropriate additional funding and time to ramp-up and improve specific capabilities, the Defence Force also has the potential to be deployed for specific tasks, while improving skills for the benefit of the Defence Force itself. For instance:

a. Medical teams can be deployed to rural areas when capacity is available;

b. technical teams can be deployed to maintain or repair equipment (generators, pumps) and vehicles in outlying areas; and

c. instructors can be deployed to provide adult educa-
tion or basic technical training for people in outlying areas.

52. **Defence Force Capabilities and Equipment.** As before, given appropriate additional funding and time to ramp-up and improve specific capabilities, the Defence Force also has a range of capabilities and equipment that can be employed in support of national development. For instance:
   a. Army engineers can maintain (even construct) roads and bridges in inaccessible areas or in insecure areas, where it is not commercially viable to do so;
   b. Air Force transport aircraft and helicopters can move equipment to areas that are not accessible to commercial aircraft or where commercial air transport is not viable; and
   c. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft can carry out mapping work for projects in outlying areas, especially in cases where this would not be commercially viable.

**BROAD CONCEPTS**

53. The Defence Force will use its inherent capacity, collateral capabilities, networks and links to society as well as its business programmes to support Government’s developmental agenda. The contribution to national development may, however, result in indirect contingent commitments where defence capabilities are provided to other departments against compensation, and by exception, in direct commitments requiring structuring and budgeting provision within Defence.

**Supporting Youth Development**

a. **Military Training.** Professionally conducted military training is extremely valuable in maturing and socialising young adults, developing in them self-confidence and self-respect and the capacity for mutual respect. A significant Reserve component, whose members are normally occupied with their civilian activities when not on active military duty, can set a good citizenship example, contribute to community leadership and be an inspiration for the youth within the communities in which they live.

b. **National Youth Service.** Defence will continue to provide National Youth Service (NYS) training in support of the requirements of various government departments and against compensation. Funding for the programme will be provided by the requesting government department by way of transfer payment to the programme before commencement of the training. Graduates of the National Youth Development Programme may be considered, against stringent criteria, for recruitment into the military for basic military training.
   i. The NYS will be established as an auxiliary service of the Department of Defence. The Minister will determine in Regulations, the annual NYS intake and the term of such service.
   ii. The DOD will provide such NYS service in cooperation with other government departments and role-players. The contribution of the Defence Force and other government departments and role-players will be planned and budgeted for.
   iii. The NYS will comprise induction, formative training, community service training, work-integrated or service learning, as well as continuation training, including accredited hard and soft skills, social and business entrepreneurship training and community service delivery. All training will be formally accredited and assessed.

c. **Voluntary Youth Programmes.** Services will continue to provide Voluntary Youth Programmes (such as Young Lions, Siyandiza, Young Falcons and Naval Cadets). Within such programmes, youth adventure camps will engender discipline and mould future leaders. Graduates of these programmes may be considered, against stringent criteria, for recruitment into the Defence Force for basic military training. This will enhance social cohesion and serve to “grow own wood”. Such Voluntary Youth Programmes should:
   i. Promote the values, norms and standards of the Constitution.
   ii. Promote norms and standards.
   iii. Enhance societal responsibility and engender ethics and discipline.
   iv. Promote the importance of education and its centrality in society.
   v. Endeavour to include stakeholders (not limited to the following):

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6 Act No 42 of 2002, Section 16(1).
7 Act No 42 of 2002, Section 5(a).
8 Act No 42 of 2002, Section 16(2)
9 Artisanship, computer literacy, etc.
10 Discipline, work-related etiquette, presentation, organisation, etc.
DEVELOPMENTAL AND OTHER ORDERED TASKS

(1) Department of Education.
(2) Provincial governments.
(3) Institutions of traditional authority.

Supporting Community Development

54. **Defence Civilians.** Recruit and employ defence civilians from local communities.

55. **Regulars.** Recruit and appoint Regulars from rural communities.

56. **Reserves.** The utilisation of Reserves in military operations, administrative tasks and command and management positions and other duties will continue to be a main consideration when considering the personnel requirements of the Defence Force.
   a. Recruit and appoint Reserves from rural communities preferably in close proximity to the units that they will be assigned to.
   b. Maximising the utilisation of Reserves that live in rural areas will provide economic benefit to rural communities and enhance the development of rural economies.
   c. Specialist Reserves should be deployed to struggling government institutions to maintain the infrastructure and carry over their knowledge and experience to employees of these institutions.

57. **Essential Critical Infrastructure.** Deliberate actions to enhance critical infrastructure in rural and inaccessible areas can be executed against compensation from the relevant government department requiring the intervention. These actions may include the building or emergency repair of bridges, roads, clinics, etc. These initiatives can be approached as force preparation exercises if necessary.

Supporting Economic Development

58. **New Technologies.** The Defence Force remains an agent that initiates, facilitates or triggers the establishment of new capabilities and technologies in the country. The Defence Force provides the catalyst for technology development and its concomitant economic activities. These range from the basic requirement to maintain existing equipment and facilities, to the higher-order requirements of developing new technologies that enhance the efficacy of defence capabilities.

59. **Spatial Dispersion of Defence Facilities.** Defence will optimise the spatial dispersion of its units and facilities to the requirements of the defence goals and tasks. Priority will be given to the establishment of military units away from the main economic hubs of South Africa. This dispersion will enhance economic activities in these areas and provide a catalyst for further development.

60. **Defence Procurement.** The procurement function will be decentralised to unit level with appropriate delegations. Units will be expected to procure goods and services from local communities as far as possible. Units will create a community liaison capability to coordinate the requirements with local goods and service providers. Specific attention will be given to providing coordinated off-take agreements with emerging farmers and service providers.

Supporting Sport and Recreation

61. The Defence Force may engage communities in developmental initiatives such as the promotion of youth development through leadership programmes centred on sports, physical education, adventure and recreation.

62. In collaboration with national sports bodies, the collateral utility of the Defence Force can be used to establish sport and recreation-based youth cadets in communities adjacent to defence force bases for youth between the ages of 14 and 17. Military sporting bodies and clubs may thus engage at community level for the purpose of increasing exposure of the youth to sporting activities and opportunities. An example hereof is the Izivunguvungu sailing programme.

63. As part of the professionalisation of the physical training, sport and recreation function, the Defence Force may give consideration to the establishment of a high-performance sports capability. Such a centre may serve to:
   a. Enhance the capacity of the Defence Force to engage communities in developmental initiatives such as the promotion of youth development through leadership programmes centred on sports, physical education, adventure and recreation.
b. Form part of a retention and development strategy for athletes from disadvantaged backgrounds who have the potential to develop into Olympic-level athletes. Collaboration between the Defence Force and Sport and Recreation South Africa (SRSA) and the South African Sports Confederation and Olympic Committee (SASCOC) would have to be secured.

c. Make use of the services of qualified sport officers and physical training instructors when presenting youth and cadet camps.

64. The contribution to national development will result in indirect contingent commitments where defence capabilities are provided to other departments against compensation, and direct defence commitments requiring structuring and budgeting provision within Defence. Defence will not necessarily structure for its contribution to the Developmental Agenda but will use its inherent collateral utility.
THE DEFENCE STRATEGIC TRAJECTORY

SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE SPENDING

BUDGET TRENDS

1. South Africa’s defence spending has fluctuated considerably over the past century. After the spikes of the First World War and the Second World War, when spending reached a high of more than 17% of GDP, spending declined sharply to around 1% of GDP until the 1970s, when it increased to between 2% and 3% of GDP, rising sharply to almost 5% in the late-1970s (Figure 9-1). The defence budget grew almost tenfold in nominal terms between 1975 and 1989, from R1 billion (bn) to R9.4 bn. In constant dollar value, however, the increase was modest, growing from US$3 bn per year in the early 1980s to US$3.43 bn per year in the last half of that decade, based on 1988 prices.

2. In 1989, South Africa ranked 13th in total world-wide military expenditure, 44th in world military spending as a percentage of gross national product and 63rd in world military spending as a percentage of total government spending. South Africa also ranked 49th in the size of its armed forces, but only 103rd in terms of the size of armed forces in relation to population.

3. By the mid-1990s, South African defence spending had been reduced to less than 3% of gross domestic product and less than 10% of total government spending. Military salaries by that time consumed more than half of defence spending. Spending on armaments and equipment declined from 44% of defence spending in the 1980s to 28% in 1994.

Defence spending averaged 16.4% of government spending in the 1980s; it ranged from a high of 22.7% in 1982 to a low of 13.7% in 1987, but rose again to 15.7% of government spending in 1989.1

4. Between 1995 and the approval of the Defence Review in 1998, the defence budget was cut by 11.1% (R1.4 bn) in nominal terms, with the concurrent mismatch arising between policy intent and execution. The defence budget further decreased from 1.54% of GDP in 2004/05 and has levelled out in recent years at around 1.2% to 1.1% of GDP. The 1998 Defence Review force design was consequently neither affordable nor sustainable, especially following the defence budget cuts in the late 1990s. South Africa at present spends less than 1.2% of GDP on defence (Figure 9-2), translating to less than five cents out of every rand of total budget being expended on defence. The Defence Force is effectively nearly 24% underfunded (in respect of its current size and shape).

5. While South Africa is not perceived to be a global military force, it can be considered a regional military power in the context of Southern Africa. It furthermore has major international commitments to Africa in the form of peace support operations, most notably in Darfur and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and has also recently begun military operations to support Mozambique in fighting piracy off its coast. In addition to the enduring deployments in support of the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU), various deployments of a shorter duration are also being executed. Internally, the Defence Force has redeployed back to the country’s borders, further increasing the Defence Force’s operational tempo. Domestic and international com-

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**Figure 9-1: Defence Budget as a Percentage of GDP**

**Figure 9-2: Recent Defence Allocations**

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Republic of South Africa, National Estimate of Expenditure.
Republic of South Africa, National Estimate of Expenditure.
In addition, the decrease in the defence allocation reflects directly in the level of prime equipment the Defence Force can acquire and operate. Figure 9-3 indicates the relative force levels over a fifty-year period from 1961 to 2011. The line-graph uses a logarithmic scale on the vertical axis in order to be able to reflect the number of combat vehicles, aircraft and naval vessels on one chart. The horizontal axis shows defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP, with the year-on-year percentage being reflected in the bar-graph. The graphs show that:


7. The integration of the Strategic Defence Packages has proven to be far more costly than was originally planned. The introduction of recently acquired modern defence equipment has resulted in an unpredicted increase in their operating cost. In most instances:

a. In order to reduce initial cost, lifecycle logistic support was not fully provided for during acquisition and it was envisaged that this would be covered in the operating budget of the combat services.

b. The current operating budget has proven insufficient to cover higher than planned fuel costs, in-service training, maintenance, repair and support to modern defence systems.

c. The introduction of new defence systems required that they were extensively operated to prove doctrine, resulting in unanticipated costs.

d. The on-going support needed to optimise these new defence systems, develop doctrine, tactics and battle-handling and ensure interoperability with other higher-order defence capabilities is placing excessive demand on the defence science, engineering and technology system. The current defence research and development budget had never planned to support these through lifecycle activities and argues for a separate in-service science, engineering and technology system and budget.

8. Defence prime mission equipment is thus unsustainable within the current budget allocation and standards of proficiency are ever decreasing, due partly to both limited funds for force preparation and the poor serviceability of certain major prime mission equipment.
9. The major defence programmes (landward defence, air defence, maritime defence, military health support and command and control systems) therefore have definable risks and shortcomings, exacerbated by the escalation in fuel and medical prices, increased maintenance costs and the high tempo of operations which have to be supported along extended logistic lines.

10. The South African military is consequently too poorly equipped and funded to execute the widening spectrum of tasks to the desired level. The increase in defence commitments from 1999 onwards, the introduction of new weapon systems and the lack of any significant adjustment to the defence allocation have rendered the Defence Force unsustainable and only partially compliant with the constitutional imperative to defend and protect South Africa and its people. It is severely stretched and many of its core military capacities require an intervention to make them sustainable.

11. Internationally it is well understood that systems need to be managed over the intended life of that system. Generally it is accepted that the acquisition costs of a military system will reflect approximately 10-20% of the total lifecycle costs of that system. It therefore stands to reason that between 80-90% of the lifecycle costs will have to be provided over the life of that particular system (Figure 9-4). In essence this means that for a system with a 30-year lifespan, 2.67% of the total lifecycle costs will have to be made available every year, for 30 years. By example, it means that for a vessel with an acquisition cost (20%) of R2.5 bn, the lifecycle costs (80%) will approximate R10 bn. Annually, over a period of 30 years, the system owner will have to ensure that it allocates R333 mil to that system for lifecycle management (constant Rand value). This reality must influence the acquisition of new systems.

IMPACT ON READINESS

12. The Minister, the Military Command and the Defence Secretariat have consequently raised their concerns on the persistent defence underfunding and have consistently articulated the consequences, as set out below. The Services are integrated systems that can be defined as “an organised, purposeful structure regarded as a whole and consisting of interrelated and interdependent elements (components, entities, factors, members, parts, etc). These elements continually influence one another (directly or indirectly) to maintain their activity and the existence of the system, in order to achieve the goal of the system”. The Defence Force is a ‘system of systems’ and as such the various components are integrally reliant on one another.

“These are perhaps the most significant statements in the document, and the most serious. If the authorities are not shaken by these, they do not have a good understanding of what national priorities should be. These very explicit warning signs should convince every sensible leader/politician of the need for an increase in the Defence Budget.”

Karel Nel – Private Submission

Figure 9-4: Life Cycle Costs of Defence Systems

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SA ARMY

13. The SA Army faces block obsolescence of its prime mission equipment and much of its support capabilities. This is directly attributable to the SA Army not having benefitted from a Strategic Defence Package capital renewal programme as did the SA Air Force and the SA Navy.

14. The lack of an adequate operating budget has further resulted in the serviceability of equipment remaining in service to steadily decline as major repair and maintenance programmes have been pushed back in order to reallocate the majority of its operating budget to personnel-related expenditures.

15. As a result of the above constraints the SA Army is no longer in a position to conduct major combat operations, nor fully roll out the forces needed to safeguard South Africa’s borders within the required timeframes.

16. The SA Army is further finding it increasingly difficult to sustain the deployment of its soldiers in the various peace missions across the continent.

SA AIR FORCE

17. The SA Air Force remains critically underfunded. This has a direct impact upon its ability to maintain combat readiness across the full spectrum of operational tasks expected of it.

18. The air combat and air combat support capability is severely constrained due to an inadequate flying-hours budget. This has resulted in insufficient pilots being trained to fly the newly acquired fighter aircraft and combat support helicopters; those that have been trained are not being afforded the opportunity to fly the requisite hours for maintaining combat proficiency. From a combat readiness perspective these capabilities, therefore, remain largely grounded. Such aircraft as can be mounted for an operation will also be restricted in their combat radius due to the loss of the in-flight refuelling capability.

19. The medium and light fixed-wing transport aircraft are all reaching the end of their operational life. Increased upgrade, repair and maintenance cycles have resulted in a reduction of their operational availability. Currently the fleet is unable to meet the lift requirements for supporting the external operations and any surge in this requirement will result in an even greater reliance on contracted airlift services. The current medium rotary wing transport capability falls far short of the operational requirement.

20. The absence of airborne early air-warning sensors has resulted in a situation where only limited aerial domain awareness exists over large parts of South Africa’s airspace today. The conduct of intelligence-driven operations aimed at safeguarding South Africa’s territorial integrity and protecting its borderlines is thus severely restricted.

SA NAVY

21. The SA Navy experiences severe pressure on its operating budget. This has primarily been brought about by increased sustainment costs resulting from the increased operational tempo of its frigates as well as the need to keep the obsolete offshore patrol vessels operating until their eventual replacement. The situation is further exacerbated by increased personnel spending, necessitating the reallocation of critical maintenance and repair funds. This has resulted in a situation where the SA Navy’s vessels can no longer be made combat-ready to execute the full range of missions they were designed for. In particular it is the primary war-fighting capabilities that have been severely affected.

22. The absence of dedicated static and airborne maritime sensors has resulted in a situation where virtually no maritime domain awareness exists around South Africa’s coasts today. The conduct of intelligence-driven operations aimed at safeguarding South Africa’s territorial integrity and protecting resources in its Exclusive Economic Zone is thus severely restricted.

SA MILITARY HEALTH SERVICE

23. The rising cost of medical care in South Africa is mirrored in the SA Military Health Service. The cost of medicine, medical equipment and contractual obligations places enormous strain on the military health budget, exacerbated by increased personnel spending. The military health budget now faces growing pressure due to the provision of free medical care to dependants and military veterans. The quality of medical care delivered to serving members of the Defence Force is consequently less than acceptable.

24. Shortfalls in professional medical expertise severely limit operational medical support. Medical support can currently only be sustained at less than a conventional brigade through the deployment of a medical battalion group minus. Similarly, chemical and biological defence capabilities have become aged and obsolete and the professional medical institutes are struggling to provide specialised medical and research services.

25. Level 4 and 3 hospitals providing support to the Defence Force are being upgraded through a repair and maintenance programme (RAMP) intervention which will partially address these facilities. However, these hospitals must be recapitalised.

1 Military Hospital is one of the contracted Level 4 (Out of Mission) UN Hospitals in Africa.
new Military Base Hospitals built, pharmaceutical stocks replenished and a specialised Medical Base Depot established to store pharmaceuticals, including those required for national reserve stock.

**STRATEGIC STOCK RESERVES**

26. The required ammunition stock level for the national reserve is currently unspecified, but it is believed that to comply with the constitutional imperative, an Army Mechanised Brigade must be supported for ninety days in a mixture of high, medium, and low intensity operations, with requisite combat support and combat service support being rendered by combat services and staff divisions.

27. Current ammunition levels can by no means support this level of effort. The Defence Force’s ammunition stocks have been depleted over time in certain crucial areas. In some instances ammunition must be procured for training, deployments, and national reserve replenishment. The Defence Force needs to urgently invest in new ammunition as well as the scheduled disposal of aged ammunition in order to allow for the following:
   a. Building up of ammunition reserves.
   b. Training and formally exercising forces.
   c. Replacing old and unstable ammunition.
   d. Providing controlled throughput of ammunition.
   e. Sustaining strategic capabilities in the defence industry.

28. Depot spares, equipment, and strategic fuel reserves are generally depleted and equipment in stock requires repair and/or replacement. Fragmented management information systems inhibit integrated and systemic decision making.

**DEFENCE FACILITIES**

29. The condition of defence facilities is significantly impacting on readiness and sustainability due to a facility maintenance backlog. This impact is increasing markedly.

30. The budget of the National Department of Public Works for maintenance, municipal rates and services, and leases has been devolved to the Defence Force, requiring alternative approaches to facility maintenance being investigated, including the establishment of a Defence Works Formation. Defence must budget in future for its total facility cost.

31. Key force preparation facilities and weapons ranges are under threat.
   a. Operational infrastructure (runways, taxiways, approach lights, approach aids, control towers, firefighting services, fuel and ammunition depots, etc) requires interventions to remain functional.
   b. Facilities and infrastructure in general require major upgrades, renovation and maintenance.
   c. Training infrastructure (simulators, classrooms, etc) is in need of maintenance, repair, replacement and/or upgrading.
   d. Support contracting for 2nd, 3rd and 4th line maintenance is severely constrained.

32. There is severe pressure to release defence land for alternative uses. Several strategic Defence Force depots and training and testing ranges are already threatened by encroachment, reducing their effectiveness and posing potential risk to the safety of encroaching communities.

**THE IMPACT ON PERSONNEL, OPERATING AND CAPITAL**

33. The allocation of the current defence budget is also a matter of concern. In FY 2010/11 the compensation of employees rose to 55% of the allocation, despite these employees “being,
at entry level, the lowest paid of South Africa’s public servants\(^\text{11}\). This leaves little for training and exercises or for operations such as peacekeeping or the maintenance of public order\(^\text{12}\).

34. The 1998 Defence Review pegged the defence personnel budget at 40% of the total budget with 30% to be spent on operating costs and the remaining 30% to be spent on capital costs (40:30:30 ratio). As can be seen in Figures 9-5 and Figure 9-6, the 40% benchmark was maintained until FY 2009/10, where after personnel spending, as a percentage of the defence budget, climbed substantially beyond the envisaged 40% of allocation to 55%.

35. This upward trend can be attributed to six main causes:
   a. The increased level of tasks, such as regional peacekeeping and border safeguarding commitments, has brought about a higher personnel requirement.
   b. The general phenomenon of growing labour costs in South Africa.
   c. Government’s employment imperative required all vacant posts in the public service to be filled, creating upward pressure on the defence personnel budget.
   d. Defence retains people who no longer fit their post-profile or who cannot be economically employed.
   e. Recent service improvements for defence personnel were introduced without commensurate budget augmentation from the National Treasury.
   f. The defence budget was augmented each year accordingly for the Strategic Defence Packages. The tapering off of these additional capital funds means that in recent years the ratio of personnel, operating and capital has distorted the defence budget.

36. The expanding defence personnel budget impacts negatively on the defence operating budget, resulting in an under-investment in the levels of maintenance and repair, training and force preparation required to meet South Africa’s defence commitments. However, this apparently inflated personnel budget is not necessarily an indication of inflated staffing, but of an insufficient operating and capital budget to support the activities of the Defence Force.

37. Similarly, capital spending has declined to close on 10% of the allocation, impacting negatively on the consequential renewal of prime mission equipment, constant reprioritising of the capital budget, and delayed decision-making on defence acquisitions.

38. The acquisition of new armament has been sub-optimal due to a number of interrelated factors impacting upon the process.

39. In the first place the absence of an appropriate Force Design giving rise to a fully funded long-term joint capital plan has resulted in a fragmented approach to acquiring new armaments where Services and Divisions largely act in silos and base their current armaments planning on their current financial allocations as reflected in the Strategic Capital Acquisition Master Plan (SCAMP) within the MTEF timeframe. This ‘silo’ approach has resulted in sub-optimal acquisition solutions being sought that have not fully supported the tenets of jointness and the enhanced defence effect that could have been achieved. It has further resulted in acquisition priorities being shifted frequently and in critical needs being only partially satisfied.

40. In the second place the acquisition process itself is very slow due to the cumbersome regulatory checks and balances that have been built into it. This results in, inter alia, equipment only becoming available long after the requirement was registered, by

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which time the requirement has invariably changed, giving rise to a new requirement or a modification(s) to the requirement being initiated. Exacerbating this situation is requirement creep during the acquisition process, which results in both time and cost overruns.

41. In the third place, given the complexity of the process, the capacity to support the process is often lacking. This has been evident within the Defence Force, Armscor and even within industry. There is thus a need to both streamline the process and to capacitate it fully with personnel specifically competent in capital acquisition.

42. Figure 9-7 below demonstrates the decline in uniformed defence personnel (Regulars and Reserves) consequential to the decline in the defence allocation. The left hand Y-axis indicates the numbers of actual personnel and the right hand Y-axis indicates defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP. The bar graph indicates the actual defence allocation per year as a percentage of GDP.

43. Figure 9-7 clearly demonstrates the rapid decline of the Reserve component between 1991 and 1996, the years following the end of military conscription. This trend has slowed in recent years, indicating that stability is being achieved in the Reserve component. Transformation has been slow due to a lack of investment in the Reserves. The requirement for a relatively small Regular component backed by a sufficiently large Reserve component has not been complied with and consequently the strategic imperative of being able to rapidly and cost-effectively expand through a Reserve component is limited. The effect of voluntary severance incentives in the late 1980s and post 1996 is clearly evident in the trends for the Regular component. Nonetheless, the Regular component has remained relatively constant, with some growth in recent years.

44. Notwithstanding this immense decline in the Reserve component, there has, in recent years, been a consistent upward Reserve utilisation trend in the pursuit of defence obligations. In particular there has been a significant year-on-year increase in the number of Reserves called to active duty. This indicates a healthy core of Reserves which is the basis for the future growth and rejuvenation of the Reserve component. The Reserve component, being the surge capability to meet ordered commitments, requires significant investment. The current capacity of the Reserves needs to be enhanced through a concerted effort to equip and train members of the Reserve component.

45. Defence members with scarce and professional skills are leaving the Defence Force at concerning rates. It is clear that the occupation-specific dispensations have some effect in stemming these losses, but conditions of service continue to contribute to these losses.

46. The Defence Force is experiencing an alarming loss of skilled personnel, specifically engineers, technicians, aircrew, vetting officers and legal officers, amongst others, requiring specific occupational dispensations to prevent the further loss of scarce skills. The retention of large numbers of persons who can no longer be gainfully employed further exacerbates this situation.

47. Linked thereto is a serious shortage of technical personnel throughout the Defence Force. This is due to a mixture of the inadequacy of employment incentives and structures, limited intakes, limited training, reduced status of technical personnel, economic growth (external demand) and industry practice. Organic for-
ward maintenance support (1st and 2nd line) to the increasingly modern and complex weapon systems of the Defence Force is seriously affected, and may lead to dependence on contractor support in operational areas. There is an urgency to improve employment incentives for technical personnel, improve technical structures, and increase intakes and training numbers.

49. The Defence Force is in a critical state of decline which is characterised by: force imbalance; unaffordability of its main operating systems; inability to meet current standing defence commitments; and the lack of critical mobility. Left unchecked, and at present funding levels, this decline will severely compromise and further fragment South Africa’s defence capability.

50. South Africa’s defence ambition is driven by its strategic posture, the role that it wishes to play both regionally and continentally and the consequent level of defence commitments made.

51. There must be either a greater budget allocation, or a significantly scaled-down level of ambition and commitment which is aligned to the current budget allocation. In short, there are two strategic options available for Government: budget must be determined by policy or budget must drive policy.

52. The reality will most probably lie somewhere in between. Nonetheless, the fundamental principle remains that the force design must match the level of commitment, without compromising the necessary ratio between personnel, operations and capital, and the balance between Regulars and Reserves. A balance of expenditure must be achieved, as currently there is a severely disjointed and institutionally crippling relationship between spending on personnel, capital and operating.

53. Even with an immediate intervention, it could take at least five years to arrest the decline and another five years to develop a limited and sustainable defence capability. The longer the neglect is perpetuated, the greater the effort, time and cost that would be necessary to arrest the decline and restore the minimum capabilities required to safeguard South Africa’s borders, protect its maritime trade routes, conduct peace missions and humanitarian interventions, safeguard South Africa and its people and defend and protect the country against external aggression.

“The only relevant military expenditure figure to consider is the amount required to meet the tasks which the SANDF is expected to perform, based on a careful security sector reform analysis.

The appropriate level of military expenditure should be based upon an objective assessment of the threats we face and the amount of insurance we want to take out.

The amount of insurance we want to take out in terms of military expenditure depends on our attitude towards risk and our ability to pay for the insurance.”

Submission from economist - Prof Geoff Harris

RESTORING THE DEFENCE CAPABILITY

48. The persistent disconnect between the defence mandate, South Africa’s growing defence commitments and the resource allocation has eroded defence capabilities to the point where the Defence Force is unable to fully fulfil its constitutional responsibility to defend and protect South Africa and its people, and is hard pressed even to maintain its current modest level of commitments. The current Defence Force baseline is:

a. A personnel complement of approximately 97 000 employees inclusive of Regulars, Reserves and Defence Civilians.

b. Approximately 67 combat units, including Army, Air Force, Navy, Special Forces and Military Health units.

c. Funding of about R40 bn in 2013 Rand value, equating to 1.1% of GDP and 3.8% of government expenditure (GE).
54. South Africa requires a relevant, balanced and sustainable defence force to fulfil its constitutional mandate. This constitutional mandate can be distilled into four strategic goals: defend and protect South Africa; safeguard South Africa; promote regional peace and stability; and contribute to developmental and other ordered tasks (Figure 9-8).

55. The future force design will pursue a balance of capabilities that adhere to the strategic concepts of rapid reaction operations for interventions, expeditionary operations to project forces for protracted periods, complex war fighting within the human and physical dimensions of the battle space, interoperability of command and control capabilities, and concurrency of operations in multiple theatres and joint, inter-agency, interdepartmental and multinational (JILM) operations.

56. The defence capability must be robust and flexible and able to project and sustain joint landward, air, maritime, Special Force and military health operations over extended distances for protracted periods on the continent. The military operating attributes of: command and control; movement and manoeuvre; firepower; intelligence; protection and survivability; and sustainment must be embedded in all capabilities (Figure 9-9).

57. **Joint Command and Control.** South Africa requires a joint command and control capability to ensure joint action with respect to land, air, sea, information and space, and which must be capable of integrating with multinational, interdepartmental and inter-agency components to achieve synergy. Joint command and control must be enabled through a comprehensive situational awareness capability that provides integrated information acquired through liaison with allied and friendly forces and governments, local human intelligence, and static and mobile sensors for enhanced military decision-making. This must be pursued at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

58. **Defence Diplomacy.** South Africa’s contribution to the prevention and resolution of conflict will be enhanced through an integration of its diplomatic, military and other efforts in a complementary manner, and in instances supported by appropriate military capabilities that strengthen South Africa’s capacity to influence international developments. This requires a defence diplomacy capability, whose strategy and main effort focuses on those national priorities where defence diplomacy engagements will add the most value. Defence diplomacy efforts will further centre on fostering long-standing relationships with key African states and other strategic partners.

59. **Special Forces.** South Africa’s increasingly complex and unstable security environment dictates an increasing reliance on Special Forces in defence operations, indicating an expansion of the current Special Forces capability in the landward, airborne and amphibious operational domains. Special Forces capabilities must be suited to: strategic reconnaissance; ordered strategic special tasks; deep reconnaissance in support of the combat services; and the execution of Special Forces-unique operations including, hostage rescue, and urban and anti-terror operations (Figure 9-10).

60. **Special Operations Forces.** Continental leadership responsibilities and the requirement to protect own vital national interests require South Africa to configure and maintain a specialised, highly mobile combat capability (closely linked to that of the Special Forces) that is able to rapidly deploy to remote areas.
areas for specific preventative and intervention operations. Such Special Operations Forces must be able to conduct joint and supported airborne, air-landed and sea-landed assault operations, with air- and sea-deployable firepower, protection and manoeuvre. Special Forces and Special Operations Forces will be supported by joint defence capabilities, and will normally be followed-on by more robust combat forces, specifically tailored to the mission.

61. **Medium-Combat Forces.** The larger portion of South Africa’s landward defence capability must be configured and maintained as a projectable, multi-rolled medium-combat capability with enhanced fire-power, manoeuvre and protection making it suitable for a range of contingencies. Such medium forces would be the bulk of South Africa’s contribution to enduring multinational operations; own safeguarding operations and other directed tasks. These medium-combat forces will be self-supporting, having embedded armour, artillery, engineer, communications, intelligence, logistics, medical support and other requirements. This medium capability may be further augmented by heavy-combat capabilities. These forces also have the contingent liability to support civil authority and the Police Service, and protect critical infrastructure if so required.

62. **Heavy-Combat Forces.** The configuration and maintenance of a heavy-combat capability are required to deter South Africa’s potential adversaries and conduct landward operations in high-threat situations. Maintained at a
63. **Maritime Operations.** South Africa has a maritime-dependent economy and significant maritime interests which it must defend and protect through the configuration and maintenance of a versatile littoral maritime capability, a credible deep-ocean capability and effective maritime domain awareness. This maritime capability must be able to provide an enduring presence in South Africa’s areas of maritime interest. This will be pursued through a maritime defence concept involving deterrence and powerful intervention through surface, sub-surface and air capabilities. This will be pursued in concentric layers that are focused on South Africa’s ports, territorial waters, trade routes and marine resources. In support of the landward strategy, the maritime capability must be able to conduct riverine and inland water operations and augment firepower when so required. It must also be capable of strategic reach and joint rapid response across the spectrum of conflict, supporting the sustenance of protracted joint operations over long distances. (Figure 9-12).
64. **Air Operations.** South Africa requires a responsive and agile air defence capability to defend and protect the integrity of South Africa’s airspace through the application of air power, and to support the landward and maritime strategies. The air defence capability must provide deterrence and powerful intervention during joint operations, specifically through comprehensive air domain awareness, air combat, combat support and air mobility capabilities. Deployed landward and maritime forces must be supported through appropriate airspace control, reconnaissance, close-air support, augmentation of firepower and inter- and intra-theatre air mobility in complex operational circumstances. The air defence capability must also be capable of strategic reach and joint rapid response across the spectrum of conflict, supporting the sustainment of protracted joint operations over long distances. (Figure 9-13).

65. **Military Health.** South African forces require sustained, layered military health support to protracted operations over long distances. Such support must ensure both force health protection and force health sustainment (Figure 9-14).

66. Future **information warfare** will be conducted in parallel with more conventional forms of warfare in the maritime, land and air domains. Defence must develop a comprehensive information warfare capability, tied into other intelligence-related information systems and complementary to its other military capabilities. Defence must further work closely with other government departments and industry to:

- enhance joint operational capabilities;
- secure vital networks; and
- guide the development of new information warfare technologies, practices and capabilities.
67. **Defence command and control** must be enabled, with a specific focus on both operational command and control and the enablement of administrative information systems. The information warfare capability must focus on:
   a. network warfare;
   b. electronic warfare;
   c. psychological operations;
   d. information-based warfare;
   e. information infrastructure warfare; and
   f. command and control warfare.

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### FIVE PLANNING MILESTONES TO RESTORE THE DEFENCE CAPABILITY

**NOTE**

- The considerations provided hereunder are intended to provide strategic-level guidance on the necessary planning which should be pursued to rejuvenate the Defence Force.
- The detail indicated in each planning milestone will be expanded through a military strategy and force design process to be conducted under the authority of the Chief of the Defence Force.
- The Defence Accounting Officer must capture the intent of the above in an Extended Long-Term Defence Development Plan, inclusive of capability development and funding trajectory, and integrate such within the government planning cycle.

68. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa\(^{13}\) establishes the Defence Force; requires it to "be structured and managed as a disciplined military force"; and provides the "primary object" of the defence force as being to "defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force".

69. An immediate intervention is required to arrest critical areas of decline in the Defence Force and to create a firm foundation against which an appropriate defence capability can be developed to be able to sustain ordered commitments and have the capacity to respond to nascent challenges in the strategic environment.

70. The restoration of South Africa’s defence capability can be mapped by quantifying five strategic planning baselines as firm foundations to direct the development of the Defence Strategic Trajectory. The following milestones (Figure 9-15) are posited as the foundation for development of the Extended Long-Term Defence Development Plan (in the order of twenty-five years), namely:

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**Figure 9-15: The Defence Strategic Trajectory**

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\(^{13}\) Constitution, 1996, Chapter 11, Section 200(2), p 113.
a. **Planning Milestone 1:** Arrest the decline in critical capabilities through immediate, directed interventions.

b. **Planning Milestone 2:** Rebalance and re-organise the Defence Force as the foundation for future growth.

c. **Planning Milestone 3:** Create the sustainable Defence Force that can meet current ordered defence commitments.

d. **Planning Milestone 4:** Enhance the Defence Force’s capacity to respond to nascent challenges in the strategic environment.

e. **Planning Milestone 5:** Defend the Republic against insurgency and/or armed conflict to the level of limited war.

71. It is important to note that Milestone 5 above reflects the constitutional mandate to its fullest possible extent. However, this Defence Review has carefully considered possible, probable and plausible circumstances in the strategic environment, at both the inter-state and intra-state levels, and thus realistically posits that:

a. **Milestone 3** must be urgently pursued and achieved in the shortest possible time so as to enable the Defence Force to: sustain its current level of ordered commitments and provide a reasonable interim level of compliance with the requirements of the Constitution.

b. **Milestone 4** must be pursued as the **appropriate end-state** for the Defence Force so that it: appropriately complies with the requirements of the Constitution; has the capability and capacity to respond to nascent challenges in the strategic environment; and, in so doing, provides significant deterrence against strategic risk.

c. **Milestone 5** is not a planning milestone per se, but nonetheless reflects and acknowledges that South Africa must be cognisant of the capability that may be required to counter significant insurgency and/or armed conflict to the level of limited war. Thus:

   i. **Figure 9-15** indicates a ‘critical decision point’ that would have to be addressed before crossing from Milestone 4 to Milestone 5.
   
   ii. Achieving Milestone 4, however, significantly reduces strategic risk and therefore minimises the likelihood of having to cross the threshold into Milestone 5.

d. It is improbable that the Defence Force will be able to migrate from its current state of critical decline to the levels of compliance set out in Milestones 3 and 4 without first implementing specific personnel, logistic, finance and organisational interventions.

e. **Milestones 1 and 2** are consequently stipulated as cardinal steps for establishing a necessary firm foundation for attaining Milestones 3 and 4. **Milestones 1 and 2 can be executed concurrently should the resources therefore be available,** thus shortening the timeframe of implementation. Notwithstanding, the organisational and capability interventions indicated in Milestone 1 cannot be ignored.

72. To this end the following **factors** are identified as being **critical to the Defence Strategic Trajectory:**

a. The President of the Republic of South Africa, as the **Head of the Executive and the Commander-in-Chief,** champions the Defence Review and directs the Defence Strategic Trajectory.

b. The Defence Review and the Defence Strategic Trajectory have the support of **Cabinet** and **Parliament.**

c. A **strategic communication intervention** is developed to pursue a national consensus on Defence.

d. An appropriate **defence funding mechanism** is identified and implemented to support the Defence Strategic Trajectory and as such, the Defence Force is appropriately resourced along this trajectory.

e. The implementation of the Defence Review and the Defence Strategic Trajectory is **driven as a strategic priority** by the Cabinet Member responsible for defence, the Defence Accounting officer and the Military Command, with specific emphasis being placed on the **core deliverables and value propositions** within each Milestone. This should be supported by an appropriate monitoring and evaluation mechanism.

f. The Defence Review and the Defence Strategic Trajectory **form the foundation** of the Future Military Strategy and the Extended Long-Term Defence Development Plan, inclusive of the Blue-Print Force Design and Force Structure.

g. The implementation of the Defence Review and the Defence Strategic Trajectory is directed and cascaded in a coordinated manner by the Defence Accounting Officer and the Military Command at all levels within the defence organisation; this being driven against an **interactive and target-driven timeline.**

h. **Monitoring and evaluation** of implementation is instituted at all levels in the defence organisation, with comprehensive reports being tabled with the **Executive** and the **Legislature** on a biannual basis.
THE DEFENCE STRATEGIC TRAJECTORY

PLANNING MILESTONE I

‘ARRESTING THE DECLINE’

PRIMARY FOCUS

73. The decline of critical defence capabilities must be arrested through immediate and directed interventions concerning defence capabilities that may be at risk, be unsustainable or be necessary for the meeting of current operational commitments. The primary focus in Milestone 1 is therefore to initiate the defence trajectory through directed organisational and capability interventions.

DELIVERABLES

74. Direct Implementation. The implementation of the Defence Review and the Defence Strategic Trajectory must be directed through comprehensive ministerial instructions and guidelines to the Defence Accounting Officer and the Military Command.

a. The Defence Accounting Officer, in conjunction with the Military Command, is to develop and promulgate the overarching implementation plan that will direct all defence components according to targets and timelines.


c. A deliberate communication intervention must be pursued to establish a national consensus on defence and comprehensively inform the people of South Africa on defence matters.

d. Particular initiatives to develop a culture of military professionalism at all levels in the Defence Force, with particular focus on the leadership cadre emphasising accountability and merit-based progression.

75. Areas of Key Leverage for Milestone 1. The following areas of key leverage are identified in Milestone 1, and are also the critical success factors for migration to Milestone 2:

a. Applying the 40:30:30 principle, the FY 2013/14 allocation can only sustain a personnel component of approximately 66 000 Regulars, Reserves and Defence Civilians.

i. Any personnel expenditure significantly larger than 40% will not provide the financial latitude for the rebalancing of the Defence Force.

ii. Recognising that the achievement of a 40% personnel expenditure will have to be achieved over a period of time, personnel expenditure should not exceed a 45% ceiling by the end of Milestone 1.

iii. Right-sizing of the personnel component would have to be achieved through a government-level intervention, which may include one or more of the following mechanisms:

(1) The reduction of those fulltime employees who are either: no longer able to meet their post profile requirements; who are surplus to the future defence requirement; or who are close to retirement;

(2) an external intervention to fund personnel above the 66 000 threshold;

(3) a combination of the above; or

(4) an alternate mechanism as established by Government.

b. Leverage the capital and operating portions of the defence budget by establishing a mechanism whereby the reimbursement for troop contributions to multinational peace missions accrues back to Defence for utilisation in the capital and operating portion of the budget.

c. An appropriate defence funding mechanism is identified and implemented to support the Defence Strategic Trajectory, with the following cardinal elements:

i. An Extended Long-Term Defence Development Plan to attain the Defence Strategic Trajectory.

ii. An Extended Long-Term Defence Funding Plan established by National Treasury to support the Defence Strategic Trajectory.

iii. A reflection on the Defence Strategic Trajectory in the National Development Plan.

76. Organisational Interventions. The following organisational interventions must be initiated concurrently so that they are in place for the re-balancing of the force required in Milestone 2.

a. Re-position the Defence Secretariat in order that the Secretary for Defence, as the primary tool and resource for the Minister to exercise civil control, and thus perform the constitutional imperative to: function under the direction of the cabinet member responsible for Defence’, with the following support being extended to the Minister:

i. Enhancing the Minister’s ability to exercise civil control over the defence function.

ii. Performing such functions as may be entrusted by the Minister, in particular those necessary...
or expedient to enhance civil control and civil oversight by:

(1) The Minister over Defence.
(2) Parliament over Defence.
(3) Parliamentary committees having oversight over Defence.

iii. Exercising powers vested through the Constitution and other statutes, subject to and in accordance with any direction of the Minister without fear, favour or prejudice.

iv. Assisting and supporting the Minister, as the principal policy advisor, in contributing to the formulation of the Government’s security policy and further assisting and supporting the Minister in developing and adapting the defence policy that best pursues national policy objectives and national interests.

v. Being responsible to the Minister, as one of the key mechanisms of civil control, in coordinating and compiling all relevant instruments through which either the President or the Minister may authorise the employment of the Defence Force and further direct such service as required by the Constitution (1996) or any other statute. This would extend to:

(1) The coordination and compilation of the Presidential Minute and Explanatory Memorandum, any necessary Cabinet Memorandum and any Ministerial Directive directing the Defence Force to conduct such service, and any consequent instruction or direction thereto.

(2) Identifying the legal implications, both domestic and international, of any employment.

(3) Identifying the financial implications of any employment.

(4) Maintaining a system to monitor and evaluate any employment.

(5) Maintaining a system to administrate, record and maintain the currency of any employment.

vi. Being responsible to the Minister in determining ministerial priorities and strategic guidelines on defence matters. This extends to setting the following strategic direction for the Minister’s subsequent authorisation:

(1) Ministerial strategic priorities, ministerial strategic guidelines, ministerial directives and ministerial planning instructions.

(2) Ministerial policy options for the MTSF/MTEF processes.

(3) Ministerial policy research and direction.

(4) Ministerial defence diplomacy framework, direction and engagement.

(5) Setting defence resource priorities.

(6) Requirements in terms of defence governance, accountability, control and risk frameworks required for the accountable management of defence resources.

vii. Being responsible to the Minister in determining strategic direction, accountability mechanisms and oversight over all defence public entities, including the defence acquisition agent and the acquisition/procurement of defence matériel.

viii. Advising the Minister on any matter referred by the Minister.

ix. Providing the Minister with parliamentary and cabinet administrative and coordination services, including the coordination of:

(1) The cabinet and parliamentary programme on defence.

(2) Parliamentary questions.

(3) The defence legislative programme.

x. Providing the Minister with legal services (excluding the Military Justice System) which will entail, inter alia, legislation, litigation and legal advice.

xi. Engaging with defence stakeholders and managing intra-governmental liaison at the national-strategic and military-strategic levels.

b. Establish the following in law:

i. A comprehensive defence delegation regime whereby powers and duties can be delegated down the command line – one step at a time – with commanders at all levels being responsible and accountable for their actions and resources to the next higher commander.

ii. A comprehensive defence organisational structuring regime whereby the Minister controls the Defence Macro-Structure and whereby the Chiefs of Services and Divisions have the power, authority and duty to manage own subordinate structures within targets and delegations set by the Defence Accounting Officer and the framework provided in the Defence Macro-Structure.

b. Restructure the Defence Force to ensure:

i. The authority and integrity of the line of mili-
iii. The clear distinction between command and staff responsibilities.

iv. The establishment of cohesive military combat formations, with organic functional support capabilities established ‘under command’ to the lowest possible functional level.

v. The empowerment of military commanders with the necessary authority and administrative delegations in command directives.

d. **Decentralise the procurement system** to the lowest possible functional level and establish appropriate procurement capabilities across the defence organisation.

e. **Supernumerary members** are managed down to not more than 2% of the total.

f. Establish the *mechanisms to recruit, educate, train and develop* quality future officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and defence civilians. The mechanisms thereto must include, inter alia:

i. Devolvement of military recruitment programmes to the Services.

(1) A unique and dedicated officer recruitment programme for Regulars and Reserves to attract the best young men and women South Africa has to offer.

(2) The recruitment of ‘other ranks’ to be pursued on a decentralised basis.

ii. Establishment of a Defence Academy to provide the military professional education, training, development and commissioning of young Regular and Reserve officers.

iii. Formal linkage established between higher defence education, training and development programmes and accredited tertiary academic institutions.

iv. Establish civilian education, training and development programmes focused on the general competencies required of defence civilians.

v. Develop mechanisms to recruit and retain high-level analytical and strategic competencies in the Defence Secretariat.

vi. Institute career planning and a merit-based career advancement system for all defence members, coupled to education, training and development achievement.

vii. Decouple rank from salary for Regulars, Reserves and Defence Civilians.

g. Specific initiatives are instituted to recruit and **retain professional and specialist military officers, engineers and technical staff**.

h. Institute a revised and **cohesive military disciplinary system**, a minor corrective measures system and concomitant administrative measures to meet the constitutional imperative that “the defence force must be structured and managed as a disciplined military force”.

i. Establish an **integrated defence enterprise information system**, linked to National Treasury’s Integrated Resource Management System, as the backbone information system to drive both defence administration and defence command and control.

j. Establish a **stock-level policy and strategy** from
Milestone 2 to Milestone 5.

k. Establish and coordinate capability and technology strategies and programmes with the defence industry appropriate to the Defence Strategic Trajectory.

l. Revitalise the defence acquisition system through, inter alia:
   i. Ensuring greater efficiency, flexibility and responsiveness in the acquisition process.
   ii. The defence acquisition agent focusing on executing those programmes specified in the long-term defence capability strategy.
   iii. Delivering required defence capabilities within shorter timeframes.

m. Redundant equipment and ammunition are identified for urgent and programmatic disposal.

n. Establish a Defence Facilities Master Plan to support the Defence Strategic Trajectory, including the development of a Works Formation to maintain defence facilities.

77. Capability Interventions.

   a. Identify and direct preservation-funding to those conventional defence capabilities at extreme risk.

   b. Enhance the strategic awareness capability; restore an effective intelligence capability at the strategic, operational and tactical levels; and establish a corps of professional analysts.

   c. Expand and enhance the Special Forces capability and the concomitant ability to insert, support and extract such forces.

   d. Optimise the border safeguarding capability, and acquire tailored equipment and weapon systems.

   e. Establish a permanent forward base.

   f. Reestablish/enhance a tactical airfield unit capability and a naval port-operating capability.

   g. Ensure troop contribution obligations are maintained at the standard whereby reimbursement is guaranteed. Specific emphasis is to be placed on the optimal serviceability of capabilities during operational missions.

   h. Improve stock-levels, with specific emphasis on:
      i. Replacement of field support equipment, including water purification, field kitchen, field accommodation, field workshop and field hospital equipment.
      ii. Rejuvenation of workshops, mobilisation stores, gun and vehicle parks, depots and magazines, the Naval Dockyard and a naval base on the east coast, and the development of facilities at naval stations.
      iii. Restocking of munitions, spares and general stores to levels that allow the conduct of effective training and effective combat operations.
THE DEFENCE STRATEGIC TRAJECTORY

i. Initiate necessary processes to attain the defence capabilities required in Milestone 2.

TARGETS

78. In Milestone 1 (Figure 9-16), the Defence Force will broadly:
   a. Consist of not more than 72 000 employees inclusive of Regulars, Reserves and Defence Civilians (average of 45% personnel expenditure). This should comprise in the order of:
      i. 47 000 Regulars.
      ii. 15 000 Reserves on active service.
      iii. 10 000 Defence Civilians, excluding members of the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Secretariat.
   b. Consist of approximately 66 combat units, including Army, Air Force, Navy, Special Forces and Military Health units.
   c. Have sustainable funding in the order of R43 bn in 2014/15 Rand value, equating to 1.1% of GDP and 3.6% of Government expenditure.

VALUE-PROPOSITION

79. The defence value-proposition for Milestone 1 (Figure 9-17) is posited as:
   a. **Internal Operations.** One sustainable infantry battalion group with associated medical, air and other support, dedicated to cooperate with the Police Service and conduct other routine internal tasks.
   b. **Border Safeguarding Operations.** The border safeguarding strategy requires:
      i. The sustained deployment of five infantry battalions, with appropriate embedded combat support and combat service support capabilities, in a 1-in-3 rotation-cycle, implying a pool of 15 battalions to conduct this task appropriately. However, in Milestone 1, a reduced capacity of four infantry battalions will be deployed in a border safeguarding role in a 1-in-3 rotation-cycle from a pool of twelve infantry battalions. In Milestone 1, deployed infantry battalions may not always have the required combat support and combat service support.
      ii. The sustained deployment of a two warships, with the required embedded capabilities, on patrol along the east coast and two warships, with the required embedded capabilities, on patrol along the west coast of South Africa. However, in Milestone 1, the funding constraint implies the limited sustainment of only two warships for maritime patrol along the east and west coasts. In some instances such vessels may not always have all the required embedded capabilities.
   c. **Peace Missions.** South Africa’s current commitment to two medium, enduring peace missions can be maintained in Milestone 1 at the level of a battalion in each instance. In each instance, additional rifle companies and other support may be added during mobilisation for a peace mission operation. However, as is currently the case, such peace missions are constrained by two main factors:
      i. A 1-in-3 rotation-cycle in each deployment area, as opposed to the international norm of a 1-in-4 rotation-cycle. This has significant implications on morale, health, social and family stability for the soldier.
      ii. Aged equipment that is difficult to maintain to the serviceability requirements that the international mandating authority may require in the troop contribution agreement. Such equipment may also lack the firepower, protection and manoeuvre required for operations in complex and often hostile environments.
   d. **Intervention Operations.** In Milestone 1, an intervention force comprising a single early-entry combat-group can be deployed to either fulfil South Africa’s continental obligations or to protect vital national interests. Such an intervention force could be deployed for a limited duration and would be further constrained by the following:
      i. Limited inter- and intra-theatre air mobility.
      ii. Limited air combat support.
      iii. The absence of link-up or follow-on forces.
      iv. Equipment may lack the firepower, protection and manoeuvre required for operations in complex and often hostile environments.
   e. **Regional Assistance Operations.** In Milestone 1, regional assistance, disaster relief and humanitarian aid can be provided, to the extent that limited air and maritime lift allows.
THE DEFENCE STRATEGIC TRAJECTORY

PLANNING MILESTONE 2
‘REBALANCE THE DEFENCE FORCE’

PRIMARY FOCUS

80. Building on the organisational and capability interventions initiated in Milestone 1, the primary focus of Milestone 2 is to reorganise and rebalance the Defence Force as the platform for further growth along the Defence Strategic Trajectory. Critical to the migration from Milestone 1 to Milestone 2 is that the areas of key leverage identified in Milestone 1 must have been addressed fully, these being:
   a. The defence allocation becomes balanced according to the 40:30:30 principle during Milestone 2. The current exponential spending on the personnel component is being arrested and normalises at around 40% of the allocation, thus providing financial latitude to address critical operating and capital matters.
   b. The reimbursement for troop contributions to multinational peace missions is accruing back to the operating portion of the defence budget.
   c. An appropriate defence funding mechanism is identified and implemented to support the Defence Strategic Trajectory, supported by an Extended Long-Term Defence Development Plan.

DELIVERABLES

81. Organisational Interventions. The following organisational interventions that were initiated in Milestone 1 must be completed and be in place in order to provide the firm foundation to rebalance the Defence Force:
   a. The Defence Secretariat is positioned to provide appropriate support to the Minister.
   b. A comprehensive defence delegation regime exists in law.
   c. A comprehensive defence organisational structuring regime exists in law. The Minister controls the Defence Macro-structure. Chiefs of Services and Divisions are managing own subordinate structures within the targets and delegations set by the Defence Accounting Officer.
   d. Procurement is delegated to the lowest possible functional level and appropriate procurement capabilities are established across the defence organisation.
   e. The Defence Force has a coherent military command and staff system with commanders at all levels having command over all allocated resources. Commanders are accountable to the next higher level of command for their actions.

f. The Defence Force is organised into combat formations that are embedded with all the required operating attributes for joint combat operations.

g. A unique and dedicated officer recruitment programme exists for both Regulars and Reserves.
h. Other ranks and civilians are recruited on a decentralised basis.
i. The pool of professional and specialist military officers, engineers and technical staff is expanding to meet the requirement and experienced personnel are retained.
j. The number of supernumerary members does not exceed 2% of total.
k. All higher defence training institutions have formal linkages to accredited tertiary academic institutions.
l. Career planning and merit-based career advancement are instituted for all defence members, coupled to education, training and development achievement.
m. Rank is decoupled from salary for Regulars, Reserves and Defence Civilians.
n. The military disciplinary system, minor corrective measures system and consequent administrative measures are established and enhance the discipline of the Defence Force.
o. The integrated defence enterprise information system drives both defence administration and defence command and control.
p. The defence industry responds in a coordinated manner to the Defence Strategic Trajectory.
q. The defence acquisition system is responsive to those programmes specified in the long-term defence capability strategy and is able to deliver required defence capabilities within shorter time-frames.
r. Redundant equipment and ammunition have been disposed of.
s. Defence facilities are developing along a defined development trajectory.

82. Capability Interventions.
   a. The capability interventions initiated in Milestone 1 are on a steady combat-ready trajectory.
   b. Development of a special operations joint rapid response intervention capability with the rejuvenation of airborne and air-landed and sea-landed assault forces and associated equipment.
   c. Simultaneous and critical renewal of the medium and light airlift capability, the in-flight refuelling capability, and the military air-ambulance capability, and the enhancement of the medium rotary-wing lift capability.
   d. Enhancement of air domain awareness including...
static, mobile and airborne surveillance and tracking systems together with associated interdiction capabilities.

e. Enhancement of **maritime domain awareness** and the extended maritime protection capability inclusive of patrol vessels, reconnaissance aircraft, unmanned surveillance systems as well as static, ship-borne and airborne surveillance and tracking systems.

f. Renewal of the **hydrographic survey capability** to both support maritime operations and ensure the international hydrographic, nautical charting and maritime warning obligations of South Africa.

g. Extended **maritime protection capability** inclusive of inshore and offshore patrol capability with organic, combat-enhanced maritime helicopters able to repel symmetric and asymmetric threats.

h. **Implement the stock-level policy** initiated in Milestone 1.

i. The necessary processes are initiated to attain the defence capabilities required in Milestone 3.

**TARGETS**

83. In Milestone 2 the rebalanced and reorganised Defence Force (Figure 9-18) will broadly:

a. Have a personnel complement of approximately 101 000 employees inclusive of Regulars, Reserves and Defence Civilians. This should comprise in the order of:
   i. 64 000 Regulars.
   ii. 25 000 Reserves on active service (called-up and on strength).
   iii. 12 000 Defence Civilians, excluding members of the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Secretariat.

b. Consist of approximately 97 combat units, including Army, Air Force, Navy, Special Forces and Military Health units.

c. Have sustainable funding in the order of R57 bn in 2014/15 Rand value, equating to 1.6% of GDP and 5.4% of government expenditure.

84. The Defence Academy is established and graduates and commissions in the order of 200 young Regular and Reserve officers per annum.

**VALUE-PROPOSITION**

85. The defence value-proposition for Milestone 2 (Figure 9-19) is posited as:

a. **Internal Operations.** One sustainable infantry battalion group with associated medical, air and other support, dedicated to cooperate with the Police
Service and conduct other routine internal tasks.

b. **Border Safeguarding Operations.** In Milestone 2:
   i. The sustained deployment of five infantry battalions, with appropriate embedded combat support and combat service support capabilities, in a 1-in-3 rotation-cycle, implying a pool of 15 battalions to conduct this task appropriately.
   
   ii. The limited sustained deployment of two warships, with the required embedded capabilities, on patrol along the east coast and two warships on patrol along the west coast of South Africa.
   
   iii. The limited sustained deployment of two maritime reconnaissance aircraft on patrol along the east and west coasts of South Africa.

c. **Peace Missions.** South Africa’s current commitment to two medium, enduring peace missions can be maintained in Milestone 2 at the level of a battalion in each instance. In each instance, additional rifle companies and other support may be added during mobilisation for a peace mission operation. However, as is currently the case, such peace missions are constrained by two main factors:
   i. A 1-in-3 rotation-cycle in each deployment area, as opposed to the international norm of a 1-in-4 rotation-cycle. This has significant implications on morale, health, social and family stability for the soldier.
   
   ii. Aged equipment that is difficult to maintain to the serviceability requirements that the international mandating authority may require in the troop contribution agreement. Such equipment may also lack the firepower, protection and manoeuvre required for operations in complex and often hostile environments.

d. **Intervention Operations.** In Milestone 2, a combat group-sized intervention force can be deployed to either fulfil South Africa’s continental obligations or to protect vital national interests. Such an intervention force would, as the capability interventions in Milestone 2 are realised, enjoy progressively improved:
   i. Inter- and intra-theatre air mobility.
   
   ii. Air combat support.
   
   iii. Link-up or follow-on forces.
   
   iv. Firepower, protection and manoeuvre required for operations in complex and often hostile environments.

e. **Regional Assistance Operations.** In Milestone 2, greater regional assistance, disaster relief and humanitarian aid can be provided as improved air and maritime inter- and intra-theatre lift is realised.
THE DEFENCE STRATEGIC TRAJECTORY

PLANNING MILESTONE 3
‘CAPACITATE THE DEFENCE FORCE’

PRIMARY FOCUS

86. The primary focus of Milestone 3 is to build on the capacity established in the reorganised and rebalanced Defence Force established in Milestone 2. The capacitated and sustainable Defence Force, being the interim objective of the Defence Review, must have the necessary capabilities and capacity to sustain Constitutional requirements as well as standing defence commitments.

DELIVERABLES

87. Organisational Interventions. Milestone 3 will require the further refinement of the measures established in Milestones 1 and 2.

88. Capability Interventions.
   a. The capability interventions pursued in Milestones 1 and 2 have become combat-ready defence systems.
   b. Renewal of the landward combat capability.
      i. Retention and renewal of the ‘core-growth’ heavy-combat capability to augment peacekeeping in high-risk situations and peace enforcement, and to provide an essential component of the deterrent capability.
      ii. Renewal of the larger medium-combat capability.
      iii. Renewal of the landward logistic vehicle fleet, related vehicles and field ambulance capability in an integrated manner to support all military operations.
      iv. Establishment of a rapidly deployable indirect fire-support capability to augment the combat capability of deployed forces.
   c. Enhancement of the air combat capability through aerial weapon augmentation including:
      i. Beyond-visual-range air-to-air, precision air-to-ground and anti-ship capabilities for the light fighter.
      ii. Close-range air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities for the lead-in fighter trainer.
   d. Full integration of the combat helicopter capability into the landward and allied roles inclusive of aerial weapons, and not limited to:
      i. Long- and short-range anti-tank/anti-bunker.
      ii. Self-defence air-to-air capabilities.
   e. Expansion of the airlift capability with heavier and longer-range fixed-wing capabilities to project and sustain combat forces over extended distances.
   f. Establishment of a heavy rotary-wing lift capa-
bility for intra-theatre support to Special Forces, Special Operations Forces, sea-landed operations, disaster and emergency relief, search-and-rescue operations and medical support to deployed forces.

g. Extension of the current maritime combat support capability to support frigate-type and offshore patrol-type vessels over extended distances. Allied thereto is the requirement for a forward deployable seaborne depot and technical support capability.

h. Establishment of a joint sealift capability that can effectively project and sustain medium combat capabilities over extended distances.

i. Renewal of the rail-lift capability as an extremely cost-effective means of long-distance transport of personnel, vehicles, heavy equipment, munitions, fuel and general stores.

j. The number of operational units is grown to approximately 140.

k. The necessary processes are initiated to attain the defence capabilities required in Milestone 4.

TARGETS

89. In Milestone 3 the rebalanced and reorganised Defence Force (Figure 9-20) will broadly:

a. Have a personnel complement of approximately 162 000 employees inclusive of Regulars, Reserves and Defence Civilians. This should comprise in the order of:
   i. 90 000 Regulars.
   ii. 57 000 Reserves that can be placed on active service at any one time.
   iii. 15 000 Defence Civilians.

b. Consist of approximately 140 combat units, including Army, Air Force, Navy, Special Forces and Military Health units.

c. Have sustainable funding in the order of R74 bn in 2014/15 Rand value, equating to 2.0% of GDP and 6.8% of government expenditure.

90. The Defence Academy graduates and commissions in the order of 300 young Regular and Reserve officers per annum.

VALUE-PROPOSITION

91. The defence value-proposition for Milestone 3 (Figure 9-21) is posited as:

a. Internal Operations. One sustainable infantry battalion group with associated medical, air and other support, dedicated to cooperate with the Police Service and conduct other routine internal tasks.
b. **Border Safeguarding Operations.** In Milestone 3:

i. The sustained deployment of five infantry battalions, with appropriate embedded combat support and combat service support capabilities, in a 1-in-3 rotation-cycle, implying a pool of 15 battalions to conduct this task appropriately.

ii. The sustained deployment of two warships, with the required embedded capabilities, on patrol along the east coast and two warships, with the required embedded capabilities, on patrol along the west coast of South Africa, expandable to the SADC maritime zone.

iii. The sustained deployment of two maritime reconnaissance aircraft on patrol along the east and west coasts of South Africa, expandable to the SADC maritime zone.

c. **Peace Missions.** In Milestone 3:

i. Two large, enduring peace missions can be maintained at the level of a battalion group in each instance. In each deployment area a 1-in-4 rotation-cycle can be achieved, implying a pool of eight battalion-sized units to conduct this task appropriately. In each instance, additional rifle companies and other combat support may be added during the mobilisation for a peace mission operation.

ii. One additional large enduring peace mission can be pursued at the level of a combat group. The combat group would operate in a 1-in-4 rotation cycle from a pool of four constituted combat groups. In this instance they are reinforced by attached elements from the combat services, supporting arms and any other specialist military capability to enhance firepower, manoeuvre and protection.

iii. The efficacy of forces deployed in peace missions will be progressively enhanced by the improvement in command and control, intelligence, firepower, manoeuvre, protection and sustainment systems.

d. **Intervention Operations.** In Milestone 3, a mission-tailored task force of approximately brigade strength can provide early entry, link-up and follow-on forces, for a limited duration, to either fulfil South Africa’s continental obligations or to protect vital national interests. This may possibly comprise:

i. A combat group-sized early entry force drawn from Special Forces and/or Special Operations Forces.

ii. A link-up Special Operations Force, reinforced by attached elements from the combat services, supporting arms and any other specialist military capability to enhance firepower, manoeuvre and protection.

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Figure 9-22: Targets for Milestone 4
iii. A motorised or mechanised follow-on force, augmented as necessary with heavier combat capabilities required for the task.

iv. In Milestone 3, as the capabilities initiated in Milestones 1 to 3 become available, the intervention force enjoys greater:

(1) Inter- and intra-theatre mobility.
(2) Landward, air and maritime combat support.
(3) Firepower, protection and manoeuvre as may be required for operations in complex and often hostile environments.

e. Regional Assistance Operations. In Milestone 3 regional assistance, enhanced disaster relief and humanitarian aid can be provided.

PLANNING MILESTONE 4

‘RESPONDING TO STRATEGIC CHALLENGES’

PRIMARY FOCUS

92. The primary focus of Milestone 4, being the desired end-state of the Defence Review, is to develop those capabilities that would: firstly, ensure that the Defence Force remains relevant to developments in the Strategic Environment; and secondly, be able to respond to a wide range of strategic challenges. The capacity of the heavy-combat forces will be programmatically advanced, from the core-growth level of critical mass, to that of expandable formations which can be made mission-ready in a shorter space of time.

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94. Capability Interventions.

a. The capability interventions pursued in Milestone 3 have become combat-ready defence systems.

b. Enhanced and expanded ground-based air defence capability to protect bases, static installations and landward forces.

c. Renewed heavy-combat capability, specifically armour and medium artillery capabilities within the core growth.

d. Enhanced combat engineer capability, inclusive of mine-detection and clearing, field earth-moving, bridge-laying and other engineering combat support tasks.

e. The number of operational units is grown to approximately 158.

f. The development of further defence capabilities is determined and prioritised in ongoing response to
developments in the strategic environment.

**TARGETS**

95. In Milestone 4 the increasingly capacitated Defence Force (Figure 9-22) will broadly:
   a. Have a personnel complement of approximately 189,000 employees inclusive of Regulars, Reserves and Defence Civilians. This should comprise in the order of:
      i. 90,000 Regulars.
      ii. 82,000 Reserves that can be placed on active service at any one time.
      iii. 17,000 Defence Civilians.
   b. Consist of approximately 158 combat units, including Army, Air Force, Navy, Special Forces and Military Health units.
   c. Have sustainable funding in the order of R88 bn in 2014/15 Rand value, equating to 2.4% of GDP and 8.2% of government expenditure.

96. The Defence Academy graduates and commissions in the order of 400 young Regular and Reserve officers per annum.

**VALUE-PROPOSITION**

97. The defence value-proposition for Milestone 4 (Figure 9-23) is posited as:
   a. **Internal Operations.** One sustainable infantry battalion group with associated medical, air and other support, dedicated to cooperate with the Police Service and conduct other routine internal tasks.
   b. **Border Safeguarding Operations.** In Milestone 4:
      i. The sustained deployment of five infantry battalions, with appropriate embedded combat support and combat service support capabilities, in a 1 in 3 rotation-cycle, implying a pool of 15 battalions to conduct this task appropriately.
      ii. The sustained deployment of two warships, with the required embedded capabilities, on patrol along the east coast and two warships on patrol, with the required embedded capabilities, along the west coast of South Africa, expandable to the maritime areas south of the SAHEL.
      iii. The sustained deployment of two maritime reconnaissance/patrol aircraft on patrol along the east and west coasts of South Africa, expandable in support of surface and sub-surface maritime deployments.
   c. **Peace Missions.** In Milestone 4, three large, enduring peace missions can be sustained at the level of a combat group in each instance. In each deployment area a 1-in-4 rotation-cycle can be achieved, implying a pool of 12 constituted combat groups to conduct this task appropriately. The efficacy of forces deployed in peace missions is increasingly enhanced by improvements in command and control, intelligence, firepower, manoeuvre, protection and sustainment systems.
   d. **Intervention Operations.** In Milestone 4, a sustainable mission-tailored task force of approximately brigade-strength can provide early entry, link-up and follow-on forces to either fulfil South Africa’s continental obligations or to protect vital national interests. This may possibly comprise:
      i. A combat group-sized early entry force comprised of Special Forces and/or Special Operations Forces.
      ii. A link-up Special Operations Force, reinforced by attached elements from the combat services, supporting arms and any other specialist military capability to enhance firepower, manoeuvre and protection.
      iii. A motorised or mechanised follow-on force, augmented as necessary with heavier combat capabilities required for the task.
   iv. In Milestone 4, as the capabilities initiated in Milestones 1 to 3 become available, the intervention force enjoys greater:
      (1) Inter- and intra-theatre mobility.
      (2) Landward, air and maritime combat support.
      (3) Firepower, protection and manoeuvre as may be required for operations in complex and often hostile environments.
   e. **Operations in the Rear Area.** In Milestone 4, operations in the rear area would extend to the enhanced and expanded protection of bases, critical infrastructure, lines of communication and identified vital national interests in the rear area.
   f. **Regional Assistance Operations.** In Milestone 4 significant regional assistance, disaster relief and humanitarian aid can be provided and sustained.

**PLANNING MILESTONE 5**

**‘LIMITED WAR AND INSURGENCY’**

**PRIMARY FOCUS**

98. Should the strategic environment deteriorate to the extent that South Africa would have to counter a significant insurgency
or repel armed aggression to the extent of a limited war, the entire national effort would focus on the creation of a war force.

99. It is extremely difficult to predict the nature and requirements of the future war force, as this would be subject to the specific circumstances at that time. Nonetheless, the solid and firm foundations created from Milestone 1 to Milestone 4 would place the Defence Force in a very sound position for development into a ‘war force’ in a reasonably short time.
DELIVERABLES

100. The development of a war force would assume priority over any other defence commitment. Forces committed to any standing or contingent defence obligations would be reassigned and redeployed. The focus of main effort would be the rapid and continued growth of the heavy combat capabilities to that of mission-ready formations, commensurate with the anticipated threat. The existing capacity of the Defence Force would be expanded, those forces committed to standing defence obligations would be re-roled and appropriate additional defence capabilities would be created.

101. The main focus of military effort (Figure 9-24) would be placed on:
   a. The protection of the rear area and all lines of communication.
   b. The capability to conduct robust major combat operations in the deep, close and rear.
   c. The protection of internal and external vital national interests.
   d. Enhanced strategic alliance and strategic partnering.
   e. The positioning of the defence industry in full support of the military requirement.

TARGETS

102. As a conservative and non-prescriptive planning figure, and merely as a basis for further investigation and as would be determined by circumstances at the time, the following may be necessary (Figure 9-25):
   a. A personnel complement of approximately 314 000 employees inclusive of Regulars, Reserves and defence civilians.
   b. Approximately 219 combat units, including Army, Air Force, Navy, Special Forces and Military Health units.
   c. Have sustainable funding in the order of R116 bn in 2014/15 Rand value, equating to 3.3% of GDP and 11.0% of government expenditure.
   d. The Defence Academy would graduate and commission young Regular and Reserve officers as might be required.

ACHIEVING THE DEFENCE STRATEGIC TRAJECTORY

POLICY OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO GOVERNMENT

103. The Defence Strategic Trajectory is intended to broadly span three cycles of the Medium-Term Strategic Framework.
The following strategic policy options (Figure 9-26) are available for government to pursue the development of South Africa’s defence capability.

**Policy Option 1: Maintain the Status Quo**

104. Should for whatever reason the Defence Strategic Trajectory not be pursued by way of either agreement on the trajectory or the funding strategy thereto, the Defence Force would have to enter into an urgent redesign process to counter its current state of critical decline and attempt to establish a healthy, though significantly reduced defence capability that would be focused primarily on domestic matters. Its primarily domestic orientation and reduced capabilities would provide a very limited capability to: defend territorial integrity, ensure national sovereignty and support South Africa’s continental leadership role.

105. The significantly reduced force design would have to arrest the critical decline in the Defence Force and establish limited capabilities that:
   a. are lighter and cheaper with a greater tooth-to-tail ratio;
   b. reduce the overhead costs of headquarters and command structures to single command corps;
   c. establish balance within a lighter force;
   d. reside within relatively unsophisticated main operating systems;
   e. meet a significantly reduced level of standing domestic and international defence commitments; and
   f. promote a spatially dispersed footprint.

106. This significantly redesigned force would have to be modelled according to the following concepts for it to develop utility:
   a. A lighter, infantry-based landward capability focused primarily on internal operations.
   b. An air defence capability focused primarily on light, tactical mobility.
   c. A littoral maritime defence capability focused primarily on the protection of territorial waters.
   d. A Special Forces capability focused on a limited spectrum of Special Forces operations.

**Policy Option 2: Implement the Defence Strategic Trajectory Independently**

107. The pursuit of the Defence Strategic Trajectory will, over time, develop a defence capability capable of conducting major combat operations in the defence and protection of South Africa, its national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The capability created would be commensurate with South Africa’s continental leadership responsibilities, establishing the gravitas required in support of Africa’s peace and security architecture. The ability to project forces over long distances and sustain them for protracted periods of time will further bolster South Africa’s continental leadership responsibilities and influence, as well as making a significant contribution to the security of South Africa’s vital national interests.

108. Should government wish to pursue the Defence Strategic Trajectory on a solely national basis, it would take significant time to establish all the necessary competence and capabilities to...
achieve the degree of defence capability set out in Milestone 4.

Policy Option 3: Implement the Defence Strategic Trajectory in Partnership

109. Government may consider a course of action that would shorten the duration of the Defence Strategic Trajectory. In essence, the main point of leverage would be the extent to which government might decide to pursue the Defence Strategic Trajectory with the assistance of either a strategic partner or a number of strategic partners.

110. Partnering, either with a single strategic partner or with multiple strategic partners in specific capability areas, would accelerate the overall implementation of the Defence Review and the Defence Strategic Trajectory, as well as leverage a number of funding options for the trajectory.

THE CONSEQUENT MILITARY STRATEGY AND BLUEPRINT FORCE DESIGN

111. Guided by the Defence Review and the approved Defence Strategic Trajectory, the following will be developed under the authority of the Chief of the Defence Force:

a. A Military Strategy, inclusive of the Force Design, Force Structure, establishment table and key resource imperatives (Figure 9-27). This Force Design should be reviewed at least every five years, or as required in response to changes in the strategic environment.

b. The Defence Force Long-Term Capability Strategy, indicating the level of operational capability required to meet the Defence Policy and the Military Strategy.

c. The Defence Force Capital and Technology Plans.

d. The necessary operational-level military doctrine to support the Military Strategy. The renewed military doctrine will in turn lead to renewed military tactics, techniques and procedures.

112. The Chief of the Defence Force will present the ensuing Blueprint Force Design to the Minister and Cabinet for approval and this will serve as an important basis for all aspects of future planning.

RESTRUCTURING THE DEFENCE ORGANISATION

113. Pursuant to the determination of the Military Strategy and the Blueprint Force Design, it is found that the Defence Force’s Force Structure will be adjusted to ensure the establishment of cohesive military combat formations, embedded with own organic support capabilities established ‘under command’ to the lowest possible functional level. Such organic support capabilities will include: personnel, finance, information and logistics (equipment, procurement, maintenance and technical services).

DEFENCE CAPABILITY PLANNING

114. As is the international norm whereby a defence force communicates its long-term intent to the defence industry and the public at large, the Minister of Defence will, every three years, publish a public rolling ten-year defence capital expenditure statement of intent. In this public document, broad statements of requirement, coupled to time and targets will be published.
This will give valuable guidance to the defence industry, increase general public confidence and assist in guiding interdepartmental planning.

115. Subject to the determination of the Military Strategy and the defence capability plan, and the adjustment of priorities over time, the following initial capability priorities are posited:
   a. Priority conventional defence capability.
   b. Special Forces capability.
   c. Rapid reaction and intervention capability.
   d. Force projection capability.
   e. Border safeguarding capability.
   f. Peace mission capability.
   g. Force sustainment capability.

EXTENDED LONG-TERM DEFENCE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

116. The achievement of the Blueprint Force Design will be critically informed by available resources and developments in the strategic environment. Resource constraints will be ameliorated by adjusting levels of readiness, balancing core-growth with operational necessity and through a careful mix of Regulars and Reserves within the one-force approach.

117. The Defence Accounting Officer must ensure integration and alignment of all subordinate strategy, planning, monitoring and evaluation and reporting processes to the Defence Review and the Defence Strategic Trajectory. The Defence Accounting Officer must further capture the intent of the Military Strategy, Force Design, Force Structure, capability strategy and acquisition plan into an extended long-term defence development plan to achieve the Defence Strategic Trajectory, inclusive of an aligned funding trajectory, and integrate such within the government planning cycle.

THE DEFENCE PLANNING IMPERATIVE

118. Irrespective of the future level of funding allocated to defence, the inviolable principle of maintaining the 40:30:30 ratio in the defence budget (at the corporate level) between the funding of personnel, operating and capital should inform all defence planning, notwithstanding that some components are technology heavy and others personnel heavy (Figure 9-28).
   a. The ‘compensation for employees’ portion of the budget should not exceed 40% of the defence budget, and must include an overall minimum of 8% of the personnel allocation directed to the development and utilisation of the Reserves.
   b. The 30% capital portion of the defence allocation should be directed at urgent equipment requirements to meet defence operational commitments and the maintenance of a core conventional defence capability with the necessary critical mass to expand when so required.
   c. The cost of the MSDS, NYS and other similar personnel systems should be viewed outside of the 40:30:30 rationale and funded separately.

119. The 40:30:30 ratio should be subject to the following caveats:
   a. The cost of operational commitments should be funded additional to the baseline defence allocation and not form part of the 40:30:30 rationale.
   b. Similarly, other ordered and directed developmental tasks given to the Defence Force must be funded additionally to the base-line allocation and not form part of the 40:30:30 rationale.
   c. The cost of the MSDS, NYS and other similar personnel systems should be viewed outside of the 40:30:30 rationale.

BALANCE BETWEEN REGULARS AND RESERVES

120. The day-to-day strength of the Defence Force may reflect a Reserve to Regular ratio in favour of the Regulars. This may especially be true in certain service-delivery elements or where specialist mustering and professions are found.

THE DEFENCE BUDGET

121. Defence expenditure is often expressed in terms of a percentage of the GDP that is allocated to defence. The real significance of this measure of defence spending is that it is an indicator of national will. It is a clear indication of how seriously a country takes its security, of how seriously it takes commitments it has undertaken in respect of regional defence or security arrangements, and how willing it is to face up to unexpected threats to itself or its region.

122. Consequently, if it is to be effective, the Defence Force must be funded adequately and appropriately:
   a. The defence budget must meet the financial requirements that arise from the roles and mission sets assigned by government to the Defence Force.
   b. The defence budget must provide steady funding over time, not on a boom or bust cycle, to allow the Defence Force to equip and train effectively.

123. This requirement can be best met by handling defence funding as four complementary sub-budgets:
   a. Defence Force Operating Budget;
   b. Defence Force Contingency Budget;
   c. Defence Force Capital Budget; and
   d. Defence Force Operational Employment Budget.
124. **Defence Force Operating Budget.** The operating budget must provide the funding to enable the Defence Force to sustain itself at the strength and readiness levels that are required to meet standing tasks and identified contingencies as developed from Defence Policy, as well as the additional operational costs incurred in respect of standing tasks. The operating budget must, therefore, provide steady funding to cover:

a. Personnel costs (salaries and allowances; accommodation or allowances; health support; etc);
b. Personnel development costs (education, training, development; relevant training centres and schools);
c. Unit, formation, joint and multinational field training exercises;
d. Maintenance, repair and overhaul costs in respect of equipment and systems;
e. Modernisation of equipment and systems;
f. Maintenance, repair and refurbishment costs in respect of facilities; and
g. The additional operational costs incurred in respect of standing tasks.

125. **Defence Force Contingency Budget.** The contingency budget must hold sufficient funds to meet the immediate financial requirements that would arise in the event of certain identified contingencies arising.

a. Such contingencies can include deployment in support of the Police Service or for disaster aid, emergency relief or search-and-rescue operations, the financial impact of which can to a reasonable extent be estimated and planned for.
b. This budget must also, however, provide for such contingencies as external disaster aid or emergency relief operations or an emergency evacuation of South African citizens from another country. Such contingencies must be identified as early as possible on the basis of continuous evaluation of intelligence, so that funds can be transferred into this account in good time from government contingency funds.

126. **Defence Force Capital Budget.** The capital budget must provide the planned funding to enable the Defence Force to equip itself to meet the operational demands arising from the standing tasks and identified contingencies as developed from Defence Policy. The capital budget must, therefore, provide planned, phased funding to cover:

a. Upgrading equipment and systems to meet the demands of evolving operational and tactical requirements;
b. Planned and phased (perhaps on a half-generation change-over basis) replacement of obsolete or obsolescent equipment and systems;
c. Acquisition of equipment and systems required for a force expansion necessitated by a change in:
   i. The Defence Policy; or
   ii. The strategic situation.
d. Acquisition of equipment and systems required to develop new force capabilities necessitated by:
   i. A change in the Defence Policy;
   ii. A change in the strategic situation; or
   iii. Technological developments.

127. **Defence Force Operational Employment Budget.**

The employment budget must provide prompt, steady and sustained funding to cover additional costs arising from operational employment of the Defence Force or elements thereof. Operational employment results from political decisions and must be funded over and above the sustainment and capital budgets. The only exceptions are:

a. Standing tasks assigned the Defence Force, and for which a properly calculated contingency amount is provided, included in the sustainment budget; and
b. Short-term contingency deployments, the costs of which are met from contingency budget funds.

128. The operational employment budget must, therefore, provide prompt, adequate, steady and sustained funding to cover the additional:

a. Personnel costs (deployment allowances; family support; accommodation; health support; etc);
b. Deployment costs (air and sea transport of personnel, equipment and supplies);
c. Sustainment costs (provision of additional depot stocks to cover higher utilisation rates; maintenance and repair of deployed equipment; rotation of equipment); and
d. Operational costs (including mission-readiness training costs and the actual cost of operations – munitions, fuel, batteries, field rations, replacement of equipment damaged or lost in operations).

129. The operational employment budget must, in addition to the above, provide prompt and adequate funding to cover:

a. Accelerated overhaul or replacement of equipment and systems resulting from the higher utilisation rates arising from operational employment; and
b. Acquisition of equipment, systems, munitions or stores required to allow effective operations in a particular situation or theatre of operations.
DEFINITION OF TERMS

1. It is necessary to clarify the following concepts:
   a. **Force Design.** The Force Design refers to those components of the Defence Force, within the wider Defence Force structure, which can and may be mobilised for operational deployment or which directly support defence operations.
      i. This includes combat, combat support, combat service support as well as command and control units that may be deployed to execute operations.
      ii. Non-deployable units in the Force Design may include structures that directly support deployed forces, such as a military hospital.
   b. **Force Structure.** The force structure is the complete structure of the entire defence organisation, inclusive of the Force Design, and ranges from the Ministry of Defence at the highest level (Level 0) to the diverse units at Level 4 in the organisation.
   c. **Force Structure Element.** A force structure element (FSE) is any self-standing organisation in the Defence Force structure across all levels of the organisation. Each headquarters, combat formation, school, depot and unit is an individual FSE.
   d. **Defence Force ‘Force Structure’.** The Defence Force ‘Force Structure’ is the complete master-plan for the full force structure requirement of the Defence Force. It is the master-plan that includes all present and future capabilities required for the execution of the defence mandate, reflecting differing states of readiness, differing levels of equipment sets and indications for the opening and closing of these units. The defence budget allocation, on the other hand, will determine the extent to which the Force Structure will be implemented. Capabilities included in the Force Structure, but which are not at combat-ready status, may be described in such terms as ‘virtual’ capability or ‘core growth’ capability. The Force Structure must therefore describe the respective readiness levels of such required capabilities.
2. The Defence Force ‘Force Design’ and Force Structure is informed by the defence mandate, mission, goals and tasks coupled to defence doctrine as expanded upon in this Defence Review.

**BROAD FORCE GENERATION CONSIDERATIONS**

3. As indicated earlier, new global and regional stresses have emerged and Africa continues to be troubled by multiple stress factors including the effects of global climate change, the rise of international terrorism and crime, and the potential effects of a new scramble for Africa’s resources. Therefore defence against possible military aggression remains a key imperative in designing a Defence Force that can pursue both a landward and a maritime defence strategy, supported by an overarching powerful air defence capability.

4. This implies that the Defence Force must have the ability to conduct a wide spectrum of operations under complex conditions. This spectrum may range from benign to hostile missions, including the support of other government departments, humanitarian support, the participation in peace missions and the defence of South Africa. All of this must be factored in when determining the Defence Force’s design and structure. The Defence Force must be designed to:
   a. Deploy and sustain forces over extended strategic distances and for protracted periods;
   b. Conduct operations within operational theatres that have extended tactical distances;
   c. Contend with diverse threats that may occur in quick succession or concurrently;
   d. Conduct operations in complex political, social and geographic arenas; and
   e. Integrate with other, very different, joint and multinational forces for the conduct of operations, including with other departments and other civilian organisations.

5. Given these challenges, developing the appropriate Force Design for the Defence Force is a complex task. While this Defence Review sets out the goals, the capability sets required for achieving those goals and the level of effort expected of the Defence Force, it remains a fact that there can be no certainty about the evolving strategic situation, and it is neither possible nor affordable to prepare for every eventuality. Further, the Force Design that is to be developed will affect the defence and security of South Africa for decades, and will involve considerable investment in human, industrial and financial capital. Given these realities, the only practical approach is to define a long-term Force Design that provides the balanced capabilities that will:
   a. Enable the country to meet existing challenges effectively;
   b. Enable the country to deal effectively with foreseeable contingencies;
   c. Be refocused or adapted to meet developing challenges or threats; and
   d. Provide the baseline for a more robust force when required, within a timeframe that is realistic relative to the strategic situation.

6. The use of a modular approach to Force Design may well provide the Defence Force with greater numbers of smaller, highly capable units which have been optimally designed to meet the requirements for specific missions. Proportionate combat, combat support and combat service support elements must be formally configured to meet the requirements for specific deployments and missions.

**STRATEGIC DEFENCE CONCEPTS**

**COMPLEX WAR-FIGHTING WITHIN COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS**

7. Diverse participants in potential African conflict may include terror groups, bandits, religious extremists, mercenaries, insurgents, unarmed protesters, environmental groups, formal militaries and non-state actors. Characteristics may include:
   a. Future conflicts will be characterised by uncertainty, complexity and an increase in asymmetry, and will not be contained by national borders.
   b. The physical terrain may include urban areas, dense bush, forests, mountains, riverine areas, swamps and desert.
   c. Ethnic, cultural, tribal, linguistic and religious diversity, and operations in the face of ethnic, tribal and religious tensions and conflicts, will produce considerable human complexity.
   d. Complex health threats to deployed forces from diseases and environmental conditions.
   e. The use of readily available commercial technology and the adaptation of these technologies, especially pervasive communications technology and social media, can create a new level of technological complexity.

8. Post-conflict missions can suddenly become as lethal as pure war-fighting missions, requiring agility to simultaneously execute a wide range of complex missions among foreign populations, as well as in unfamiliar and difficult terrain. Such complex, highly fluid and lethal environments demand enhanced command and control, protection, mobility, firepower, sustainment and situational awareness. Such complexity places added emphasis on the need for human intelligence (HUMINT).
INTEROPERABILITY

9. Interoperability is principally concerned with the ability of personnel and systems of different nations and agencies to work efficiently and effectively together. Future defence operations will probably be conducted in combination with other defence forces, requiring the ability to operate effectively alongside forces with differing military capabilities, doctrine, language and cultural backgrounds.

10. Priority must be given to promoting interoperability on command and control capabilities (processes, policies, doctrine and procedures) with regional partners, as well as meeting the needs of regional coalitions. Capability coherence must be created through experimentation and exercises. The initial focus will be on interoperability in command, control and communication. Interoperability should also address:
   a. **Compatibility.** The capability to function in the same system or environment without mutual interference applies to all systems and organisations.
   b. **Inter-changeability.** The capability of “being exchanged for the other item without selection for fit or performance, and without alteration of the items themselves, or of adjoining items, except for adjustment”\(^1\) applies to combat supplies.
   c. **Commonality.** A state achieved when groups of individuals, organisations or nations use common doctrine and procedures, or equipment requires common standards and measurements.

RAPID REACTION

11. Security crises can arise overnight both in times of peace and conflict. These may include imminent danger, grave human rights violations, threats of a human origin and natural disasters. **Prompt, highly mobile, rapidly executed military response** will prevent such crises from escalating and will limit and alleviate the human security consequences thereof. The ability to respond rapidly to such contingencies and sustain such response is a critical component of the defence concept.

EXPEDITIONARY

12. **Strategic air, rail, road and sea mobility** is crucial to South Africa’s contribution to regional and continental security. This necessitates the capability to project and sustain forces over protracted periods of time and over extended distances from South Africa, sometimes with limited in-theatre infrastructure. Such capability must comprise strategic inter-theatre and intra-theatre lift and support, as well as forward-basing on the continent.

CONCURRENT OPERATIONS OF A ‘CAMPAIGN QUALITY’

13. Subject to government direction, defence might have to execute several concurrent operations, varying across the spectrum of conflict. This calls for sufficient capacity and a dynamic and flexible planning process and capability sets that are responsive to the fluidity of the strategic environment. At the operational level, multiple operations must be sustainable over protracted periods of time – thus implying multiple operations of a “campaign quality”. Campaign quality is the ability to win decisive combat operations and to sustain military operations for as long as necessary, while quickly adapting to unpredictable changes both in the context and the character of the conflict.

JOINT, INTER-AGENCY, INTERDEPARTMENTAL AND MULTINATIONAL (JI2M) OPERATIONS

14. Future Defence operations will be based on a JI2M approach. Emphasis will be placed on increased collaboration with and between Defence, government departments, international organisations, multinational partners, non-government organisations and volunteer organisations and on addressing both internal and external matters of security. This will not exclude the coalition of willing allies conducting joint intervention operations under grave circumstances prior to a multilateral mandate emerging.
   a. Joint operations integrate and synchronise the capabilities to exploit combined potential to generate joint combat power. Joint forces must have the intelligence, command and control, firepower, protection, mobility and sustainment to engage any threat found across the spectrum of conflict. The command and control for JI2M operations will include both the methods and the means that a designated commander may employ in the exercise of authority over assigned forces to accomplish the mission.
   b. Inter-agency and interdepartmental operations, on the other hand, forge a link between Defence and other organs of state, as well as between the various non-governmental organisations (NGOs), private voluntary organisations (PVOs) and international organisations (IOs). The objectives are improved civil-military relations and integration and unity of effort.
   c. Both the joint operations and the inter-agency aspects could extend to an international and multinational context.

FORCE GENERATION GUIDELINES

15. JI&M operations will therefore integrate military and non-military operations, leveraging each participant’s strength into unified actions to address multidimensional security challenges. Such actions will remain the preferred defence choice.

DEFENCE OPERATING SYSTEMS

16. Defence doctrine provides that there are six operating systems. These operating systems constitute the components of a complete military system and function as a checklist for two purposes, namely:
   a. The planning of operations.
   b. Force development.

17. These operating systems should be understood as being interdependent and interrelated. No single operating system can be blindly adhered to or be declared as a priority over another.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

18. Effective command and control is intended to ensure the most effective employment of military forces for accomplishing the assigned military objective(s). Command and control is applied to sequence and synchronise a military unit’s activities in peacetime and orchestrate the use of military as well as non-military sources of power to accomplish assigned strategic objectives.

19. Sound command and control ensures unity of effort, provides for centralised direction-giving and decentralised execution (mission command), provides an environment for applying common doctrine and ensures interoperability. Effective command and control facilitates unity of effort, being one of the primary prerequisites of successful performance by military leadership.

MOVEMENT AND MANOEUVRE

20. Movement and manoeuvre is one of the most critical aspects for the successful deployment of military forces, as it is aimed at manoeuvring the military force into a position of advantage. This does not only imply the physical aspects of movement and manoeuvre, but also seeks to defeat opposing forces by shattering their psychological and physical cohesion, affecting their ability to fight as an effective and coordinated whole, as opposed to the physical destruction of the opposing force through incremental attrition.

FIREPOWER

21. Firepower is used to deliver combat power quickly and at the decisive place and time. Firepower is crucial to the success of any military action and includes kinetic and non-kinetic firepower. The latter could be delivered by psychological operations and information operations. To be fully effective, the firepower operating system must be synchronised with the other operational functions.

INTELLIGENCE

22. Intelligence is a critical function that is used to support the planning, preparation and execution of military operations. It is essential to integrate the intelligence operating system into the other operating systems.

23. The primary function of the intelligence operating system is to enable the taking of well-informed military decisions based on accurate understanding of the situation. Furthermore, it is essential that the respective combat services each have a tailored and unique intelligence function to support their contribution to military operations. This implies that each of the combat services must provide for the full spectrum of intelligence functions: namely intelligence collection, processing, dissemination.

24. The individual intelligence operating systems of Services should be integrated with others by means of tailor-made protocols, as well as with Defence Intelligence operating systems which will be used to integrate defence intelligence products.

PROTECTION

25. Military as well as non-military sources of power must be protected. The protection operating system pertains to a series of physical and non-physical actions and measures conducted in peacetime, crises and war to preserve the effectiveness and the survivability of military capabilities.

SUSTAINMENT

26. Sustainment is intended to provide and maintain an effective supply system, maintenance, transportation, general engineering, health services and other services to military forces. The sustainment operating system is thus used to plan, support and maintain military forces and is used to ensure a high degree of adequacy, responsiveness, anticipation, integration, flexibility, continuity, simplicity and protection. In order to exhibit these characteristics, the sustainment operating system must be integrated with the other operating systems to ensure the sustainment of military force.
OVERARCHING DEFENCE CAPABILITIES

DEFENCE DIPLOMACY CAPABILITY

27. Defence diplomacy is undertaken to achieve and maintain security cooperation among regional blocs in furtherance of bilateral defence relations to acquire and procure defence capabilities, implement joint operations and training programmes, and share critical resources in addressing common threats.

28. The Minister of Defence is responsible for setting the international defence diplomacy policy and strategy, extending to international security issues, bilateral relationships and multilateral relationships with international defence and security institutions. The Chief of the Defence Force is responsible for the execution of defence diplomacy and assisting the Minister with foreign ministerial commitments.

29. South Africa is committed to the promotion of peace and stability and to the resolution of conflict by peaceful means. Active participation in multilateral institutions and collective security mechanisms is an expression of this commitment. South Africa has also entered into a number of international agreements that entail reciprocal obligations and undertakings to engage in cooperation in various sectors, including defence. Such agreements can be legally and financially binding, or merely an expression of intent.

30. In the post-conflict reconstruction role, there is a vital linkage to be established between foreign policy, defence policy and trade policy. Whilst defence is primarily concerned with the arena of security sector reform, other sectors of government must become seized with important concurrent trade and investment initiatives to:
   a. Initiate economic development in the country emerging from conflict, thus linking the axiom of security and development.
   b. Unlock economic benefit for South Africa that could arise from achieved peace and stability on the continent.

31. The signing and implementation of international defence agreements are thus a critical policy action and will continue to play an important role in advancing defence diplomacy, participation in peace missions, cooperation in the defence and related industries, arms control and the non-proliferation of WMD.

32. South Africa also pursues defence diplomacy initiatives to promote defence cooperation with other states in SADC, Africa and beyond. Defence will thus engage in cooperative ventures with its counterparts throughout the world in such fields as training and education, defence planning, exchange visits, multinational exercises, and procurement of military equipment. The deployment of defence attachés is in support of this capability.

33. South Africa’s future defence attachés will be stringently selected for their military knowledge and operational experience and their ability to champion South Africa and further foreign policy, defence diplomacy and international objectives.

COMMAND AND CONTROL CAPABILITY

34. A joint command and control capability is essential to ensure jointness of action with respect to land, air, sea and space as well as sustainment to support JI²M operations in a manner that sustains coherence between defence concepts and doctrine. Military command and control must integrate with interdepartmental and inter-agency command and control to ensure synergised effects.

35. The command and control capability needs to be understood as a collective of the following key enabling elements:
   a. Situational awareness that presents the commander and staffs with relevant information for decision support and decision-making functions.
   b. Integrated information acquired through sensors as a technical platform for both intelligence and situational awareness. In some instances this is provided through automated command and control processes.
   c. The successful conduct of JI²M operations requires that this joint command and control capability will be conducted in a manner that:
      i. Is coherent across all levels of command.
      ii. Provides effective command and control support to commanders and their staffs irrespective of the type of mission, battle space conditions, and the force elements comprising the operational force.
      iii. Heightens interoperability across all the participants in the JI²M operation, enabling each force element to collaborate in synergy with other force elements and achieve maximum defence effect.
      iv. Exploits computer, sensor and communications technologies to the greatest extent possible, so as to improve situational awareness, clearly and rapidly communicate intent and monitor and control the execution of military missions and tasks.
      v. Takes advantage of network-enabled defence capabilities, thus enabling force elements to
be more adaptable, flexible, responsive and agile in the conduct of operations.

36. A **single unified chain of command** will be pursued that ensures the effective and efficient conduct of all activities. Decisions regarding implementation will be taken at as low a level as possible with **maximum delegations to empower lower-level commanders**. Commanders are to receive the necessary delegations so as to have control over all their designated resources, and are held accountable for their actions.

**INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY**

37. Continued continental instability will require the involvement of the Defence Force in a variety of complex operational environments, requiring its **intelligence capability** to be sensitive to a more complex world that is prone to rapid changes coupled to a wide range of challenges. Transnational issues, the asymmetrical threat, Information Warfare, and weapons and technology proliferation will be more difficult to address as a result of globalisation. At the same time, **Defence Intelligence** will be expected to continue monitoring international hotspots, strategic threats and emerging trends. Defence planners, policy makers as well as combat forces depend on the intelligence capability to provide actionable intelligence to execute their missions and to anticipate and prepare for new challenges.

**STANDING AND SURGE MILITARY CAPABILITY**

38. National security and the defence mission, defence goals and strategic tasks require a standing military capability and a surge military capacity.

39. The standing and surge capacity must consist of supported balanced land, air, maritime, special force and military health capabilities able to meet various contingencies at short notice.

40. This standing and surge capability is based on the following principles:
   a. The **first principle** is that the standing military capability will contain the necessary capabilities and capacity to execute standing defence commitments. The standing military capability also provides the platform for a surge in force levels as required for dealing with contingent defence commitments. The standing military capability will comprise both Regulars and Reserves at differing readiness levels.
   b. The **second principle** is that the expanded military capability as necessitated by surge requirements will also comprise both Regulars and Reserves, with the Reserves being the predominant provider of the surge capability.
   c. The **third principle** is that a “One Force” approach will consequently be pursued, in which the Regulars (full-time uniform) and the Reserves (part-time uniform) will constitute an integrated Defence Force. These components are integrally reliant on each other for a cohesive combat capability. The Reserves are represented at all levels in Defence and are maintained at a sufficiently large scale to provide capacity on a day-to-day basis and for force level surges when required.
   d. The **fourth principle** is that such surge capability is supported by the defence industry and the national stock reserve.

41. The balance between Regulars and Reserves may change from time to time. Whereas in the standing military capability the number of Regulars may be greater, the number of Reserves will be greater in the surge capability.²

42. Combat command and control, administration and support structures must be able to expand from peacetime to wartime capacity, in accordance with early warning predictions, through the Reserves. This expansion capacity will be seen as an integral facet of the defence structure. All defence structures that must be able to expand more rapidly than normal recruiting will allow, will have an appropriate Reserve component. The dynamics of the Reserves differ from those of the Regulars and, as a result, the management approaches to these two components will differ.

43. The **Reserve component**, as an important part of the Defence Force surge capability, must therefore be designed, structured, maintained and resourced to be able to:
   a. Augment the Regulars in on-going operations and the day-to-day activities of the Defence Force.
   b. Form part of both the standing and surge military force capability.
   c. Provide the expansion capability of the Defence Force for major combat operations and crisis response.
   d. Provide certain specialist and scarce skills to the Defence Force.
   e. Provide the main specialist capabilities for reconstruction and development.
   f. Enhance the relationship between the Defence Force and the public and private sectors.

² The ratio between Regulars and Reserves is discussed more substantially under the chapter on Defence Strategic Trajectory.
EXPEDITIONARY CAPABILITY

44. Expeditionary operations require a balanced rapid response capability of forces that can meet the demands of the particular situation, and that can be projected and supported by air or sea at the inter- and intra-theatre levels. The success of such operations will hinge on the ability to exploit manoeuvre, surprise, night-fighting capability, superior command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

45. This capability will consist of highly mobile, rapidly deployable special operations forces able to meet contingencies during times of peace and conflict. The capability will be comprised of airborne and seaborne elements with air-droppable, air-landed (fixed and rotary wing) and sea-landed abilities with the required medical and logistic support. The success of these operations will hinge on the availability of intelligence before and during the operation.

46. The strategic projection of the response capability may occur from own soil through land, air and sea and/or from forward-positioned land or sea bases. It will have limited tactical mobility and therefore be vulnerable until link-up forces arrive. In-theatre air transport will provide tactical and operational mobility and will enable the dispersion and concentration of forces as required. Combat helicopters will greatly enhance tactical and operational firepower and limit force vulnerability.

DEFENCE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY CAPABILITY

47. Science, engineering and technology (SET) will be one of the major power bases of the future South African state. As a developing nation, South Africa is currently fortunate to have a strong SET capability in some areas which can be used as a future force multiplier for the Defence Force.

48. A growing percentage of relevant defence technologies is developed in the commercial domain, resulting in defence forces becomingly increasingly reliant on the use of commercial technologies. An agile defence force will need to exploit technology opportunities through rapid technology acquisition, use of civil technologies and infrastructure, and rapid adaption and creation of new doctrine and tactics, as well as their implementation.

49. Fewer nations are able to design, develop and produce new weapon systems due to the rise in complexity and cost. Current trends indicate that there will be increasing multinational collaboration to develop new weapon systems. This requires the concerted development of a strong Defence Science, Engineering and Technology (DSET) capability to become a smart-buyer of weapon systems, to effectively participate in international collaborative efforts and have the required depth of know-how to support and upgrade technologies.

50. Having a strong DSET will further allow the Defence Force to leverage the capabilities of the national SET spectrum to meet future defence demands.

GENERAL FORCE GENERATION GUIDELINES

51. The uncertain and continuously evolving strategic situation requires a Defence Force that is:
   a. Intellectually agile, able to understand the evolving strategic situation and derive from it the key implications for South Africa;
   b. Continuously evolving its concepts, doctrines, organisation and training to keep ahead of developments;
   c. Able to adapt promptly and quickly to sudden, unforeseen challenges and threats; and
   d. Resilient, able to recover quickly and without loss of cohesion from mishaps and setbacks.

52. The Defence Force must, further, be appropriate, adequate and cost-effective. The force planning construct must include various levels of defence aligned to possible levels of funding.
   a. Appropriate to the strategic situation in structure, organisation, composition, doctrine, equipment, training and education, with specific focus on the built-in flexibility to adapt quickly to changes in the strategic situation.
   b. Adequate to meet the demands likely to be made on it, in terms of its standing and surge strength, logistic and technical support capacity, reserves of fuel, munitions and stores to sustain extended operations, and the funding to train and maintain forces.
   c. Affordable in terms of financial and opportunity cost. While there can be ‘military luxuries’, unnecessary duplications and wasteful procedures, it is not always simple to define what is ‘affordable’, and decisions in this regard are fraught with risk and must be considered in the light of practical experience and the experience of other defence forces.
   d. Aligned levels of ambition and intent between the Services and the engineering of the Defence Force as a system of systems with the elimination of duplication.

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3 Medium strategic lift.
53. The required capability sets and levels of effort defined in this Defence Review contain certain overlaps in terms of FSEs. In determining a Force Design this has to be taken into consideration to avoid unnecessary and costly aggregation while still providing for potential concurrency of the missions and tasks falling to the Defence Force.

54. Developing an effective military capability is a long-term process, both because equipment takes time to acquire and bring into service and because it takes time to develop and grow officers and non-commissioned officers. The realistic planning horizon for full implementation of the Force Design will be thirty years hence. This implies certain unavoidable short-term vulnerabilities. In order to mitigate these, the Defence Force must:
   a. Exploit technology to increase the effectiveness and lethality of its forces in order to deter conflict conditions from developing; and
   b. Develop doctrines and the capabilities of its FSEs to maximise their operational and tactical utility.

55. The Force Design therefore provides the framework for acquiring the right military capabilities needed for the short, medium, long and extended long term based upon the evolving strategic situation. In the short to medium term the requirements of Goals II to IV together with those specified for Goal I in the Short-Term Force Employment Guidelines are to be addressed, with the full capabilities required for Goal I to be addressed in the long to extended long term.

56. In addressing the above, acquisition must be so phased as to provide for a consistent multi-year funding commitment that will ensure the long-term viability of the South African Defence Industry and will avoid block obsolescence of prime mission equipment in future.

57. In operationalising the Force Design, cognisance is to be taken of the service specific requirements laid down. It is, therefore, the preserve of the Defence Force to operationalise the Force Design through a detailed force design and implementation planning process.

### SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY

#### ARMY CAPABILITY

58. The South African Army, as the major component of the landward defence strategy and supportive of the maritime defence strategy, is required to remain balanced, robust and relevant in relation to the evolving nature of warfare, with enhanced manoeuvrability, firepower and protection.

   a. Continental leadership responsibilities and the requirement to protect own vital national interests require South Africa to configure and maintain a specialised, high-readiness, highly mobile combat capability (closely linked to that of the Special Forces) that is able to rapidly deploy to remote areas for specific preventative and intervention operations. Such special operations forces must be able to conduct joint and supported airborne, air-landed and sea-landed assault operations, with air- and sea-deployable firepower, protection and manoeuvre. Special Forces and special operations forces will be supported by joint defence capabilities, and will normally be followed-on by more robust combat forces, specifically tailored to the mission.

   b. The larger portion of South Africa’s landward defence capability must be configured and maintained as a projectable, multi-roled medium-combat capability with enhanced firepower, manoeuvre and protection, making it suitable for a range of contingencies. Such medium-forces would be the bulk of South Africa’s contribution to enduring multinational operations, own safeguarding operations and other directed tasks. These medium-forces will be self-supporting, having embedded armour, artillery, engineer, communications, intelligence, logistics, medical support and other requirements. This medium capability may be further augmented by heavy-combat capabilities. These forces also have the contingent liability to support civil authority and the Police Service, and protect critical infrastructure, if so required.

   c. The configuration and maintenance of a heavy-combat capability are required to deter South Africa’s potential adversaries and conduct landward operations in high-threat situations. It must be maintained at a deployable core-growth level within a self-supporting armoured brigade, with a balanced composition inclusive of: armour, mechanised infantry, artillery, engineer, communications, intelligence, logistics, medical support and other requirements. Although relatively small, this heavy-combat capability must be able to augment the combat requirements of other multi-roled medium and special operations capabilities, specifically where the threat situation dictates enhanced protection, firepower and manoeuvre. This core must be sufficient to expand in response to changes in the strategic environment.
59. The South African Army combat capability sets will include:
   a. **Command, Control, Surveillance and Information.** A command, control, surveillance and information capability is required for the effective conduct of landward operations. This is to be provided through static and mobile platforms and sensors for landward operations. The South African Army command and control system will be embedded in the headquarter elements of divisions, brigades and battalions with the requisite C4ISR. The deployable elements of the divisions, brigades and battalions will provide the foundation for joint tactical command and control capacity to deployed South African Army forces.
   b. **Intelligence.** Army intelligence will provide tactical intelligence regarding opposing forces, terrain, population and other factors that must influence detailed tactical planning and the successful execution of operations. Army intelligence must be mandated to operate across the full intelligence cycle, namely: collection, processing and dissemination. Members of the Army Intelligence Corps must be competent to translate information and intelligence into evidence to be submitted in courts of law, especially in the instance of border safeguarding operations. The landward intelligence operating system must be effectively integrated into the Defence Intelligence Operating System, which will provide electronic overview but will not directly command landward intelligence operations.
   c. **Signals.** Army signals will provide information and communication systems and services. Capabilities will include tactical communication equipment, satellite communication systems, deployable local area network capabilities, maintenance and repair on ICT equipment and electronic warfare capabilities.
   d. **Artillery.** Artillery will provide effective direct and/or indirect light and/or medium fire support during landward operations, using a suite drawing on air-transportable and/or air-droppable guns, towed and/or self-propelled guns, rocket launchers and heavy mortars.
   e. **Air Defence Artillery.** Air defence artillery will provide, in cooperation with the Air Force, protection of the Army and prevent opposing aircraft from interfering with own operational plans. This is achieved by making use of guns, missiles and radar to counter air attacks. Air defence artillery guns may also be used in the ground role.
   f. **Infantry.** The infantry will engage and destroy opposing forces and hold ground. The infantry will use mechanised, motorised, air-borne and light infantry capabilities. Highly mobile, rapidly deployable infantry will be airborne, air-landed and sea-landed. Other special infantry may use specialised equipment, such as motorcycles, dogs, horses, etc.
   g. **Armour.** Armoured units provide mobile, protected firepower and contribute to deterrence. Armour further dominates the battle space through fire and manoeuvre and physical and psychological operations.

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*Figure 10-1: SA Army Land Command*

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4 Command, Control, Communication, Computing, Information, Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance.
ARMY FORCE DESIGN

60. Figure 10-1 provides the end state SA Army Land Command (Milestone 4 in the Defence Strategic Trajectory).

61. The Army’s operational forces are to be grouped under a Land Command, with the combat elements organised into brigades grouped into three divisions, each of which has a specific operational focus. In addition, some specialised elements will be under direct command of the Land Command. The three divisions are:

a. A **Mechanised Division**, which will be the primary Army component of the overall deterrent capability, and which will provide medium and heavy force elements for peace enforcement and similar operations. This division is to have three brigades being an armoured brigade (tanks and mechanised infantry), a mechanised brigade (mechanised infantry and armoured cars) and a motorised brigade (infantry and armoured cars) as well as divisional troops such as reconnaissance, medium artillery, air defence and engineers.

b. A **Motorised Division**, which will provide border and rear area protection elements and the main force elements for peace support and similar operations. This division is to have six motorised infantry brigades. Some of the infantry battalions of these brigades must be multi-rolled as light forces and others also developed for complex environments, such as mountain and forest operations. The divisional troops include some light armour and light artillery.

c. A **Contingency (Special Operations) Division**, which will provide a rapidly deployable capability as well as the highly mobile elements to support the other divisions. The contingency division’s highly mobile airborne brigade, air-landed brigade, sea-landed brigade and division troops will be structured and equipped to support deep operations, rapid deployment and early entry and follow-on forces.

62. It is important to note that the Defence Force is no longer structured to manage the protection of critical infrastructure following earlier decisions to move this function to the Police Service. The implication would be the re-establishment of capacity in the Defence Force to undertake such a mandate as a contingent liability. The Defence Force may consider strengthening its reserve units and realigning their footprint for this purpose.

63. As the future force design will only be achievable over the long term, the interim focus (Milestone 3) is to be on the motorised division, a contingency brigade (building block of the contingency division) and an armoured brigade (building block of the mechanised division). Current capabilities are to be developed into multi-mission units with more lethal asymmetric capabilities that can execute a range of missions across the conflict spectrum and serve as interim counters to larger conventional forces. These multi-mission capable forces will be established at battalion and combat group level, and will be suitably armed and equipped to give the required multi-role capability, with particular emphasis on highly mobile, medium and specialist infantry capabilities. These units will be structured to allow rapid aggregation in various proportions for customised, mission-oriented application. They will also be capable of full integration with the military capabilities of the SADC Standby Force.

64. In the short term (Milestone 2) the focus will be on the re-establishment of brigade and division structures. In the long term (Milestone 4) the focus will be on the renewal of the mechanised capability.

65. The specialised elements under the direct command of the Land Command, include:

a. A **Civil-Military (CIMIC) Cooperation** capability, responsible for cooperating with civilian communities and authorities in operational areas to minimise disruption of life during operations and to facilitate a swift commencement of post-conflict reconstruction. Every unit will require a CIMIC capability, including the multi-roling of other capabilities to achieve this requirement.

b. A **Psychological Warfare capability**, responsible for psychological operations against hostile forces and for establishing broad communication with the local communities.

ARMY MIGRATION PRIORITIES

66. As an immediate intervention (Milestone 2), the South African Army will seek to consolidate its existing force structure
within the context of a Land Command comprising one division and two brigades, notably:

a. A motorised division.
b. A contingency (special operations) brigade.
c. An armoured brigade, containing one-of-a-kind as a preservation mechanism.

67. The above will be the initial building blocks towards the attainment of the future force structure as described earlier.

68. In the short term (Milestone 2):

a. The Air Force is required to support the Army through:
   i. Enhanced medium air lift (fixed and rotary wing) for rapid response.
   ii. Appropriate (fixed and rotary wing) close air support.

b. The Special Forces are required to support the Army in the development of its Special Operations Forces.

69. In the medium term (Milestone 3):

a. The Air Force must establish its heavy air lift (fixed and rotary wing) for inter- and intra-theatre mobility.

b. The Navy must be able to sea lift a battalion group in one wave.

70. The consolidation of the existing capabilities and the development thereof towards the future force structure will be pursued in the following manner:

a. A steady and sustained consolidation of the mechanised elements of the South African Army, such as the mechanised infantry, artillery, air defence artillery and armour, and building these towards an accelerated growth in the medium to longer term.

b. An accelerated initial growth path for the special operations and motorised forces, airborne forces, intelligence and engineer elements that are used mainly in the support of international commitments, border safeguarding and rapid reaction.

71. The practice of multi-roling and multi-skilling of units and the raising of Reserves will continue as critical tools contributing to the South African Army’s ability to sustain its force provision obligations.

**SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE**

**AIR FORCE CAPABILITY**

72. South Africa requires a responsive and agile air defence capability to deliver air power to defend and protect the integrity of South Africa’s airspace and support the landward and maritime defence strategies. The air defence capability must provide deterrence and powerful interdiction during joint operations, specifically through comprehensive air domain awareness, air combat, combat support and air mobility capabilities.

73. Deployed landward and maritime forces must be supported through appropriate airspace control, reconnaissance, close-air support, augmentation of firepower and inter- and intra-theatre air mobility in complex operational circumstances. The air defence capability must also be capable of strategic reach and joint rapid response across the spectrum of conflict, and support the sustainment of protracted joint operations over long distances.

74. The future demands of air operations will require:

a. Coordination of all air defence assets.

b. Balanced real-time situational awareness to include target acquisition and battlefield assessment (C4ISR) in a defined area of responsibility.

c. A modular, tactical and flexible force, deployable at short notice across the full spectrum of conflict.

d. A night operating capability in all weather and light conditions.

e. Participation in the Information Warfare environment.

75. The capability sets of the South African Air Force will include:

a. **Command, Control, Surveillance and Information.** A command, control, communication, surveillance, domain awareness and intelligence capability is required for the effective conduct of air operations. The following capabilities are to be provided through static and mobile platforms and sensors for air defence operations over land and sea:
   i. An air defence management capability, including a contribution to joint operations through:
      (1) A spectrum of deployable command and control capabilities, ranging from an airborne command and control capability to a mobile air operations team (MAOT) capability.
      (2) An intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability providing integrated battlefield situational awareness and interpretation.
      (3) Providing tactical intelligence regarding the opposing force, terrain, population and other factors that influence detailed tactical planning and the successful execution of operations at the operational and strategic levels.
ii. An airspace control capability.
iii. A mission control capability.
iv. A networked command communications capability.
v. An electronic warfare capability, covering the full range of the electromagnetic spectrum.

b. **Air Combat Support Capability.** An air combat support capability is required to prevent and deter conflict and defend and protect South Africa through the provision of counter-air, air-to-ground, maritime strike, surveillance and combat support over land, at sea and in the air. These are provided by:
   i. An advanced multi-role fighter capability.
   ii. A light fighter capability.
   iii. A combat helicopter capability.
   iv. An unmanned aerial vehicle capability

c. **Military Air Mobility Capability**

   A military air mobility capability is primarily required in the defence, protection and safeguarding of South Africa and to promote regional security. Diverse military air mobility operations are conducted, including support to the Police Service and other civil authority, humanitarian relief operations and search-and-rescue operations. The following military air mobility capabilities are to be provided:
   i. Heavy fixed- and rotary-wing cargo and troop transport capability.
   ii. Medium fixed- and rotary-wing cargo and troop transport capability.
   iii. Light fixed- and rotary-wing command and control capability.
   iv. An in-flight refuelling capability.
   v. A military air ambulance capability.
   vi. A VIP air transport capability is required to provide:
      1. Presidential and Deputy Presidential intercontinental air transport capability;
      2. VIP (and other identified persons) intercontinental air transport capability; and
      3. VIP (and other identified persons) continental air transport capability.
      4. The capital and operating funds for VIP air transport should be ring-fenced and managed by the Chief of the Air Force.

d. **Maritime Combat Support Capability.** A maritime combat support capability is required in support of: the maritime defence strategy; the safeguarding of South Africa’s coastline, exclusive economic zone and maritime territory; good order at sea; and meeting South Africa’s treaty obligations in terms of maritime search and rescue. This requires a maritime patrol and surveillance capability:
   i. A fixed-wing maritime capability.
   ii. A rotary-wing maritime capability.

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5 Consideration must be given to standardising air transport platforms that can be multi-roled.
6 Strategic projection will be at combat-group level.
e. **Deployable Tactical Air Basing Capability to Support Joint Expeditionary Operations.** A deployable airbase operating capability is required to establish and maintain joint forward mounting, including:
   i. Deployable temporary air base and tactical airfield capabilities with inherent support.
   ii. Deployable airfield operating, maintenance, communication and security capability.
   iii. Capability for the air transport, handling and distribution of mass freight, fuel, commodities, weapons and ammunition for joint forces.

**AIR FORCE ‘FORCE DESIGN’**

76. Figure 10-2 provides the end state SA Air Force Air Command (Milestone 4 in the Defence Strategic Trajectory).

77. The SA Air Force’s operational forces are to be grouped under an Air Command, with the combat elements organised into squadrons.

78. As it will take time to achieve the full set of capabilities required, the immediate focus (Milestone 2) must be on enabling greater tactical flexibility on the part of the land forces deployed on border safeguarding and closer integration of combat support helicopter capabilities with the Army. In addition, the short-term focus must be on increasing the VIP transport capability, introducing both medium strategic lift and maritime reconnaissance capabilities and the renewal of the light fixed-wing transport capability and the mobile and static radars for airspace control.

79. In the medium term (Milestone 3) the requirement is to replace the medium fixed-wing transport and the acquisition of an air early warning capability. In the longer term the focus is to shift to renewal and expansion of existing fighter and helicopter capabilities to the required levels.

**AIR FORCE MIGRATION PRIORITIES**

80. In migrating towards the future SA Air Force force design, priority emphasis must be given to:
   a. Meeting the full requirements for VIP air transport.
   b. Air capabilities required for the safeguarding of South Africa, with specific attention to dedicated air capabilities required for border safeguarding and maritime reconnaissance.
   c. Inter-theatre and intra-theatre lift in support of landward deployments, with specific attention to the air capabilities required for rapid reaction and Special Forces operations, including strategic lift, intra-theatre lift and heavy-lift rotary-wing capabilities.
   d. Rotary-wing combat support for landward operations with integrated anti-armour capability.
   e. Interception and interdiction and close air support for deployed forces, with integrated stand-off capability.

**SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY**

**NAVY CAPABILITY**

81. South Africa has a maritime-dependent economy and significant maritime interests which it must defend and protect through the configuration and maintenance of a **versatile littoral maritime capability**, a **credible deep-ocean capability** and effective **maritime domain awareness**. This maritime capability must be able to provide an **enduring presence** in South Africa’s areas of maritime interest. The SA Navy is primarily responsible to execute the maritime defence strategy involving **deterrence** and **powerful interdiction** through **surface**, **sub-surface** and **air abilities**. This maritime defence strategy is pursued in **concentric layers** that are focused on South Africa’s ports, territorial waters, trade routes and marine resources.

82. In support of the landward defence strategy, the maritime capability must be able to conduct **riverine** and **inland water operations**, and **augment firepower** when so required. It must also be capable of **strategic reach** and **joint rapid response** across the spectrum of conflict, and support the **sustainment of protracted joint operations** over **long distances**.

83. The capability sets of the SA Navy will include:
   a. **Command, Control, Surveillance and Information.** A command, control, surveillance and information capability is required for the effective conduct of maritime operations. The following capabilities are to be provided through static and mobile platforms and sensors for maritime defence operations:
      i. An integrated maritime domain awareness\(^7\) capability.
      ii. Shore-based maritime defence command and control capability.
      iii. Joint seaborne command and control capability.
   b. **Intelligence.** Naval intelligence will provide tacti-
cal intelligence regarding the opposing force, terrain, population and other factors that influence detailed tactical planning and the successful execution of operations. The summated tactical intelligence picture will be fed up the operations staff line to the operational and strategic levels.

c. **Autonomous Surface Combat Capability.** A surface combat capability is required to prevent and deter conflict and defend and protect South Africa through the provision of defence against hostile air, surface and sub-surface threats. This capability is, furthermore, required to provide maritime strike as well as combat support to land forces and provide a sea-borne joint command and control capability. This capability will primarily be vested in frigate-type vessels and will include a fire-support capability.

d. **Sub-Surface Combat Capability.** A sub-surface combat capability is required to prevent and deter conflict and defend and protect South Africa through the provision of defence against hostile surface and sub-surface threats and the gathering of strategic intelligence. This capability is, furthermore, required to provide combat support to land forces and will be primarily vested in submarines.

e. **Maritime Patrol Capability.** A maritime patrol capability is required to contribute to the defence and protection of South Africa, ensure territorial integrity and safeguard the EEZ and meet South Africa’s treaty obligations in terms of maritime search and rescue. This capability is further required to contribute to peace and security in the region, contribute to situational awareness and conduct constabulary operations through cooperation with the Police Service, civil authority and other organs of state. This capability will be vested in lightly armed inshore and offshore patrol vessels.

f. **Mine Warfare Capability.** A mine warfare capability is required to prevent and deter conflict and defend and protect South Africa through the provision of offensive and defensive mine-laying and defensive mine countermeasures. A mine warfare capability will assist in controlling port approaches and littoral areas. Mine-laying will be done from diverse platforms and the mine counter-measures capability will consist of portable systems using unmanned or remote controlled vehicles for mine detection and neutralisation.

g. **Underwater Security Capability.** An underwater security capability is required to protect strategic infrastructure and vessels against asymmetric attack. This includes the ability to detect, classify and neutralise underwater threats such as swimmers, divers, autonomous underwater vehicles and small submersibles that may threaten ports, seaward installations and vessels at anchor or alongside.

h. **Strategic Force Projection Capability.** A strategic force projection capability is required to deter threats, project strategic influence, promote regional and continental security and respond to disasters and humanitarian crises through both combat service support to the fleet and combat support to land forces. This capability will further provide for sea-based joint command and control and hospital services. This capability will be vested in a combination

![Figure 10-3: SA Navy Fleet Command](image)
of combat support ships and landing platforms.

i. **Naval Coordination and Guidance of Shipping (NCAGS) Capability.** A NCAGS capability is required to support the defence and protection of South Africa by the routing of merchant shipping through areas of least danger and the avoidance of enemy combatants in times of conflict.  

j. **Deployable Port Operating Capability to Support Joint Expeditionary Operations.** A deployable port operating capability is required to:

   i. Establish and maintain joint forward mounting, with inherent harbour operations, maintenance, communication and security capability for the maritime transport, handling and distribution of mass freight, fuel, commodities, weapons and ammunition for joint forces.

   ii. Establish and maintain forward operating naval base capability with inherent support capacity for joint operations.

k. **Marines Capability.** A comprehensive and spatially dispersed marines capability is required for the defence and protection of South Africa’s maritime interests and the promotion of regional and continental maritime security. This capability will specifically provide combat support to the Fleet and other defence combat formations, cooperate with the Police Service and assist civil authority in times of need. This capability will provide for inland water and inshore patrols, as well as operational diving, combat search and rescue and the protection of military assets ashore, in harbours and anchorages. This capability will be vested with deployable small craft, clearance divers and specialised maritime reaction force abilities. This capability must be able to operate in conjunction with Special Forces and special operations forces.

l. **Hydrographic Capability.** A hydrographic capability is required in support of the Fleet and to fulfil South Africa’s treaty obligation of hydrographic services to the maritime community. This capability will provide for surveying, meteorology, cartography and combat surveys. This capability will be vested in survey vessels and ashore hydrographic infrastructure.

**NAVY FORCE DESIGN**

84. Figure 10-3 below provides the end state of the SA Navy Fleet Command (Milestone 4 in the Defence Strategic Trajectory).

85. The SA Navy’s operational forces are to be grouped under a Fleet Command, with the combat elements organised into the following mission-focused squadrons, each of which has a specific operational focus. The squadrons are responsible for doctrine development in respect of their missions, for the day-to-day operation of their ships, for the training of crews and for the routine maintenance of their ships. These squadrons are:

   a. **Autonomous Warfare Squadron.** This squadron is part of the primary naval component of the overall maritime deterrent capability. It is responsible for maritime defence, maritime strike, interdiction, distant patrols, escort of important vessels, anti-submarine operations, naval gunfire support for sea-landed and Special Forces operations and for surface reconnaissance operations.

   b. **Submarine Squadron.** This squadron will consist of the SA Navy’s submarines. It too forms part of the primary naval component of the overall deterrent capability. It is responsible for strategic surveillance and reconnaissance, interdiction of hostile shipping, support for Special Forces operations and anti-submarine operations.

   c. **Patrol Squadron.** This squadron is to comprise the SA Navy’s patrol vessels. It is responsible for safeguarding South Africa’s EEZ, its territorial waters and port approaches. The squadron is also to provide forces for patrol support to friendly countries and patrol support to other countries as foreseen by the SADC Maritime Security Strategy (MSS) and the African Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050 (AIMS-2050).

   d. **Combat Support Squadron.** This composite squadron is to comprise the SA Navy’s combat support ships, its hydrographic survey vessel and the still to be acquired heavy sealift vessels. In addition to meeting South Africa’s maritime survey needs this squadron is to be responsible for providing an unopposed ship-to-shore landing capability for the Army’s sea-landed forces through a major harbour, or by means of landing craft through a minor harbour, and for on-station support of such landed forces. It is further responsible for providing an afloat support base for forces engaged in littoral operations, for non-combatant evacuation operations, for disaster aid and emergency relief operations and for transport or support missions.

   e. **Marines.** The SA Navy’s current maritime reaction squadron will be reconstituted as a composite marines capability established for combat support to the Fleet and other defence combat formations, cooperation with the Police Service and to assist civil authority in times of need. This composite capability will comprise a rapid reaction component, an operational boat component, an operational diving component and an underwater security component.
i. The rapid reaction component will be configured loosely around a special-infantry capability, responsible for providing protection of static and forward bases, reaction forces for the protection of naval bases and stations and boarding and protection parties for deployed vessels. In times of special need this may extend to the deployment of protection teams embarked on merchant shipping in a Maritime Security Patrol Area (or similarly intended international reporting or security mechanisms).

ii. The operational boat component will be responsible for the seaward protection of naval bases and stations and commercial harbours, for conducting riverine and lake operations and for providing boarding forces.

iii. The operational diving component will be responsible for clearance diving and explosive ordnance/hazardous matériel disposal.

iv. The underwater security component will be responsible to detect and neutralise asymmetric underwater threats against infrastructure or vessels.

f. **Mine Warfare Capability.** This capability is to provide the SA Navy with a defensive and offensive mine warfare capability. It is to be so configured that it comprises components organic to the other squadrons.

**SA NAVY MIGRATION PRIORITIES**

86. As it will take time to achieve the full set of capabilities required, the immediate focus (Milestone 2) must be on providing an extensive maritime domain awareness capability and an offshore patrol capability.

87. In the medium term the focus is to be on acquiring heavy sealift vessels for the SA Army’s sea-landed infantry capability and on acquiring additional combat support ships (Milestone 3). At the same time the protection force is to be expanded to battalion size units.

88. The medium-term focus (Milestone 3) includes the renewal of the frigates and submarines and on the improvement of the mine warfare capability.

89. As is the case with the SA Army and SA Air Force, it will take considerable time to bring the Navy to the strength and capability mix required by regional responsibilities.

90. In migrating towards the future SA Navy force design, priority emphasis must be given to:

   a. Maritime capabilities required for the safeguarding of South Africa, with specific emphasis on border safeguarding and meeting the full requirements of the national maritime security strategy.

   b. Inter-theatre and intra-theatre lift in support of landward deployments, with specific attention to the maritime capabilities required for rapid reaction and Special Forces operations. In the short-term the SA Navy must be able to sealift a battalion group in one wave. In the longer term, the SA Navy must be able to sealift a Brigade in multi-waves.

   c. The hydrographic obligations of the South African maritime zone.

**SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY HEALTH SERVICE**

**MILITARY HEALTH CAPABILITY**

91. The SA Military Health Service will prepare, provide and deploy military health capabilities to support the landward and maritime defence strategies, inclusive of the air defence and Special Forces components thereof. The SA Military Health Service must be able to conduct and sustain layered military health support to protracted operations over long distances. Such layered health services will ensure both force health protection and force health sustainment.

92. The SA Military Health Service capability sets will include:

   a. **Command and Control.** A medical command and control capability is required for the effective conduct of medical operations. These are provided through static and mobile capabilities. The operational command and control capability will reside in the Medical Command, whereas the brigades and battalion groups will provide tactical command and control.

   b. **Health Intelligence Capability.** A health intelligence capability, including targeted epidemiology, will provide tactical health intelligence to determine and coordinate the health support plan. The summated tactical intelligence picture will be fed up the operations staff line to the operational and strategic levels.

   c. **Deployable Military Health Support Capability.**

      i. The medical brigades and their deployable components are required to render support
to division-strength combat forces. Depending on the nature, size and duration of an operation, sub-elements of the medical brigade may be mobilised and deployed to support operations. These sub-elements are:

1. Medical battalion groups to support brigade-strength combat forces with inherent capabilities to sustain task group functions.
2. Medical task groups to support battalion-strength combat forces and may be specialised in specific areas of operational support, such as airborne forces, maritime components or Special Forces.
3. Medical task teams will support company-strength combat forces.

ii. The following specialist capabilities may be embedded in the medical task groups and medical teams.

1. **Emergency Care Capability.** Operational emergency care providing battlefield resuscitation, basic evacuation of casualties and first-line primary health care for treatment of minor ailments.
2. **Evacuation Capability.** Specifically equipped evacuation teams manage the evacuation of casualties on land and by air and assist in maritime evacuations.
3. **Environmental Health Capability.** A deployable environmental health capability is required to support deployed forces with environmental health aspects.
4. **Chemical, Biological and Radiological (CBR) Defence Capability.** CBR defence capability to detect chemical, biological and radiation threats and to further treat contaminated personnel, casualties and vehicles.
5. **Oral Health Care.** A deployable oral health care capability that provides operational care consisting of emergency and essential dental care.
6. **Animal Health.** The capability renders support during operations for canine patrols and explosive detection. Animal health capabilities are also deployed in support of search-and-rescue operations to take care of search dogs.

iii. The deployable military health support capability must be able to provide the following levels of clinical care in a peace support operation:

1. **Level 1 Medical Post.** This provides a lifesaving capability, stabilisation, primary and secondary health care and evacuation to the next level. A level 1 medical post consists of resuscitation, surgical and minor ailment treatment capabilities.
2. **Level 2 Field Hospital.** This capability provides triage, emergency resuscitation and stabilisation, surgery, second-line health care, general specialist services (general surgery, anaesthesia, and orthopaedic surgery and specialist internal medicine services), pharmacy, basic laboratory facilities, basic diagnostic capabilities, dental care, operational stress management, social work interventions, casualty evacuation to the next level and a preventative health service.

**d. Static Military Health Support Capability.**
The static military health support capability will render health sustainment to forces while at base, their families and other eligible persons. This service is delivered through base-orientated infrastructure.

i. **Sickbays and Military Medical Clinics.** Sickbays and military medical clinics are positioned within geographical concentrations of designated beneficiaries and render a primary health care service through various components of the multi-professional health team. These facilities are normally positioned within unit lines.

ii. **Palliative Care.** Palliative care is delivered through community-orientated home-based care, supported by hospice capabilities.

iii. **Military Base Hospitals.** The military base hospital facilities provide a comprehensive primary and secondary health care capability in larger military bases with an admission and operating theatre capability. These can be configured as level 2 hospitals in peace support operations. Level 2 hospitals are generally established at existing infrastructure, and include specialist diagnostic resources, specialist surgical and medical capabilities, ancillary health services, dentistry, psychology and social work.

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8 The additional role for dental personnel during combat operations is to augment the combat casualty care capability. This is particularly required during mass casualty operations.
iv. **Military Hospitals.** The military hospital facilities are positioned in specific geographical locations, based on the military footprint, to render a comprehensive hospitalisation service to patients. These capabilities are also utilised in support of operations. Military hospitals render secondary and tertiary levels of care including rehabilitation functions. These can be configured for level 4 hospitals in peace support operations and normally comprise specialist surgical and medical procedures, reconstruction, rehabilitation, convalescence, and psychological and social support.

v. **Specialised Institutes.** Specialised institutes render a specialist function in specific areas of military medicine through specialised capabilities and research.

**MILITARY HEALTH FORCE DESIGN**

93. Figure 10-4 provides the end state SA Military Health Service Medical Command (Milestone 4 in the Defence Strategic Trajectory).

94. The Military Health Service provides combat service support. This is done through force health protection of deployed elements of the combat services and force health sustainment of non-deployed military personnel and their dependents, military veterans and their dependants and other designated persons. The Force Design of the SA Military Health Service must therefore be such that it can meet these responsibilities. To this end capabilities are grouped under a Medical Command and organised into a level 4 base hospital, and three military health brigades, each with a level 3 specialist hospital each with battalion groups under command. The battalion groups will consist of both static and deployable elements, these being medical task groups, level 2 static medical facilities inclusive of sick bays and/or deployable level 2 field hospitals.

95. The military health brigades will be aligned and organised to support the mechanised division, motorised division and contingency brigade of the SA Army respectively. The military health brigade supporting the contingency brigade will also support the SA Air Force and the SA Navy.

96. The military health brigade headquarters assigned to support the army divisions are to be geographically co-located with these divisional headquarters. The medical task groups of the medical battalion groups are to be assigned to the combat formations they support.

**MILITARY HEALTH MIGRATION PRIORITIES**

97. In migrating towards the future SA Military Health Service Force Design:
   a. Priority emphasis must be given to the establishment of the medical brigades and their subordinate structures.
   b. Consideration is to be given to establishing a dedicated SA Military Health Service military police element to have “own” military police capability under command during operations.
98. The SA Special Forces shall be organised as a Special Forces Command under command of the Chief of the Defence Force, operating in support of the landward and maritime defence strategies, and for the conducting of specific Special Force operations.

99. South Africa’s increasingly complex and unstable security environment dictates an increasing reliance on SA Special Forces in defence operations, indicating an expansion of the current Special Forces capability in the landward, airborne and amphibious operational domains. SA Special Forces will be competent in the physical, informational and psychological dimensions of warfare.

100. The SA Special Forces must be balanced, technologically advanced and able to conduct and sustain protracted operations over long distances and across the spectrum of conflict. The SA Special Forces capabilities must be suited to: strategic reconnaissance; ordered strategic tasks; deep reconnaissance and other tasks in support of the combat services; and the execution of SA Special Force operations including hostage rescue, urban and anti-terror operations.

101. The SA Special Forces shall be employed as an enabler throughout the spectrum of operations, requiring the maintenance of a small but permanently ready force for the conduct of joint or autonomous military operations, or in collaboration with Police Service task forces and other Special Forces capabilities within the region.

102. Special Forces intelligence will provide tactical intelligence regarding the opposing force, terrain, population and other factors that influence detailed tactical planning and the successful execution of operations. The summated tactical intelligence picture will be fed up the operations staff line to the operational and strategic levels.

103. The Special Forces Command will not be structured with their own inherent air, naval and support assets. Services and Divisions have a distinct responsibility towards ensuring the strategic capability of Special Forces through participation in Special Forces training and employment, as well as identified specialist elements to render Special Forces support. Personnel and equipment provided in support of such training and operations must meet the rigorous criteria demanded in this specialist environment. The following, inter alia, will be established in the Special Forces Command to meet the operational requirements of the Defence Force:
   a. Command and control capability.
   b. Triphibious capability (airborne, amphibious, urban and anti-terror combat capability).
   c. Special Forces training capability.
   d. Special Forces support capability.

104. Related defence acquisitions pursued by other Services and Divisions should be supportive of Special Forces requirements. Included are heavy and medium fixed-wing lift and air supply, heavy rotary-wing lift and interoperability with naval assets.

105. The SA Special Forces have a responsibility to support the SA Army in establishing its contingency (special operations) capability.

SPECIAL FORCES ‘FORCE DESIGN’

106. The SA Special Forces will consist of operational regiments that will specialise in airborne and amphibious strategic reconnaissance as well as urban and anti-terror operations. The SA Special Forces will have responsibility for strategic reconnaissance
and other strategic tasks, for deep reconnaissance in support of
the combat services and for the execution of certain special op-
erations, amongst others hostage rescue outside South Africa.
Figure 10-5 below demonstrates the required Special Forces
capabilities (Milestone 4 in the Defence Strategic Trajectory).

SPECIAL FORCES MIGRATION PRIORITIES

107. In migrating to the future Special Forces force design, prior-
ity emphasis (Milestone 2) must be placed on increasing
the capacity of the existing regiments by one Special Forces commando each (including resources, infrastructure, housing, etc) to be able to deal with the diversity of tasks emanating from the Defence Environmental Analysis and Defence Intelligence Estimate. In the medium term (Milestone 3) it will entail the establishment of an additional Special Forces regiment. Given the sensitive nature of some of the tasks, the organisation must have an inherent capacity to protect itself in high-risk environments.

108. A unique approach to recruitment, training, termination of service and leadership development is required to ensure that Special Forces personnel are effectively managed. Conditions of service need to reflect these unique requirements. Personnel need to conform to the highest level of security clearance.

INFORMATION WARFARE

109. Command and control must be enabled across the Defence Force, with a specific focus on both operational command
and control and the enablement of administrative systems.

110. The Defence Force is to take the lead in providing for
common defence against an attack intended to disrupt or disable South Africa’s key national information systems and infrastructure. To this end the Defence Force will develop comprehensive defensive Information Warfare capabilities, which will be tied into the intelligence-related information systems of the intelligence services.

111. The Defence Information Warfare Capability focuses on six areas, namely: Network Warfare; Electronic Warfare; Psychological Operations; Information-Based Warfare; Information Infrastructure Warfare; and Command and Control Warfare (Figure 10-6).

112. The focus areas are defined as follows:
   a. **Network Warfare (Netwar):** To exploit or use the information systems (offensive) of an adversary and to protect all defence information systems (defensive) to ensure use for own forces.
   b. **Electronic Warfare:** To exploit or use electromagnetic energy to determine, exploit, reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum while retaining its friendly use.
   c. **Psychological Operations:** To conduct planned psychological activities in peace, conflict and war in order to create attitudes and behaviour favourable to the achievement of political and military objectives. These operations include psychological action and warfare activities designed to achieve the desired psychological effect.

*Figure 10-6: Information Warfare Capabilities*
planning is to maintain balanced capabilities that:

everything. The only practical approach to defence
nal major power. It is neither possible nor affordable to prepare
sidered assessment could be entirely overturned within a short
114. There is thus always a real risk that the most carefully con-
evolved strategic situation, or what threats might arise.

I13. Defence planning is both a science and an art. It requires
decisions that will affect the defence of the country for decades,
and that involve considerable investment of human, industrial
and financial capital; and those decisions must be based on the
evolving strategic situation, or what threats might arise.

I14. There is thus always a real risk that the most carefully con-
sidered assessment could be entirely overturned within a short
time by unforeseeable events, such as intervention by an exter-
nal major power. It is neither possible nor affordable to prepare
for every eventuality. The only practical approach to defence
planning is to maintain balanced capabilities that:

a. Enable the country to meet existing challenges
effectively;

b. Enable the country to deal effectively with foresee-
able contingencies;

c. Are flexible and can meet developing challenges or
threats; and that

d. Provide the foundation on which to build stronger
forces when required, within a timeframe that is re-
alistic relative to the strategic situation.

I15. The balanced set of capabilities must be continuously
evaluated against the evolving strategic situation, and refocused,
adapted or expanded as the situation dictates. There are ten key
areas in which balance must be maintained:

a. Among the combat services and the sup-
porting services and staff divisions. There is a
clear need to have the right balance among ground,
naval and air force elements, and to have optimal
balance between ‘teeth’ and ‘tail’. There is often
pressure to improve the ratio of ‘teeth’ to ‘tail’,
which is logical but which also holds the risk of de-
veloping forces that cannot sustain operations.

b. Between Regulars and Reserves. A balance
of Regulars and Reserves - Regulars to provide the
core and deal with crises, and the Reserves to aug-
ment and expand the force when necessary.

c. Between forces for local and expeditionary
operations. Any country must in the first instance
look to its own defence, but some countries must also,
in their own interests, look to regional security and
stability. South Africa must be able to undertake
expeditionary operations, be they constabulary or
peace support in nature.

d. Between ‘high tech’ and ‘low tech’. ‘High
tech’ is tempting, can give a very real edge over
opponents and can be the most cost-effective op-
tion. But ‘high tech’ can also be costly to achieve and
maintain. ‘Low tech’ is tempting because it is in most
cases cheaper, but can prove to be a false economy
if the opposing forces are better equipped. Technol-
gy decisions must be taken judiciously on a case-
by-case basis.

e. Between local and foreign equipment. Local
will give strategic independence, provide equip-
ment optimised for the theatre and for the Defence
Force’s operational style, and can have valuable spin-
offs for the wider economy. Local manufacture un-
der licence can also be an option. Key items that will
be manufactured locally include munitions, batter-
ies and spares, secure command and control com-
munications, Information Warfare equipment and
other equipment required in large quantities. Com-
plex equipment that is needed in small quantities is
generally optimally acquired military-off-the-shelf. A
much larger sourcing of materiel from local suppliers
could serve as an impetus to re-industrialisation.

f. Between current equipment and future
technology. The Defence Force must acquire the
equipment it requires to conduct current operations
and to meet potential short-notice challenges. But
equipment acquisition will be phased to avoid the
problem of block obsolescence facing the Defence
Force at a critical time. Under-equipping and over-
equipping can be equally dangerous. While suffi-
cient consideration must be given to research and
development, care must be taken to not over-spec-
ify requirements in a chase of technology, thereby
detracting from the general principle of acquiring
equipment military-off-the-shelf.

g. Between preparation for a ‘short’ war or a
‘long’ war. South Africa will ensure adequate re-
erves of equipment and support for more protract-
ed operations by ensuring the availability of strategic
stocks.

h. Between preparation for ‘high intensity’
and ‘low intensity’ operations. Armies are of-
ten accused of planning for ‘the last war’ and not
for ‘the war to come’. South Africa will address this
challenge by being prepared for a balance of high
intensity and low intensity operations.
i. In preparation for probable, possible and
‘impossible’ threats. Assuming a particular threat to be ‘impossible’ is irresponsibly dangerous. All contingencies will be identified and then prioritised by assessing the risk thereof; being a function of the probability of occurrence and the level of impact should that occurrence occur.

j. **Between defence expenditure and other government expenditure.** An under-funded Defence Force will be disjointed and unable to meet its constitutional obligations. South Africa will endeavour to find the balance between spending on development and social programmes and national security imperatives.
1. Leadership lies at the centre of organisational excellence. The importance of exemplary military leadership cannot be over-emphasised as any failure of the Defence Force in the execution of its mandate has dire and disastrous consequences for the state. It is for this reason that the Defence Force cannot compromise on the education, training and development of its leaders.

2. Military leadership is rooted in the burden of command and there can be no compromise in the development of confident and competent men and women who will be placed in positions of authority. Throughout human history, military action has been shaped by the character and competence of those in command.

3. Leadership is an intangible quality and, ultimately, the effect of the integration of a number of traits within individuals centred on the "what" the leader should be, know and do. Dynamic, visionary and transformational leadership, underpinned with knowledge, skill and attitude, is the foundation for future successful leaders in the Defence Force. To this end, defence leaders will be subject to intensive education, training and development programmes.

4. Education, training and development, coupled to the exposure to military complexity over defined periods of time, is the proven pathway for the development of military leaders with the required character, knowledge, skills and attitudes. Military professionalism, based upon core military values, ethics and a robust professional ethos, is the foundations for the future military leader.

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1. Command is the lawful and onerous authority every officer has over men and women in his/her charge by virtue of his/her rank and appointment.
5. Throughout the world, militaries are recognised as key institutions for the development of leadership within societies. The leadership foundation inculcated in the young men and women of both the Regular and Reserve components of the military will thus profoundly influence society as a whole.

6. The Defence Force, through its leadership development programmes and the highly trained and disciplined members it cultivates, contributes significantly to the development of South Africa’s youth and society as a whole. The military professional education, training and development of young men and women will thus make a direct and significant contribution to national development and the future success of South Africa.

7. The principles contained in this chapter apply equally to members of both the Regulars and Reserves. It is recognised however that because of the part-time nature of the service of the Reserves and their commitment to their civilian careers, flexibility will be required in the implementation of the principles.

REQUIREMENT

8. Defence requires an education, training and development programme, linked to a doctrine regime, to mould its members into informed, competent and cohesive military professionals for institutional and operational excellence across the spectrum of conflict. The guiding principle is that all programmes and courses will require formal assessment and examination for certification and graduation.

GUIDING DEFENCE PRINCIPLES

9. Ensuring that the Defence Force will strive to be seen as a representative and trusted non-partisan national asset, the following overarching defence principles are applied to the education, training and development of its members:
   a. The Defence Force is subject to sound civil control and oversight through the Commander-in-Chief, the Executive and the Legislature.
   b. The Defence Force is compliant with national law and regulations and international law (specifically international humanitarian law).
   c. Due consideration and cognisance are given to the unique nature of the Defence Force relative to the wider public service.
   d. The Defence Force is an agile, balanced, flexible and technologically advanced force supported by appropriate science, engineering and technology capabilities.
   e. The Defence Force is to cultivate and maintain a high standard of military professionalism.
   f. Soldiers are skilled, healthy, fit, and highly disciplined professionals imbued with a high level of morale, sense of duty and pride in themselves, their capabilities and their equipment.
   g. Soldiers are led by exemplary, competent, ethical and dynamic leaders. Mission command is the foundation of the defence leadership philosophy.
   h. The Defence Force is broadly representative of the people of South Africa, with due consideration being given to matters of equity, including gender and otherwise enabled persons.

EDUCATION, TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT PRINCIPLES

10. The following principles are pursued to enhance defence education, training and development:
   a. Notwithstanding the broader development of its members, defence education, training and development has a primary focus on the defence mandate, the development of a warrior ethos and the ability to execute successful combat operations.
   b. The defence doctrinal tenet of mission command will be rigorously pursued. Commanders will be prepared to take full control of their resources and will be empowered to make command decisions within their areas of direct responsibility.
   c. Development of defence members is a line function and therefore a command responsibility throughout all levels of Defence.
   d. The personnel development system is aligned with the national regulatory framework and consequently supports later access to alternative civilian careers by providing portable skills and qualifications for departing defence members.
   e. Defence has command over accredited defence learning institutions, whose education, training and development practices meet the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) stipulations.
   f. Defence presents accredited learning programmes that satisfy its organisational objectives as well as its human capital requirements.
   g. Education, training and development opportunities support individual career plans and individual learning pathways.
   h. Education, training and development is delivered effectively through tailored infrastructure and sufficient capacity, and coupled to appropriate methodologies and delivery systems, such as blended-learning and e-learning.
   i. Individual members take co-responsibility with the defence organisation for their own continuous professional education and actively seek access to
education, training and development opportunities.

j. The development of defence personnel is measured by the value that development initiatives have added to individual competence in the workplace and by their contribution to the success of military operations.

k. Distance and e-learning will be emphasised to enable more Reserve members to avail themselves of the opportunity for empowerment and development.

**EFFECTS**

11. Defence Force leaders, as members of a global body of military professionals, are confident, self-assertive and capable of interacting at both the intellectual and technical levels amongst their counterparts in Africa and abroad.

12. The defence leadership development programmes provide sufficient capacity to both ensure the requirements of the Defence Force and make a significant contribution to public sector and private sector leadership through its Reserves.

13. The military education, training and development system endows officers, warrant officers (WOs) and non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and civilian members with the appropriate knowledge, skills and attitudes to advance the credibility and professionalism of the Defence Force.

**APPLIED EDUCATION AND TRAINING CONCEPTS**

**BROAD-LIBERAL EDUCATION CONCEPT**

14. Education is directed towards the cognitive development of individuals to think independently. Thinking requires the higher order intellectual skills of analysis (dissecting and illuminating concepts), synthesis (combining concepts and generating new ones) and evaluation (establishing criteria and making judgements).

15. Education is an open knowledge-driven process. A broad-liberal education is the foundation for the future professional military officer and is thus directed towards the development of personal attributes that apply to life in general (see Figure 11-1). In the military, educational skills are essential for the creation and development of military doctrine.

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4 A broad-liberal education ascribes to a broad education that empowers individuals with broad knowledge and transferable skills, and cultivates a strong sense of values, ethics, and civic responsibility. It is more a way of studying than a specific course or field of study. In this instance the curriculum is based on a programme of core military sciences with detailed specialisation in at least one military academic discipline.
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION CONCEPT

16. Professional military education is the term used to distinguish between the broad-liberal education provided by societal higher education institutions and that education which is provided and focused on the military. The efficacy of professional military education depends to a large extent on the quality of the initial broad-liberal education provided as a foundation. Professional military education is provided by the military in conjunction with or independently of tertiary institutions of higher learning and is directed towards specific military professional and occupational-specific knowledge. The spectrum of knowledge that is addressed during this education is applicable to all aspects and spheres of the profession of arms.7

MILITARY TRAINING CONCEPT

17. Military training is rooted in the need for action. It places the focus on the primary operational functions of the military and the skills required to do that well.8 Training is thus directed towards instilling the necessary technical and tactical military skills to perform effectively. Training is mostly a group-oriented activity to instil armed forces with an ability ‘to do’. Training constitutes the foundation of an appropriate military culture and is largely a closed process for the translation of doctrine into action, inculcation of discipline, and establishment of cohesion. Good training produces military personnel who respond instinctively to anticipated, recognisable circumstances in a manner circumscribed by the doctrine and culture to which they have been trained.9

FOUNDATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING CONCEPT

18. Foundational education and training refers to the initial orientation, training, and education of the officer recruits of the Defence Force. It defines the process through which officer recruits are inducted into the Defence Force and inculcated with the appropriate skills, knowledge and attitudes needed for a career as a military professional.

19. The future military leader (officers and other ranks) requires a balance between thinking and fighting. This foundational military development will be rooted in an understanding of the uniqueness of the military profession and will be done by the individual Services.

20. The officer career path will in general be rooted in quality tertiary-level broad-liberal education and professional military training. The WO and NCO career path will be rooted in professional military training, supported by exposure to a wide range of military experiences, to ensure a skills and mentor-driven approach to leadership by WOs and NCOs. Though a tertiary-level education is not a prerequisite for WOs and NCOs, it is nonetheless encouraged.

FUNCTIONAL MILITARY DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT

21. Functional military development is linked to the process of life-long learning and is by and large the responsibility of the individual through opportunities created by the Defence Force. This development also relates to the immediate working environment and is normally of an immediate applied practical and functional nature. Development thus relates to learning activities that occur outside the formal career-related education and training programmes of the Defence Force.

RECRUITMENT CONCEPT

22. Recruitment programmes are rooted in the enhanced status of the Defence Force in society. The military is a practical profession that balances military adventure with excellent military education and learning opportunities. It is this combination of experiences that attracts young men and women to the Defence Force.

23. Defence recruitment importantly pursues diversified recruitment opportunities throughout society, ranging from geographical recruitment at the grass-roots level to the targeted recruitment of its future leaders. The recruitment of future defence leaders will occur in a very competitive labour market. Recruitment is broadly representative of the people of South Africa, with due consideration being given to matters of equity.

   a. The Defence Force must have a dedicated decentralised officer recruitment programme based on the deliberate selection of individuals from schools and universities with demonstrable leadership qualities and who meet the academic and professional profile required of the future military leader.

   b. Recruitment of other ranks is broad-based and spread throughout South Africa to ensure that the breadth of South African society is represented in a
Figure 11-2: Balancing Education, Training and Experience

provincially proportionate manner. A balance is ensured between the urban and rural backgrounds of enlisted recruits.

LEADERSHIP CONCEPT

24. All education and training of rank-bearing personnel will be directed towards the development of leadership attributes and qualities and is steered towards a culture of decisive, timeous decision-making. The defence doctrinal tenet of mission command will be instilled.

BALANCING CONCEPT FOR EDUCATION, TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE

25. Education, training and development will be based on an understanding of the difference between and the need for both. Added to this is the requirement to balance the knowledge and skills so acquired with functional experience and a sound military ethos (Figure 11-2).

LIFE-LONG LEARNING CONCEPT

26. Career progression in the Defence Force will be linked to the concept of life-long learning. Members will be encouraged to take personal responsibility for their own learning experiences and career development activities.

ACCREDED LEARNING CONCEPT

27. All learning in the career path of officers, WOs and NCOs will be accredited within the NQF and adhere to the requirements of the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA). The Defence Force will, as far as possible, partner its military professional education with existing programmes at universities and other institutions of higher learning and ensure accreditation of its own training programmes.

BOTTOM-UP VS TOP-DOWN LEARNING CONCEPT

28. From the bottom-up perspective, foundational officer military education and training will be delivered through a single, tailored military institution which is linked to an established national tertiary institution. From a top-down perspective, the advanced education and training of officers, WOs and NCOs will be pursued through access to a variety of institutions of higher learning, both domestically and internationally.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING PARTNERSHIP CONCEPT

29. Defence forces historically have a strong predisposition for training and they train on their own very well. Cooperation and support, however, are required from institutions of higher learning for the education of military personnel. The Defence Force will thus ensure an appropriate balance between an in-house training capacity and the out-sourcing of education to institutions of higher learning. Partnerships will be established with recognised institutions of higher learning for both quality education and training in the Defence Force.

JOINT AND SERVICE-UNIQUE EDUCATION, TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT

30. Foundational education, training and development is directed towards military professionalism and the preparation of military personnel for a career in the armed forces. Joint and service-unique requirements will be balanced in the education,
training and development of military personnel. The officer cadet phase follows foundational military training at the Services.

EDUCATION, TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT LINKED TO DEFENCE DOCTRINE

31. The interplay between military education, training, development and military operations is of critical importance for the strategic positioning of the Defence Force and the professionalism of its members (Figure 11-3). The Defence Force will thus link its education, training and development programmes with the doctrine domain.

a. The military operations domain executes successful military operations through the application of military doctrine in each mission and collates new experience for integration into existing doctrine or the development of new doctrine.

b. The education domain integrates broad security, strategic and military considerations with the experience derived by defence members in operations so that adjustment to and development of doctrine can occur.

c. The training domain develops suitable training regimes and inculcates soldiers with the appropriate functional and war-fighting skills. The training domain must be responsive to and able to adapt to new doctrinal realities.

32. The interplay between these domains will be coordinated by the operations, doctrine and training staffs of the Chief of the Defence Force.

GROWING FUTURE OFFICERS

DEVELOPMENT OF THE OFFICER CORPS

33. The Defence Force is recognised as a key institution for the development of leadership within the wider South African society. There will be no compromise on the education, training and development of the future officer; to do so would have dire implications for the operational success of the Defence Force. A unique and dedicated officer recruitment programme must be established that attracts the best young men and women South Africa has to offer. The military professional education, training and development of young officers will be founded in a broad-liberal education at the Defence Academy and the subsequent education, training and development programmes within the Defence Force.

34. The Officer Corps is the collective commissioned leadership of the Defence Force. Without this Officer Corps, the Defence Force cannot attain its mandate. The Officer Corps must have a comprehensive and sound education, comprehensive and current training and the experience to enable it to meet new challenges effectively as they arise and evolve.

35. The future Officer Corps will be mainly derived from the four main streams as described below.

a. Young officer cadets specifically recruited primarily from schools and other secondary institutions who, after initial foundational military training in the Services, will follow a four-year pre-commissioning cadet officer programme at the future Defence Academy, culminating in a three-year degree or diploma qualification and an officer commission.
b. Specialist and professional candidate officers specifically recruited to pursue professional or specialist academic programmes at contracted tertiary institutions, and who will receive foundational military training from the Services, including an academic preparation programme prior to commencing studies.

c. Graduate and late-entry candidate officers that will, in general, follow foundational military training from the Services and foundational military education from the Defence Academy or a satellite of the Defence Academy, culminating in an officer commission. Such candidate officers must pursue a one-year post-graduate diploma qualification from the Defence Academy, either on a full-time basis or by distance and satellite learning.

i. Candidate officers recruited by Services as graduates from tertiary institutions.

ii. Late-entry candidate officers from the NCO and WO ranks who are functional or technical specialists, and who are identified for officer appointment.

iii. Specialist or professional graduates who will undergo an abbreviated form of induction and commissioning.

d. University Reserve Training Programme candidate officers, while studying at tertiary institutions, and receiving foundational military training from Services and foundational military education from the Defence Academy on a combination of distance and satellite training.

PROFESSIONAL SKILLS REQUIRED OF THE OFFICER CORPS

36. The Officer Corps must first and foremost be military professionals, and must receive the focused education, training, service development and experience that will enable effective and efficient functionality in various leadership positions. The officer must be provided with the opportunity and the ability to expand and hone professional skills throughout the officer’s career.

37. Career paths must be planned to deliberately endow officers with the correct education, training and service experience necessary to be able to command at all levels, inclusive of international security structures.

38. The fundamentals of soldiering and officership, military administration and military law must be taught as part of basic officer training and foundational education. An officer must attend foundational training and education coupled to the functional and battle-handling training of the particular corps. Such series will comprise:

a. Officer Foundational Education and Training.

b. Junior Command, Warfare and Staff Course.

c. Senior Command, Warfare and Staff Course.

d. Joint Strategic Studies Course.

TRAINING, EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE REQUIRED OF THE OFFICER

39. In order for an officer to progress to senior appointment in the Defence Force a broad understanding of the various elements of own service and the other services, and a wider insight into the military profession as a whole, are required. Education and training will provide only a part of that. The remainder must come from balanced experience gained throughout his/her career, covering, as an illustrative example:

Figure 11-4: Broad Officer Career Development Path
FUTURE MILITARY LEADERS

a. Basic military leadership.  
   b. Command at the sub-unit, unit and formation level.  
   c. Operational staff assignments at unit, formation and headquarters levels.  
   d. Training and education duties at unit, corps school and Service level.  
   e. Appointments to posts in joint structures.  
   f. Attachments to foreign armed forces, including course attendance and attaché duty.  
   g. Postings at various levels in international/multilateral forces.  

40. The career planning system must ensure that officers obtain sufficient broad experience and specialisation before the rank of colonel/naval captain.

FURTHER EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF OFFICERS

41. Officers are encouraged to read for post-graduate or post-diploma qualifications and contribute to professional journals. Officers should be in possession of a post-graduate or post-diploma qualification for appointment as general or flag officers.

OFFICER CAREER PATH

42. The officer career path will broadly adhere to the following broad trajectory (see Figure 11-4):
   a. Pre-commissioned, foundational education, training and development is provided by the Services at the Defence Academy. The Defence Academy must ensure the inculcation of an appropriate level of military knowledge and skills and the moulding of a culture of military professionalism.  
   b. Failure to achieve either the required academic or training standards will disqualify the individual from the cadet programme. Further utilisation in the Defence Force will be determined on a case-by-case basis.  
   c. After the junior officer’s commissioning, functional and corps schools will provide Service-specific training at functional, corps and Service-specific training institutions to ensure functional alignment for initial tactical employment.  
   d. Service-specific Command and Staff Training at the Service Colleges for command and staff appointment at the tactical, higher tactical and operational levels.  
   e. Junior and Senior Joint Warfare Courses at the War College.  
   f. Command and Staff Course at the War College in preparation for appointment at joint operational command and staff positions.  
   g. Security and Defence Studies Programme at the Defence College in preparation of general or flag level officers for high command and strategic staff positions.

GROWING FUTURE WOs AND NCOs DEPARTMENT OF THE WO AND NCO CORPS

43. Future operational success remains critically dependent on the quality and calibre of the future soldier – and the development of responsible, value-driven and disciplined soldiers. The Defence Force recruitment system will be devolved to Services and pursued on a decentralised basis. The future soldier will be a skilled, healthy, fit, and highly disciplined military professional imbued with a high level of morale and sense of duty. The Defence Force will be an equitable, broadly representative and gender-aligned national asset. A through-life assessment and selection system will be established to inform merit-based career advancement for all soldiers, coupled to education, training and development achievement.

44. The WO Corps forms the ‘backbone’ while the NCO Corps forms the ‘skeleton’ of the Defence Force. It is these bodies of tough and experienced WOs and NCOs who train soldiers, airmen and sailors and provide their officers with combat-ready soldiers with which to execute missions. WOs also ensure that forces remain functioning during combat. This includes the planning for and execution of echelons during combat.

PROFESSIONAL SKILLS REQUIRED OF THE WO AND NCO CORPS

45. The value of the WO and NCO arises from the experience built up over many years of service. WOs and senior NCOs have more experience than most junior officers with whom they will work. Senior NCO skills are developed over time and are founded in practical application. It is this body of experience that makes the senior WO or NCO an invaluable asset to the Defence Force.

46. The technical specialists of the WO and NCO Corps carry the responsibility for ensuring that the assigned equipment is properly maintained and serviceable for use when required, while the administrative specialists carry the responsibility for the effective and efficient running of the unit, and particularly for ensuring that the personnel, logistic and financial systems are implemented correctly and function effectively.

11 Platoon level.
47. The combat WO and NCO Corps are in many respects the military craftsmen, skilled in the craft of individual and small-group combat tactics, in leadership and in the combat aspects of the particular branch of the Service. The WO and NCO Corps must receive the focused education, training and service experience that will enable them to function effectively and efficiently in various posts and to expand and hone skills throughout the course of their career.

48. WO and NCO Corps education, training and service experience must be planned to provide:
   a. An outstanding understanding of people under stress, the skills to lead and manage them and the ability to instil discipline based on mutual respect.
   b. The ability to teach, train and enthuse trainees.
   c. The basic skills of soldiering, a thorough understanding of the relevant weapons and equipment and their maintenance, and the ability to use them to optimal effect.
   d. A sound grasp of battle drills, and the ability to execute them under conditions of extreme stress.
   e. The tact to work effectively and cordially with junior officers who are often far less experienced but nonetheless bear command seniority.

49. The fundamentals of soldiering, military leadership and administration must be taught as part of WO and NCO training. WOs and NCOs must attend a series of courses, coupled to the functional and warfare training of the particular corps. Such series will comprise:

   a. NCO Formative Training and Development.
   b. Senior NCO Course.
   c. WO Supervisors Course.
   d. Joint WOs Course.

TRAINING, EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE REQUIRED OF THE WO AND NCO CORPS

50. Although courses convey specific skills, good WOs and NCOs are primarily created by service experience that imbues knowledge, wisdom and judgement. The WO and NCO career planning system must ensure that their career progression allows for the widest possible experience at every level of appointment. WOs and NCOs are required to spend sufficient time in each rank group in order to develop a depth of experience. This exposure may extend to:
   a. Soldiering in the smallest element of the branch of the Service.
   b. A junior leader.
   c. An instructor on corps and service training.
   d. A specialist or supervisory instructor.
   e. A senior NCO.
   f. A WO who directly supports his/her commander at different levels.

51. In order for a WO to progress to appointments at formation and higher level in the Defence Force, a general understanding of the various elements of own Service and the other Services, and a wider insight into the military profession as a whole, is required. Education and training will provide only a part of that. The remainder must come from balanced experience gained throughout his/her career, covering (merely as an illustrative example):
   a. Basic military leadership.
   b. Supervision and monitoring at the sub-unit, unit and formation level.
   c. Operational assignments at unit, formation and headquarters levels.
   d. Training and education duties at unit, corps school and Service level.
e. Appointments to posts in joint structures.

f. Attachments to foreign armed forces, including course attendance and attaché assistant duty.

**WO AND NCO FURTHER EDUCATION AND TRAINING**

52. In addition to the courses that WOs and NCOs are required to undergo during their career, they will also be afforded the opportunity to further their military and general education. Increasingly, NCOs and WOs will be required to study for B Tech degrees in their areas of technical specialisation.

53. NCOs should be required to read for a one-year certificate prior to promotion to a senior NCO appointment.

54. Senior NCOs should be required to read for at least a two-year certificate/diploma prior to promotion to a WO appointment.

55. WOs should be required to read for a tertiary qualification prior to promotion to a senior WO at formation level and higher.

**WO AND NCO CAREER PATH**

56. The Defence Force will develop and implement a career path for WOs and NCOs. The foundation of this career path must be a rank structure that provides sufficient rank levels, equal to the eleven levels in the officer career path, and visible progression accompanying performance and seniority that ensures a satisfying career.

57. The WO and NCO career path must adhere to the following broad trajectory (see Figure 11.5):

a. As a general rule, the appointment of NCOs will occur from the ranks.

b. Pre-appointment foundational training at the corps schools will ensure the inculcation of an appropriate level of military knowledge and skills and a culture of military professionalism.

c. Post-appointment, Services will provide Service-specific training at functional, corps and Service-specific training institutions to ensure functional alignment for tactical employment.

d. Service-specific training at the Service colleges for appointment and employment at the tactical, higher tactical and operational levels.

e. Training at the Warrant Officers Academy in preparation for appointment at the joint operational levels.

**GROWING FUTURE DEFENCE CIVILIANS**

**DEVELOPMENT OF CIVILIANS**

58. Defence civilians, as a component of the ‘one-force’, provide professional, specialist, managerial and functional support within the Defence Force, the Defence Secretariat and the Ministry of Defence. Development of the civilians in defence remains critical to the functionality of the defence organisation.

59. Attention will be given to the development of a competent civilian component at all levels in defence. Civilian education, training and development programmes will be tailored to integrate with domestic and foreign learning opportunities. Particular focus will be given to the high-level analytical and strategic competencies required of defence personnel serving in the Defence Secretariat. A merit-based career advancement system will be established, coupled to education, training and development achievement.

60. Defence civilians must attend education, training and development programmes to acquire the required competencies and outcomes. Civilian incumbents must comply with the required competencies for their specific post and post level. The following aspects of civilian development are emphasised:

a. **Recruitment.** Apart from the current practice of recruiting the civilian component from outside the defence organisation, consideration must also be given to recruiting military members no longer wishing to pursue a military career into the civilian component.

b. **Integrated Approach.** Defence shall ensure that education and training programmes are aligned with the integrated development programmes as recommended by the Defence Service Commission.

c. **Induction/Orientation Programme.** It is compulsory for all defence civilians, including interns, to attend organisational and functional induction programmes.

d. **Same Applicable and Appropriate Programmes for Civilians and Military Members.** The same applicable and appropriate education, training and development programmes for civilians and military members will support the defence personnel strategy. This aims at minimising duplication of learning programmes and ensuring mutual understanding. Examples are leadership development and civic education.
Learning Path for Defence Civilians. A learning path must be developed for civilians and be based on a coherent competency framework that guides Services and Divisions in identifying functional and developmental education, training and development for civilians. The compulsory and recommended education, training and development must be linked to the specific requirements of the organisation and the profile requirements of the employee.

Attention will be given to the development of civilian competencies at all levels (administrative, junior, middle and senior management) and education, training and development programmes will be tailored to integrate with domestic and foreign learning opportunities.

DEFENCE EDUCATION AND TRAINING APPROACH

THE DEFENCE EDUCATION AND TRAINING PHILOSOPHY

62. The following underpinning defence education and training philosophy provides a holistic approach for military professional education and training, starting from foundational education and training and progressing up to the level of advanced national security studies. Due cognisance is given to the alignment of Defence Force operational requirements with corresponding academic qualification levels. This holistic approach honours the ‘one-force’ concept and provides education, training and development systems for the Regulars, Reserves and defence civilians as depicted in Figure 11-6. An auxiliary service will have its own specific education, training and development requirements.

63. The defence training system is structured to deliver within the broad milestones reflected below and is provided by the following organisational groupings and capabilities.

FOUNDATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING

64. Services will provide foundational military training for all soldiers. The Defence Academy, as the officer commissioning authority, will provide the foundational education to officer cadets and candidate officers to enable their commissioning as junior officers in the Defence Force.

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING

65. Services, as the military competency authorities, provide the colleges and schools that deliver the following accredited programmes:

a. Formative Non–Commissioned Training. Formative training, which includes induction training and current basic military training, must be presented by the Services to inculcate both the common/joint military culture and the Service-specific culture. (Period from entry to WO).

b. Services Junior Training and Functional Training. This training is the responsibility of the Services (as military competency authorities) as well as Services and Divisions (as functional competency
authorities) and is structured to render deployable soldiers. The focus is on providing appropriate professional military education and training. (Period from lieutenant/corporal to captain/staff sergeant.)

c. **Joint Warfare Training.** The principle of joint warfare and battle handling training at all levels is emphasised. To this end, joint warfare training will be presented at both the junior officer and senior officer level and from the NCO up to senior WO level. At the junior levels, the principles of joint warfare will be taught in order to prepare the defence member for joint higher warfare training.

d. **Services Senior Command & Staff and Functional Training.** This training is the responsibility of the Services and must provide sufficient professional military education and training for entry into senior service and the joint, interagency, interdepartmental and multinational operational environment. (Period from majors/WOs to lieutenant colonels.)

e. **Force Training.** This training is the responsibility of the Services and provides combat-ready capabilities. The Operations Headquarters, at the operational level, will provide mission-ready training for the application of combat-ready capabilities at the different levels of operational and tactical deployments.

**FUNCTION-ORIENTATED EDUCATION AND TRAINING**

66. Services and Divisions, as the functional competency authorities, provide and/or coordinate accredited function-oriented education and training as follows:

a. **Functional Training and Academic Integration.** The further training and development, up to the Services’ senior phase, together with all levels of functional training will be integrated with undergraduate studies at universities and universities of technology, or vocational studies from NQF level 5 to 6 at further education and training colleges.

i. Services will be responsible for ensuring that their members receive vocation-orientated tertiary education specific to their Service or Division requirements.

ii. Such education may be provided by a combination of in-house and external tertiary educational institutions contracted to the Defence Force.

iii. Specialist education, which may include medical, engineering and other advanced fields, is to be provided by external tertiary educational institutions contracted to the Defence Force.

b. **Foreign Learning and Exposure.** Foreign learning opportunities and exposure through international placements will be actively pursued for officers and WOs to address defence diplomacy, increase understanding of international military practice, and enhance the professional profile of senior NCOs, WOs and officers.

c. **Exit Education Training and Development.** This training is the responsibility of the individual in alignment with career planning and will be executed on a continuous basis to ensure that defence members are able to successfully reintegrate into civilian careers, after leaving the Defence Force.

**JOINT EDUCATION, TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT**

67. **Operations, Doctrine and Training.** The operations, doctrine and training staffs of the Chief of the Defence Force will ensure:

a. Joint defence education, training and doctrine integrity.

b. Training institutions and programmes.

68. **The Warrant Officers Academy.** The Warrant Officers Academy provides the education and training of WOs in preparation for appointment at the joint operational and strategic levels.

69. **The College of Educational Technology (COLET).** The COLET provides:

a. The development of Occupation-Directed Education, Training and Development Practitioners (OD ETDPs). The instructors, directing staff, facilitators, lecturers and other ETD practitioners (training managers, instructional designers, learning material developers, researchers, and evaluators) must firstly be functionally qualified, military-professionally educated and trained at appropriate levels before being developed in the skills required to be accredited educators and trainers.

b. The professional training to be competent to apply the knowledge, skills and systems as proposed by the applied science of educational technology. This is of fundamental importance in the provisioning of education, training and development in the national education, training and development landscape as contextualised for the military.

c. Research and development into training methodologies and technologies and the integration thereof into the education and training institutions and providers.

70. **The War College.** The War College provides the following accredited programmes:

a. **Joint Senior Command and Staff Education**
and Training. This education and training which addresses security studies, warfare studies at the joint and multinational operational level and corporate management for officers will be provided by the Joint Training Command. Academic integration takes place at the post-graduate/honours degree level.

b. Foreign Learning Opportunities. These programmes will be established and the War College will invest in a vibrant exchange programme of students and directing staff with foreign military institutions of higher learning.

c. Course Accreditation. Service agreements will be established with selected institutions of higher learning to ensure accreditation of the programme at the honours-degree level (NQF-level 8).

71. The Defence College.
   a. The Defence College will be the capstone institution for higher learning in the Defence Force. Its programme and products will reflect the quality of South African strategic thinking. Strategic leadership and diplomacy will be integrated at this level.
   b. The Defence College will provide an advanced strategic studies programme to prepare officers for supreme command and strategic-level staff work. Graduates will be conversant with the nature of South African political and defence policy and military strategies, and competent to analyse them.
   c. Consequently the Defence College will provide the Security and Defence Studies Programme.
   d. Service agreements will be established with selected institutions of higher learning to ensure integration of the programme at the masters-degree level (NQF-level 9).

72. Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC). The PMTC provides specialist, globally accessible, full-time and distance-learning courses and programmes on peace support, humanitarian relief, and security operations to military personnel, police, and civilians working together in peace missions.

PROGRAMMES OF THE DEFENCE ACADEMY

74. The Defence Academy must be the Defence Force’s officer commissioning authority and provide the following fully accredited programmes.

   a. Officer Cadet Programme. Handpicked and stringently selected high-quality recruits attend the Defence Academy for a broad-liberal education (diploma or degree), further military training and officer formative training over a four-year period until officer commissioning. The military training component of the programme will be presented by Service instructors assigned to the Defence Academy.

   b. Candidate Officer Programme. Regular and Reserve graduate recruits, specialists and late entry NCOs are provided with further military training and officer formative training for officer commissioning. The military training component of the programme will be presented by Service instructors assigned to the Defence Academy. The post-graduate Diploma in Military Studies may be pursued on a full-time basis or by distance and satellite learning.

   c. University Reserve Training Programme. The Defence Academy, in conjunction with the Services, will be responsible for the University Reserve Training Programme in which tertiary undergraduates are provided with foundation military training, officer formative training and officer commissioning whilst studying at own expense at tertiary institutions throughout the country. Whilst the programme is primarily aimed at the military training of Reserves, successful completion enables commissioning at graduation and appointment to either the Regular or Reserve component of the Defence Force.

   d. Post-Graduate Military Studies. Officers are provided with post-graduate military studies through a Faculty of Military Science to study for honours, masters and doctorate degrees (or post-diploma equivalents) during their period in service.

THE FUTURE DEFENCE ACADEMY

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE ACADEMY

73. A Defence Academy must be established to provide foundational education, training and development to all officers of the Defence Force. It must have sufficient inherent capacity to ensure the Defence Force officer requirements for both the Regulars and Reserves are met.

BASIC TENETS OF THE DEFENCE ACADEMY

75. The Defence Academy must be, at all times, a symbol of military professionalism and leadership excellence, and a reflection of civil-military relations in South Africa. Education, training and development is presented in a complementary manner that ensures appropriate levels of knowledge and skills as well as the development of an appropriate military ethos.

76. The focus of the education, training and development programmes at the Defence Academy must be on the enhance-
ment of leadership potential and a military culture that enhances the professional ethos of the Defence Force.

77. The Services are responsible for foundational military training prior to entry to the Defence Academy, further military training during the four-year programme, and Service-specific training during the last six months at the Defence Academy. This training prepares members for appointment to their respective Services.

FUNCTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THE DEFENCE ACADEMY

78. The Defence Academy must allow for:
   a. The cognisance of the fundamental difference between academic education and military training but the equal importance of both.
   b. The need for education, training and development as the basis of military professionalism and officership.
   c. The recognition of the military as the training authority and the university as the education authority.
   d. A clear line between the academic apparatus and military apparatus of the Defence Academy in order to optimise each domain according to its ethos.
   e. The Support Branch will be responsible for all the financial, logistical and personnel support functions at the Defence Academy.
   f. The Training Branch will be responsible for military training, officer formative training and the coordination of the Service-specific training of candidate officers and cadets at the Defence Academy.
   g. The Doctrine Branch will be responsible for the teaching of defence doctrine and will liaise with the Centre for Military Studies and Faculty of Military Science for purposes of research and development.
   h. The Education Branch will be responsible for the candidate officers and cadets during education and alignment of the education programme of the Faculty of Military Science with the programme of the Defence Academy.
   i. The Physical Training, Sport and Recreation Branch must be responsible for the physical fitness, sport and recreational programmes at the Defence Academy.
   j. Consideration can be given to placing the Defence Force Sports Science Centre of Excellence at the Defence Academy, with a further mandate, in part-

DEFENCE ACADEMY ORGANISATION

79. The following structuring principles are provided (Figure 11-7):
   a. The Defence Academy will be in the command-line of the Chief of the Defence Force.
   b. The Commandant of the Defence Academy will be a senior officer of either General or Flag rank, being a retired Service Chief or other senior officer from the combat disciplines.
   c. The Commandant will command the Defence Academy.
   d. The Dean of the Faculty of Military Science is a university academic appointment and is responsible for the education programmes of the Defence Academy.

Figure 11-7: Defence Academy Organisation
nership with Sport and Recreation South African (SRSA), to provide sport development assistance to South African youth.

**Faculty of Military Science**

80. The Faculty of Military Science will be responsible for the education of officers at the Defence Academy. The Faculty of Military Science will be a fully-fledged self-standing academic faculty of a university.

81. The academic staff of the Faculty of Military Science will promote academic freedom and as such be employed by the university. Nonetheless, the relationship between the university and the Defence Force will allow for the secondment of defence personnel to the Faculty of Military Science in order to complete post-graduate studies whilst also teaching in the Faculty of Military Science. The university will be encouraged to make use of retired senior defence personnel with the appropriate academic qualifications in the Faculty of Military Science in order to capture relevant military experience towards the education of the future officers of the Defence Force.

82. The Faculty of Military Science must have internationally recognised scholars as its teachers and researchers. Fulltime permanent staff members will be supplemented on an ad hoc basis by visiting scholars from other universities as guest lecturers and visiting fellows.

**Centre for Military Studies (CEMIS)**

83. The Centre for Military Studies must function as a research centre of the university within the Faculty of Military Science and the Director must report directly to the Dean of Military Science. The research ethos of CEMIS is based on the following values: being research driven, upholding integrity in research, maintaining high ethical standards, intellectual independence and professional, accountable and responsible spending of funds, best-practice deliverables and their widest possible dissemination.

84. The research programme of the Centre for Military Studies must focus on contemporary security, military and civil-military issues and will cooperate with the Doctrine Branch of the Defence Academy to provide the Defence Force with a research and development capability. The Centre for Military Studies will, as far as possible, be policy-relevant and support the Defence Force with independent scholarly research. The Defence Force will second personnel with the appropriate academic qualifications as research associates to the Centre for Military Studies for this purpose.

85. The research output of the Centre for Military Studies must adhere to the requirements for research at the university, international academic citizenship and best practice and as such will be published and distributed through academic and scholarly journals and the available digital media. CEMIS, as a multi- and interdisciplinary research-driven platform, must focus strongly on research excellence and cooperation with national/international research associations/institutions/academic stakeholders, in both production and dissemination of research outputs/deliverables.

**Defence Academy Advisory Committee**

86. A Defence Academy Advisory Committee (DAAC) consisting of military experts and academics from other universities must be established as an advisory body to the university and the Defence Force on the content of the degree and diploma programmes in order to ensure a world-class education for officers of the Defence Force.

**Relationship between the Dean of Military Science and the Commander of the Education Branch**

87. The Dean of the Faculty of Military Science must be appointed by the university to manage the teaching, research and community interaction of the Faculty of Military Science as a faculty of the university.

88. The Commander of the Education Branch must be appointed by the Defence Force and will be responsible for:
   a. Coordination, discipline and command and control over the candidate officers and cadets during the education timeframes.
   b. Consolidation and articulation of the educational requirements of the Defence Force.
   c. Liaison with and coordination of the programme of the Defence Academy with the Dean of Military Science.

**THE DEFENCE ACADEMY CURRICULUM**

89. All activities at the Defence Academy must be directed towards:
   a. The development of the leadership potential and qualities of all future officers.

12 Established in the 1990s under the aegis of both the University of Stellenbosch and the SANDF.
13 Open and transparent research.
14 International best practice.
b. The promotion of a culture of command and decision-making.
c. Character development and the inculcation of an appropriate military culture.
d. An understanding of the military’s obligation to be different from society.

90. The training programme must be premised on the further inculcation of basic soldiering skills and officer formative training. The Defence Force may consider the following options in this regard:
   a. A combined training approach at the Defence Academy using Service-specific instructors.
   b. Service-specific training during the Defence Academy programme.

91. The physical training and sport programme must ensure that both candidate officers and cadets remain physically fit and actively participate in sport during the one-year or four-year programmes at the Defence Academy.

The Academic Curricula

92. The development of the academic programmes of the Faculty of Military Science must be based on a partnership approach between the Defence Force and the university (see Figure 11-8).

93. The academic curriculum must be focused and directed towards equipping future officers of the Defence Force with the appropriate knowledge, skills, and attributes in order to effectively address the complexities and uncertainties they will face in their future personal and professional lives. The number of academic programmes in the Faculty of Military Science must be directed towards a recognised academic professional military curriculum with specialisations in either the sciences or the humanities.

94. The academic programme must also be deliverable through distance learning and be available to all defence personnel.

Core Curriculum

95. Both the Bachelor Degree in Military Science and the Diploma in Military Science must be informed by a core curriculum based on the essentials of military science. It is required that the core curriculum for both the candidate officers and cadet programmes be a conglomerate of the following academic disciplines, adjustable to the ongoing requirements of the Defence Force:

   a. Military History.
   b. Political Science (International Relations).
   c. Strategic Studies.
   d. Broad legal studies (including Military Law, IHL, Criminal Procedures and Law of Evidence).
   e. Military Sociology.
   f. Mathematics or Applied Military Mathematical Literacy.
   g. Defence Resource Management.
   h. Public Administration.
i. Military Geography, Aeronautical Science or Nautical Science (as a choice and depending on the future employment of the officer cadet).

**Non-Core Curriculum**

96. The focus of the Faculty of Military Science must be interdisciplinary and directly related to the military sciences. The Faculty of Military Science will therefore primarily be responsible for the core programme. Any additional non-military science curricula should be delivered by the other faculties of the affiliated university that specialise in those subjects.

**Officer Cadet Programme**

97. The cadet programme at the Defence Academy will be a four-year programme. Successful completion of the education, training and development programme by cadets at the Defence Academy will culminate in the award of an officer commission from the Defence Force and a Bachelor Degree in Military Science from the university.

**Candidate Officer Programme**

98. The candidate officer programme at the Defence Academy will be a one-year post-graduate programme. Successful completion of the education, training and development programme by candidate officers will culminate in the award of an officer commission from the Defence Force and a Diploma in Military Science from the university.

**GRADUATION AND COMMISSIONING OF OFFICERS**

99. On successful completion of studies, the officer cadets will be commissioned and awarded with either a Bachelor Degree in Military Science or Diploma in Military Sciences from the university.

**CAREER-LONG CIVIC EDUCATION**

100. Complementary to the above, all defence members must be exposed to a career-long robust civic education programme. Civic education is regarded as the process in which taught values are translated into lived values. The aim and purpose of the civic education programme are to instil respect amongst military personnel and civilian members of Defence for the core values of a democratic South Africa through appropriate education and training. These values derive principally from the Constitution. They include respect for human rights, the rights and duties of soldiers, the rule of law, international law, non-partisanship, non-discrimination and civil supremacy over the armed forces.

101. This programme must consist of and cover at least the following aspects:

a. **Subjects Covered.** The key features of: the democratic political process; the South African Constitution; the Bill of Rights; civil-military relations in a democracy; International Humanitarian Law (the Law of Armed Conflict); the defence corporate value system and military professionalism in a democracy.

b. **Target Group.** The civic education programme will extend to all defence personnel, both for uniformed and civilian members, but will necessarily be tailored according to function and rank. It must cover all the levels of military professional education and training for officers, WOs and NCOs, as well as for defence civilians. Applicable subjects must also extend to all levels of combat- and mission-readiness training.

c. **Contextualisation of Civic Education.** The civic education programme will be integrated into all aspects of education and training rather than being treated as an isolated subject. It will be applied in the military and defence civilian contexts through lectures, simulated exercises, combat-/mission-readiness training exercise scenarios and case studies, as applicable. The civic education programme does not replace military or civilian disciplinary processes or procedures. The defence institutional culture will be imbued with respect for human rights and the rule of law only if its members are subject to disciplinary action in the event of transgression.
MILITARY DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM AND RELATED MEASURES

REQUIREMENT FOR MILITARY DISCIPLINE AND RELATED MEASURES

1. A revised and cohesive military disciplinary system, a minor corrective measures system and concomitant administrative measures are required to meet the constitutional imperative that “the defence force must be structured and managed as a disciplined military force”.

2. The current military disciplinary system was developed within the constitutional framework to assert norms applicable to military judicial processes. The current system of military justice is thus based mainly on the Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act (Act No 16 of 1999) as read with its Rules of Procedure and the First Schedule of the Defence Act (Act No 44 of 1957).

3. However, challenges arising from the application of the Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act and limited training thereon have led to perceptions that military discipline has been compromised and the authority of commanders eroded. The current system has specifically disempowered commanders by removing the summary discipline system away from the commander to the military courts.

4. Certain challenges, shortcomings and opportunities for improvement have been identified and are being addressed through the development of a draft Military Discipline Bill (MDB).

MILITARY DISCIPLINE

5. An effective soldier is proud, tough and disciplined, and displays morale, cohesion, trust, shared soldiering values and high standards of military conduct at all times. Soldiers, in joining the military, agree to accept the lawful direction of those placed in authority over them. Soldiers train for the application of lethal force under conditions of conflict and in so doing accept the...
risk of death or serious injury in the execution of orders. Military discipline is that mental attitude and state of training which renders military obedience instinctive under all conditions and, if necessary, for soldiers to engage in major combat operations to defend and protect South Africa and its people – even to the forfeiture of one’s own life. It is this function that distinguishes the Defence Force from other government departments and from all other sections of our society.

6. Sound military discipline is the cornerstone of a professional and functional defence force. It is founded upon respect for, and loyalty to, properly constituted authority. It is achieved through rigorous training that develops self-control, character and efficiency. Such training implies subjection to control exerted for the good of the group. Justice Kriegler of the South African Constitutional Court clearly spells out the requirement for military discipline in his judgment on the Minister of Defence vs Postane and Another, and concurred with by Justices Chaskalson, Langa, Ackermann, Madala, Mokgoro, O’Regan, Sachs, Yacoob, Du Plessis and Skweyiya:2

“The ultimate objective of the military in time of peace is to prepare for war to support the policies of the civil government. The military organization ... requires, as no other system, the highest standard of discipline [which] can be defined as an attitude of respect for authority that is developed by leadership, precept and training. It is a state of mind which leads to a willingness to obey an order no matter how unpleasant the task to be performed. This is not the characteristic of the civilian community. It is the ultimate characteristic of the military organization. It is the responsibility of those who command to instil discipline in those who they command. In doing so there must be the correction and the punishment of individuals.”3

Modern soldiers in a democracy, those contemplated by chapter 11 of the Constitution, are not mindless automatons. Ideally they are to be thinking men and women imbued with the values of the Constitution; and they are to be disciplined. Such discipline is built on reciprocal trust between the leader and the led. The commander needs to know and trust the ability and willingness of the troops to obey. They in turn should have confidence in the judgment and integrity of the commander to give wise orders. This willingness to obey orders and the concomitant trust in such orders are essential to effective discipline. At the same time discipline aims to develop reciprocal trust horizontally, between comrades. Soldiers are taught and trained to think collectively and act jointly, the cohesive force being military discipline built on trust, obedience, loyalty, esprit de corps and camaraderie. Discipline requires that breaches be nipped in the bud – demonstrably, appropriately and fairly.4

The most common form of disciplinary proceeding against a soldier is a summary and relatively informal appearance before the commanding officer of his or her unit. This swift and purely internal disciplinary procedure is retained in the Act, which also creates courts of first instance staffed by military judges with more extensive punitive jurisdiction.5

For a civilian prosecutor, even one attached to the particular military unit but not forming part of the command structure, to have to take [such] decisions would be unfair to both the prosecutor and the accused. For such decisions to have to be debated at a more senior level by or with the officials of the NDPP who have no knowledge of and little feel for the local circumstances would be even more problematic. In either event the effect on military lines of authority and command would be potentially disastrous.”6

7. The effectiveness of a military organisation is inextricably linked to the concepts of command, leadership and discipline. In essence, military discipline is that state of good military order which should exist in a military command. A lack of discipline compromises the effectiveness of the Defence Force and renders it unable to perform its constitutional mandate of defending and protecting South Africa and its people. It is this good order that allows all members of a military command to act together as a cohesive fighting force. Deviation from this state of good military order is dealt with within uniquely military disciplinary and corrective measures systems. It is the responsibility of those who command to instil discipline in those who they command. In doing so there must be the correction and punishment of individuals.

8. Disciplinary or corrective action may be taken against a defence member who fails to meet or uphold the military standard of conduct. This is entirely consistent with the military doctrine of ‘mission command’ whereby commanders fully control their resources and are empowered to make command decisions within their areas of direct competence.

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2 Minister of Defence v Potsane and Another; Legal Soldier (Pty) Ltd and Others v Minister of Defence and Others 2002 (1) SA 1 (CC).
3 Ibid, par 39.
5 Ibid, par 40.
6 Ibid, par 41.
9. The broader concept of military discipline should be distinguished from military disciplinary measures, (minor) corrective measures and the prosecution of criminal offences committed by persons subject to the Military Disciplinary Code.
   a. In the first instance, military discipline is not about punishing crime or maintaining and promoting law, order and tranquillity in society, but about ensuring an effective military force capable and ready to protect the territorial integrity of the country and the freedom of its people7.
   b. In the second instance, the military disciplinary system exists to uphold good military order and discipline using statutory powers to:
      i. Deal with minor infringements summarily and apply minor sanctions through a disciplinary hearing.
      ii. Address more serious contraventions in a formal manner through a court martial.
      iii. Provide for extra-territorial jurisdiction when defence members subject to the military disciplinary system are deployed outside the borders of the Republic.
   c. In the third instance, minor corrective interventions are measures that the commanding officer may routinely pursue to address shortcomings that may from time to time arise regarding the personal and professional performance of a military member. Corrective measures are regimental interventions that embed military standards, correct errant behaviour or adjust behaviour inconsistent with military norms.
   d. In the fourth instance, military offences must be distinguished from criminal offences. Certain criminal offences committed by members outside the borders of the Republic during deployments are dealt with by military courts in accordance with the extra-territoriality jurisdictional principle. There are, however, certain criminal offences which, if committed inside the borders of the Republic, are dealt with by civil courts.

MINOR CORRECTIVE MEASURES SYSTEM

10. Purpose. The fundamental purpose of the minor corrective measures system is to:
    a. Provide commanders at all levels with a swift and formally regulated way of dealing with minor failings or defaults related to standards and performances.
    b. Foster, promote and uphold the requisite discipline and behaviour for the maintenance of operational effectiveness.

11. Terms and Principles. The following terms and principles are confirmed:
    a. Minor Corrective Measures.
       i. Officers commanding or superior officers, using their command authority8, may implement against any direct subordinate, minor corrective measures to rehabilitate, censure conduct or correct minor professional or personal failings and defaults in order to achieve, restore and maintain operational effectiveness and efficiency.
       ii. Specific corrective actions may be applied to contribute towards the achieving and maintaining of operational effectiveness and efficiency.
       iii. Corrective measures are inappropriate to address the following:
          (1) Criminal transgressions.
          (2) Habitual repetition of minor transgressions.
    b. The Minor Corrective Process. The minor corrective process shall involve the following: observation, reporting or informal investigation, recording and carrying out of appropriate action.

12. Authority. The authority for the administration of minor corrective measures is derived from the command authority of commanders at all levels, according to powers appropriate to rank, appointment and utilisation. Corrective action implies regimental intervention by the command or delegated authority in minor transgressions with the intent to impact with immediate effect on the transgressor’s conduct.

13. Subjectivity. Any person subject to the Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act (Act 16 of 1999) may be subjected to minor corrective measures, whether inside or outside the borders of the Republic.

14. Execution Authority. Officers commanding or superior officers may implement minor corrective measures against any direct subordinate.

15. Minor Corrective Action.
    a. A minor corrective action must:
       i. Be formally recorded in writing in the prescribed manner.

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7 Ibid, par 38
8 SANDF Military Dictionary, p 79, ‘Command Authority is the lawful authority every officer has over soldiers in his/her charge by virtue of the respective officer’s rank and appointment’.
ii. Be applied with a sense of immediacy.
iii. Promote or enforce the maintenance of routine discipline within a unit.
iv. Comply with the principles of proportionality and appropriateness with regard to:
   (1) The transgression or default.
   (2) The impact on operational effectiveness.
   (3) The adverse impact, or likely impact, on the individual or unit.
   (4) The transgressor’s/defaulter’s rank, age or rate of remuneration where relevant.
v. Be carried out under supervision, where appropriate.

b. A minor corrective action must not:
   i. Be unreasonable.
   ii. Have public humiliation as an objective.
   iii. Result in unreasonable or unjustified discrimination.

c. Minor corrective actions may include the following non-punitive regimental measures:
   i. Special instruction with regard to accepted dress requirements.
   ii. Conditioning drills and instructions.
   iii. Drill practice.
   iv. Repetitive instructions.
   v. Corrective training.
   vi. Additional duties.

MILITARY DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM

16. The military disciplinary system serves to empower commanders to effectively enforce military discipline through the medium of military courts. This will support the command line to uphold the discipline and behaviour required for the maintenance of operational effectiveness.

17. Terms and Principles. The following terms and principles are defined:

a. Disciplinary Measures. Disciplinary measures may be taken by the chain of command, using statutory powers, to uphold good order and military discipline. Disciplinary measures are taken where it is necessary to correct breaches of discipline, punish the individual and/or deter others.

b. Military Justice System. The line commander may undertake disciplinary measures through statutory powers, to uphold, maintain and enforce good order and military discipline. Military judicial measures are taken where a statutory military offence has been committed and it is necessary to punish behavioural deviations of individual or group conduct.

18. Substratum of the Military Disciplinary System. The substratum embodies the following:

   a. A military discipline statute.
   b. A code of conduct for uniformed members.
   c. A code on the legal rights of the soldier.
   d. Military law training at each level of staff training.
   e. The execution of the provisions of the statute by competent functionaries with a sense of integrity and justice.
   f. The primary role of managing the efficiency of a disciplinary system is led, inter alia, by officers commanding, commanding officers at all levels, unit adjutants, regimental and other sergeant-majors or coxswains and other warrant officers, military police officials, military law practitioners and the military courts.

MILITARY COURTS

19. The Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act (Act 16 of 1999) establishes the following military courts:

   a. The Commanding Officer’s Disciplinary Hearing.
   b. The Court of a Military Judge.
   c. The Court of a Senior Military Judge.
   d. The Court of Military Appeals.

20. The Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act (Act 16 of 1999) creates new terminology which steps away from internationally recognised terminology. This has been counterproductive and it is recommended that the term ‘courts martial’ is reintroduced into the South African military justice system, with greater participation in the proceedings of military courts by military line-officers, albeit in conjunction with legal officers.

COMMANDING OFFICER’S DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS

21. A commanding officer and every officer subordinate in rank to such commanding officer and of a rank not less than field rank, who is authorised thereto in writing by such commanding officer, may conduct a disciplinary hearing of any person subject to the Military Disciplinary Code, other than an officer or warrant officer, who has elected to be heard by a commanding of-
MILITARY DISCIPLINE

ficer, for any military disciplinary offence, and may on conviction sentence the offender to any prescribed punishment. The penal jurisdiction of a Commanding Officer’s Disciplinary Hearing is as follows:

a. A fine not exceeding R600.00.

b. In the case of a private or equivalent rank, confinement to barracks for a period not exceeding 21 days.

c. In the case of a private or equivalent rank, corrective punishment for a period not exceeding 21 days.

d. Extra non-consecutive duties for a period not exceeding 21 days.

e. A reprimand.

22. A person subject to the Military Disciplinary Code of a rank not higher than staff sergeant or its equivalent rank may, in respect of a charge relating to a military disciplinary offence on which that person intends to tender a plea of guilty, if he or she elects to be dealt with by a disciplinary hearing, be so heard without legal representation.

23. Every finding of guilty, any sentence imposed and every order made by a Commanding Officer’s Disciplinary Hearing shall be subject to the process of ‘automatic’ review. Every sentence shall be reviewed by a review counsel who may uphold the finding and the sentence: provided that, if the review counsel is of the opinion that the finding or sentence should not be upheld or on the request of the Director Military Judicial Reviews, that counsel shall submit the record or the requested record of the proceedings, together with his or her views on the case, to the Director Military Judicial Reviews, who may thereupon, subject to the changes required by the context, exercise in respect of those proceedings, the powers conferred on a Court of Military Appeals, or refer the case to a Court of Military Appeals.

24. The sanction imposed by the commanding officer presiding at a Commanding Officer’s Disciplinary Hearing is reviewed by a Military Judicial Review Counsel. Such Review Counsel may review the facts or law of that case or the validity or justice of any finding, sentence or order made thereat and may uphold the finding and the sentence. Should the Review Counsel be of the view that the finding or sentence should not be upheld, he or she may request the Director Military Judicial Reviews to exercise the powers conferred on a Court of Military Appeals. The Director Military Judicial Reviews may also refer the case to a Court of Military Appeals.

25. The accused person also has the right to approach the High Court for relief at his or her own cost.

COURTS OF SENIOR MILITARY JUDGES AND MILITARY JUDGES

26. A military court may try any statutory military as well as certain criminal offences. The punishments which may be imposed by a military court are one or more of:

a. imprisonment;

b. in the case of an officer:
   i. cashiering; or
   ii. dismissal from the Defence Force;

c. in the case of any rank other than that of an officer:
   i. discharge with ignominy from the Defence Force; or
   ii. discharge from the Defence Force;

d. in the case of any rank other than that of an officer, detention for a period not exceeding two years;

e. in the case of a private or equivalent rank, field punishment for a period not exceeding three months;

f. in the case of an officer:
   i. reduction to any lower commissioned rank; or
   ii. reversion from any acting or temporary rank to his or her substantive rank;

g. in the case of any rank other than that of an officer:
   i. reduction to any lower rank, to any non-commissioned rank or to the ranks; or
   ii. reversion from any acting or temporary rank to his or her substantive rank;

h. reduction in seniority in rank;

i. a fine not exceeding R 6000.00;

j. in the case of a private or equivalent rank, confinement to barracks for a period not exceeding 21 days;

k. in the case of a private or equivalent rank, corrective punishment for a period not exceeding 21 days;

l. in the case of any rank other than that of an officer:
   i. extra non-consecutive duties for a period not exceeding 21 days; or
   ii. a reprimand.

27. Where it is impractical to impose the punishment of detention or confinement to barracks, including where the offender is serving outside the borders of the Republic or on a ship which is at sea, in lieu of that punishment, a military court
may sentence the offender to be deprived of his or her pay as prescribed.

28. In case of a sentence of detention or imprisonment, a military court may order the operation of the whole or any portion of the sentence of detention, or the whole of the sentence of imprisonment to be suspended as it may determine in its order.

29. The jurisdiction of military courts extends to certain categories of civilian persons as depicted in Section 3 of the Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act (Act 16 of 1999).

30. Every acquittal or discharge of an accused shall be final, but every finding of guilty, any sentence imposed and any order made by a military court shall be subject to the process of review by a Military Judicial Review Counsel or the Court of Military Appeals or on application be dealt with by the Court of Military Appeals.

31. A Court of Military Appeals shall be the highest military court and a judgement thereof will bind all other military courts. A Court of Military Appeals shall be both institutionally and judicially independent from executive or command interference.

32. A Court of Military Appeals shall be competent to exercise full appeal and review in respect of the proceedings of any case or hearing conducted before any military court and may, after due consideration of the record of the proceedings of any case or hearing and of any representations submitted to it or argument heard by it:

   a. **uphold** the finding or the finding and the sentence;
   b. **refuse** to uphold the finding and set the sentence aside;
   c. **substitute** for the finding any valid finding; or
   d. if it has upheld the finding, or substituted a finding, **vary** the sentence.

33. A Court of Military Appeals shall comprise at least a serving Judge or retired Judge of any division of the High Court of South Africa (Chairperson), a serving military law practitioner (Member) with experience exceeding ten years in the administration of military or criminal justice and an officer with experience in exercising command in the field in the conducting of operations (Member). Independence further requires that the modes of appointment to a Court of Military Appeals and the conditions of service of its members are free from command influence.

**REVIEW BY A HIGH COURT**

34. Upon sentencing a convicted person, a military court shall inform such person, inter alia, of his or her right to approach the High Court for relief at his or her own cost.\(^\text{11}\)

**CIVILIAN COURT**

35. Members of the Defence Force can be tried in civil courts for common law, statutory and military offences. They can also be tried in military courts for military offences and for most common law and statutory offences. There is also protection against double jeopardy between the two court systems. However, only military courts, and no other South African court, can exercise criminal jurisdiction in respect of offences committed by soldiers outside the borders of South Africa (extra-territorial jurisdiction).

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\(^{11}\) Charnelley notes that “review to the High Court has not been, and should not be, excluded”, p 77 in Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 33, Nr 2, 2005, “"The South African Military Court System – Independent, Impartial and Constitutional?"”.

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DEFENCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

CHAPTER 13

INTEGRATED DEFENCE INFORMATION SYSTEM

REQUIREMENT

1. Defence’s legacy information systems no longer support defence business efficiently and are becoming unaffordable to operate and sustain. This results in the majority of available funding being directed to operating and sustaining these legacy systems and therefore insufficient funding being available for renewal and investment. Defence thus requires the establishment of an integrated management system to drive both defence administration and defence command and control. To this end an ‘integrated defence enterprise system’ will be established as the backbone information system for end-to-end defence business processes.

2. The pursuit of an integrated defence enterprise system will be a matter of utmost priority. It will replace the disjointed legacy defence information systems and will provide automated, real-time, end-to-end defence management - supporting both defence administration (blue network) and military command and control (red network).

3. The National Treasury programme, the Integrated Resource Management System, will have a major impact on the replacement of the current legacy defence corporate systems and will imply that Defence will have to develop the unique functionalities to conduct those elements of its business which are not included in the integrated financial management system. The migration to the National Treasury’s Integrated Resource Management System implies that Defence will utilise information systems common to all government departments.

4. The integrated defence enterprise system and ‘general defence network’ (blue network) will be established as the foundation for all defence business processes and activities, including adding and reusing information functionality as it becomes available (Figure 13-1).

5. The integrated defence enterprise system means the complete spectrum of:
a. Establishing agile and dynamic policy on systems, software and standards, with cascading directives and delegations. This must be based on best-practices policy standards across the technology platform and may require Defence to obtain cutting edge decision-support services during this process.

b. Collaboratively building the enterprise system, by establishing in parallel the following dimensions:
   i. Business processes across the resource areas.
   ii. The communication and network infrastructure.
   iii. Granular security.

c. Establishing web-based business systems that enhance functionality and end-to-end values chain in all resource areas.

d. Establishing resource services processes in all functional areas.

e. Ongoing enhancement of the platform through new business processes, services and functionality.

6. The enterprise system must integrate and optimise all defence information system requirements and serve as a basis for ensuring standardisation, compatibility, connectivity and interoperability.

7. Proven systems are in service in some defence forces across the world having already been adapted for unique military use. An option is to procure such a proven military-off-the-shelf (MOTS) enterprise system where the development and adaptation costs have already been borne by other parties and which has already been tailored for both military use and modern compliance, accounting and reporting standards. A MOTS enterprise system must be able to interface with government information systems, yet provide modular security for defence information.

8. The priority milestones, linked to the ICS strategy, in this process will include:
   a. Migration of defence applications to web-based services. Such web-based services may by necessity not be connected to the Internet.
   b. Enhanced personal connectivity for defence members.
   c. Revolutionised office automation.
   d. Institution of information systems training at all levels of the Defence Force.

9. The characteristics of the defence enterprise system will include:
   a. The enablement of combat service support through automated, tracked, in-transit visible, real-time information which is integrated with various resource system databases and networks.
   b. The defence enterprise system must be:
      i. Driven by core Defence Force doctrine and functional area doctrine.
      ii. Granular, secure and accessible.
      iii. Compliant with defence regulatory framework standards.
      iv. Integrated across all resource areas.
      v. Deployable at all locations of defence activity.
      vi. Operational to the lowest functional level in the field, performing over limited bandwidth and non-persistent network infrastructure, or even independently at remote locations.

   e. Data clean-up of all legacy functional systems by functional owners.
   f. Data integrity determination by functional owners.
   g. Staggered migration of personnel, logistic, finance and procurement systems to the defence enterprise resource management system.
   h. Archiving of data.
vii. Complete business-to-business system integration with information at the 5th line of support, industry standard information systems and other defence information management systems.

viii. Enabling of data integrity and clean-up of disparate information.

ix. Enabling of accountability and reporting across all levels and functions.

x. Enabling of organisational auditability and set standards.

xi. Enabling of compliance with standards.

xii. Contribution to organisational performance management and organisational reporting.

xiii. Contribution to early warning and risk aversion.

c. The defence enterprise system must be able to adapt to rapidly changing business process architecture, data and technology with minimal delay and cost, and without requiring changes in the information system platform and software.

**DEFENCE COMMAND AND CONTROL**

10. The ability to exercise command and control is critical to the effective execution of the defence mission, goals and tasks. The diversity of military tasks performed by different combat, combat support, combat service support and other support structures requires both single service and joint command and control capabilities.

11. Military command and control will be driven by the concept of “network enabled command and control” through standardised new-generation digital communication equipment capable of transferring all types of data on the battlefield, thus facilitating network-enabled operations and improved situational awareness.

12. The command and control network (red network) will be a sub-set of the defence enterprise network (blue network) within the ‘next generation technology platform’, supported by enhanced granular security. This network will prioritise quality, integrity and reliability.

**PERSONAL MOBILE CONNECTIVITY OF DEFENCE PERSONNEL**

13. Portable interconnectivity between defence personnel, independent of the place of work and from remote locations, is crucial for both effective command and control and management in the workplace. To this end, web-based connectivity between members and employees at appropriate levels in the organisation must be enhanced. The defence enterprise system must thus provide integrated work-place electronic connectivity enabling real-time communication between members responsible for the command and management of the organisation.

**PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT**

**ORGANISATIONAL PERFORMANCE**

14. Defence performance management is defined as that set of management processes, supported by information technology, that help to improve the execution of strategy, day-to-day...

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**Figure 13-2: Overarching National Planning, Budgeting and Reporting Cycle**
management and decision-making. Performance management enables the definition and communication of identified strategies, performance plans, measures and targets that are to be pursued in the improvement of organisational performance. Figure 13-2 depicts the national planning, budgeting and reporting cycle.

15. The performance management process must enhance the formulation of strategic objectives, provide measures for performance and analyse and generate reports on organisational performance as well as align the people and culture towards achieving the set objectives. Performance reporting, both financial and non-financial, is therefore essential in measuring and quantifying organisational performance and compliance.

16. The accurate provision of financial information such as budgets, expenditures and revenues remains critical for the determination of the costs and efficiencies of programmes. On the other hand, the accurate provision of non-financial information such as outcomes and outputs is equally important for assessing the effectiveness and progress of the organisation.

17. Performance information must be appropriate and promote results-based management, where such results are measured against a determination of risk, success or failure and therefore are drivers to an adjustment to future-oriented strategies. Measurement of performance therefore ensures, inter alia, that:
   a. Civil oversight and control are enhanced.
   b. Organisational policy is complied with.
   c. Policy, planning, budgeting and reporting are aligned to ensure enhanced efficiency and effectiveness.
   d. Funding equates to measurable results.
   e. Information is utilised strategically to improve policy and funding choices.
   f. The defence value-proposition is defined and pursued.
   g. Individual employee performance and accountability are enhanced.
   h. Organisational and individual focus remains on the defence mandate and policy priorities.

18. Performance management has numerous facets which are broadly grouped to the following areas:
   b. Employee performance.

19. The selection of a performance management tool is critical and must allow for the full range of assessment, including assessing the organisation against the achievement of its objectives or required outcomes. The performance management tool must also provide the ability to assess and manage the performance of individual employees against their respective individual performance agreements which must be concomitantly aligned to organisational outcomes. In so doing, the employees will be aligned to the required outcomes of the organisation. Each area of performance management is continuously tested and evaluated in accordance with a cycle as depicted in Figure 13-3 below.

20. Monitoring and evaluation forms part of the overarching performance management process of the organisation as it is inculcated and integral to planning, not an add-on after-thought. Monitoring and evaluation findings must feed into the next plan-

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**Figure 13-3: Integrated Performance Management Cycle**
ning process so that new outcomes, outputs and performance baselines and indicators can be set.

21. Figure 13-4 depicts the monitoring and evaluation process and sub-processes that culminate in the required performance reports which enhance civil control and oversight.

RISK MANAGEMENT

22. Risks to organisational performance are identified during the annual planning phase and are then aligned to performance indicators and targets as set out in the annual performance plan. These identified risks are generally based on assumptions made during the planning phase.

23. The application of risk management during planning allows for the development of contingencies and a systematic approach to mitigation of the negative consequences of the materialising risks. When risks are properly identified, there is a correlation between the deviations from planned performance and the risks that were identified.

24. Progress on the mitigation of risks is reported on as a mechanism to monitor the minimisation of deviation from planned performance.

DEFENCE ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURING PRINCIPLES

25. The design and structure of the Defence Force must be informed by the defence mandate, mission, goals and tasks, coupled to defence doctrine. The policy, philosophy, concept and doctrine for defence structure management must thus enable rapid and responsible structure management throughout the defence organisation, including: the establishment, adjustment and alignment of structures under delegation by Service and Division chiefs.

26. Consequently, the Defence Act (Act No 42 of 2002) must be amended to provide a clear and considered mandate for the management of defence organisational structures. The following principles must be embedded in the amendment:

   a. The Head of Department and Accounting Officer must establish and maintain the defence macro-structure, under approval of the Minister as the Executive Authority. Such macro-structure will enjoy the force of policy.

   b. The defence macro-structure must be reviewed every five years, or if there are required changes to the Defence Force Establishment Table, or if there is any other amendment the Minister may deem necessary.

   c. The Minister retains the authority to open and close force structure elements and commission and decommission vessels, ships, aircraft, vehicles systems, combat systems and combat-support systems.

   d. The defence macro-structure must include:
      i. The mandate of each Service and Division.
      ii. The outputs for each Service and Division.
      iii. The post-structure threshold for each Service
and Division, inclusive of the Regular, Reserve and civilian components, and indicating thresholds of both active and non-active posts.

iv. A personnel budget ceiling of each Service and Division, expressed in the Rand value of a particular financial year.

v. As a general principle, at least 30% of active posts on the corporate force structure will be reserved for Reserves to rotate through. This number may be higher at unit level and lower at headquarters level.

e. Chiefs of Services and Divisions will:

i. Receive appropriate delegations to undertake organisational structure management within the context of composite guidelines and restrictions.

ii. Have own inherent capacity to administer own organisational structures within the context of given delegation, policy, guidelines and restrictions.

iii. Constantly pursue a balance between personnel, operating and capital costs.

iv. Remain aligned with the approved defence macro-structure.

v. Ensure sustainability of prescribed macro-capabilities and achieve set deliverables.

27. The Head of Department and Accounting Officer must enable the establishment of organisational structuring, internal controls, not limited to:

a. Establishing organisational structure management practices, procedures and standards.

b. Providing functional training on organisational structure management.

c. Ensuring quality control of defence structures.

d. Maintaining the necessary ICT system.

DEFENCE FORCE ESTABLISHMENT TABLE

28. The role, shape, size and footprint of the Defence Force must be determined as the firm basis for future defence planning and be expressed in a Defence Force Establishment Table. The Defence Force Establishment Table, informing the defence macro-structure, must provide at least the following information:

a. The name, nature and purpose of each force structure element.

b. An indication of the opening or closing date of the force structure element.

c. The envisaged readiness level of the force structure element.

d. The mixture of Regulars, Reserves and defence civilians in the force structure element.

e. An indication of the prime mission equipment of the force structure element.

f. The embedded support system within the force structure element.

29. The Defence Force Establishment Table excludes any temporary task force, temporary headquarters, group element or unit established by the Chief of the Defence Force for military exercises or operations.1

30. The Defence Force Establishment Table must be presented by the Chief of the Defence Force to the Minister on at least a five-yearly basis for approval. It must be a configured and controlled Defence Force document and must enjoy the force of policy. The achievement of the Defence Force Establishment Table, however, remains critically dependent on resources. Thus the Defence Force will continuously mitigate these resource constraints by adjusting the levels of readiness of force structure elements, as well as through a careful mixture of Regulars and Reserves within the ‘one-force’ approach.

31. Should the allocated or anticipated resources be insufficient to establish and sustain the capabilities required, adjustments to the defence requirement, the defence concept or the resource allocation (or a combination of these) will be required to establish a balance between intent and available resources.

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1 Defence Act, 2002 (Act No 42 of 2002), Section 12(2)(b).
INTRODUCTION

1. The rapidly changing strategic environment requires an agile and balanced military force that can execute its function in pursuit of national security in the most efficient and effective way possible, across the defence mission goals and tasks. Flexibility remains essential.

2. The defence design, structure, profile and footprint are critical for establishing affordability and therefore sustainability. The execution of the defence function is achieved through the integration of the force design, the supporting capabilities vested in the force structure, resources and efficient business processes. This integration is managed by the staff system and enabled by an integrated ICT system and a business process architecture tailored to defence needs and supported in its decision-making by an appropriate defence science, engineering and technology capability. At the highest level these functions are directed, orchestrated and controlled by the respective Chiefs of Staff Divisions. Units, across the different levels, must be structured for the required support capabilities necessary for the successful attainment of their respective tasks. The functional resource areas and the impact of transverse resource systems are depicted in the cross impact matrix below (Figure 14-1).

OVERARCHING DEFENCE SERVICE SUPPORT DOCTRINE

DEFENCE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT PRINCIPLES

3. Defence combat service support is an overarching function providing combat services with support across the full spectrum of conflict. It is the process of supplying combat services with resource support including equipment, facilities, consumables, personnel and finance support for the successful attainment of the defence mission, goals and tasks. In simple terms, defence combat service support includes health support, personnel resources, logistic resources, financial resources, organisation structure and the ability of the force to continually sustain and restore itself. Defence combat service support can only be a joint defence endeavour. This combat service support doctrine is applicable to all support functions and support commands. Combat service support will be provided within (Figure 14-2):
a. **5th Line Support.** Support from the industrial and commercial base of both national and international partners. This may include the national and international defence industry and various civilian institutions.

b. **4th Line Support.** Support from the deeper levels in the Defence Force, extending to static bases, mobilisation centres, depots and other static establishments in the rear area. The delivery of this support is a joint responsibility of both combat services and combat service support, and includes common and unique support.

c. **3rd Line Support.** Support from both static and mobile Defence Force capabilities deployed to shorten the lines of communication to deployed combat forces in the combat zone. In the SA Army, it would be the responsibility of the combat division to provide 3rd line support. This may include forward basing, preposition and forward mounting.

d. **2nd Line Support.** Intermediate support capability which is provided in the theatre of operations. In the case of the SA Army, it would be the responsibility of the brigade to provide a second line support.

e. **1st Line Support.** Organisation and organic support at the unit level, provided organisationally at unit level in the theatre of operations. The unit is required to provide support to its sub-units and lower organisations. In the case of the SA Army, 1st line support is organisationally provided at the battalion level.

4. The defence enterprise information system is a critical intervention to drive all combat service support. Combat service support remains critically reliant on such a transverse system.

5. The following common principles will guide all components of the defence combat service support system through centralised direction and decentralised execution:

   a. **Functional Authority.**
      i. Functional control is embedded in the respective staff division, which is responsible to plan, orchestrate, direct and control support through, inter alia, the provision of functional policy, doctrine, functional and competency standards and standardisation, and training curricula.
      ii. Functional authorities are responsible for the integration of functional doctrine with Defence Force doctrine, multinational doctrine and practices.

   b. **Functional Competency Authorities.** Functional competency authorities are, of necessity, appointed and mandated from both combat services and staff divisions to provide military certification for defence prime mission equipment, support equipment, munitions, personnel selection, and personnel competency certificates.

   c. **Combat Services.**
      i. Combat forces will have all necessary inherent support capabilities up to the battalion or equivalent level.

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**Figure 14-2: Direct Orchestrate and Control Support**
ii. Combat forces are, in turn, sustained by the intermediate and deeper level support structures.

iii. Combat services are responsible for their unique own 5th to 1st line support.

d. **Common Support.** Transverse support of a common nature, normally of significant quantity, will be provided through the command and staff capabilities of the Chief of the Defence Force. This may extend to, inter alia:

i. Setting of term and transverse procurement contracts.

ii. Management of common commodities and services.

iii. Facilities.

iv. Career management.

v. Pension management.

vi. Professional development training.

vii. Military tertiary education and development.

### DEFENCE SUPPORT AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

6. The National Executive provides strategic guidance on priorities and national interests. It further determines the National Defence Policy, and determines the quantity, quality and level of strategic national resources required (eg: oil, ammunition, strategic lift). This sustainment may be coordinated with international partners. At the national level, sustainment is planned and coordinated interdepartmentally with role-playing departments responsible for various national strategic resources and industry. The Defence Force is resourced according to the National Defence Policy. The Commander-in-Chief, together with the National Executive, consults on and determines the defence budget allocation. Funds are appropriated by Parliament by means of a vote.

### CONCEPTS TO ENHANCE DEFENCE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

7. The Defence Force is responsible, within resource guidelines set by the Executive, to ensure adequate and appropriate combat service support. The Defence Force is responsible for mobilising and preparing adequate defence personnel and to conclude contracts with the defence industry for product acquisition, services, maintenance, procurement, sustainment, movement and concentration of defence matériel.

8. The defence combat service support system must have the capability to support and sustain combat forces over protracted periods of time, over extended distances, in diverse and complex theatres and along multiple lines of communication. Given inherently long supply lines, planning must ensure the physical security of sustainment installations and lines of communication.

#### Expeditionary Support

9. Deployed forces must have joint and expeditionary sustainment capabilities that support the full spectrum of conflict, consistent with the joint operational concept. This requires a single, integrated, responsive, end-to-end distribution system, capable of interfacing with inter-agency and multinational capabilities.

#### Forward Basing, Preposition and Forward Mounting

10. The foundation of the expeditionary sustainment system is the maintenance of strategic, operational and tactical reserve
stocks and the pre-positioning (forward sustainment) of stock at identified land and sea positions in accordance with the operational requirements that may exist at a particular time.

**JI²M Support**

11. Defence will support its interdepartmental and inter-agency activities within the framework of the given mission.
   a. Within joint forces, the Joint Force HQ will be responsible to sustain its forces with regard to common items.
   b. The Joint Force HQ will also be responsible for equipment that is mission-specific but that is not part of normal service equipment.
   c. Combat services will provide own unique sustainment.

**Defence Reserve Stock Levels**

12. Defence must prescribe the level of reserve stocks to be maintained to support the spectrum of defence missions, goals and tasks. These must be able to support rapidly escalating force levels as the core force expands into the surge force. This includes:
   a. **Strategic Reserve Stocks.** Reserves that are determined by the full spectrum of potential threats to security. These reserves are maintained to bridge the gap between peace and national defence (mobilisation reserves, etc).
   b. **Operational Reserve Stocks.** Operational reserves are determined by risks emanating from foreseeable operational contingencies such as imminent military threats, regional disasters, regional instability, crime and domestic instability (health care, disaster relief, air supply, etc).
   c. **Tactical Reserve Stocks.** Tactical reserves are designed to achieve superiority during military engagements through the employment of operational and combat support units (support echelons, spare bandwidth, deployment-in-depth, etc).

**STRATEGIC RESOURCE ALIGNMENT**

13. Strategic alignment and convergence must be achieved between the various resource systems in order that common implementation approaches are adopted. Common approaches and processes are to be used to support both force preparation and force employment so that sustainable combat-ready forces are produced and employed. This entails the harmonisation of the approaches between the various defence resource systems:
   a. A **single defence plan** identifies the resources required to meet defence objectives. This defence plan ensures alignment between assigned objectives and allocated resources per programme. The single defence plan forms the basis for the consequent acquisition, utilisation and management of the allocated resources to ensure the successful execution of the defence mandate.
   b. The annual **Defence Budget Vote** appropriates funds to enable investment in defence resources in accordance with the authorised medium-term defence strategic business plan and programmes. The Defence Vote allocates funds (spending ceiling) to the main and sub-programmes, enabling the management of resources on inventory as well as the procurement of replacement and/or supplementary resources.
   c. While this single defence plan entails a process of **centralised strategic direction and functional authority**, the execution of the plan and the subsequent utilisation of the resources will be decentralised to ensure its effective, efficient, and economical management. The realisation of a credible force design and force structure for the Defence Force is dependent on the appropriate allocation of resources.
   d. **Support is a command function.** As such, commanders at all levels will be responsible, accountable and empowered to execute the plan through the management of all resources, the fostering of appropriate human skills and appropriate personnel, logistics and financial delegations and authorities.
   e. The **effective, efficient and economical utilisation** of such critical resources within each resource management system is of paramount importance to meet functional requirements.
   f. All resource systems must provide **management information** and advice to defence decisions makers. The information provided in each area must integrate with all other resource areas, using a **defence enterprise system**.
   g. **All commanders and managers must account** for their compliance with policy and performance against the defence plan and programmes on a quarterly and annual basis as prescribed in national legislation.
   h. **Internal controls, risk and performance management** must be an integrated aspect of each resource system.

**KEY DEFENCE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT TENETS**

**PRINCIPLES**

14. The Chief of the Defence Force must be capacitated by appropriate **professional and technical expertise** to man-
age and account for all defence resources allocated. The main divisions of defence resources are:

a. Personnel.
b. Intelligence.
c. Operations.
d. Logistics.
e. Planning.
g. Training.
h. Finance.
i. Specialist Staffs.

15. The defence resource management system will be compliant with all resource administration prescripts in statute and regulation.

16. The utilisation of defence resources must be audited and reported upon to the National Executive and the Legislature, as may be prescribed in law.

17. The general principle of transparency is espoused and will be pursued. Notwithstanding, care will be taken to provide, within the Rules of Parliament, for reporting on confidential aspects of the broader defence function.

DEFENCE ACCOUNTABILITY AND DELEGATION REGIME

Defence Accountability Concept

18. The Head of Department and Accounting Officer is accountable for all defence resources. Linked to the organisational renewal imperative hereunder, the current defence accountability concept must be re-assessed, and if necessary, adjusted in order that the Head of Department and Defence Accounting Officer is able to fully meet his or her statutory accountability responsibilities and obligations.

Defence Resource Delegation Regime

19. The current manner whereby responsibility, authority and accountability for resources are delegated from the Accounting Officer, across the entire defence organisation and down to the unit level, compromises military command and control, and specifically the integrity of the line of command. In accordance with the principles stated earlier in this chapter:

a. Due cognisance must be given to the unique nature of the Defence Force relative to the wider public service.

b. Commanders must have the necessary delegations to execute their assigned mandates, have commensurate responsibility and authority over all resources assigned, and must account for such resources.

20. In this instance, it is imperative that recognition is given throughout the wider public service that the military organisation is by nature a hierarchical one. Delegations, and concomitant responsibility, authority and accountability, must formally cascade down the command line, one step at a time, from each level of command to the next level of subordinate. Without this understanding, commanders cannot account for the performance of a subordinate against a delegation.

21. It is thus imperative that the Defence Act be urgently amended to provide for a comprehensive defence resource delegation regime in law, whereby powers and duties can be delegated down the command line – one step at a time along that line – with commanders at all levels being responsible and accountable for their resources.

22. The defence resource delegation regime must be embedded in and be enabled through the fully integrated and defence-wide enterprise system and its associated infrastructure.

Defence Enterprise Information System

23. An integrated defence enterprise information system, linked to the National Treasury’s Integrated Resource Management System, is required as the backbone information system to drive both defence administration and defence command and control. It must integrate and optimise all other defence information sub-system requirements and serve as a basis for ensuring standardisation, compatibility, connectivity and interoperability. It will be established as the foundation for all defence business processes and activities.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE DEFENCE FORCE

24. **Chief of Staff.** The Chief of Staff will, within the defence staff system:

a. Assist the Chief of the Defence Force in the following capacities as:

   i. **Organiser.** The Chief of Staff, as organiser, directs the activities of the staff towards the results and plans all the necessary resources.

   ii. **Administrator.** The Chief of Staff, as administrator, performs operative management to ensure the normal flow of all the processes of the staff divisions, as well as proportional distribution of the resources and overseeing their effective use.

   iii. **Manager and Leader.** The Chief of Staff, as manager and leader, implements the integration of staff issues, when the work of the staff members will be encouraged and directed towards the results.

b. Support the Chief of the Defence Force in the deci-
sion-making process by integrating and coordinating the activities of the allocated staffs.

c. Coordinate the work of the staff divisions by giving clear direction and setting priorities, thus in effect acting as the "programme director".
d. Impose order within the headquarters, arbitrate any disputes between members of the staff, facilitate the workflow between the staffs, communicate decisions to all members of the staffs and provide for the management of the veracity of all management information pertaining to information emanating from supporting staffs.

25. Planning. The Chief of the Defence Force’s planning staff will set strategic direction through the establishment of outcomes, outputs and targets, which in turn enable planning and the allocation of resources, including:

b. Defence Force Planning. Directing, orchestrating and controlling the annual Defence Force planning process, which will in turn support the delivery of the defence strategy by articulating the strategic outcomes required and allocating outputs and targets to programme and sub-programme owners. This is achieved through annual planning guidelines that inform the next annual planning process.
c. Annual Strategic Environmental Analysis. An annual disciplined military appreciation process to assess the strategic environment for purposes of informing both strategy and planning.
e. Defence Capabilities. Planning the capabilities required to meet defence objectives, desired operational outcomes and effects. Defence capabilities are made up of force elements (ships, aircraft, combat forces and other force enablers) with associated personnel, training, equipment, logistics, information, infrastructure, concepts, doctrine and organisation. This will be expressed formally as the Chief of the Defence Force’s Force Design.
f. Performance Monitoring, Risk and Evaluation. Planning is further the process owner for performance and risk management to ensure that the Defence Force meets stated outcomes.
g. Performance Reporting. Performance reporting will be achieved through a quarterly performance and risk report showing progress in implementing Defence Force outcomes, outputs and targets set out in the defence plan, and an annual audited report of the performance of programmes and sub-programmes against the defence plan.
h. Cluster Management. Timeous and relevant Defence Force reports and policy inputs to the cluster system.
i. Defence Structure Management. The establishment and the maintenance of an effective Defence Force structure management service that directs enterprise business processes and structures that are supportive to the implementation of the Department of Defence Strategy.

26. Personnel. The Chief of the Defence Force’s personnel staff will:

a. Set the Defence Force’s personnel philosophy, policy, strategy and doctrine.
b. Discharge personnel management duties prescribed in:
   i. Part 2 of Chapter 5 of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act No 1 of 1999), the annual Division of Revenue Act and the Treasury Regulations.
   ii. The Public Service Act, 1994 (Act No 103 of 1994) and Public Service Regulations.
c. Coordinate the execution of any other statutory personnel obligations placed on the Chief of the Defence Force.

27. Logistics. The Chief of the Defence Force’s logistics staff will:

a. Set logistics philosophy, policy, strategy and doctrine.
b. Assist the Chief of the Defence Force by discharging logistic management duties prescribed in Part 2 of Chapter 5 of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999, the annual Division of Revenue Act and the Treasury Regulations.
c. Coordinate the execution of any other statutory logistic obligations placed on the Chief of the Defence Force.

28. Information and Communication Systems (ICS). The Chief of the Defence Force’s ICS staff will:

a. Set the Defence Force’s ICS philosophy, policy, strategy and doctrine.
b. Discharge ICS management duties prescribed in:
   i. Part 2 of Chapter 5 of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999, the annual Division of Revenue Act and the Treasury Regulations.
c. Coordinate the execution of any other statutory ICS obligations placed on the Chief of the Defence Force.
29. **Finance.** The Chief of the Defence Force’s finance staff will:
   a. Set the Defence Force’s finance management governance, philosophy, policy, strategy and doctrine.
   b. Discharge finance management duties prescribed in Part 2 of Chapter 5 of the Public Finance Management Act, 1999, the annual Division of Revenue Act and the Treasury Regulations.
   c. Coordinate the execution of any other statutory finance obligations placed on the Chief of the Defence Force.

30. **Inspector General.**
   a. The Inspector General is responsible for the independent investigation, evaluation and assessment of:
      i. Training.
      ii. Economy, effectiveness and efficiency.
      iii. Morale.
      iv. Readiness.
   b. The Inspector General will provide certificates of compliance related to the above evaluations and assessments.
   c. The Inspector General will determine the anti-fraud and anti-corruption strategy and will investigate any alleged irregularities. The Inspector General will provide functional inspection of service training for all Combat Services and Staff Divisions.
   d. The Inspector General will determine compliance with national legislation in respect of Occupational Health and Safety.

31. **Defence Personnel.**
   a. Defence personnel comprises the Regular component, the Reserve component, the Civilian Component of the Defence Force, the Defence Secretariat and the Ministry of Defence, as well as any member of an Auxiliary Service that may be established in terms of Section 16 of the Defence Act, 2002 (Act 42 of 2002).
   b. This definition recognises that uniformed and civilian personnel are not the same, but acknowledges that Defence Civilians serve a unique organisation that makes unique demands on individuals, which are not experienced by other civilians in the Public Service.
   c. All defence personnel must fall under unified legislation that provides for one service dispensation for all and which is overseen equitably by the Defence Service Commission.

32. Defence personnel are a key resource, the level and quantity of which are determined by the defence mission, goals and tasks, the derived force structure and post establishment table, and an appropriate balance between rank and salary levels.

33. A single, comprehensive, and rigorous personnel system will be established that can be tailored to requirements and that is capable of delivering support to both internal and external operations from the 5th to the 1st line of support, in accordance with defence combat service support doctrine.

34. The ‘one-force’ concept seeks to ensure that Defence is supported by the most sustainable, effective, integrated and affordable balance of Regulars, Reserves, Defence Civilians and auxiliaries.

### REQUIREMENT

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### DEFENCE PERSONNEL SYSTEM


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**DEFENCE PERSONNEL SYSTEM**

**DEFINITION OF TERM**

31. **Defence Personnel.**
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   b. This definition recognises that uniformed and civilian personnel are not the same, but acknowledges that Defence Civilians serve a unique organisation that makes unique demands on individuals, which are not experienced by other civilians in the Public Service.
   c. All defence personnel must fall under unified legislation that provides for one service dispensation for all and which is overseen equitably by the Defence Service Commission.
These core elements are supported by support elements, namely that of Personnel Policies and Processes, Personnel Technology, Personnel Functionaries, Commanders/Managers and the Personnel Budget. As indicated in the diagram the core elements of the personnel function are interlinked and cannot exist in isolation. This integrated approach is supported by the indicated support elements to ensure an effective, efficient and economic personnel function for defence (Figure 14-3).

36. The defence personnel system will focus on the organisational requirements of defence and will ensure well-managed and -administered and capable defence personnel through the application of sound defence personnel practices. It will enable force provisioning, force preparation and force employment through pursuit of the ‘one-force’ principle by establishing an appropriate balance between the Regular component, Reserve component, defence civilians and auxiliaries through tailored personnel-feeding systems.

37. The system must further:
   a. Support local, distant, dispersed and extended operations.
   b. Support participation in international operations.
   c. Accord equal priority to all defence strategic goals and strategic tasks.
   d. Comply with the national regulatory framework, government priorities, internal governance and stakeholder requirements.
   e. Maximise personnel outputs while minimising costs.
   f. Reduce personnel risk to as low a level as reasonably practicable.

38. **Personnel Management Principles.** The personnel system must be based on the following principles. It must:
   a. Comply with the relevant prescribed provisions of the regulatory framework.
   b. Pursue the execution of the defence strategy.
   c. Reinforce the competent management of personnel as a command responsibility, duly assisted by quality personnel functionaries to provide specialist advice and guidance and the execution of day-to-day personnel functions.
   d. Be comparable to military best practices found in defence forces across the world.
   e. Be flexible to meet both defence operational requirements and the needs of individual defence members.
   f. Ensure functional alignment with the defence structural design across a four-tier system.
   g. Be directed towards the continuous capacity-building and empowerment of all defence members through soundly planned and executed education, training and development opportunities.
   h. Place the ‘right person in the right post at the right time’, thereby establishing an optimal organisational fit between people and structures.
   i. Possess appropriate technology to facilitate accountable, productive, effective, efficient, economical and transparent personnel management.
   j. Recognise and reward appropriate individual and group performance.
   k. Apply corrective measures to improve undesired levels of performance.
   l. Reflect constitutional values, aspirations and adherence to the principles of equity and equal opportunities, values and diversity, and strive to eradicate all forms of discrimination through:
      i. An enabling transformation environment.
      ii. Compliance with legislative prescripts and imperatives.
      iii. Affirming equity and diversity management and eradicating discrimination.

**DEFENCE PERSONNEL BUDGET THRESHOLD**

39. In order to achieve sustainability of the organisation as a whole, the ‘compensation for employees’ component of the budget will not exceed 40% of the annual allocation to defence. In most environments, at least 8% of the personnel budget will be ring-fenced and dedicated to the development and utilisation of the Reserve component, but escalating in the contingency of higher levels of operational readiness.

40. Milestone 4 of the Defence Strategic Trajectory envisages a personnel component of approximately 189 000 Regulars, Reserves and defence civilians, of which:
   a. 90 000 (48%) Regular members.
   b. 82 000 (43%) Reserve members.
   c. 17 000 (9%) defence civilians.

41. Notwithstanding the above, the day-to-day strength of the Defence Force may reflect a Reserve to Regular ratio in favour of the Regulars. This may especially be true in certain service delivery elements or where specialist mustering and professions are found.

42. The post structure and personnel budget for any Auxiliary Service will be established by the Minister.

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1. This figure excludes the civilians employed in the Defence Secretariat and the Ministry of Defence.
DIRECT DEFENCE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

43. The strategic direction for defence personnel management will be centralised, while the execution of personnel management will be decentralised. Defence personnel management will be institutionalised as a command function, with full responsibility, accountability and authority fixed by clear delegation to the lowest appropriate level, supported by a comprehensive defence enterprise system.

44. The Chief of the Defence Force’s personnel staff are responsible to plan, orchestrate, direct and control personnel matters through, inter alia, the provision of personnel policy, doctrine, functional and competency standards and standardisation, and training curricula. This will be achieved through:
   a. Establishing an appropriate and relevant personnel regulatory framework.
   b. Integrated planning, consolidated reporting, internal controls and risk management.
   c. Determining personnel output objectives and directing strategic resource allocation.
   d. Positioning the civilian education sector and military education and training institutions to support the development of defence members.
   e. Determining strategic, operational and tactical personnel reserves through a risk-based approach to ensure that the demand and supply of defence personnel are affordably reconciled.
   f. Determining employment systems characterising the unique requirements of defence.
   g. Establishing an integrated personnel risk management system and process.
   h. Establishing labour and service relations appropriate to the unique attributes of defence.
   i. Establishing a grievance system at all levels of the organisation.

45. Defence will develop and implement its personnel strategy through personnel sub-strategies that specifically address the following:
   a. Integrated corporate personnel support plans coupled to the medium-term strategic framework and the medium-term expenditure framework.
   b. Rigorous governance, compliance monitoring, risk management and appropriate wellness programmes.
   c. Individual and organisational performance management with a jeopardy and reward system in performance monitoring that enhances accountability and responsibility.
   d. Updated personnel regulatory framework, policies and personnel delegations in support of all personnel functions.
   e. Empowered line managers, commanders and personnel functionaries in all defence subsystems and functions.
   f. Appropriate resilience interventions for defence personnel.

EXECUTE DEFENCE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

46. Combat services, combat support services and units at all levels will execute their own personnel management. Personnel and financial delegations, organisational capabilities and information systems will be cascaded to the lowest appropriate levels within the Defence Force, but not beyond the unit level. To this end, personnel management capabilities will be embedded up to the unit level, but will not extend to sub-unit and sub-sub-unit level.

DEFENCE PERSONNEL INFORMATION SYSTEM

47. The defence personnel information system must be based on a single, rigorous, comprehensive and suitably tailored personnel process. The personnel information system will be a seamless component of the defence enterprise system, enhancing effectiveness, efficiency, economy and integrity and providing (inter alia):
   a. Real-time personnel information.
   b. Real-time fault diagnostics.
   c. Optimal personnel data integrity.
   d. Automated personnel accounting.
   e. Automated personnel reporting.
   f. Personnel administration.
   g. Personnel payments.
   h. Military education, training and development enablement.
   i. Interfacing with other corporate and national information systems
   j. Work scheduling.

48. The personnel information technology system will support the total value chain of personnel management processes (workflow) and includes the implementation of a new generation electronic capability that:
   a. Focuses on business process requirements.
   b. Automates the bulk of repetitive tasks and eliminates waste in the process.
   c. Significantly reduces reliance on paper-based operations.
d. Simplifies application processes at client level, ensuring effective data validation at the point of entry.

**ACQUISITION OF DEFENCE PERSONNEL**

49. Defence will pursue improved marketing, recruitment, selection and appointment processes for all its service systems. The annual recruitment of personnel will be driven by the approved defence establishment table, personnel turnover tendencies and the specific requirements of corps and musternings. To prevent excessive growth of the Regular component, annual intakes must be based on the annual attrition rate.

50. Targeted country-wide recruitment campaigns, designed to meet the rejuvenation requirements of both the Regular and Reserve components, will focus on: a balance between rural and urban areas; top scholars from both secondary and tertiary education institutions; and building awareness amongst youth in specific target areas.

51. In order to ensure that the personnel quality base is appropriate and meets the profile requirements, recruitment will be executed in a decentralised manner by Combat Services and Staff Divisions. A pool of professional recruiters will be established per combat service. In some exceptional instances recruitment may be decentralised to unit level, particularly so in the instance of extremely specialised environments and the Reserve units.

52. Recruited members will adhere to the health, age, fitness, intellectual and other standards of the Defence Force, and as may be appropriate to the specific corps or mustering.

53. Focused and directed recruitment of young men and women with leadership attributes will be key to the effectiveness of the future Defence Force. To this end:
   a. Appropriate selection criteria and instruments will be used that focus on the candidate’s leadership abilities.
   b. A dedicated officer selection programme will be established.
   c. The priority for the recruitment of potential leaders will lie with those candidates already in possession of a tertiary qualification. A grade 12 exemption certificate will however be the minimum requirement to enter the system as an officer cadet.

54. The post profile of the non-leader group will determine the minimum academic qualifications as this may vary between musternings.

55. This will be augmented by the direct probationary appointment of qualified professionals into the Regular and Reserve components. To this end the University Reserve Training Programme, as part of the Reserve Training System, will be used to acquire specialist and scarce skills.

56. Annual and separate intakes will feed the Regular and Reserve components respectively.

**DEFENCE CAREER MANAGEMENT**

57. Career management will be managed by the Combat Services and Staff Divisions through a standardised career management process that aligns organisational requirements with individual career development or progression. Defence will ensure clear career-pathing and development programmes per mustering and speciality. To this end, a clearly defined corps (or mustering) post profile and person profile will support the career management process, including the identification of stages for exiting the Defence Force.

58. The quality of defence personnel will be enhanced through dedicated remunerative and non-remunerative initiatives to acquire and retain scarce skills. Academic qualifications and scarce skills in both the Regular and Reserve components will be recognised and incentivised.

59. The following principles will be pursued to enhance defence career management:
   a. Career and succession planning promotes the transfer of skills and competencies.
   b. A synergetic relationship is created between individual career plans and workplace skill plans with individuals taking co-responsibility for their own career management and development.
   c. Career paths are effectively communicated and individual career plans are regularly updated and compiled in consultation with the member or employee.
   d. Succession plans are available two years in advance.
   e. Commanders and line managers are actively involved in the career management process.

**MAINTENANCE OF DEFENCE PERSONNEL**

60. The effective retention of defence personnel requires an established and comprehensive day-to-day personnel maintenance system. To this end the following principles will be pursued:
   a. Defence personnel processes both support and are informed by the defence regulatory framework and defence personnel policies.
   b. Defence members are supported by an accessible personnel maintenance system. To this end:
      i. E-personnel will be pursued.
      ii. Individual personnel transactions will be executed promptly and accurately.
iii. High-volume and repetitive personnel transactions are performed against a measurable standard.

iv. Pro-active personnel processes and transactions are executed where possible and applicable.

c. A zero tolerance on negative audit findings is maintained.

DEFENCE PERSONNEL SEPARATION

61. The Defence Force will be maintained as a young, healthy and fit organisation. Due to its unique composition, the Defence Force cannot offer a life-long career to all of its members. Defence members will therefore be afforded opportunities throughout their defence career to prepare and qualify themselves for a second career as useful citizens in the mainstream economy of South Africa. Personnel separation will thus be integrally linked with a defence member’s career pathway and associated service contract.

62. A dignified, attractive exit mechanism will be developed to provide the process of severance with members at specified career gateways. Notwithstanding, and for a variety of reasons, the services of certain defence members may be required for a period that surpasses their designated retirement age. An amendment to the Defence Act (Act No 42 of 2002) and a consequent policy system are required whereby the services of such defence members may be extended with the approval of the Minister as the Executive Authority.

63. A government-wide mechanism must be found to exit members who no longer meet their post profile requirements due to age, health, fitness or competence standards. This may include:

a. Being exited in a dignified and sensitive manner.

b. The transfer to other government departments where such members may be more effectively utilised.

c. Ongoing support to such members in their transition and exit.

64. Personnel separation will be decentralised to the combat services. The following principles will be pursued in the separation of defence personnel:

a. Defence maintains a system to prepare defence members for their transition to a second career (Transition Assistance Programme) through assisted labour market entry at identified exit stages.

b. Placement assistance offices and other mechanisms and agencies assist defence members in finding employment opportunities.

65. A seamless migration from the Regular component to the Reserve component must be ensured. On separation, defence members may volunteer to be retained as members of the Reserve component, in which they are available for service on a part-time basis, or move to the membership of the military veterans and are placed on the National Reserve.

WIDER SPECTRUM OF DEFENCE ‘RANK AND SCALE’

66. In order to prevent the natural tendency of ‘rank inflation’, salary will be decoupled from rank and a far broader salary scale will be implemented in each rank.

COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH PROGRAMME

67. In as much as government has a responsibility to maintain a healthy force, individual defence members have a corresponding responsibility to meet the health and fitness requirements of the Defence Force. To this end, the Defence Force shall institute a revised comprehensive health programme whereby biannual health assessments are conducted with all members, regardless of age or rank. Bearing in mind gender, age and matters such as disabilities, each defence member shall:

a. Undergo a fitness evaluation.

b. Undergo a body mass index evaluation.

68. The standards for the above shall be set in regulations. Defence members not complying to the set standard will be given opportunity to remedy any non-compliance. Continual non-compliance will result in dismissal from the Defence Force.

69. In addition to the above, the involvement of defence members in sport and allied activities shall be encouraged as a further mechanism toward maintaining the health of the force.

a. As part of the professionalisation of the physical training, sport and recreation function, it is proposed that the Defence Force establishes a sports capability or sports regiment, which will be a high-performance, professional capability. This will be part of a retention and development strategy for athletes from disadvantaged backgrounds who have the potential to develop into Olympic-level athletes. This requires dedicated funding from National Treasury based on collaboration between the Defence Force, Sport and Recreation South Africa (SRSA) and the South African Sports Confederation and Olympic Committee (SASCOC).

b. Establishment of this capability will enhance the capacity of the Defence Force to engage communities in developmental initiatives such as the promotion of youth development through leadership programmes centred on sports, physical education,
adventure and recreation. The qualified services of sport officers and physical training instructors would be instrumental in presenting youth and cadet camps. This will serve to enhance social cohesion and also to "grow own wood".

PERSONNEL PRIORITIES

70. Personnel short-term priorities:
   b. Service Systems. Establish service systems that sustain the feeder system of both the Regular and Reserve components.
   c. Recruitment and Appointments Across Career.
      i. Appoint only specialist and qualified persons in posts, other than learner/student posts (correct mustering and qualification). Unsuitably qualified serving personnel to be placed supernumerary if no suitable post is available.
      ii. Personnel Service Code (PSC) to allow appointment of trainee civilian engineers and technicians once they have applied for Engineering Council of South Africa registration.
   d. Remuneration.
      i. Establish sustained non-remunerative measures that support defence member retention.
      ii. Establish remuneration conditions of services and benefits that reflect the uniqueness of the military and which are aligned with market trends.
      iii. Establish a flexible remuneration system that makes provision for broad-banding and limits rank inflation by de-linking rank from salary.
   e. Exit Mechanisms.
      i. Establish a 'rank-age policy', linked to corps and mustering requirements, that directs individual career paths and exit stages of defence members.
      ii. Introduce longer minimum 'time in rank' for senior officers across all race groups. Establish and map career paths that identify specific appointments en route to senior appointments. This must be applied within a career progression pyramid system at ages 30, 40 and 50. This is for the Regular component only.
      iii. Establish an attractive exit mechanism, including an appropriate benefit structure, to support the exiting of defence members at identified points.
   f. Training of Commanders. Introduce a “functional command and management” course for non-self-accounting and accounting units that must be completed prior to taking up a command appointment.

71. Personnel longer-term priorities:
   a. The inadequate and fragmented defence personnel management strategy, policy and system must be repositioned to provide adequate personnel strategic direction to the support of the defence mission, strategic goals and strategic tasks.
   b. On-going review of personnel delegations.
   c. On-going simplification of personnel processes and the elimination of non-value-adding activities in the execution of personnel management.
   d. Reintroduction of specialist personnel practitioner training at all levels to ensure efficient, effective and economical personnel management.

THE RESERVE COMPONENT OF THE ‘ONE FORCE’

REQUIREMENT

72. The Reserve component as contemplated in the Defence Act2 will be an integral element of the 'one force' and will be optimised to deliver assured capabilities for all defence goals and tasks.

73. The Reserves will provide a cost-effective mechanism for capacitating the Defence Force for operational surges, sustenance of protracted operations and major combat operations as well as providing specialist and scarce skills not normally found in defence. Reserves will also serve at all levels of command and management.

TENETS

74. The Reserve component will harness the widest pool of societal talent for defence and will uphold a volunteer ethos. It will be sustained by formal governance mechanisms and safe-
guards and be appropriately and equitably resourced.

75. The Reserve component will be integral to the design and structure of the Services as well as their development trajectories. As such, Reserves may also be constituted as fully fledged stand-alone design or structure elements under command of a higher order single Service or joint headquarters. Extensive use will be made of Reserves in all staff divisions at all levels of the Defence Force. The Reserves will provide a cost-effective specialist and scarce-skill capacity to the Defence Force.

76. Whilst the Reserves are part of the ‘one force’, their management will be approached and tailored with an understanding of their unique and specific requirements. In the final outcome, however, the Reserves will conform in every respect to the professional military competency required of their Regular counterparts.

77. Reserve units will be spread throughout South Africa so as to enable access to reserve service by citizens in both urban and rural areas. Reserve units will also provide a platform for the Defence Force to contribute to ordered developmental tasks. Specialist skills vested in the Reserves will be applied internally, as ordered, to the developmental needs of urban, peri-urban and rural communities, and to external post-conflict reconstruction and development operations.

PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING

78. The Reserve component will be formally provided for within the defence programmes and sub-programmes, with funding linked to specific outcomes. These outcomes are to be quantified as measurable targets for each Service and Division and will be reflected in strategic and annual performance plans as well as in the performance agreements of commanders.

79. The relative size of the Reserve component remains dependent on the strategic situation but, nonetheless, must be able to meet the required development trajectory capacity requirements and the capacity forecast requirements for operations and other defence tasks and activities. The Reserves will therefore be organised, staffed, equipped, trained and maintained at appropriate levels of readiness.

80. The Reserve component will be quantified by means of an establishment table and a post structure that will be reflected on the defence structure management system, enabling costing and resource allocations in accordance with readiness requirements.

81. Personnel acquisition for the Reserves will be provided at Service-level by programmes that include the following: an initial military intake stream focused on recruitment of South African youth; focused direct recruitment of professionals and specialists; a University Reserve Training System at tertiary education institutions; and the translation of members leaving the Regulars as well as members from the former statutory and non-statutory forces that volunteer to join the Reserve component.

82. The training outcomes required by the overarching defence education, training and development system will remain equally relevant for the Reserve and Regular components. However, the methodology used in achieving the same will be structured and delivered in a manner that caters for Reserve-unique aspects.

83. Measures will be taken to involve business and state entities in assisting young reservists with employment opportunities. Vocational skills development in collaboration with the Sector Training Authorities (SETAs) and job placement of the members will be an on-going activity. This will be decentralised to Service-level with outsourcing contracts awarded to reputable companies that specialise in these services.

84. Additional supporting legislation to enhance the Reserve service system, including an update of the moratorium clauses in legislation to protect members from discrimination by employers and legislation that enables employer benefits for supporting Reserve service, will be reviewed, amended, developed and promulgated.

DEFENCE LOGISTICS SYSTEM

REQUIREMENT

85. Defence logistics is the integrated series of processes required to ensure the availability of matériel, facilities and services, as well as the movement of matériel and personnel, in support of defence operations from the 5th to the 1st line of combat service support.

a. This requires enhanced logistics interoperability, based on the establishment of a single integrated logistic information system and a single defence logistics process.

b. It implies vertical alignment with national and departmental direction and governance, and horizontal integration across the Defence Force, with a special emphasis on integration over the supply chain and lifecycle management of systems and assets.

86. Definitions. The following nomenclature is used in the context indicated hereunder:

a. Support. Manage defence capabilities throughout their total lifecycle.
b. **Sustain.** Maintain defence operating capabilities over a period of time.

c. **Maintenance.** Repair, servicing and overhaul of defence equipment to ensure it is in a serviceable condition to satisfy operating requirements.

d. **Maintain Defence Reserves.** Ensure the availability of resources (equipment and personnel) of appropriate quality and quantity as per reserve stock policy.

### DEFENCE LOGISTICS SYSTEM

87. A single, comprehensive and rigorous logistic system will be established that can be tailored to requirements and is capable of delivering combat service support to both internal and external operations in accordance with defence combat service support doctrine.

88. The logistic system must:

a. Enable force provisioning, force preparation and force employment through the provision of appropriate, ready and sustained logistics.

b. Enable jointness and interoperability.

c. Provide combat service support on a joint and multinational basis, yet recognising the uniqueness of systems operating on land, in the air, at sea and in the military health domain.

d. Integrate supply chain management, asset management, lifecycle management and quality management perspectives.

e. Consolidate reporting and planning.

f. Create a common Defence Force logistics language.

89. The system must further:

a. Support local, distant, dispersed and extended operations.

b. Support participation in international operations.

c. Accord equal priority to all defence strategic goals and strategic tasks.

d. Comply with the national regulatory framework, government priorities, internal governance and stakeholder requirements.

e. Maximise logistic outputs while minimising costs.

f. Reduce logistics risk.

### DIRECT DEFENCE LOGISTICS

90. Strategic direction for defence logistics will be centralised, while logistics execution will be decentralised. Defence logistics will be institutionalised as a command function, with full responsibility, accountability and authority being fixed by clear delegation to the lowest appropriate level, supported by a comprehensive defence enterprise system.

91. The Chief of the Defence Force’s logistics staff are responsible to plan, orchestrate, direct and control logistics through, inter alia, the provision of logistic policy, doctrine, functional and competency standards and standardisation and training curricula. This will be achieved through:

a. Integrated planning, consolidated reporting, internal controls and risk management.

b. Determining logistic output objectives and directing strategic resource allocation.

c. Managing common-use systems by a single point of responsibility so as to achieve efficiency and economy of scale through standardisation and consolidation.

d. Ensuring reserves for common commodities.

e. Positioning the defence industry, the private sector and defence institutes to support both defence lifecycle and supply chain management.

f. Determining strategic, operational and tactical reserve stock levels through a risk-based approach to ensure that the characteristics of demand and supply are affordably reconciled.

g. Supplying strategic direction to the execution of logistics.

### EXECUTE DEFENCE LOGISTICS

92. Combat services, combat support services and units at all levels will execute logistics. Logistic support capabilities will be embedded up to the unit level, but will not extend to sub-unit and sub-sub-unit level. Logistic and financial delegations, organisational capabilities and information systems will be cascaded to the lowest appropriate levels within the Defence Force, but not beyond unit level.

93. Logistic support will be executed as follows:

a. **5th line logistic support** from the national or international defence industry or through the National Reserve.

b. **4th line deeper level logistic support** from defence logistic depots and logistic units.

c. **3rd line deployable support**, including forward basing in the communication zone. (Typically at combat division level.)

d. **2nd line intermediate support** in the theatre. (Typically at brigade level.)

e. **1st line organisational support** from the units’ own internal support structures. (Typically at battalion level.)

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3 Includes movable, immovable and intangible inventory.
94. Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and military-off-the-shelf (MOTS) must be the first-order consideration in both acquisition and procurement. A pragmatic approach based on local procurement will be applied whenever it is the most cost-efficient method.

**DEFENCE LOGISTICS DOCTRINE**

95. Logistics doctrine will be informed by the defence mission, goals and tasks. Logistics doctrine will be based on defence doctrine and will deliver a single, rigorous, comprehensive logistics process, founded on best practice military logistics principles and philosophy.

**DEFENCE LOGISTICS INFORMATION SYSTEM**

96. The logistics information system will be a seamless component of the defence enterprise system. The logistics information system will enhance effectiveness, efficiency, economy and integrity in the logistics system, providing (inter alia):
   a. A proactive ‘push logistics’ approach from depots to operational areas.
   b. Real-time inventory and asset tracking.
   c. Real-time fault diagnostics.
   d. Optimal logistic data integrity.
   e. Automated logistic accounting.
   f. Automated logistic reporting.
   g. Asset and inventory management aligned with national prescripts.
   h. Supply chain management.
   i. Item identification and codification.
   j. Interactive and tracked electronic, technical and other documentation.
   k. Interfacing with other corporate and national information systems.
   l. Work scheduling.

**LOGISTICS EXPERTISE**

97. The logistician’s role is to analyse the mission of the force, calculate the requirements and determine how to meet the support requirements, advise the commander on the feasibility of alternative courses of action, support the commander’s selected course of action to the highest level possible, and warn the commander in time when this support is not possible.

98. The complexity and diversity of the logistic function require a wide variety of professional and specialist lifecycle and supply chain management personnel. Most of these are scarce skills and therefore specific measures will be taken to ensure their availability, including remunerative and non-remunerative means as well as intensive education, training and development programmes.

99. Special focus will be placed on ensuring the availability of appropriate, quality and competent logisticians through attracting, recruiting, educating, training, developing, retaining, motivating, correctly deploying and eventually redeploying sufficient competent logistics members.

**DEFENCE LOGISTICS PRIORITIES**

100. **Logistics short-term priorities.**
   a. **Logistics Information System.** Implementation of a single logistics information system as a seamless component of the broader defence enterprise system as the first and primary intervention.
   b. **Interim Measures.** In the immediate absence of the single logistic information system, and to the best extent possible, enhance:
      i. Logistic reporting, with particular reference to tangible capital assets, contingent liabilities and the understatement of accruals in the financial statements.
      ii. The Defence Asset Register for both moveable and immovable assets.
      iii. The Defence Lease Register.
      iv. The management of Defence Force assets in both foreign deployments and embassies, with specific reference to establishing procedures concerning procurement, sustainment and disposal in the foreign country and the accounting and reporting thereof.
      v. Supply chain management and the elimination of non-coherent practices.
   c. Introduce an operational supply support process.
   d. Dispose of surplus, redundant and unserviceable ammunition to improve safety and reduce fruitless accounting, warehousing and labour costs.
   e. Dispose of surplus, redundant and unserviceable equipment stock to reduce the cost of capital and reduce fruitless accounting, warehousing and labour costs.
   f. Acquire, as a matter of principle, commercial and military-off-the-shelf solutions as opposed to designed-to-purpose solutions.
   g. Increase equipment serviceability ratios through channelled increased funds to the operating budget, establishing more service contracts with industry and the recapitalisation of maintenance and repair institutions.
h. Migration from cash-based accounting to accrual accounting, including asset management up to unit level for moveable and immovable assets.

i. Devolve logistics management and procurement delegations and accountability to combat services and staff divisions to the lowest extent possible.

j. Establish a quality logistic governance, risk and compliance process.

k. Accreditation of all functional logistic training institutions.

l. Intervention to both enhance the training of Regular logistics and to draw on Reserve logistics, followed by the continuous improvement of the skills and capacity of logistics throughout the Defence Force, retention of scarce skills and the development of all logistic personnel.

101. **Logistics long-term priorities.**

a. The inadequate and fragmented defence logistics strategy, policy and system must be urgently addressed.

b. Internal capabilities and priority funding must be channelled and developed to halt and roll-back the disrepair of defence prime mission equipment, defence facilities and infrastructure.

c. Implement best-practice military supply chain and lifecycle management founded on a single logistic management information system.

d. Reduce Defence Force exposure to safety, health, environmental and quality risks which constrain operational sovereignty and lead to increased compliance or litigation costs.

e. Renew logistic capabilities, organisation, equipment, reserves, doctrine and knowledge.

**DEFENCE PROCUREMENT**

**Defence Procurement Policy and Doctrine**

102. The defence procurement system is a critical component of the defence logistic system and as such is a key resource area that will contribute to the effective, efficient and transparent spending of the defence budget.

103. Procurement policy and doctrine will be informed by the defence mandate, goals and tasks. The defence procurement policy and doctrine will be based on higher-order defence policy and doctrine and will deliver a single, robust, comprehensive, inclusive, transparent procurement process.

104. The defence procurement system must be capacitated and capable of delivering a defence procurement policy and doctrine (including research and development) that ensure compliance with governance and auditing requirements.

**Definition of Defence Procurement**

105. Defence procurement is the complete process of acquiring or obtaining personnel, matériel, services, or property from outside the Defence Force (by means authorised in pertinent directives) in support of operational requirements. It includes negotiating, contracting and purchasing.

**Defence Procurement Requirement**

106. Defence procurement will be managed in the manner as prescribed in the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (as amended) and the Treasury Regulations (as amended). Defence procurement specifically is responsible to:

a. Establish a single, comprehensive, tailor and robust procurement system that is capable of delivering fair, competitive, transparent, equitable and cost-effective procurement support to both internal and external operations in accordance with defence combat service support doctrine within the 5th to the 1st line of support.

b. Ensure that goods and services are procured and made readily available for defence officials to execute their respective roles and to dispose of inventory no longer required. Only certain defence officials shall be authorised and responsible to procure the required goods and services and/or sell goods no longer required.

107. The defence procurement system must achieve the following objectives:

a. Consolidate procurement planning, execution, control and reporting.

b. Enable force provisioning and re-provisioning, force preparation and force employment through the application of appropriate procurement services at all levels within defence.

c. Support local, distant and dispersed operations over extended lines of communication, including international operations.

d. Accord equal priority to all defence goals and tasks.

e. Achieve effectiveness, efficiency and economy in all procurement practices by:

   i. Strengthening of governance, risk, compliance and accountability (GRCA) processes that address the ethical and fiduciary prescripts.

   ii. Enabling Services and Divisions to function effectively through all phases of defence procurement, including: planning, execution,
controlling, reporting and accounting and compliance to broad-based black economic empowerment imperatives.

iii. Providing an inclusive multi-disciplinary procurement service to procure quality products and services at the best value cost.

108. When urgent operational requirements so dictate, the Defence Force must be given the latitude to take certain decisions which may deviate from national legislation. In instances when this is justified, condonement from the relevant approval authorities, such as National Treasury and the Auditor General, must be obtained.

109. Defence will report to National Treasury on defence procurement and the payment of suppliers.

**Direct Defence Procurement**

110. Strategic direction for the defence procurement management system will be centralised, while procurement execution will be decentralised to all Services and Divisions. Defence procurement will be institutionalised as a command function, with full responsibility, accountability and authority being fixed by clear delegation to the lowest appropriate level, supported by a comprehensive and integrated defence enterprise system.

111. The Chief of the Defence Force’s logistics staff are responsible to plan, orchestrate, direct and control procurement through, inter alia, the provision of procurement policy, doctrine, functional and competency standards and training curricula. This will be achieved through:

a. Integrated planning, consolidated reporting, internal controls and risk management.

b. Determining procurement output objectives and directing strategic resource allocation in conjunction with Service and Division Chiefs.

c. Managing common-user systems by means of a single point of responsibility so as to achieve efficiency and economy of scale through standardisation and consolidation.

d. Positioning the defence industry, the private sector and defence institutes to support defence supply-chain, lifecycle procurement and procurement management.

e. Procuring strategic, operational and tactical reserve stock levels through a risk-based approach to ensure that the characteristics of demand and supply are reconciled and managed efficiently, effectively and economically.

f. Supplying strategic procurement direction to the Services and Divisions.

**Execute Defence Procurement**

112. Services and Divisions will execute procurement. Procurement support capabilities will be embedded down to unit level, but will not extend to sub-unit and sub-sub-unit levels. Procurement delegations, organisational capabilities and information systems will be cascaded to the lowest appropriate levels within the Defence Force, but not below unit level.

113. Procurement support will be executed as follows and values are reflected in 2014 Rand terms and will be amended from time to time:

a. 5th line procurement support from National Treasury.

b. Extended 4th line deeper level procurement support to a delegated financial ceiling of R50m.

c. 4th line deeper level procurement support from the Central Procurement Service Centre (CPSC) and the Simon’s Town Procurement Service Centre (SPSC) with a delegated financial ceiling of R10m.

d. 3rd line intermediate deployable support, including forward basing in the communication zone from the Services’ procurement units with a delegated financial ceiling of R5m.

e. 2nd line intermediate support in theatre from relevant support bases with a delegated financial ceiling of R1m.

f. 1st line organisational support from the units’ own internal support structures with a delegated financial ceiling of R500 000,00.

114. For common sustainment, COTS requirements must be the first order consideration in the procurement process. MOTS can be considered in the second order. Bespoke (custom configuration) requirements for goods and services should always be the last option in the procurement process.

115. A pragmatic approach based on local procurement will be applied whenever it is the most efficient, effective and economic method. This does NOT necessarily mean the cheapest option in all cases. This approach will further enable and enhance the Defence Force’s contribution to the national developmental agenda.

116. Whilst transversal contracts are concluded by National Treasury, non-delivery or poor delivery impacts severely on the conducting of defence operations. Transversal contracts furthermore restrict the Defence Force’s contribution to the developmental agenda by limiting the goods and services that may be procured locally. The Defence Force requires a special dispensation from National Treasury so as to be able to guarantee the integrity of its operations and at the same time fully support its contribution to the developmental agenda.
Defence Procurement Information System

117. The procurement information system will be a seamless and integrated component of the defence enterprise system. The procurement information system will enhance effectiveness, efficiency, economy, transparency, integrity and simplicity in the procurement system, and will address:
   a. A ‘forward procurement’ approach.
   b. Real-time procurement systems and procurement process monitoring.
   c. Real-time fault diagnostics.
   d. Optimal procurement data integrity.
   e. Automated procurement accounting and auditing.
   f. Automated procurement reporting.
   g. Procurement management aligned with national prescripts.
   h. Supplier payment integrated with the supply chain management system according to national prescripts.
   i. Interactive and tracked electronic technical and other documentation.
   j. Interfacing with other corporate and national information systems.
   k. Work scheduling.

118. It is therefore critical that the defence procurement information system is based on a single, rigorous, robust, comprehensive, integrated and tailorable procurement management process.

119. Decentralised Execution.
   a. Procurement will be a logistic function closely supported by finance for supplier payments.
   b. Services and selected Divisions will establish their own comprehensive procurement management capabilities down to unit level.
   c. Services (including combat divisions, brigades, formations, bases and units) will manage and account for their own procurement resources.
   d. The functional command and control of procurement will be cascaded via the command line to the lowest level (unit level; not to sub-unit, or sub-sub-unit level).
   e. Collation of finance and procurement functions and systems will be sought to expedite defence supplier payments.

Defence Procurement Expertise

120. Due to the primary object of defence procurement being that of in-theatre support, the majority of defence procurement officials should be military personnel.

121. The complexity and diversity of the defence procurement system requires a wide variety of professional and specialist procurement management personnel. Most of these skills are scarce and specific, not only to defence, but also nationally and globally. Specific measures will therefore be introduced, including remunerative (occupation-specific dispensation) and non-remunerative methods, and intensive education, training and development programmes, to ensure their availability and correct placement.

122. Functional procurement training will be established for the education and training of procurement officials along a dedicated procurement learning path within the defence logistics career path. This training must be a continuous process to ensure capacitated and professional defence procurement practitioners.

123. Performance agreements for procurement personnel will follow the line of command.

Defence Procurement Priorities

   a. Implementation of a single procurement management information system as a seamless component of the broader defence enterprise system.
   b. Interim Measures. In the immediate absence of the single procurement information system, enhance:
      i. Procurement reporting, with particular reference to the procurement and payment of assets and contingent liabilities.
      ii. The Defence Procurement Register for the procurement and payment of both moveable and immovable assets.
      iii. The management of the procurement of Defence Force assets in both foreign deployments and embassies, with specific reference to establishing procedures concerning procurement and disposal in foreign countries and the logistic and financial accounting and reporting thereof.
      iv. Devolve procurement management, delegations and accountability to combat Services and Divisions to the lowest appropriate level.
      v. The establishment of organisational procurement structures with qualified procurement personnel to capacitate the Chief of the Defence Force and commanders at all levels to control defence resources and account therefore.
      vi. Rolling out a comprehensive system of procurement delegations to the lowest appropriate level in the Defence Force.
vii. Establish a quality procurement governance, risk and compliance process.
viii. Intervention both to enhance the training of defence procurement personnel and to draw on qualified Reserve component procurement personnel, followed by the continuous improvement of the skills and capacity of procurement personnel throughout the Defence Force, retention of scarce skills and the development of all defence procurement personnel.

125. Defence procurement long-term priorities.
   a. Implement best practice military procurement management founded on a single integrated procurement management information system that includes the migration requirement to accrual accounting.
   b. Establishment of the defence procurement regulatory framework.
   c. Elimination of all adverse audit findings in the defence procurement environment.

DEFENCE FINANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

REQUIREMENT

126. Defence finance is a key resource area. The defence budget will be determined by the defence mission, goals and tasks.

127. A single, comprehensive, tailorable and rigorous finance system will be established that is capable of delivering finance support to both internal and external operations in accordance with defence combat service support doctrine from the 5th to the 1st line of support.

DEFENCE FINANCE MANAGEMENT

128. Defence finance will be managed in the manner prescribed in the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (as amended) and the Treasury Regulations (as amended).

129. The finance management system must achieve the following objectives:
   a. Enable force provisioning, force preparation and force employment through the provision of appropriate finances.
   b. Consolidate finance planning, execution, control and reporting.
   c. Support local, distant, dispersed and extended operations as well as participation in international operations.
   d. Accord equal priority to all defence goals and tasks.
   e. Achieve finance effectiveness, efficiency and economy where reasonably practicable.
   f. Enable Services and Divisions to function effectively through all phases of defence finance management, including: planning, budgeting, execution, controlling, reporting and accounting.
   g. Provide inclusive and quality multi-disciplinary products and services at the best possible value.

130. Strategic direction for defence finance management will be centralised, while finance execution will be decentralised. Defence finance management will be institutionalised as a command function, with full responsibility, accountability and authority being fixed by clear delegation to the lowest appropriate level, supported by a comprehensive defence enterprise system.

131. The Chief of the Defence Force’s finance staff are responsible to assist the Chief of the Defence Force in discharging finance management duties, including: the exercise of sound budgeting and budgetary control practices; the operation of internal finance controls; and the timely production of finance reports.

132. The Chief of the Defence Force’s finance staff are responsible to plan, orchestrate, direct and control defence finance management through, inter alia, the provision of finance policy, doctrine, functional and competency standards and standardisation and training curricula. This will be achieved through:
   a. Integrated planning, consolidated reporting, internal controls and risk management.
   b. Determining finance output objectives and directing strategic resource allocation.

133. The Chief of the Defence Force’s finance staff are responsible for providing the Chief of the Defence Force with integrated staff oversight and control related to:
   a. The Defence Force estimate of expenditure for programmes assigned to the Defence Force.
   b. The Defence Force allocation.
   c. Defence Force finance reports.
   d. Defence Force financial statements.
   e. Contributing to defence submissions to Treasury.
   f. Ensuring the veracity of any Defence Force finance data in Cabinet memoranda.
   g. The Defence Force appropriation statement.
   h. Replies to Defence Force finance audit queries and audit reports.
   i. The Defence Force finance management system and structure.
   j. Defence Force finance management policies.
k. The Defence Force finance delegations framework.
l. Coordinating Defence Force personnel payments.
m. Defence Force supplier payments.
n. Defence Force finance control services.
o. Defence Force finance accounting services.

EXECUTE DEFENCE FINANCE MANAGEMENT

134. Decentralised Execution.
   a. Services and Divisions will establish own comprehensive finance management capabilities in accordance with the defence staff system.
b. Combat services and units at all levels will manage and account for own finance resources.
c. Such finance management capabilities will be embedded up to the unit level, but will not extend to sub-unit and sub-sub-unit level.
d. The functional control of finance will cascade to the lowest level via the staff line.

135. Procurement.
   a. Greater co-location of finance and procurement will be sought to expedite defence supplier payments.
b. Procurement will be a logistics function, of which finance will control supplier payments.
c. Logistic and finance delegations, organisational capabilities and information systems will be cascaded to the lowest appropriate levels within the Defence Force, but not below unit level. This requires that the delegations framework for logistics and finance be revisited to effectively support the concept.

136. Finance as a Combat Service Support Function.
Defence finance management will be executed as follows:
   a. 5th line finance management support from National Treasury, the Reserve Bank and other financial institutions.
b. 4th line deeper level finance support from the Chief Staff Finance and finance staffs at Services and Divisions.
c. 3rd line deployable finance management, including forward positioning in the communication zone. (Typically at division level.)
d. 2nd line intermediate finance management in the theatre. (Typically at brigade level.)
e. 1st line organisational support from the unit’s own finance management support structures. (Typically at battalion level.)

DEFENCE FINANCE MANAGEMENT DOCTRINE

137. Defence finance management doctrine will be informed by the defence mission and the spectrum of the strategic goals and strategic tasks. Finance management doctrine shall be based on defence doctrine and shall deliver a single, rigorous, comprehensive finance management process, founded on best practice military finance principles and philosophy.

138. A finance concept of operations must be established for campaign planning.

DEFENCE FINANCE INFORMATION SYSTEM

139. The defence finance information system will be a seamless component of the wider defence enterprise system, providing reliable real-time finance information, technology, networking and automation. The defence finance information system will enhance effectiveness, efficiency, economy and integrity in the financial system, providing (inter alia):
   a. Real-time finance management.
b. Real-time fault diagnostics.
c. Optimal finance data integrity.
e. Automated finance reporting.
f. Personnel payments aligned with national prescripts.
g. Supplier payment integrated with supply chain management.
h. Interactive and tracked electronic, technical and other documentation.
i. Interfacing with other corporate and national information systems
j. Work scheduling.

140. It is critical that the future defence finance information system is based on a single, rigorous, comprehensive and tailorable finance management process.

FINANCE EXPERTISE

141. Establishment of a Finance Corps. The defence finance management system is a core component of the defence combat service support which must be provided from the 5th line to the 1st line within the theatre of operations. This necessitates that the vast majority of defence finance officials are militarised. To this end:
   a. The intent is to re-establish a uniformed finance capability within the Defence Force as a deployable corps in support of successful defence operations.
b. A Finance Corps must be established with its unique personnel management and personnel development systems. A Corps Director will be established. Further corps managers will be established at the Service level, including being the finance capability manager for the particular service.

c. A Personnel Management Code (PMC) for finance must be established to manage finance officials.

d. Finance functional training, alongside defence formative and military training, will be established whereby finance officials will be educated and trained in the functional areas identified within a finance learning path focused on defence finance management practises and processes.

e. To this end, all previous military finance practitioners, irrespective of current mustering, must be offered the opportunity to militarise. This must be extended to include defence civilians with "CA" suffix currently serving in the Financial Management Division as finance functionaries.

f. A needs-analysis must be conducted to determine the military, formative and functional training required by members militarising. Such training must be built into the established career paths of members, without prejudice to the affected individuals.

g. The militarisation of the finance capability must be underpinned by addressing the contractual relationship of the Defence Force with such members, including, but not limited to: career-pathing, pension, group-life insurance, medical benefits and salary notches.

h. Those that do not wish to militarise may remain in the finance management system or their otherwise current career path outside of the finance corps as defence civilian employees.

i. An occupation specific dispensation will be pursued to obtain and retain such specialist staff, including remunerative and non-remunerative means as well as intensive education, training and development programmes.

ii. Agreements will be entered into with educational institutions to develop capable defence finance personnel into chartered accountants through specific training interventions.

b. Specific measures will be taken to ensure sustained availability of finance personnel, including remunerative and non-remunerative means as well as intensive education, training and development programmes.

c. Special focus will be placed on ensuring the availability of appropriate, competent finance officials through attracting, recruiting, educating, training, developing, retaining, motivating, correctly deploying and eventually redeploying sufficient competent finance personnel.

d. The continuous staffing of the finance management system will be achieved by rotating personnel within the Services and Divisions.

DEFENCE FINANCE MANAGEMENT PRIORITIES

144. Finance management short-term priorities.

a. Implementation of a single comprehensive finance management and control system as a seamless component of the broader defence enterprise system. This must be fully integrated with the logistic and procurement systems incorporating delegations to the lowest appropriate level in the Defence Force so as to ensure eventual accrual accounting compliance.

b. The establishment of organic finance structures and finance personnel to capacitate the Chief of the Defence Force and commanders at all levels to control defence resources and account therefore.

c. Rolling out a comprehensive system of finance, procurement and logistic delegations to the lowest appropriate level in the Defence Force.

d. The establishment of a Finance Corps.

e. Placing uniformed finance personnel where appropriate throughout the Defence Force.

145. Finance management long-term priorities:

a. Migration to the accrual financial system and the complete adoption of the Standard Chart of Accounts.

Meaning those defence members whose force number suffix changed from ‘PE’ to ‘CS’.
b. Elimination of all adverse audit findings in the finance field.
c. Establishment of the defence finance framework in legislation.

DEFENCE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

REQUIREMENT

146. Defence information is a strategic resource over which the Defence Force must exert complete control, ensure inviolable security and maintain absolute autonomy, this from the 5th to the 1st line of combat service support. Appropriate defence information and communication systems will be informed by the defence mission, goals and tasks.

147. The concept of ‘information as a strategic resource’ will drive all thinking on defence information management, hence the use of the term “information resource management”.

DEFENCE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEM PRINCIPLES

148. **Common Systems.** Common defence information and communication systems must be capable of delivering combat service support to both internal and external operations in accordance with defence combat service support doctrine. To this end the following principles will apply from the 5th to the 1st level of combat service support:

a. **Access to Defence Information.**
   i. Information and communication systems must enable access to relevant defence information required for the execution of functional tasks securely and efficiently, and when and where required by acquiring, accessing and distributing information to remote locations in a secure manner. Efficient secure connectivity must be established between sensors and military, corporate and common information and communication systems.
   ii. Defence must maintain autonomy in terms of providing access to its information and communications system infrastructure.
   iii. Accurate, quality, non-duplicated and relevant information must be available to authorised users in the correct form and format, and when required.

b. **Information and Communication System Security.**
   i. An aspect of modern warfare is the use of non-lethal weapon capabilities which invoke battle between adversaries for the exploitation and protection of information and communication systems. The protection of information as a strategic resource places emphasis on the requirement to develop a significant offensive and defensive capability to exploit and defend information systems.
   ii. The defence information and communication systems security architecture must be aligned across all systems to consistently maintain the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information.

   c. **Economic Optimisation.**
      i. Defence information and communication systems must be centred on modern, technologically-advanced, efficient and effective, yet affordable information and communication technology capabilities. Such capabilities are constrained by scarce financial resources and thus emphasis will be placed on overall value-for-money through administrative systems based on proven technology.
      ii. The development of shared defence information and communication systems will enjoy precedence over the duplication of systems with similar functionality. The emphasis will thus fall on a common information and communication technology architecture.
      iii. A balance between unique systems and COTS and MOTS must inform procurement considerations, with specific emphasis being placed on maintaining strategic capabilities and niche technology competence. A pragmatic approach based on local procurement will be applied whenever it is feasible to do so.

d. **Enabling Command and Control & Management Processes.**
   i. Defence command and control and administrative information systems must provide accurate, relevant and timely information to all levels of command during force preparation, employment and support activities with respect to every sphere of military business.
   ii. Information processing must synchronise and replicate information between geographical operational areas to maintain self-sustaining operating environments.

149. **Unique Systems.** Services and Divisions are responsible for the lifecycle management of own unique information and communication technology service delivery, maintenance and disposal.
DEFENCE INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATION SYSTEM OBJECTIVES

150. Information Resource Management. The management of information as a strategic resource extends to the planning, policy maintenance, strategic control and research and development of integrated information management services, including the lifecycle, archiving and configuration management of information.

151. Joint Information Systems Management. The concept of information as a strategic resource will drive future information systems management. Defence information requirements will be translated into joint information systems and infrastructure needed to meet such information requirements.

152. Joint Information Warfare. Joint information warfare seeks to both defend own information and communication systems against attack and to adversely influence the opposing forces’ use of their information systems. Good information system security protects own information systems against unauthorised access, whilst offensive actions will adversely influence the opposing forces’ utilisation of information systems.

153. Joint Information Communication Infrastructure Management. The management and technical support of the defence information and communication infrastructure extend to the lifecycle management of defence information product systems, technical support and interoperable, interconnected and standardised information technology infrastructure.

154. Spectrum Management. Spectrum management at an international and a national level extends to the coordination of spectrum usage with entities such as commercial spectrum users and government institutions. This requires efficient joint management of the radio frequency spectrum within the Defence Force.

155. Integrated Information Systems. Information system integration extends across defence enterprise information system portfolios through centralised strategic control and integration of defence enterprise information systems.

DEFENCE INFORMATION SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK AND STRATEGY

156. There are mandatory criteria and changes in the information and communication technology environment requiring an appropriate defence governance, risk and compliance regime conducive to the realisation of affordable and appropriate information and communication systems and technology.

157. A defence information and communication system interoperability framework must be established, maintained and aligned to ensure connectivity between defence administrative and command and control systems. Defence intellectual property related to the development of information and communication systems must be maintained and managed within this framework.

158. The defence information and communication systems strategy will address five strategic focus areas (Figure 14-4):
   a. Optimised value of the defence information and communication technology investment.
   b. Effective information and communication technology.

Figure 14-4: Strategic Focus Areas of Defence Information and Communication

SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE REVIEW 2015 14-23
DEFENCE RESOURCE SYSTEMS

c. Integrated information and communication technology enablement.
d. Professional information and communication technology organisation.
e. Secure and protected information and communication technology.

159. The five strategic focus areas are of equal importance.

DIRECT COMMON DEFENCE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

160. Strategic direction for common defence information and communication systems will be centralised, while the execution will be decentralised. The Chief of the Defence Force’s ICS staff are responsible to plan, orchestrate, direct and control common defence information and communication systems through, inter alia, the provision of logistic policy, doctrine, functional and competency standards and standardisation and training curricula. This will be achieved through:

a. Computing and communication technology.
b. Enterprise management systems.
c. Network-enabled command and control systems.
d. Defensive and offensive information warfare.
e. Providing strategic direction for the execution of ICS.

EXECUTE COMMON DEFENCE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

161. Defence ICS support will be executed as follows:

a. 5th line information and communication systems support from the national or international commercial sector or the defence.
b. 4th line deeper level information and communication systems support from within the Defence Force.
c. 3rd line deployable support from the Information and Communication Systems Command within the communication zone. (Typically at combat division level.)
d. 2nd line intermediate support from the Information and Communication Systems Command in the theatre. (Typically at brigade level.)
e. 1st line organisational support from the units’ own internal support structures. (Typically at battalion level.)

162. The Chief of the Defence Force’s ICS staff will provide common information and communication support transversely across the Defence Force and will be the information and communication prime systems integrator for the Defence Force across both common and universal/transverse systems. The staff will provide the operational management of defence information systems.

163. The Chief of the Defence Force’s ICS staff will further be responsible for the management of records as prescribed by the National Archives and Records Service of South Africa Act (Act No 43 of 1996) as amended, specifically Section 13 provisions regarding efficient records management in government, as well as the National Archives and Records Service of South Africa Regulations, Part V: Management of Records, which addresses the specific parameters within which government bodies should operate regarding the management of their records.

THE DEFENCE FOOTPRINT

DEFENCE FACILITIES

164. In fulfilment of its constitutional obligations, Defence utilises a large number of state facilities. This includes land for training and research purposes and fixed assets such as buildings, roads and runways for force preparation and employment. Defence is consequently one of the largest users of property in South Africa and controls land in each of the nine provinces. The defence property requirement stems from its core functions and activities. This ranges from the larger training areas, Army bases, Air Force bases and ammunition depots, to smaller properties such as communication sites, shooting ranges and even remote observation posts of only a few square metres.

165. Government owns most facilities utilised by defence. Such land is legally owned by the South African government with defence having a reservation of use, although the deeds are held by the Department of Public Works as the national custodian of all state land and facilities. Some defence land is defence endowment property transferred from the government of the United Kingdom in 1922, which is also classified as state land. Such property is governed by an Act of Parliament (Defence Endowment Property and Account Act, Act No 33 of 1922). The remaining infrastructure is generally leased from the private sector. Defence leases properties for shooting ranges, for forward airfields and for sites for the countrywide communication network. Defence also has “rights of use” agreements with land owners that allow certain land to be used for military purposes.

THE DEFENCE LAND REQUIREMENT

166. Defence currently has approximately 420 000 hectares of land under its control. This includes the following general categories, each being in itself a significant consideration in determining the size of defence properties. However, it should be noted that more than one of these activities could take place on portions of defence land:
a. **Training Combat Elements.** The specific combat element and role for which training is required (for example deployment of mechanised or motorised infantry in conventional, peace-support-operation or area-protection roles) will determine the area of land needed to train the force. This means that the area needed for training will be determined by the combat elements (or combination of combat elements) to be trained.

b. **Type of Training.** The types of training to be conducted also have an impact on the area of land needed for training. Smaller areas are required for dry training, field craft training and vehicle training than for training with live ammunition. A variety of geographical features and veld types should be present to simulate different scenarios within which skills are to be acquired.

c. **Expansions in Force Design and Development of new Weapon Systems.** Provision must be made for expansions in force design and the development of new weapon systems.

d. **Spatial Implications of Safety Templates.** The types of weapons and the combinations in which they are deployed have a profound influence on the area of land required. The safety arc for each weapon is clearly defined and must be strictly adhered to. Such safety templates form an integral part of any military area where armed training takes place. The size of a military base where armed training is performed is to a large extent determined by the ammunition used in training and the linked safety templates. The size of a military training area usually increases with the use of higher order ammunition, which requires larger safety templates.

e. **Base Areas, Administrative Areas, Maintenance Areas and Stores Depots.** The sizes of these facilities are to a large extent determined by the amount of infrastructure needed to perform these functions.

f. **Ammunition Depots.** Ammunition depots are used to store large quantities of defence ammunition. Variables that have an influence on the size of these depots include the types of munitions to be stored and the prescribed safety margins. Different types of munitions, for instance pyrotechnics and projectiles, are stored in separate bunkers for safety reasons. Clearly defined safety distances are maintained between bunkers, as well as on the perimeter.

g. **Weapon Ranges.** The size of weapon ranges is determined by the maximum application distance and safety arcs of weapons to be employed.

h. **Naval Bases.** The size of these facilities is to a large extent determined by the amount of infrastructure needed to perform their function and to allow for the training of personnel.

i. **Air Force Bases.** Apart from runways and infrastructure provision, a large number of variables, such as restricted air space, aerial approach zones, safety areas on the perimeter and radio frequency requirements, are taken into account in determining the size of an air force base.

j. **Telecommunication Installations.** A major consideration in determining the size of telecommunication installations is the required presence of a magnetically clear spectrum around the facilities.

k. **Rifle Ranges.** Rifle ranges are designed and established according to a set of clearly defined guidelines. Variables which might be present to play include land use activities on adjacent properties and the distance from residential infrastructure.

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167. The migration towards the Defence Blueprint Force Design means that the defence infrastructure footprint will have to be realigned according to South Africa’s defence needs. The Force Design will serve as the basis for determining defence facilities and environmental support requirements. The spatial dispersion of defence land and facilities will further be influenced by the pursuit of both a landward and a maritime defence strategy.

a. The establishment of new defence operational facilities must be pursued after a thorough assessment of both the geographical location and the security requirements of South Africa’s dispersed vital infrastructure.

b. Any expansion or reduction in the defence footprint would have to be executed in a responsible and strategic manner so as not to impact on defence capabilities and the operational readiness of the Defence Force. Surplus and redundant facilities will be surrendered to the Department of Public Works for alternative utilisation or disposal.

c. The number of leased defence properties must be reduced by translating the portfolio of leased properties to that of ownership of defence properties. This may, where possible, be pursued through alternate funding models, such as cooperation with the Public Investment Corporation (PIC) or Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) where possible within the relevant framework established by National Treasury.

168. The Chief of the Defence Force’s logistic staff will establish a comprehensive Defence Facility Strategy that will address the defence footprint requirement. In so doing new ways may be explored to manage defence facilities in a consolidated and proactive manner, including co-use and cooperation agreements.
169. Defence strives to achieve efficiency and effectiveness in the use of facilities and has achieved a considerable reduction in its footprint by surrendering unused land to the Department of Public Works. The Government Immovable Asset Management Act (Act No 19 of 2007) has emphasised this matter and defence strives to comply therewith. Since 1986, defence has consequently returned approximately 311 000 hectares of land to the Department of Public Works, largely as a result of a reduced defence posture, internal rationalisation, restitution claims and urban and agricultural pressures.

**REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE OF DEFENCE FACILITIES**

170. The matter of the repair and maintenance of defence facilities has gained considerable prominence in recent years. Repair and maintenance is the responsibility of the Department of Public Works. However, funding constraints have severely hindered the maintenance of essential defence infrastructure, giving rise to a significant maintenance backlog which impacts directly on the operational readiness of the Defence Force and its ability to prepare and employ forces.

171. Defence has consequently engaged in a significant repair and maintenance programme (RAMP) in collaboration with the Department of Public Works. To a large extent this has been supported through the provision of additional funding through the annual MTEF Policy Options. These consolidated interventions will contribute to the reduction of the backlog.

172. The Defence Works Formation is to take over the full responsibility of the Department of Public Works and manage the renewal of defence assets. The Defence Works Formation, as well as SA Army Field Engineer Regiments in each province, will focus on the reduction of the repair and maintenance backlog of defence infrastructure, as well as arresting the further deterioration of defence facilities.

**CO-USE OF DEFENCE FACILITIES**

173. There is great pressure to become more cost-effective in defence facility management, while at the same time ensuring that the Defence Force retains its proficiency. This necessitates the exploration of alternative ways to finance and maintain defence facilities.

174. The private sector has lodged many requests for the co-use of defence facilities in recent years. Under-developed land and under-utilised facilities can be made available for additional uses, providing there is coherence with existing defence facilities and that core military activities are not compromised. The principal restricting factor in this regard is security and safety. In many cases, alternative use will require a portion of land or facilities to be isolated from the main defence activities. Defence may further give consideration to entering into joint ventures with developers and conservation organisations to minimise the cost of managing defence facilities and to improve defence infrastructure without drawing on additional state funds.

**LAND RESTITUTION**

175. Defence is committed to the equitable resolution of land restitution claims in the spirit of enhancing social justice. The Restitution of Land Rights Act was approved by Parliament in 1994 and the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights was established in 1995. Defence is affected by restitution claims against certain defence land. The restitution process provides a framework and various options to arrive at an appropriate solution through negotiation by the parties or adjudication by the Land Claims Court. Restitution can take the following forms: restoration of the land from which claimants were dispossessed; provision of alternative land; payment of compensation; alternative relief including a package containing a combination of the above, sharing of the land, or special budgetary assistance such as services and infrastructure development where claimants presently live; or priority access to state resources in the allocation and development of housing and land in the appropriate development programme.

176. Although defence has prioritised the restoration of the land concerned, rather than other forms of restitution, this has not always been possible. In some cases the land has been retained and compensation has been made, or alternative land provided. Certain land claims remain in the restitution process and will be finalised in collaboration with the Land Claims Commissioner or in the courts. In all instances, defence remains committed to the principle of equitable restitution.
177. **Principles.** Defence will apply the following principles in relation to land restitution:

a. Commitment to the Constitution and the affirmation of the land reform programme.

b. A proactive approach towards restitution is adopted.

c. Preference will be given to the restoration of land rather than other forms of restoration.

d. Commitment to the speedy resolution of restitution cases.

e. Creative alternatives explored in cases where land cannot be restored.

f. Where defence land is handed back to claimants, the acquisition of alternate land will be assessed in terms of core defence functions and activities.

g. The acquisition of alternative land arising from settlement transfers will be determined consensually amongst all relevant government departments and ministries.

h. Commitment to transparency in the restitution process.

i. Commitment to the resolution of land claims through negotiations and the remedy of the Land Claims Court as a last resort.

j. Land under claim will be made available for restitution unless the Department of Defence deems it not feasible. Non-feasibility could be due to:

   i. Financial cost.

   ii. Unique location of the facility.

   iii. Unique military requirements.

   iv. Strategic value of the facility.

**DISPOSAL OF DEFENCE FACILITIES**

178. Base closure is a complex issue requiring careful consideration of processes, role players and timeframes. The closure of defence properties presents both opportunities and serious challenges. Some of the major problems associated with defence base closure are the following:

a. The loss of employment opportunities in defence and associated industries as well as within local supporting economies.

b. Some defence properties are environmentally contaminated and often require very costly clean-up operations.

c. Maintenance and protection of the bases before reuse or ultimate disposal can be costly.

d. The development opportunities arising from the reuse of bases can be plentiful depending on the geographic location and infrastructure of the base concerned. Developmental factors will be a major consideration taken into account when evaluating the various land use and conversion options for obsolete bases.

179. State land surplus to requirements is usually handed back to the Department of Public Works. The remediation, clean-up, handing over and subsequent disposal of redundant state land must take place in a coordinated manner.

**DEFENCE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT**

**ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT APPROACH**

180. The increased emphasis on the sustainable use of natural resources requires a complete review of the impact of military activities on the natural and built environments. Urban sprawl causes defence installations and facilities to compete with other local activities. Public complaints over dust and noise, demands for urban development of “prime” real estate, and increasing requirements for minerals, grazing land and water are all external forces that compete with the use of land by the military.

181. By effectively integrating environmental considerations into the planning and execution of all military activities, defence can minimise the adverse effects of its activities as well as make a substantial social contribution towards the conservation and sustainable utilisation of environmental resources in South Africa.

182. Defence is committed to the responsible use and management of land and facilities used for the execution of its core functions and will thus minimise and manage the impact on the environment. Defence environmental management remains complex and forms an integral part of the broader defence management system.

183. Sustainable environmental management of defence training areas will ensure that the quality of the defence land resources is maintained for realistic training in future. Incorporating environmental practices into military procedures and operations will have financial benefits such as reducing energy costs and clean-up, disposal or litigation costs.

184. Defence remains committed to the principles of military integrated environmental management through a corporate
environmental management plan and specific operational environmental implementation plans. Accordingly, defence land and facilities will be managed sustainably in accordance with the relevant legislation, policies, norms and standards aimed at minimising the negative effects of military activities.

185. Military Integrated Environmental Management will be dealt with as a recognised and dedicated defence support function through funded corporate programmes. Military activities will be fulfilled in accordance with environmentally sustainable best practices. This commitment applies across the scope of military activities.

GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE

186. Human security is promoted and threatened by a variety of economic, cultural, political and environmental factors. Global environmental change and human security refer to efforts to link security to environmental change and therefore large-scale hazards to human security posed by global environmental change include climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, loss of biodiversity and ecosystem functioning, changes in hydrological systems and supplies of fresh water, desertification and land degradation and the depletion of non-renewable energy resources.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONTINGENT LIABILITY

187. The obligation to clean up unexploded ordnance (UXO) and spillages on defence training areas constitutes an environmental contingent liability that must be disclosed in the annual defence financial statements. Although defence training areas are swept for blinds and misfires after training exercises, they are not entirely cleared, and UXO as well as contamination from explosive debris is left behind, which poses a threat to human life and the environment, either for new inhabitants of the area or for participants in the following training exercise. Procedures and models must be developed to identify, determine and disclose such contingent environmental liabilities.

ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE

188. Defence environmental policy and activities must be consistent with national environmental policy, and promote cooperation with environmental bodies. Defence regional environmental advisory forums will be used to enlist the support of external experts in the management of military properties.

GRAVES AND BURIAL SITES

189. Some defence areas contain burial sites. Relatives and descendants are allowed to visit these graves when training activities permit and with due regard to their safety. Defence will remain sensitive to this issue and this practice will continue. This will be properly regulated in regulations to standardise procedures and set public liability regarding access to such burial sites on military properties. An inventory of all graves on defence-controlled areas will be established.

CLEAN-UP AND REMEDIATION OF DEFENCE TRAINING AREAS

190. Defence training activities have a variety of environmental impacts. Environmentally destructive effects and by-products of military operations, such as UXO, shrapnel, targets and debris which leach explosives and heavy metals into groundwater, all forms of waste, pollution, fuel spills and other chemicals released as a result of military action, and the destruction of vegetation by military vehicles or explosives, threaten the integrity of the physical environment and natural resources. These have become central drivers for cleanup and remediation due to the inherent risk to personnel, the public and the environment.

191. Informed by safety considerations, training areas will be regularly cleared. This entails the cleaning of all UXO and other visually detected debris. To this end, an inherent military range clearance (MRC) capability will be established. This process will use an integrated seven-step process to include environmentally-friendly detection of UXO and subsurface clearance technologies, as well as models and tools for determining the costing, prioritisation and Geographic Information System (GIS) decision support for the clean-up and remediation of all live-fire military training areas.

ENVIRONMENT FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS

192. Environmental considerations will be incorporated in the planning and execution of joint, combined and multinational exercises and force employment processes. Environmental management personnel will be deployed to advise and assist on en-
environmental best practice and ensure the implementation of the necessary remediation measures following the demobilisation of forces.

193. The relationship between human security, global environmental change and military integrated environmental management is indicated in Figure 14-5.

ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY

194. Environmental scarcity is determined by environmental change, population size and growth, and unequal distribution (or access to) resources. Of these factors, unequal access to resources is not bound by physical limits alone. Leading examples of emerging environmental change are: depletion and pollution of fresh water supplies, depletion of fisheries, degradation and disappearance of biodiversity, degradation and loss of agriculture lands, food and health safety, stratospheric ozone depletion, and global warming. These challenges will likely be growing threats to environmental security and ultimately affect human security in future.

Figure 14-5: Military Environmental Management Model
INTRODUCTION

1. The purpose of this chapter is to provide strategic guidance to the development of policies and strategies concerning the South African defence industry, with specific emphasis on the attainment of the Defence Review and the pursuit of the Defence Strategic Trajectory. The National Defence Industry Council, as discussed hereunder, will have the responsibility to further develop these strategic guidelines into specific policies and strategies.

2. The term defence industry in this chapter refers to companies (both public and private) that are primarily concerned with the design, development, manufacture, production or support of weapons, munitions, pyrotechnics, equipment systems and other matériel for the Defence Force or for export; divisions of companies in other sectors that are so engaged; and companies that are major sub-contractors or component suppliers to such activities.

NATIONAL DEFENCE INDUSTRY COUNCIL

3. Given the strategic relevance of this industry sector to South Africa's defence and security, its indirect but considerable importance to economic and industrial development, and further its potential as a tool of foreign policy, a National Defence Industry Council will be established as a significant policy making and coordination tool for the defence industry. The National Defence Industry Council will be charged with the tasks of:

a. Establishing and maintaining the focus of a national vision in respect of the defence industry.

b. Coordinating approaches between the Defence Force and the defence industry in pursuit of the Defence Strategic Trajectory.

c. Overseeing the development and implementation of policies and strategies appropriate to the defence industry, and, in particular, the National Defence Industrial Strategy.

d. Ensuring the optimal integration of the defence industry within the National Development Plan, industrial and trade policy and South Africa’s regional and wider foreign policy and strategy.
e. Identifying and furthering the **optimal development** of the defence industry.

f. Providing the **coordination** of government’s **marketing support** to the defence industry.

4. This National Defence Industry Council should be **chaired by the Minister of Defence** or, in the unavoidable absence of the Minister, by the Deputy Minister of Defence, and should have a **small permanent secretariat** located within the Ministry. Its members should include:

a. The Secretary for Defence.


c. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Armscor, as the defence acquisition agent.

d. A senior representative from each of the following potential clients of the industry:
   i. The South African Police Service.
   ii. The Intelligence Services.

e. A senior official from each of the Departments of:
   i. International Relations and Cooperation.
   ii. Public Enterprises.
   iii. Trade and Industry; and
   iv. Science and Technology.

f. The Group CEO of Denel.

g. The Chairperson of the AMD Board and senior industry executives representing the public and private sectors and the various competency areas of this industry.

h. Selected scientists and academics from the CSIR (DPSS) and those universities active in defence-related research or researching other fields of relevance to the Defence Force.

5. In order to be effective in steering and supporting the South African defence industry, the Council will **meet at least quarterly** to consider the state of the South African defence industry, the challenges it faces and international developments, and to make any necessary determinations and recommendations on that basis.

6. The **National Defence Industry Council** may further develop **legislation** and consequent **regulations** as may be necessarily for the implementation of the policy frameworks that are developed. A possible example hereof may include the promulgation, through Parliament, of enabling legislation and regulations so as to ensure government control over identified **vital technologies and wider strategic independence**, and the **extent of foreign ownership** of South African defence industry companies.

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**POLICY INTENT**

**BACKGROUND**

7. **South Africa** is one of the top thirty economic actors in the world and is **not aligned to any major power**. South Africa is classified as a **middle-income, emerging economy, affluent in natural resources** with well-developed legal, communications, financial, energy and transport sectors. Agriculture contributes 9% to the gross domestic product, with **industry** and services contributing 26% and 65% respectively. South Africa has by far the largest and most sophisticated economy on the African continent. South Africa has the 25th largest gross domestic product in the world accounting for 25% of Africa’s GDP and 33% of the sub-Saharan GDP, and has been ranked as the 32nd largest importer and 37th largest exporter. **More than 50% of the economy is trade-related**, with mining, manufacturing, services and to a lesser degree agriculture as the mainstays of the economy. The **bulk of exports and imports is transported via sea lines of communication**, with the Port of Durban being one of the busiest in the Southern Hemisphere.

**REQUIREMENT FOR A DEFENCE INDUSTRY**

8. South Africa requires an effective defence capability, which includes, as an integral element, a **defence industry to support sovereign capabilities** and maintain an essential level of strategic independence. A vibrant, focused defence industry is **thus a major asset** to South Africa, strengthens its defence and security capabilities; supports its foreign policy initiatives – particularly within the region and on the continent – and is **supportive to the national development agenda**.

9. A vibrant defence industry remains a critical component of an effective South African defence capability, providing South Africa with a **defence and security industrial base** that must be positioned to ensure the **attainment of the Defence Review** and the **pursuit of the Defence Strategic Trajectory**. This will in the main include, were appropriate, support in pursuit of:

a. **Strategic independence**.

b. **Sovereign capability** in selected areas.

c. **Optimised** equipment and systems.

d. **Cost-effective** equipment, systems and services to the Defence Force and other Security Services.

**Economic benefit** derived from necessary defence expenditure.

f. **Collateral benefit** ensuing from the endeavours of the defence industry.
10. The intention of government is to not only maintain, but also further develop South Africa’s defence industry as a key national asset and as a key partner in the pursuit of the Defence Strategic Trajectory.

11. As such this industry should be identified, recognised, supported and prioritised as a strategic manufacturing sector by the Department of Trade and Industry. It is, further, the intention of government to work closely with the public and private sectors to achieve this goal and to do so cost-effectively. This will give South Africa a defence and security industrial base that will, in addition to the characteristics described above, provide increased access for Black businesses and military veterans to a sustainable technology-intensive and competitive industry sector.

12. The development of South Africa’s defence industry must, however, occur within the context of the wider international defence industry, taking account of general developments in that industry, as well as the evolving nature of armed conflict and the requirements that arise from it, and developments in technology. Further, while that defence industry will depend heavily on government orders, it will also:

   a. Bring valuable technological spin-offs for the wider economy and industry, chiefly in the form of technologies new to South Africa and localised in the course of designing, developing, manufacturing or supporting defence equipment.
   b. Play a crucial role in developing the country’s intellectual and skills capital, by virtue of its need for scientists, researchers, engineers and technicians and the effect of defence projects in attracting the right calibre of people into the relevant professions.
   c. Make a major contribution to the GDP growth.
   d. Generate foreign currency earnings from export sales and the support of exported equipment and systems.

13. The establishment, development and retention of certain defence industrial capabilities will not be solely governed by market forces, due regard being had for strategic necessity and also for strategic advantage, and particularly in respect of defence matériel over which sovereign control is required. Government may, therefore, retain or establish state-owned enterprises in technology domains that are necessary to the attainment of the Defence Review and the pursuit of the Defence Strategic Trajectory, as developed from national security and defence policy objectives, but that are not commercially viable in South Africa.

14. Strategic independence here means the ability of the Defence Force to perform its key functions for extended periods without reliance on direct foreign support in respect of critical capabilities. This will chiefly require South Africa to retain the capability to:

   a. Support, maintain and repair critical equipment and systems.
   b. Manufacture critical munitions, batteries, components and sub-assemblies (amongst others).
   c. Manufacture such high-rate-of-use spares and other items as cannot be either:
      i. Stockpiled in sufficient quantity;
      ii. brought into production at short notice without direct foreign assistance; or
      iii. acquired from multiple foreign sources via multiple channels, to negate an embargo by one or more governments.

15. Strategic independence further means the ability to:

   a. Conduct operational research across the spectrum of Defence Force responsibilities.
   b. Comprehensively and thoroughly test and evaluate equipment, munitions, systems and other defence matériel to a standard that ensures that items acquired by the Defence Force fully comply with the requirement and the related specifications, including aspects such as reliability, availability, maintainability and durability (RAM-D).
   c. Ensure effective in-service testing and evaluation of combat readiness and system efficiency.
   d. Conduct or manage directed, focused research and development in connection with the development of Defence Force requirements and the related specifications.

16. Such capabilities are at present managed by:

   c. Denel: Overberg Test Range (air-, ground-, and ship-launched weapons, evaluation of weapons/combat systems, flight test support and limited satellite support).
Sovereign Capability

17. **Sovereign capability** here means the ability to ensure, under full national control and without reliance on any direct foreign assistance, certain capabilities identified as vital to national security, including, but not limited to, command and control, secure communications, aspects of precision-guided munitions, elements of electronic warfare, relevant algorithms and relevant software. This will require, as far as is practicable:
   a. The capability to integrate and support such systems and equipment.
   b. The capability to design, develop and support relevant algorithms and software.
   c. The capability to design, develop and manufacture certain equipment locally, which does not exclude the use of imported components.
   d. The control of those capabilities under custodianship by either a public or private South African-owned company.

Optimised Equipment and Systems

18. **Optimised** here refers to equipment and systems specifically developed or adapted to meet the demands set by:
   a. A harsh and unforgiving operating environment: heat, dust, torrential rain, little infrastructure and few and poor roads.
   b. A demanding operational environment: low-force densities that require dispersed operations, no clearly defined front line or even area of operations, and insecure lines of supply.
   c. The operational style developed by the Defence Force to meet those challenges: high-mobility/high-tempo, dispersed, joint operations
   d. The need to be interoperable with selected legacy equipment and systems, including some equipment and systems used by the Police and other agencies and departments of government
   e. The desire to achieve increased interoperability with regional partners.
   f. The need to ensure the supportability of equipment and systems.

19. Examples of such optimised equipment include wheeled combat vehicles (good operational mobility), long-range artillery (support of dispersed force elements) and rugged logistic vehicles, as well as communications equipment suited to those operational, geographic and climatic conditions.

Economic Benefit

20. The potential to leverage wider economic and industrial opportunity on the basis of necessary expenditure on defence and security equipment and systems has been demonstrated in several developing countries:
   a. Manufacturing and supporting defence matériel creates skilled and semi-skilled jobs and develops the experience and skills of the people involved, both within the defence industry itself and in the general industry companies that form part of the defence and security supply chain, executing sub-contracts or supplying some related equipment or components.
   b. Development of defence equipment establishes, and can sometimes develop, new technologies, techniques and processes that ‘spin off’ to other sectors of industry to the benefit of the national economy, enhancing international competitiveness and supporting the national development agenda.
   c. Defence research and development develops new technologies that also spin off to other sectors, supporting the National System of Innovation and also further reinforcing the development agenda.
   d. People with skills and experience gained in the defence industry also spin off to other sectors, expanding the national skills and experience base.

21. There is also the potential to align the defence acquisition strategy with the industrial development strategy of the Department of Trade and Industry, for instance by designating certain sectors for localisation where there are common technologies for military and civilian products. One possible example might be found in heavy vehicles, which could also have some export potential.

Collateral Benefit

22. The defence sector has the demonstrated potential to create indigenous technologies and bring foreign technologies into the country and establish them, from which base they and the related skills can migrate to other sectors of the economy. Internationally, much existing technology has been a result of spin-off from developments in the defence industry. The trend today is for spin-on from commercial developments into the defence field. Much of the underlying technology is, in fact, still a result of past defence research, and much fundamental and applied research around the world is still being driven by the work undertaken in the defence field.
23. The defence industry’s range of products and services will contribute to the technology and knowledge base of the country. It will further publically pronounce on a strategy that sets out its contribution toward addressing national strategic concerns, especially developmental drivers such as education, health and economic development.

**LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIPS**

24. The definition of what is critical, where sovereign control is required, and where the benefits of optimisation justify the investment and cost, will be developed and set out in the Defence Industry Strategy, and amended from time to time as the strategic situation may require.

25. Achieving and maintaining the desired level of strategic independence, the desired sovereign capabilities, and the ability to develop optimised equipment and systems will require sufficient, ongoing, long-term investment by government in:
   a. Relevant education, training and skills retention programmes.
   b. A defence science, engineering and technology support capability and funding of both general and specific research and development projects and programmes.
   c. Maintaining and modernising or upgrading facilities.
   d. Export support to facilitate future research and development.

26. The responsibility lies with the Defence Force to ensure that sufficient (and sufficiently regular) funding is directed to maintaining defence industrial capabilities or technologies that are identified as having vital importance, especially in respect of the underlying technologies, the required skills, and the required research, design, development, manufacturing and support facilities.

**DEFENCE FORCE/DEFENCE INDUSTRY RELATIONSHIP**

27. The defence engagement of the defence industry is premised primarily on the Defence Review, and on the attainment of the Defence Strategic Trajectory.

28. The focus of the defence/industry relationship is thus (in the main) in the pursuit of: firstly, the development of strategic technologies and capabilities; secondly, the ongoing matériel and services needs of the Defence Force; thirdly, the in-service support of defence systems and prime mission equipment; and fourthly, upgrades and modernisation, where appropriate.

29. Defence matériel programmes will be specifically guided by the Military Strategy, an optimised and integrated Defence Capability Strategy and a consequent Defence Long-Term Capital Plan, which must be determined by the Chief of the Defence Force. The defence matériel requirement will be ameliorated with available resources, in order to establish long term plans and programmes. Defence matériel programmes will be executed within the frameworks established for this purpose.

30. The objective is to develop a healthy partnership between the Defence Force and its supporting industry, with local industry in principle enjoying preference, where it can practically and cost-effectively meet requirements. This will be a policy principle in the new acquisition policy.

31. The strategic orientation of the defence industry will be primarily informed by South Africa’s defence and security sector priorities. Local sourcing will be primarily pursued, where possible, in the following areas:
   a. Manufacture of missiles and wider guided munitions technology, products and systems.
   b. Manufacture of critical munitions and ordnance.
   c. Manufacture of critical and alternate energy and propulsion sources.
   d. Manufacture of critical and high-rate-of-use spares and other stores.
   e. Support of equipment, systems and weapons, and the related training systems and facilities.
   f. System integration to allow optimisation of equipment, weapons and systems for specific defence requirements, and to minimise strategic risk.

32. This will be accompanied by an additional orientation on ensuring:
   a. The commercial viability of South African defence products, particularly those that may be required by other regional and continental armed forces.
   b. Harmonising, where feasible, military-off-the-shelf (MOTS) and commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) requirements, or aligning defence orders with export orders, with the aim of achieving larger production orders to result in longer production runs and the accompanying economies of scale.
   c. Mutual spin-on and spin-off of civilian and military capabilities.

33. An integrated government focus, informed by the defence interest and so championed by defence, will be pursued, inter alia, in the following domains where viable prod-
ucts, capabilities or particular niche areas exist:

a. The aerospace sector.
b. The maritime sector.
c. The landward sector.
d. The command and control and Information Warfare sector.
e. National Defence Industry Council specified South African defence and security niche or competitive edge capabilities.
f. Centres of excellence enhancing or contributing to the National System of Innovation.
g. Potential new business in cooperation with other nations, and particularly in cooperation with South Africa’s strategic partners.

34. The support of equipment, systems and weapons, and related training systems and facilities, may (where it is practicable and it holds no disadvantage in respect of operational readiness, the ability to deploy forces, sustainability and resilience) be considered for out-sourcing.

INDUSTRY FOCUS AREAS

35. It is not the intention to recreate the exceptional breadth and depth of capabilities that was a feature of the defence industry during the period of the arms embargo, as that:

a. Is not essential to South Africa’s national security;
b. Would be neither cost-effective nor practicable at a time when defence companies worldwide are having to globalise to survive; and
c. Would tend to remove the industry from relevant global supply chains, making it increasingly difficult to win substantial export orders.

36. The intention is rather to focus on those areas and sectors of defence technology and manufacturing that offer real potential to meet the policy intent set out above.

37. It is important to ensure that the flow of national contracts for defence and security research, development, manufacturing and support is structured and phased such that:

a. The Defence Force brings equipment and systems into service at a steady rate to ensure an efficient commissioning process and to avoid block obsolescence.
b. The domestic defence and security industry has a viable base load of work to:
   i. Sustain research, design, development, industrialisation and manufacturing capabilities and capacities;
   ii. enable it to continuously renew itself in terms of human capital and capital equipment; and
   iii. serve as a base for export ventures.

38. It is, further, the intention that the Defence Force, like all other government entities, will contribute toward addressing national strategic concerns, especially developmental drivers such as education, health and economic development. The defence industry’s range of products and services will also contribute to the technology base of the country.

AREAS OF COMPETENCE

39. The focus of national support for the defence industry, based on military priorities, will, therefore, be on primarily local sourcing, insofar as is practicable, in the following areas:

a. Support of equipment, systems and weapons and the related training systems and facilities.
b. Manufacture of critical munitions.
c. Manufacture of critical, specialised batteries and other energy sources.
d. Manufacture of critical and high-rate-of-use spares and other stores.
e. System integration, to:
   i. Allow optimisation of equipment, weapons and systems for specific Defence Force requirements.
   ii. Minimise political/strategic risk.
f. Modernisation and upgrading of equipment, platforms and systems to optimise them for their roles as conditions or requirements evolve, and to extend their service lives.
g. Development of specific critical equipment and systems.
h. Development of specific optimised equipment and systems.
i. Sustained manufacture of equipment required in large numbers or amounts.

KEY TECHNOLOGY DOMAINS

40. Further to the pursuit of the Defence Strategic Trajectory, the initial focus of the support for those capability areas will be on the following technology domains:

a. Command and control.
b. Information warfare, at all levels of war.
c. Secure communications.
d. Information technology, including data fusion technology.
e. Intelligence-gathering sensor, analysis and evaluation technology.
f. Target acquisition and identification technology.
g. Unmanned systems (aerial, ground, surface and under-water).
h. Missile and wider guided munitions technology.
i. Night and poor visibility observation and engagement technology.
j. Electronic warfare technology.
k. Rugged tactical vehicles optimised for operations in the African theatre.
l. Mine and IED detection and protection technology.
m. Long-range artillery, precision bombardment and point target engagement systems.
n. Chemical, biological and radiological defence, including the manufacture of military carbons and canisters.
o. Battlefield medical care optimised for the African theatre of operations.
p. Modelling and simulation.

41. The aerospace sector should be considered for inclusion in this group of key defence industry sectors if it is believed that there is real potential to develop a viable product or viable capabilities in particular niche areas. It may, for instance, be possible to:

a. Expand South Africa’s capabilities in the field of unmanned aerial systems on the basis of existing capabilities in that field and in related fields, and on the basis of the airframe development capability resulting from UAV projects and the light multi-role aircraft currently in development;
b. develop one or both of those concept aircraft into a viable operational system with real export potential; or
c. build on the Air Force’s medium- to long-term requirements for combat support and medium transport helicopters to develop a local manufacturing capability and linked maintenance, repair and overhaul capability to support other helicopters in the wider region.

42. In addition, government will support niche capability areas in which the South African defence and security industry has a demonstrable edge or potential to gain such edge. Among them are:

a. Precision-guided weapons and precision engagement systems.
b. Fire direction systems.
c. Products or technologies in any field in which an edge can be established.

43. Government will further support the establishment of centres of excellence for each of the key domains and areas of competence. This support will be part of the national drive to enhance the National System of Innovation, thereby creating imperatives for other national research bodies, such as the Department of Science and Technology, to invest in these sectors and areas of competence. Government will also seriously consider support for entry into other domains where there is real potential for success, perhaps in cooperation with other nations.

DEFENCE ACQUISITION AND PROCUREMENT POLICIES

WORLD-CLASS ACQUISITION POLICY

44. Defence will retain a robust, world-class acquisition policy that is focused on firstly, executing the defence capital plan; secondly, maintaining key defence technologies and capabilities through specific measures, conditions and provisions, including the vesting of such in identified industry partners; thirdly, timely, efficient and cost-effective equipment acquisition; fourthly, sustaining and further developing the South African defence industry; and fifthly, setting the parameters within which Armscor (as the defence acquisition agent) will support the defence acquisition process.

45. The entire acquisition effort will be informed and regulated through a single defence acquisition policy, binding on both defence and Armscor, and such policy being firmly focused on supporting the attainment of the Defence Capability Strategy and consequent Capital Plan. A high premium will be placed on both risk reduction and efficiency.

46. The entire acquisition process is required to pursue, to the fullest extent, the Defence Capability Strategy and its consequent Long-Term Capital Plan. The strategies, policies and procedures of both defence and Armscor will thus be fully aligned and pursue a continuum of defence acquisition.

47. Predicated on the desire to achieve heightened levels of efficiency, effectiveness and economy with commensurately reduced bureaucracy and shorter delivery timeframes, Armscor will provide strategic assistance in the acquisition of defence systems, defence research and development and the through-life-support of defence systems. It will be the contracting and quality assurance authority for defence acquisitions.

48. To this end, the Defence Force is to develop a long-term, securely funded, multi-year Defence Capability Strategy and consequent Capital Plan, enabling:

a. The Defence Force to develop integrated acquisition approaches that will:
i. Synchronise joint capability planning to enhance interoperability.
ii. Address prime mission equipment as a complete system, by means of synchronised projects.
iii. Allow long-term, coherent and integrated modernisation and upgrade plans to be developed and implemented.

b. The Defence Force to develop coherent long-term acquisition plans, to:
   i. Largely avoid block obsolescence.
   ii. Retain project management skills within Services, corps and branches.
   iii. Achieve long production runs and accompanying economies of scale, where applicable.
   iv. Make possible properly planned lifecycle management of equipment, which may include using availability- or performance-based contracts placed with the industry to complement or supplement internal capacities and capabilities.

c. Defence industry companies to plan their future properly on the basis of the Defence Force’s long-term, integrated capability requirement planning and multi-year manufacturing, modernisation/upgrade and support contracts, to which end defence acquisition plans will, except with respect to particularly sensitive projects, be available in an open form with sufficient detail of the requirements and the allocated funding and funds flow to make such planning practicable.

d. Coordination with domestic industrial development objectives of the Department of Trade and Industry.

49. As a general principle, the acquisition of technology-sensitive equipment, weapons and systems will be dealt with in a phased manner to the extent possible, as to avoid the challenge of block obsolescence. Nonetheless, some equipment will require immediate and expedited acquisition.

REvised PROCUREMENT POLICY

50. The intent of the defence industry policy will be further supported by a revised procurement policy that is focused on three primary tenets:
   a. The seamless integration of procurement and acquisition policies in support of the Defence Strategic Trajectory.
   b. Responsive and reliable support to defence systems and prime mission equipment.
   c. The geographically decentralised procurement of general stores and services.

51. The purpose of the decentralised procurement of general stores and services is:
   a. To enable units to procure commodities and services promptly as and when they are needed.
   b. To disperse Defence Force procurement expenditure across a wider spectrum of the economy and, particularly, among small and micro businesses.
   c. To embed units in their local economy, thereby further strengthening the linkage between elements of the Defence Force and the communities within which they reside, providing stimulus to local economies and contributing to the developmental agenda of government.

DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL PARTICIPATION

52. The Defence Industrial Participation (DIP) requirements attached to the acquisition of equipment or systems from abroad, will, in future, be focussed primarily on:
   a. A balanced and aligned consideration between DIP and national industrial participation (NIP) obligations that may emanate jointly from defence acquisition programmes, especially in that the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) is pursuing NIP as the primary mechanism to effectively implant NIP commitments, thus requiring regular and close collaboration between the DTI and Armscor industrial participation processes and approval forums.
   b. Ensuring the effective and efficient through-life support of the equipment, including its upgrading as required during its service life.
   c. Ensuring support for key sectors of the industry and/or the establishment of identified key technologies within the industry.
   d. Facilitating efficient linkage with related government initiatives as set out in the Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP), the National Science and Technology (NST) framework, the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act (PPPFA) and NIP policies and regulations.

53. Export facilitation and access to international supply chains will be important factors, but will rank after the above in priority.

54. In any future Request for Proposal (RFP), Request for Quotation (RFQ), or in any other solicitation document, foreign Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) must
present a **viable and binding industrial participation plan as part of the tender submission**. To ensure both the **transfer of knowledge** and the **cost-effective through-life support of defence matériel**, selected industrial participation activities must address any, or all, of the following **key domains** in their proposal or quotation:

- a. Human capital/technology development priorities.
- b. Advanced manufacturing priorities.
- c. Participation in direct or indirect manufacturing of selected defence equipment.
- d. Targeted transfer of in-service support capabilities to local industry and/or defence facilities during the execution of the acquisition contract.

### EXPORT SUPPORT

55. **Government will support** export sales, technology transfers and joint ventures by the **South African defence industry in all areas and domains**, provided that the exports, technology transfers or joint ventures do not: compromise national security; conflict with arms export or non-proliferation legislation and policy; expose sovereign capabilities; or hamper the future development of the South African defence industry.

56. That support will include:

- a. Ministerial and wider government **support for export marketing drives**.
- b. A streamlined **export approval process**, including a Cabinet-level single point of contact and provision for accelerated approval in cases where that is required and where that is in line with national security interests and priorities.
- c. **Favoured-nation status** for countries identified by foreign or defence policy, for instance the SADC countries, granting automatic approval for some classes of equipment in the absence of any specific case against such approval.
- d. Pre-approval of **long-term support contracts** for identified countries.
- e. **Defence Force support** to demonstrate equipment and to assist client evaluation teams, also forming part of wider defence diplomacy.
- f. **Immediate supply from Defence Force stocks** where practicable and when there is no major implication for national security, with automatic provision for additional defence funding to replace those stocks.
- g. **Defence Force technical and training support** for client forces, also falling within the ambit of defence diplomacy.
- h. Support for the acquisition of South African defence and security equipment, by means of **financing assistance**, providing **export guarantees** or similar measures.
- i. Support for the acquisition of South African defence and security equipment, by means of **offsets and industrial participation**, particularly within the SADC and on the wider African continent. Such arrangements must be to the mutual benefit of both countries.
- j. Coordination with the DTI and with the Industrial Development Corporation to **support the export of designated localised products and services**.

### DEFENCE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY

#### TECHNOLOGY CONTEXT

57. Defence technology is complex and ever-evolving, both in respect of technologies developed for the defence environment and in respect of technologies taken over from the civilian environment and adapted to defence needs. The impact of defence technology on the wider economy mostly takes the form of unexpected and unintended technology spin-offs. These often manifest in the establishment of small, medium and micro-enterprises, as is visible in, particularly, the science, engineering and technology sector in South Africa.

58. **Developments in technology** have a **major impact on defence capabilities**, particularly with regard to the development, manufacture and support of complex systems, such as: the weapons system of a combat helicopter; the combat management system of a warship; a ‘system of systems’ such as an integrated air defence system; and which require a broad range of technical and technological skills and capabilities.

59. Defence technology research and development by its nature is mostly **focused on the advanced application of the physical sciences** in highly specialised fields, often requires **costly and dedicated infrastructure**, may involve hazardous materials, often involves **extended timescales** and is **uncertain in terms of the outcomes**. The step from technology development to economic exploitation of the new technology lies in product and system development, often in terms of optimised, perhaps even unique, military capabilities. The return on the investment comes from the export of the defence matériel concerned, or of matériel developed from it for export purposes.

60. The **Defence Force must remain abreast of developments** in defence technology and other potentially relevant
DEFENCE INDUSTRY POLICY AND STRATEGY

Technologies in order to be in a position to:

- Attain the Defence Review and pursue the Defence Strategic Trajectory.
- Develop and maintain the military-technological insight required to understand evolving military capabilities and opportunities growing out of new or adapted technologies.
- Support, modernise and upgrade equipment and systems to optimal effect.
- Set appropriate requirements and specifications for critical or optimised equipment and systems to be developed and/or manufactured locally.
- Develop, manufacture and support complex systems, requiring a broad range of technical and technological skills and capabilities.
- Be an educated client when acquiring equipment or systems from other countries.

TECHNOLOGY FOCUS

61. Defence technology development is generally a long-term process that only shows returns after an extended period of investment. This demands a long-term approach to planning, funding and managing, one that extends over the expected life of the technology. This is not amenable to the normal open-tender contracting process, implying that the management of defence technology research and development requires a management approach that is significantly different to that adopted in business-focused private bodies or even that adopted by academic institutes.

62. Defence will fund technology tracking and evaluation of new technologies by designated defence institutes and other research bodies and, where that may be preferable, by industry, to ensure that it and the industry keep up with trends and developments.

63. The management of defence technology development will be vested in a Chief Defence Scientist, having a broad defence research remit, and having specific responsibility for defining, establishing and maintaining the defence research and development requirement. The Chief Defence Scientist will adopt a focused approach to prevent costly duplication of capabilities, capacities and effort to ensure that it keeps up with trends and developments. Long-term funding commitments will be directed to meet strategic defence technology requirements at both public and private defence institutes, research bodies, academia and industry.

64. Preference in such research and development support will be given to capabilities and technologies of strategic or other particular importance to defence, and to areas where capabilities and technologies may have wider economic and developmental potential, by means of funding:

- In-house research and development in niche, specialised or sensitive areas.
- Background scientific and technology research and development by universities.
- Directed research and technology development by the CSIR, including specialised testing and evaluation, modelling and simulation and a high level of systems integration capability.
- Focused research and product development by companies of the defence industry.
- Specific projects proposed by academia and other companies that are of value to defence.
- The development and production of technology demonstrators where that is relevant to de-risking future acquisition projects or to ensuring that the Defence Force remains an intelligent, educated buyer in specific fields of defence matériel.

65. Subject to the determinations of the Chief Defence Scientist, the defence focus will initially rest in the following technology domains:

- Command and control.
- Information Warfare, at all levels of war.
- Systems integration.
- Secure communications.
- Information technology, including data fusion technology.
- Intelligence-gathering sensor, analysis and evaluation technology.
- Target acquisition and identification technology.
- Unmanned systems (aerial, ground, surface and under-water).
- Missile and wider guided munitions technology.
- Night and poor visibility observation and engagement technology.
- Electronic warfare technology.
- Rugged tactical vehicles optimised for operations on the African continent.
- Mine and IED detection and protection technology.
- Artillery, precision bombardment and point target engagement systems.
- Chemical, biological and radiological defence, including military carbons and canisters.
- Battlefield medical care optimised for the African continent.
- Modelling and simulation.

66. Defence will also support selected blue-sky research and development that falls into either of the above categories, on the basis of a codified, clearly set out Defence Research...
DEFENCE INDUSTRY POLICY AND STRATEGY

and Technology Development Strategy that is aligned with the national technology and innovation priorities as set out by the Department of Science and Technology from time to time. At least 10% of research funds will be directed to blue-sky research.

TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT TO DEFENCE

67. Defence operational research means the use of scientific or specialised techniques, employing mathematical methods, simulation and qualitative or logical reasoning in systematic and general approaches to defence problem solving and decision making.

68. Cross impacting defence science, engineering and technology support, and in particular operational research, must be established or enhanced in the following domains to:

   a. Support strategic decision making through analysis, modelling and experimentation to develop:
      i. Defence policies and strategies appropriate to South Africa and its strategic environment.
      ii. An understanding of the complexity of current and future conflict, future technologies to be found in the spectrum of conflict and trends in the future utilisation of technology.
      iii. An understanding of current and future defence conflict, and defining the concepts, capabilities and systems required to meet future challenges.
      iv. The integration, optimisation, synergising and balance of concepts, capabilities and systems within the context of the Defence Force Design.
      v. Defining future defence capabilities and technologies to be acquired or procured and which are to be prioritised in the Force Design, Defence Capability Strategy, and the Long-Term Capital Plan.

   b. Support acquisition and procurement programmes through:
      i. The development, establishment and maintenance of the defence technology base.
      ii. Support the acquisition or procurement of interoperable equipment or technologies.
      iii. Support to the upgrade of existing systems and enhancement of their interoperability.
      iv. Testing and evaluation to effectively measure the performance of the integrated system.

   c. Support lifecycle management of defence systems through:
      i. Defence systems integrity management.
      ii. Responsive adaption of current defence systems to diverse operating environments.
      iii. Proactive and reactive logistic maintenance and repair on in-service systems.

   d. Support system-owners and operators of individual weapon systems through:
      i. Integration of the weapon system with other weapons systems into higher-order defence capabilities.
      ii. The development, maintenance and adaptation of doctrine.
      iii. The development, maintenance and adaptation of tactics, techniques and procedures.
      iv. Evaluating the utilisation of weapon systems to enhance performance.

DEFENCE INDUSTRY OWNERSHIP

69. With an eye to ensuring sovereign control over identified vital technologies and wider strategic independence, the government will control the extent of foreign ownership of South African defence industry companies. Restrictions will apply in respect of defence matériel related to capabilities that are required to be under sovereign control or are considered essential in the interests of strategic independence. In principle:

   a. The development, manufacture and support of defence matériel over which sovereign control is deemed essential will, to the extent possible, be restricted to South African defence companies or, when necessary, partly South African-owned defence companies. To this end, it will be important to make proper provision for single-source contracts.

   b. The development, manufacture and support of defence matériel related to strategic independence will, to the extent possible, be restricted to South African defence companies or partly South African-owned defence companies, but may be contracted to South African-based defence companies.

   c. Where it is necessary or preferable — for instance for access to technologies — for such companies to carry out such work in partnership with foreign companies, this will be permitted, provided only that suitable and agreed security measures are implemented.

SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE COMPANY

70. A South African defence company is one that is fully controlled by South African owners, who have at least a 51% shareholding, those being:

   a. South African companies with no foreign shareholding exceeding 49% and fully controlled by South African citizens; and/or
b. South African citizens who do not hold any dual nationality; and
c. whose executive management comprises South African citizens who do not hold any dual nationality; and which, further,
d. have their relevant manufacturing and, preferably, their relevant research and development facilities in South Africa; and
e. are fully compliant with all relevant South African legislation, except insofar as there may be a waiver or waivers granted in consideration of strategic issues.

71. This requirement does not preclude a South African company participating in a joint venture project with a foreign company, even on a minority share basis, except in that there may be no direct linkage to sovereign projects other than by prior agreement with the Defence Force in such cases where cooperation with foreign companies is essential to the project, for instance in order to acquire or develop the required technologies.

72. Where there is any significant foreign interest in a South African defence company as defined above, security of uninterrupted supply to the Defence Force and security of all South African intellectual property will be ensured by means of appropriate government-to-government agreements.

73. South African defence companies may compete for any and all defence contracts within their field of competence, and will enjoy preference, provided that:

a. Their products and/or services fully meet the requirement in all critical respects.
b. They demonstrate the ability to support that product through its lifecycle, including such upgrades that may be necessitated or required from time to time.
c. No foreign product demonstrates an overwhelming advantage over the local product.
d. Their price and long-term support price structure are:
   i. Broadly in line with other offers; or
   ii. are considered acceptable given the advantages of local sourcing.

74. A defence company will be considered to be partly South African-owned for the purposes of defence contracting if:

a. At least 26% of its shares are held by South African citizens or by a South African company.
b. Its relevant manufacturing and/or development facilities, or those relevant to any contract in question, are located in South Africa.
c. There is security of uninterrupted supply to the Defence Force.
d. There is an agreement with the Defence Force, if deemed necessary accompanied by a government-to-government agreement, covering the security of intellectual property owned by the Defence Force or being developed under contract from the Defence Force, including no transfer outside South African hands or foreign access to such intellectual property other in terms of that agreement or a specific contract.
e. The company demonstrates a real, tangible and enduring commitment to:
   i. Adding economic value to South Africa.
   ii. Skills development in South Africa.
f. The company is fully compliant with all relevant South African legislation, except insofar as there may be a waiver or waivers granted in consideration of strategic issues.

75. Partly South African-owned defence companies may compete for any and all defence contracts within their fields of competence, including items over which sovereign control is required, given that the relevant security requirements are met, and will enjoy preference over companies with no or a smaller South African shareholding, provided that:

a. Their products and/or services fully meet the requirement in all critical respects.
b. They demonstrate the ability to support that product through its lifecycle, including such upgrades that may be necessitated or required from time to time.
c. No foreign product demonstrates an overwhelming advantage over the local product.
d. Their price and long-term support price structure are:
   i. Broadly in line with other offers; or
   ii. are considered acceptable given the advantages of local sourcing.

76. A defence company may be considered to be South African-based if:

a. The relevant manufacturing and research and development facilities are in South Africa and are locally controlled in respect of their operation to the extent required to ensure uninterrupted supply to the Defence Force; or
b. it has other major such facilities in South Africa; and
c. there is security of uninterrupted supply to the Defence Force; and, further,
d. there is an agreement with the Defence Force, if deemed necessary accompanied by a government-to-government agreement, covering the security of intellectual property owned by the Defence Force or being developed under contract from the Defence Force, including no transfer outside South African hands or foreign access to such intellectual property other in terms of that agreement or a specific contract;
e. the company demonstrates a real, tangible and enduring commitment to:
   i. Adding economic value to South Africa.
   ii. Skills development in South Africa.
f. the company is fully compliant with all relevant South African legislation, except insofar as there may be a waiver or waivers granted in consideration of strategic issues.

77. South African-based companies may compete for the development, manufacture and support of defence matériel in respect of which strategic independence is required, and for the development, manufacture and support of all other equipment, systems, stores and supplies, and will enjoy preference over foreign companies, provided that:
a. Their products and/or services fully meet the requirement in all critical respects.
b. They demonstrate the ability to support that product through its lifecycle, including such upgrades that may be necessitated or required from time to time.
c. No foreign product demonstrates an overwhelming advantage over the local product.
d. Their price and long-term support price structure are:
   i. Broadly in line with other offers; or
   ii. are considered acceptable given the advantages of local sourcing.

78. In exceptional circumstances South African based companies may be considered for sovereign items, but only within the framework of contract-specific controls set to ensure sovereign control of that matériel and the related technologies and intellectual property.

FOREIGN-CONTROLLED DEFENCE COMPANIES IN SOUTH AFRICA

79. Local defence companies that are not compliant with the requirements set out above are not considered to be South African, partly South African-owned or South African-based in respect of sovereign equipment or systems or those considered essential for strategic independence.

80. Such companies:
a. May compete for the development, manufacture and support of defence matériel, commodities and services not considered sovereign or required for strategic independence, and their bids will enjoy an advantage over entirely foreign companies if all else is equal.
b. May be allowed to compete in respect of items required for strategic independence, if they can show that effective local manufacture and support can be established where that is practicable, and that such manufacture and long-term support can continue despite opposition or even prohibition by the government of the country in which they are headquartered or in which the majority of the ownership resides.

81. All companies wishing to compete for Defence Force contracts must also have a record, or in the case of newer companies the demonstrated intent, to support the national development agenda as outlined in government policy from time to time, particularly in respect of a commitment to training and skills development and to deepening and expanding South Africa’s knowledge and technology base. Their performance and/or commitment in this respect, with due allowance for variances in what is practicable in a particular sector and in the case of smaller companies, will be a factor in evaluating bids.

FOREIGN DEFENCE COMPANIES

82. Local branches of foreign companies may compete for the development, manufacture and support of general defence matériel, commodities and services.

83. Where, however, such a local branch is in effect no more than a marketing or representative office, that company will be regarded as being a foreign company with no local presence. Foreign companies with no South African branch may be allowed to compete for such contracts, but may be required to establish a local branch to manufacture, support or assist with the support of the relevant defence matériel if the contract is awarded to them, if:
a. That is important to ensure effective support to the Defence Force; or
b. there is a major economic impact; and if
c. such establishment is practicable.
84. All foreign suppliers will be required to meet the industrial participation requirements set by the Department of Defence and the Department of Trade and Industry, as stipulated by national economic and development policy, as well as other relevant legislation.

85. **Commitment** to supporting South Africa’s national development agenda will, as in respect of South African-based companies, be a factor in evaluating bids.

### STATE-CONTROLLED OR OWNED DEFENCE COMPANIES

86. The establishment, development and retention of certain defence industrial capabilities will not solely be governed by market forces, due regard being had for strategic necessity and also for strategic advantage, and particularly in respect of defence matériel over which sovereign control is required.

87. The state may, therefore, retain or establish state-owned enterprises in technology domains that are key to the intent of the defence industry policy and strategy, as developed from national security and defence policy objectives, but which are not commercially viable in South Africa.

88. Where a commercial entity is active in such a technology domain, but finds it is no longer viable as a business, the state may:
   a. Acquire that entity;
   b. acquire control of that entity; or
   c. invest in that entity or the relevant portion thereof, with regard for the protection and control of that investment.

89. Where the state chooses to acquire control or majority or full ownership of a company, the owners will be compensated to a mutually accepted market value, taking into account the demonstrated and verifiable past investment in the company’s defence capabilities and technology development made in good faith by the owners to support the Defence Force.

90. State-owned entities that are potentially viable as commercial enterprises, and that are not engaged in areas that are either sovereign or otherwise particularly sensitive, may be sold into private ownership, in whole or in part, provided that there is assurance that this entity will continue with work deemed essential to the Defence Force.

91. Private defence entities may not be sold, in whole or part, to foreign entities without the agreement of the Minister of Defence, which will not be unreasonably withheld. In a case where the existing owners must divest themselves of their ownership of a defence industry entity, the state may choose to acquire that entity or a portion thereof at a mutually accepted market value.

92. Similarly, private defence entities may not close certain capabilities or exit the industry without the agreement of the Minister of Defence. Where existing owners must take such action, the state may:
   a. Enter into an agreement with the owners to support retention of that capability, or to ensure the survival of the entity or a part of the entity; or
   b. acquire the entity, in whole or part, if applicable, compensating the owners to a mutually accepted market value.

93. In some cases where this might be a logical course of action, the state may enter into a public-private partnership arrangement with a defence industry entity, for instance a government-owned/contractor-operated arrangement in respect of a manufacturing facility.

94. All such acquisitions, disposals or other such arrangements will be in accordance with the relevant legislation and regulations except where the exigencies of the defence and security environment might demand a departure, in which case a fair outcome for the other party will be ensured by negotiation or arbitration.

### Denel

95. **Denel** is a national security asset, with the primary purpose of designing, developing, manufacturing and supporting defence matériel. In addition thereto, Denel is charged with:
   a. The custodianship of assigned sovereign or strategic defence capabilities, technologies and abilities, inclusive of those that may be at risk, the loss of which would threaten South Africa’s required defence capability.
   b. The design, development, manufacture and support of important capabilities which may not be commercially viable.

96. The divisions of Denel are classified as follows:
   a. Denel Dynamics – Sovereign.
   b. Denel Land Systems – Strategic.
   c. Denel Aviation – Strategic.
   d. Rheinmetall-Denel Munitions – Strategic.
   e. Pretoria Metal Pressings (PMP) – Strategic.
   f. Overberg Test Range (OTR) – Strategic.
97. Denel will, in carrying out such projects, make optimal use of private South African companies in the defence industry and in the wider industrial sector, acting as the prime contractor and, where it has the capability to do so, as the system integrator.

98. The relationship between the Defence Force and Denel will at all times remain a normal contractual one.

99. Denel may also be contracted by other state entities to carry out projects that are key to national strategy, suited to its capabilities and not commercially viable, provided that it can do so without detriment to its primary purpose.

100. Denel may dispose of, wholly or partially, to private owners such divisions that are not involved in sovereign projects or deemed essential to strategic independence or key to the intent of defence industrial policy. The state may allow investors, local and foreign, to acquire minority share holdings in those divisions in which it chooses to retain majority ownership. Any minority shareholding will be strictly monitored to ensure security and sovereignty. Due regard will be paid in this respect to economic imperatives and foreign policy objectives.

101. Consideration should be given to establishing a maritime division within Denel to take over the management of the Naval Dockyard (and any other mutually identified facility) in terms of a properly planned division of both functions and responsibilities between itself and the Navy.

102. The establishment of a Denel maritime division will be an optimal approach, specifically the application of Denel’s systems engineering capability and its ability to sustain better upkeep of warships and other naval vessels.

103. Sovereign command and control technology will be established within either Denel or a selected South African-owned company.

**Armscor**

104. Defence acquisition will be carried out by Armscor as the defence matériel acquisition agency to ensure the necessary compliance in the acquisition of defence matériel and related stores. Armscor will also assist the Defence Force to be an intelligent buyer by, in concert with local industry as may be appropriate, conducting, contracting or overseeing:

a. Evaluation of acquisition, procurement, research, development and manufacturing models in other countries.

b. Evaluation of lifecycle management practices in other countries.

c. Research and evaluation in respect of foreign weapons, equipment and systems.

d. The planned and focused development of a science, engineering and technology support capability:

i. In areas identified as key to the future capability of the Defence Force; and

ii. to support the operations and management of the Defence Force.

105. Armscor will, in principle, not develop or manufacture equipment, nor compete in any way with local industry, but will conduct, contract or coordinate:

a. Background technology monitoring and research, to be able to advise the Defence Force and local industry.

b. Research and development in particularly sensitive areas (such as chemical, biological and radiological defence).

c. Research and development in areas in which it is already engaged (such armour technology).

d. Research and development in niche areas as may be identified by the Defence Force from time to time.

106. In the event of an urgent operational requirement that cannot be met by industry, from available resources, Armscor may, nonetheless, arrange and oversee development and manufacture, by sub-contractors or in-house.

107. Armscor has the additional function of supporting and assisting the development of the South African defence industry and its capabilities. In this respect Armscor will work with the Defence Force and the industry to develop acquisition, procurement and logistic/technical support strategies that:

a. Ensure optimal acquisition, procurement and support for the Defence Force.
b. Support the national strategy to develop and strengthen the defence industry.

c. Support South African defence industry market penetration.

DEFENCE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

108. Defence intellectual property may, in the main, be created or developed by:

a. Investment and product development in the course of an acquisition or procurement programme;

b. Investment in a dedicated research and development programme in pursuit of defence science, engineering and technology objectives; or

c. Investment arising from the Defence Industrial programme.

109. For the purposes of this section, defence intellectual property means:

Any intellectual property that is created exclusively or partially with defence funds, and may be found in, or take the form of, books, manuscripts, reports and notes, computer software, inventions, drawings and designs, data items, data packs, specifications, models, photographs, trademarks and other graphical images.

Defence intellectual property includes intellectual property that is created through indirect contracting, such as contracts made by the other party with a sub-contractor, as well as intellectual property that is obtained or created exclusively or partially through the Defence Industrial Participation (DIP) programme or other contracts or co-operations of the Defence Force with foreign entities or countries, where the Defence Force and/or the other party are legally entitled to the intellectual property.

110. The management of defence intellectual property will be broadly guided by a Defence Force policy, through contractual arrangements undertaken to regulate acquisition and research and development projects. Intellectual property may be further regulated by means of patent registration as may be decided on a case-by-case basis.

111. The above places the burden on the state to ensure significant rigour concerning the management of defence intellectual property in future defence matériel contracts. Such contracts may, based on the merit of each transaction, address important defence intellectual property considerations including but not limited to the following:

a. Management of commercial background and foreground intellectual property.

b. Ownership, use and transfer of background and foreground intellectual property.

c. Ownership, use and transfer of defence intellectual property created or developed, including the co-ownership relationship.

d. Management of indivisible defence intellectual property.

e. The modification, altering, development, amendment or enhancement of defence intellectual property.

f. The registration of patents.

g. Royalties arising or payable from defence intellectual property.

h. Right of use or licence to use defence intellectual property.

i. Third party transfer of defence intellectual property;

j. Loss or unlawful use of defence intellectual property;

k. Sale or change of ownership of defence intellectual property.

l. Management of defence intellectual property under instances of joint ventures, alliances and sale of company equity.

m. Measures of protection and confidentiality.

n. Safekeeping and general military security arrangements concerning defence intellectual property.

o. Arms control, dual-use and non-proliferation considerations.

p. Procedures to manage or dispose of redundant defence intellectual property.

q. Settlement of disputes.

112. In some instances defence intellectual property may be further regulated by binding bilateral instruments concluded on a government-to-government basis to either regulate all intellectual property exchanged between the two countries or to regulate the management of specific intellectual property related to a particular government-to-government transaction.

113. The ownership of all and any intellectual property in respect of any defence matériel or technology developed under a direct government defence contract or indirectly as part of a direct government defence contract, will reside with defence, unless specifically ceded to another body or person, regardless of any patents that may be lodged.

114. Where the cost of development was shared by the developing company, companies or individuals, the ownership of the resulting intellectual property will be held pro rata by defence and those companies or individuals as determined in the relevant contractual agreement(s), which will cover, inter alia, the required levels of sovereignty and secrecy, the use of background technology, the future transfer of such intellectual
property and the matter of royalties. Defence intellectual property that is brought into South Africa by a company, or is created or developed by a company using its own funding, remains the property of that company.

115. The Defence Force will not divest itself of such intellectual property except with the agreement of the Minister of Defence that so doing does not present a strategic risk. The Minister of Defence, advised by the Secretary for Defence and the CEO of Armscor, will decide on the management of intellectual property related to defence matériel deemed sovereign or critical to strategic independence.

116. The CEO of Armscor is the responsible authority for the day-to-day management of all Defence Force-owned intellectual property.

117. In managing its intellectual property, defence will keep foremost in mind that an excessive emphasis on royalties will hamper the ability of the South African defence industry to penetrate other defence markets. The royalties to be levied will, therefore, not exceed accepted international market trends and best practice. Where levying royalties would endanger the conclusion of export contracts, consideration will be given to waiving such royalties in favour of concluding such contracts and furthering South African penetration of the international defence market, with the resulting intrinsic benefits to the Defence Force.

118. As a general principle the Defence Force will not patent its intellectual property, as that would:
   a. Entail considerable and ongoing cost.
   b. Compromise the security of the technologies, processes or products concerned.

119. The Defence Force will, instead, ensure the protection of its intellectual property by implementing:
   a. Best practice in the management of trade secrets.

120. The spin-off of capabilities and technologies from the defence industry and the defence research institutes into the wider South African economy and industry will be encouraged and supported.

121. Royalty arrangements will be managed contractually by the CEO of Armscor in close consultation with defence to extract optimal value from existing technology. The preferred method of value-generation will be of a non-mone-

**DEFENCE INDUSTRY STRATEGY**

**DEFENCE STRATEGIC TRAJECTORY – FIVE MILESTONES**

123. The Defence Strategic Trajectory (Chapter 9 of this Defence Review) posits the following critical milestones to develop the defence capabilities that South Africa requires, namely:
   a. **Milestone 1**: Arrest the decline in critical capabilities through immediate and directed interventions.
   b. **Milestone 2**: Reorganise and rebalance the Defence Force as the foundation for future growth.
   c. **Milestone 3**: Create a sustainable Defence Force that can meet ordered defence commitments (interim end-state of the Defence Review).
   d. **Milestone 4**: Enhance the Defence Force’s capacity to respond to emerging threats (end-state of the Defence Review).
   e. **Milestone 5**: Defend the Republic against an imminent or dire threat.

**PHASES FOR THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY STRATEGY**

124. A defence industry sector strategy will be developed that will: meet the critical defence needs; add substance to South Africa’s deterrent posture; add substance to South Africa’s standing as a country; and provide the ability to utilise defence equipment sales in support of foreign policy. The five overlapping phases set out below, which set out the broad concept for the development of the national defence industrial strategy, and is broadly aligned to the five milestones of the Defence Strategic Trajectory. These are:
   a. **Phase 1**: Measures to retain selected capabili-
ties and capacities at risk and the consolidation of the existing state-owned capacities.

b. Phase 2: Ensure sustainment of those capabilities and capacities.

c. Phase 3: Support the economic turn-around of South African and South African-based defence companies.

d. Phase 4: Create conditions for further development of the South African defence industry, in cooperation, where that is relevant and practicable, with the DTI, to support the establishment and development of downstream industries.

e. Phase 5: Recover, recreate or develop sovereign capabilities under South African ownership.

125. While these milestones are essentially sequential, they will in some cases be overlapping or interlocking. The implementation of this strategy will be carried out in step with the development and implementation of the acquisition and procurement policies set out above.

126. The first step towards achieving the desired defence industrial capability is to secure the existing capabilities and capacities as a base from which to expand. This phase will centre on placing short-term contracts locally that are focused on:

- Ensuring the immediate survival of particular companies.
- Ensuring the immediate retention of particular capabilities and capacities.
- Meeting identified requirements of the Defence Force.
- Underpinning pending and potential export orders.

127. Such contracts will include orders for:

- Refurbishment of existing equipment that it is intended to keep in service.
- Upgrading and modernising certain defence matériel.

Figure 15-1: Key Targets across the Defence Strategic Trajectory
c. 
**Replenishment** of reserve ammunition stocks and spares.
d. 
**Continuing** existing research and development projects.

128. Defence may also assist key companies financially to ensure their immediate survival and/or to upgrade facilities. Such assistance must be provided within the regulations of the Public Finance Management Act or in terms of a waiver of those regulations.

**PHASE 2: SUSTAIN EXISTING CAPABILITIES**

129. The second milestone is to ensure the sustainability of the identified defence companies. This will be done by means of:

a. Placing **multi-year contracts** for identified items that are required for training (eg munitions, spares) or to replenish the reserve stocks of the Defence Force.
b. Placing **multi-year contracts** for the support of defence matériel in service.
c. Placing **multi-year contracts** to meet immediate and near-term defence matériel needs of the Defence Force, in some cases in phased batches to enable the Defence Force to coherently rebuild certain capabilities while simultaneously providing industry with an extended order book.
d. Adopting an **acquisition strategy** that makes maximum use of common systems to achieve greater interoperability and easier support in the field on the one hand and greater economies of scale on the other. This strategy will not, however, be allowed to place commonality above mission utility.
e. Informing local companies of planned acquisitions and likely budgets, to enable them to plan ahead and invest appropriately.
f. Expanding the present levels of research and development (R&D) funding and ensuring alignment of R&D projects with Defence Force priorities and, insofar as is practicable, with wider national R&D imperatives and goals.
g. Actively **supporting exports** of defence matériel in production and upgrading of systems and equipment already in service with other forces;
h. Establishing and supporting relevant ‘centres of excellence’.
i. Supporting relevant undergraduate, postgraduate and technical courses at South African universities and other tertiary educational establishments.

**PHASE 3: SUPPORT THE TURN-AROUND**

130. The third milestone is intended to support a turn-around of the industry aimed at ensuring its long-term viability. This will be achieved within identified existing capabilities and within capabilities that can be quickly and efficiently established:

a. Giving the Defence Force **medium-term** and **long-term** authority to commit funds to equipment projects and programmes.
b. **Standardising on platforms** in production or about to enter production to extend production and facilitate through-life support, albeit not favouring commonality at the expense of mission-suitability.
c. Adopting a **half-generation change-over policy** for equipping the defence force. This will guard against block obsolescence and give both the Defence Force and the industry the benefit of predictable longer production runs.
d. **Extending orders** for in-production equipment and systems and items about to go into production, to equip approximately half of the existing fleet or envisaged fleet in each case.
e. Actively **supporting the export of equipment** that is in current production for the Defence Force.
f. Making visible the Defence Force’s medium-term and long-term requirements to the industry, ideally by establishing a **Capital Expenditure Statement** as a public document in respect of all but specifically sensitive projects and envisaged funding levels.
g. **Supporting local development of equipment and systems** to meet requirements that have been identified and largely defined, insofar as this is both practicable and financially sensible.
h. **Supporting joint ventures** with foreign defence companies and countries.
i. Guiding and **supporting industry-funded research and development** to meet future requirements and to pursue some potentially relevant ‘blue sky’ concepts.

**PHASE 4: SUPPORT FUTURE DEVELOPMENT**

131. The fourth milestone is intended to establish a base from which the industry will be able to develop into the future and expand its capabilities. This will be achieved by identifying jointly with the industry **those areas** into which the industry can logically expand and then support that expansion:

a. To meet identified sovereign and strategic independence requirements;
b. where there are sufficiently substantial local requirements;

c. where there is sufficient export or joint venture potential; or

d. where there is substantial potential for valuable spin-offs into the economy.

132. Export and joint venture potential, together with local requirements, exists in several fields, including guided weapons, artillery systems and areas of electronic warfare, and can be recreated in the field of tactical communications systems if that capability is restored.

133. Areas of potentially substantial economic spin-off exist in software development and in the local manufacture of various MOTS items required by the Defence Force that also have civilian applications.

PHASE 5: REPOSITION SOVEREIGN CAPABILITIES

134. Where capabilities that have been identified as requiring sovereign control are in fact controlled by foreign companies, government will either:

a. Acquire those capabilities from their owners at a mutually agreed market value; and in accordance with the relevant legislation and regulations, or,

b. failing that, re-establish the necessary capabilities within DENEL and/or one or more South African-owned companies.

135. In either case this will be accompanied by a focused programme to develop the skills base required for this to be done effectively and efficiently, where possible drawing back into the industry South African individuals with relevant expertise and experience to lay the foundation and to mentor their successors.

KEY INDUSTRY CAPABILITY AREAS

136. The following sections set out in outline the minimum requirement for primary industrial capability. These capability areas apply particularly in respect of the key technology domains identified above, but are also cross-cutting in respect of all defence technology domains.

EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS SUPPORT

137. This refers to a coherent system of through-life system management, from acquisition to disposal, including:

a. Support during the acquisition of foreign-sourced matériel.

b. Commissioning equipment and systems into service.

c. Routine maintenance and overhaul.

d. Battle damage, operational damage and accident repair.

e. Controlled long-term storage and re-commissioning after extended storage.

f. Decommissioning and disposal.

g. Support for equipment passed on to other armed forces in the context of defence diplomacy in congruence with foreign policy and national security objectives to develop a system of closer defence ties within the SADC and the continent.

SUPPORT TO MILITARY OPERATIONS

138. An important issue is the ability of the industry to support key equipment in the field. This may require the deployment of civilian industry staff into an operational area or on operations. In such cases:

a. Civilian members of defence industry companies who deploy with South African forces on an operation will be appointed to the Reserve for the duration of that deployment, in an acting rank commensurate with their posts and responsibilities. This will ensure that all South African personnel fall under a single legal system and that such industry staff enjoy the protections accorded to military personnel in the event of capture by opposing forces or arrest by neutral forces. They will be issued, on a temporary basis, with appropriate clothing and personal equipment, which may include firearms if this is considered necessary. Such appointment will not in any way affect their rights and duties in terms of applicable labour legislation except insofar as required in terms of the conduct and security of operations and to ensure their safety.

b. The Defence Force will be responsible for the transport, protection, accommodation and subsistence of such company staff to and within the operational area, with those costs being for its account, to be charged against the cost of the operation concerned. Defence industry staff deployed in an operational area will be required to adhere to all instructions issued by the local command in respect of movement and security.

c. To cater for inherent risks of being deployed to an operational area, special measures must be developed to ensure due care and adequate compensation in the event of injury or loss of life.

CRITICAL MUNITIONS AND RELATED MATTERS

139. This refers particularly but not exclusively to:

a. All munitions likely to be used in large quantities.
munitions for locally developed weapons, and specialised munitions with limited shelf-life.

b. Specialised batteries for, among other things: communications and other electronic equipment; missiles, torpedoes and other guided weapons; and remotely operated systems.

HIGH RATE-OF-USE SPARES AND CRITICAL STORES

140. This refers to, among other things:

a. Spares for weapons, weapon systems and unmanned systems.

b. Spares for communications and other electronic equipment.

c. Spares for combat vehicles and tactical logistic vehicles.

d. Spares for combat and transport rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft.

e. Spares for naval vessels.

f. Replacement filters for respiratory (individual and collective) equipment.

g. Pharmaceuticals, medical stores, decontamination chemicals and stores, and spares for medical equipment.

h. Field rations, uniforms and general field equipment.

141. It is necessary to keep in mind that some of these spares and stores will be expended in the course of disaster aid and similar operations.

SYSTEM INTEGRATION

142. A system integration capability critically allows the Defence Force to acquire optimal sub-systems and equipment from different suppliers in order to:

a. Develop optimised equipment and systems without the cost of developing sub-systems.

b. Deploy and support equipment and systems.

c. Integrate complex system environments with other systems to construct a ‘system of systems’.

d. Develop system backbones or links to facilitate interoperability among forces.

e. Modernise, upgrade and convert equipment and systems optimally.

143. The system integration capability must include the ability to independently:

a. Integrate precision weapons and related systems with in-service and future platforms.

b. Modify key missile (and related system) algorithms, for example those governing guidance and control, attack profiles and electronic counter-counter-measures capability.

c. Integrate unmanned systems with other in-service and future systems.

EQUIPMENT MODERNISATION AND UPGRADE

144. Most modern platforms (aircraft, ships and vehicles) and systems have a service life of twenty to thirty years, thus requiring the Defence Force to modernise and upgrade such systems to ensure optimal effectiveness and to meet evolving threats. Having the ability within the country to modernise, upgrade and convert equipment and systems allows the Defence Force to optimally manage its equipment both in terms of its utility and in terms of cost-effectiveness.

145. This capability is in many respects a combination of the ability to support equipment and of a systems integration capability.

CRITICAL EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS

146. Critical equipment and systems are those that are essential to the conduct of operations or those which can provide a useable tactical edge. Examples include:

a. Secure communications systems.

b. Information operations systems.

c. Electronic warfare systems.

d. Reconnaissance and intelligence collection, management and evaluation systems.

e. Precision weapons, including missiles and guided and homing bombs and projectiles, and particularly low cost, man-portable and low-collateral-damage weapons, and fire direction systems.

147. Having the ability to develop, manufacture and support such systems will also provide the capability to optimise them to suit the Defence Force’s needs.

OPTIMISED EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS

148. The operational environment and the operational style of the Defence Force are such that there is a requirement for optimised systems and equipment in some defence capability areas, and real potential advantage to be gained in others. It will not be practicable to autonomously develop optimised equipment in all cases, but it will be possible to do so:

a. Where the numbers required justify local development and industrialisation.
In partnership with original equipment manufacturers.

UNMANNED SYSTEMS

149. The strategic, operational and tactical potential of unmanned systems is advancing and expanding at a significant rate. The Defence Force must make optimal use of such systems and understand the impact on own forces operations of such systems in the hands of opposing forces. The Defence Force will draw on technical and scientific advice to:

a. Evaluate and monitor developments in unmanned systems and related technologies at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.
b. Develop service-level and joint unmanned systems doctrines and strategies.
c. Work with the defence industry, the relevant research and development bodies and the relevant government departments to develop and implement a national unmanned systems strategy to cover:
   i. The employment of unmanned systems, including integration at relevant levels.
   ii. The acquisition, integration and support of unmanned systems.
   iii. The development and production of unmanned systems in South Africa.

LARGE-SCALE ACQUISITION OF CIVILIAN-STANDARD EQUIPMENT

150. There is a good logic for manufacturing locally, without necessarily developing locally, normal civilian standard equipment that must be acquired or procured in large numbers or quantities. Quite apart from military advantage, this will further job creation and sustainment, reduce import expenditure and also potentially lead to export earnings.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND RADIOLOGICAL DEFENCE

151. South Africa does not intend to use, acquire or develop chemical, biological or radiological (or nuclear) weapons; nor is there any near-term likelihood of South Africa becoming involved in armed conflict with a country that has such weapons. It is, however, necessary for South Africa to conduct research and development work in this field in order to be able to:

a. Understand the risks and dangers involved;
b. develop the necessary intelligence collection and sensor technologies to guard against such attack;
c. acquire or develop and manufacture protective equipment and clothing for critical facilities, emergency response teams and military personnel;
d. acquire or develop and manufacture relevant inoculations, antidotes and supportive medicines for personnel who may be exposed to such agents; or weapons

e. acquire or develop and manufacture decontamination equipment and materials.

152. The responsibility for ensuring that the necessary capabilities are to hand is that of the Defence Force. It is, therefore, also the responsibility of the Defence Force to initiate, fund and support the necessary research to allow effective and efficient acquisition and/or development and manufacture of the necessary equipment, clothing and medicines. All research, development, manufacture, production and storage carried out in respect of this requirement will be carried out in strict compliance with South Africa’s relevant international treaty obligations and the related national legislation and regulations.

GENERAL COMMODITIES

153. The Defence Force requires various general commodities and civilian-standard equipment in large quantities and numbers. While there is no critical need to manufacture such items in South Africa, this can make economic sense in some cases, and particularly so when there is also a substantial civilian market for the same or an essentially similar item. There may be a particular opportunity here to support small and micro-businesses and military veterans, especially where there is logic to procuring particular commodities from businesses in the immediate area of a Defence Force base.

CONCLUSION

154. The success of the defence industry will be its integration into mainstream South African industrial policy as a distinct and supported sector in the wider industrial base. Defence thus has an onerous responsibility to work together with all stakeholders towards this end, and specifically the integration of the defence industry sector into the Industrial Policy Action Plan, and any subsequent amendment. The next iteration of the National Development Plan should include the Defence Industry as part of South Africa’s national industrial base.

155. The future defence industry strategy will be developed by the National Defence Industry Council, drawing on the expertise within the Defence Force, the Defence
Secretariat and the defence acquisition agent, and in conjunction with the industry and with inputs from the Department of Trade and Industry and the Department of Science and Technology. This strategy will be updated as required to take into account the evolving strategic situation and developments in defence technology and the international defence industrial environment.

156. The implementation of this strategy will be carried out in step with the development and implementation of the acquisition and procurement policies. The strategy will further be aligned and interlinked with government’s wider economic and industrial development strategies, including:

a. Support for small business enterprises.

b. Furthering the general BBBEE and military veterans policies as they develop.

c. Inclusion of the defence industry as a sector in its own right in the IPAP of the DTI, rather than jointly with Aerospace (IPAP 2012/13 – 2014/15, Paragraph 14.17) and specific recognition of and support for realising this sector’s potential in respect of:
   i. Exploiting new opportunities created by South-South cooperation (IPAP, 12.1.2).
   ii. Potential for development of long-term advanced capabilities (IPAP, Cluster 3) and specifically 14.15 “advanced manufacturing” and 14.16 “advanced materials”.
   iii. In relation to other sectors, including:
      (1) Metal fabrication and boat-building (Cluster 1), including the potential for the development of a comprehensive ship-building sector.
      (2) Automotive products and components, and medium and heavy commercial vehicles (Cluster 2).
      (3) Aerospace, electro-technical and ICT (Cluster 3).

d. Inclusion of the defence industry in the DTI’s Manufacturing Competitiveness Enhancement Programme (MCEP).

e. Aligning, without sacrificing strategic independence, the Defence Force acquisition strategy with:
   ii. The Competitive Supplier Development Programme (CSDP) of the DTI.
   iii. The Technology Localisation Programme of the Department of Science and Technology.

f. Inclusion of the defence industry in the DTI’s Manufacturing Competitiveness Enhancement Programme (MCEP).

g. Inclusion of the defence industry in the Support Programme for Industrial Innovation (SPII) of the Department of Trade and Industry, reversing the present specific exclusion of the defence sector by Paragraph 5.6 of the SPII Rules Document (Version 3.0 dated 1 April 2012).

g. Alignment with the policies, strategies and efforts of other government departments and agencies insofar as is practicable and without detriment to the support provided to the Defence Force.

157. An urgent follow-on activity will be the further determination of strategic capabilities and technologies, as well as niche capabilities and technologies, which must be driven and maintained at a corporate level. To this end, it is recommended that a Prioritisation Committee be established by the Minister for this purpose and which will report to the National Defence Industry Council.
1. BACKGROUND


2. ESTABLISHMENT OF A DEFENCE REVIEW COMMITTEE

2.1 The Defence Review Committee (hereafter referred to as the Committee) was established on 05 July 2010 to undertake a complete review of South Africa’s Defence Policy. The Committee was established under authority of the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans (hereafter referred to as the Minister) in her capacity as the Executive Authority for the Department of Defence, and in terms of the Treasury Regulations Chapter 20: Commissions and Committees of Inquiry:

20.1 A ‘committee’ means a committee of inquiry appointed by the executive authority and includes an interdepartmental committee of inquiry, but does not include any permanent commission, board, council, committee or similar body, whether appointed pursuant to any law or otherwise.

2.2 The members of the Committee are appointed under individual contract, and are remunerated in terms of the provisions of Treasury Regulations Chapter 20: Commissions and Committees of Inquiry and on the basis of a written determination by the Accounting Officer:

20.2 Remuneration of Members

20.2.1 An official member may not receive additional remuneration. Subsistence and other allowances may be paid to the official member by the institution that employs the official member in accordance with his or her conditions of service.

20.2.2 A non-official member must be remunerated according to scales approved by the National Treasury.

20.2.3 Should the accounting officer deem it necessary, he or she can, in consultation with the executive authority, determine other remuneration, provided that:

(a) the terms of reference are properly defined in terms of time and cost; and

(b) if applicable, the remuneration is considered taking into account the tariffs as determined by the institute that regulates the profession that the non-official member belongs to.

20.2.4 The remuneration of all members of a commission or committee must be disclosed as notes to the financial statements of the institution.

2.3 The Committee must execute its mandate in accordance with these Terms of Reference and any other directive that may be provided by the Minister.

3. MANDATE

3.1 With due cognisance of the 1996 White Paper on Defence and the 1998 Defence Review, the Committee is re-
DEFENCE REVIEW COMMITTEE – TERMS OF REFERENCE

required to proposed a new Defence Review for the consideration of the Minister, and through which the Minister can engage the National Executive and the Legislature on South Africa’s future defence policy direction. The proposed new Defence Review is required to:

3.1.1 Identify the high-order principles pertinent to the defence function.

3.1.2 Ensure comprehensive alignment of South Africa’s Defence Policy with the Constitution, domestic statute and international law.

3.1.3 Establish a long-term policy and strategy defence vision supportive of South Africa’s strategic posture and international responsibilities.

3.1.4 Enunciate the complete spectrum of defence responsibility, through stated defence functions, high-level goals and tasks, identifying strategic concepts and doctrine and required defence capabilities.

3.1.5 Provide a level of defence effort which must be pursued by the Defence Force.

3.1.6 Provide a sound policy base for determining the concomitant Military Strategy and the Blueprint Defence Force ‘Force Design’ and ‘Force Structure’.

3.1.7 Provide the long-term defence trajectory, in terms of defence organisational interventions, force generation and defence capability development.

3.1.8 Provide a high-level, first-order discussion on the funding principles, practices and requirements of the defence organisation.

3.1.9 Provide a strategic discussion on the role and function of South Africa’s defence industry, with all relevant ramifications thereto.

3.2 In the course of drafting the proposed new Defence Review, the Committee shall take, inter alia, the following into consideration:

3.2.1 The primary object of the Defence Force and other Constitutional and statutory imperatives.

3.2.2 The fundamental defence challenges and concomitant interventions required.

3.2.3 Government priorities, including the Medium-Term Strategic Framework.

3.2.4 The strategic security environment, trends and predictions, including emerging sources of insecurity.

3.2.5 Current national security policy processes.

3.2.6 South Africa’s national interests.

3.2.7 South Africa’s international relations policy, international relations strategy and international obligations.

3.2.8 International best practice on defence matters and recent international experiences in policy making, with particular reference to developments on the African continent.

3.2.9 The nature and scope of the South African defence industry, its products and its strategic domestic and international partners.

3.2.10 The manufacture, marketing, sale, export, import and transit of South African armament and related goods and services.

3.2.11 South Africa’s fiscal framework and policy as it applies to the defence sector.

3.3 In the course of its work the Committee is required to consult extensively in the following domains:

3.3.1 The Defence Force.

3.3.2 The Defence Secretariat.

3.3.3 Relevant government departments and agencies.

3.3.4 Relevant public entities.

3.3.5 The defence industry.

3.3.6 Appropriate organised labour and employee organisations.

3.3.7 Appropriate academic institutions, research organisations and non-governmental organisations.

3.3.8 The people of South Africa at a grass-roots level.
3.3.9 The multilateral African peace and security structures.

3.3.10 Bilateral partners, as the opportunity may arise.

3.4 The work of the Committee must seek to achieve maximum consensus on the proposed Defence Review through:

3.4.1 Enhancing public understanding of the defence mandate and public support for the Defence Force.

3.4.2 Expanding the understanding of the defence contribution to national security, national interests and foreign policy.

3.4.3 Deepened consensus in the Executive and the Legislature on South Africa’s defence needs and requirements.

4. DELIVERABLES

4.1 The Committee will deliver the following:

4.1.1 A draft Defence Review for public consultation.

4.1.2 A public engagement process (and record thereof) on the draft Defence Review.

4.1.3 A revised draft Defence Review following public consultation, input and submissions.

4.1.4 A range of presentations to engage stakeholders and decision-makers, including the National Executive and the Legislature.

4.1.5 A summary of the Defence Review.

4.1.6 An abstract of the key policy pronouncements, interventions required and the proposed defence trajectory.

4.1.7 A decision-support tool to estimate the level of defence capabilities required and the high-level funding requirement thereto.

4.1.8 An updated and consolidated suite of documents and presentations for the Minister to engage Cabinet and Parliament.

4.1.9 A final suite of approved Defence Review documents which can be submitted for printing.

4.2 The Committee shall assist the Minister in any manner required and shall undertake any further work as may be directed.

4.3 The Committee may, on their request, and to the extent that it is feasible, assist the Secretary for Defence and the Chief of the Defence Force with matters related to the Defence Review.

5. THE ORGANISATION AND FUNCTIONING OF THE DEFENCE REVIEW COMMITTEE

5.1 A Chairperson, assisted by a Deputy Chairperson, shall preside over the Committee and will direct and manage the work of the Committee, specifically through:

5.1.1 Providing broad strategic direction to the Defence Review process.

5.1.2 Managing and directing Defence Review political and consultative engagements.

5.1.3 Providing policy and strategy direction to the drafting of the Defence Review.

5.1.4 Providing direction to the administrative support of the Defence Review process, including the prescribing of internal controls as may be required in accordance with departmental and government policy.

5.2 The Committee shall comprise three components, namely: the Defence Review Committee itself, a Resource Group and a Secretariat which supports the Committee (Figure A-1).

5.3 The Committee deliberates on strategic issues and provides strategic direction to the Defence Review process.

5.4 The Resource Group researches and drafts documents as required by the Committee and conducts other tasks as directed by the Chairperson.

5.4.1 Researching, coordinating and drafting research documents.

5.4.2 Preparing and delivering necessary presentations.

5.4.3 Monitoring, evaluating, analysing and interpreting domestic, regional, continental and global developments relevant to the Defence Review.

5.4.4 Researching, coordinating and drafting the Defence Review document.
DEFENCE REVIEW COMMITTEE – TERMS OF REFERENCE

5.4.5 Establishing and maintaining a system to configure and manage Defence Review documents and presentations.

5.4.6 Formulating specialist advice and inputs as required.

5.5 The Secretariat, provided by the Department of Defence, provides:

5.5.1 Administrative and other support to the Committee and the Resource Group.

5.5.2 The efficient, effective and economical use of resources, within the parameters of set policies in this regard.

5.5.3 The capacity to acquire, manage and account for the resources availed to the Committee.

5.5.4 A system of internal controls for the resources availed to the Committee.

5.5.5 Secretariat services that enable the work of the Committee.

5.6 Specific liaison points will be established with the Office of the Secretary for Defence and the Office of the Chief of the Defence Force for the coordination of the Committee’s engagement with the Defence Secretariat and the Defence Force.

5.7 Official members serving on the Committee and any of its sub-structures, are required to:

5.7.1 Conduct themselves and undertake their duties in a manner consistent with the standing and status of the Committee.

5.7.2 Through their respective command channel, account to the Chairperson for their performance.

6. FUNDING THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE

The work of the Committee will be funded from the vote of the Department of Defence and in particular from the Administration Programme: Sub-Programme Policy and Planning.

Figure A-1: Defence Review Command, Staff and Communication Structure
7. PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE

7.1 The Chairperson shall convene the Committee according to a programme as will be agreed upon with the Minister.

7.2 The Chairperson shall determine the time and place of committee meetings.

7.3 The Deputy Chairperson will preside over meetings in the event of the absence of the Chairperson.

7.4 The Committee may seek specific guidance or advice from the Minister before proceeding to new areas of work.

7.5 A quorum shall consist of the Chairperson (or in the absence of the Chairperson, the Deputy Chairperson) plus a simple majority of the members.

7.6 The Committee may still meet if a quorum is not reached, provided that all decisions taken are presented for adoption at the next quorated Committee meeting.

7.7 Committee members are required to declare any possible conflict of interests arising from service on the Committee.

7.8 Committee members shall conduct themselves in a manner befitting their appointment to the Committee.

7.9 The deliberations and work undertaken by the Committee remain confidential and no member is authorised to disclose such information unless it is in accordance with the agreed Work Plan or any decisions of the Committee. Confidentiality and Intellectual Property Rights will be specified in the Memorandum of Understanding to be concluded between the Department and each Committee member.

7.10 The Committee shall endeavour to arrive at its decision by means of consensus.

7.10.1 In instances where consensus is not possible, the Committee shall make its decision by means of a vote.

7.10.2 In addition to a deliberating vote, the Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson shall enjoy a casting vote. On a vote being tied, the Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson shall exercise their casting votes.

7.11 The Chairperson may request the Minister to resolve such dispute or impasse.

7.12 The Committee may establish sub-committees as it deems fit.

7.13 The Committee may, through the Chairperson, request advice, assistance or support from the Secretary for Defence and/or the Chief of the Defence Force.

7.14 The Committee may, as necessary, co-opt defence experts or officials to support the Committee, provided such co-option is directed through the Secretary for Defence and/or the Chief of the Defence Force.

8. THE SECRETARY FOR DEFENCE

8.1 The Secretary for Defence, as Accounting Officer and Head of Department, shall:

8.1.1 Provide overall administrative and technical support to the Committee.

8.1.2 Provide appropriate resources required for the functioning of the Committee.

8.1.3 Assign a senior official as the nodal point between the office of the Secretary for Defence and the Committee.

8.1.4 Ensure coordinated flow of Defence Secretariat inputs into the Defence Review process.

8.1.5 Avail technical experts to the Committee as may be required by the Committee.

8.1.6 Liaise with the Minister on the matters pertaining to the work of the Committee, as and when required.

9. CHIEF OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE

9.1 The Chief of the SANDF shall:

9.1.1 Assign a senior member as the nodal point between the office of the Chief of the SANDF and the Committee.

9.1.2 Ensure coordinated flow of SANDF inputs into the Defence Review process.
9.1.3  Avail technical experts to the Committee as may be required by the Committee.

9.1.4  Facilitate engagement between the Chiefs of Divisions/Services and the Committee.

9.1.5  Facilitate access to units and sight visits as may be required by the Committee.

9.1.6  Liaise with the Minister on the matters pertaining to the work of the Committee, as and when required.

10. RECORD KEEPING

10.1 The Committee Secretariat shall be responsible for the keeping of records for the activities of the Committee.

10.2 The records of the Committee shall be subject to auditing (internal or external) as may be required from time to time.

11. COMMUNICATION

11.1 The Head of Communication (HOC) in the Ministry shall be responsible for all communication matters related to the Defence Review.

11.2 The Committee will be supported by a communication strategy which will be planned, organised and managed by the HOC and which shall, inter alia, include:

   11.2.1 Public consultation and Imbizo.

   11.2.2 Defence Review branding, primary themes and key messages.

12. PARLIAMENTARY AND CABINET ENGAGEMENT

Cabinet and Parliamentary engagement will be coordinated and conducted solely under authority of the Minister.
## ANNEXURE B

### DEFENCE REVIEW CONSULTATION PROGRAMME & PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROCESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<td>Institution of Defence Review Committee</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>Minister</td>
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<td>Comparative analysis</td>
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<td>Meeting with Secretary for Defence</td>
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<td>DOD: Chief of Joint Operations (CJ Ops)</td>
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<td>Presentation</td>
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<td>Presentation</td>
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<td>Presentation</td>
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<td>05 Aug 11</td>
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<td>Presentation</td>
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<td>Presentation</td>
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<td>15 Aug 11</td>
<td>DOD: Chief Finance Officer, Chief Director Budget Management</td>
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<td>16 Aug 11</td>
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</tr>
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<td>AMD</td>
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</tr>
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<td>29</td>
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<td>Discussion</td>
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<td>Presentation</td>
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<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>19 Aug 11</td>
<td>Strategic considerations – Prof Binedell</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>19 Aug 11</td>
<td>Defence Tech – defence, security</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>22-24 Aug 11</td>
<td>Visit to Free State units</td>
<td>Visit &amp; presentations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>22-24 Aug 11</td>
<td>Visit to SA Armour Regiment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>22-24 Aug 11</td>
<td>Visit to 44 Parachute Regiment</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>22-24 Aug 11</td>
<td>Visit to 16 Squadron</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>22-24 Aug 11</td>
<td>Visit to Mobilisation Centre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>25 Aug 11</td>
<td>NICOC</td>
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</tr>
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<td>25 Aug 11</td>
<td>Reutech briefing</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
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<td>25 Aug 11</td>
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<td>Visit &amp; presentations</td>
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<td>25 Aug 11</td>
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<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
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<td>29 Aug 11</td>
<td>National Planning Commission</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
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<td>29 Aug 11</td>
<td>Military Strategy – Prof Deon Fourie Strategic Studies, UNISA</td>
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</tr>
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<td>46</td>
<td>30 Aug 11</td>
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<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>31 Aug 11</td>
<td>SADC and BRICS attachés</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Defence Decision Support Institute (DDSI) and DDSI: BRICS countries</td>
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<td>01-02 Sep 11</td>
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<td>Demonstration, visit &amp; presentations</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>01-02 Sep 11</td>
<td>Visit to northern borderline – Musina</td>
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<td>05 Sep 11</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Visit &amp; presentation</td>
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<td>07 Sep 11</td>
<td>DOD: Defence Reserves</td>
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</tr>
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<td>57</td>
<td>09 Sep 11</td>
<td>SCAMP presentation</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Cooperative Governance: National Disaster Management Centre</td>
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<td>Visit SANDF units in Western Cape</td>
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<td>SA Navy Fleet Command</td>
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<td>12-15 Sep 11</td>
<td>Military Academy</td>
<td>Visit &amp; presentations</td>
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<td>64.</td>
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<td>Air Force Base Langebaan</td>
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<td>Fort iKapa – Reserve Force Units</td>
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<td>Danish Academy: Danish Defence Policy</td>
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</tr>
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<td>19-23 Sep 11</td>
<td>DRC work session – Dullstroom</td>
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<td>69.</td>
<td></td>
<td>25 Sep - 07 Oct 11 External visit to DRC</td>
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<td>70.</td>
<td></td>
<td>External visit to Uganda</td>
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<td>External visit to Central African Republic</td>
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<td>External visit to Netherlands</td>
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<td>Visit SA Defence College</td>
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<td>Work session – fundamental defence principles</td>
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<td>76.</td>
<td>14 Oct 11</td>
<td>Department of Home Affairs</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
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<td>77.</td>
<td>18 Oct 11</td>
<td>Discussion with CEO Armscor</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>78.</td>
<td>18 Oct 11</td>
<td>Legal Audit Committee</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
</tr>
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<td>18 Oct 11</td>
<td>Interim Defence Service Commission</td>
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<td>Discussion CEO Denel Group</td>
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<td>19 Oct 11</td>
<td>Visit SANDF units</td>
<td>Visit &amp; presentations</td>
</tr>
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<td>82.</td>
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<td>DOD Vehicle Reserve Park – Wallmansthal</td>
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<td>43 Brigade – Wallmansthal</td>
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<td>84.</td>
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<td>Special Forces School – Murrayhill</td>
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<td>85.</td>
<td>21 Oct 11</td>
<td>SAPS Presentation – border policing</td>
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</tr>
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<td>86.</td>
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<td>Resource Group feedback on drafting</td>
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<td>26-28 Oct 11</td>
<td>Committee and Resource Group work session</td>
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<td>01 Nov 11</td>
<td>Visit SANDF units – SA War College</td>
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<td>Defence Tech</td>
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</tr>
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<td>02 Nov 11</td>
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<td>03 Nov 11</td>
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<td>DOD: Presentation by Procurement – Secretary for Defence (Sec Def)</td>
<td>Presentation, MS Word doc</td>
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<td>External visit – SADC Brigade planning element, Gaborone</td>
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<td>No.</td>
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<td>DOD: Defence Industry &amp; Matériel Management – defence industry discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>96.</td>
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<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
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<td>97.</td>
<td>09 Nov 11</td>
<td>HR Acquisition presentation</td>
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<td>98.</td>
<td>10 Nov 11</td>
<td>Work session: defence industry</td>
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<td>99.</td>
<td>11 Nov 11</td>
<td>SAPS Civilian Secretariat</td>
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<td>100.</td>
<td>14 Nov 11</td>
<td>SAPS discussion and exchange</td>
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<td>14-15 Nov 11</td>
<td>DRC work session</td>
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<td>Presentation</td>
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<td>24-25 Nov 11</td>
<td>MODMV seminar with SADC Ministers of Defence</td>
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<td>30 Nov - 2 Dec 11</td>
<td>External visit – UK</td>
<td>Visit &amp; presentations</td>
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<td>105.</td>
<td>5-7 Dec 11</td>
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<td>08 Dec 11</td>
<td>Engage with MCC</td>
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<td>11 Jan 12</td>
<td>Military Ombud Office</td>
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<td>12 Jan 12</td>
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<td>Minutes</td>
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<td>16-18 Jan 12</td>
<td>DRC Strategy work session</td>
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<td>111.</td>
<td>23 Jan 12</td>
<td>AMD</td>
<td>Presentation/minutes</td>
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<td>112.</td>
<td>25 Jan 12</td>
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<td>DRC work session – National Security Concept</td>
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<td>114.</td>
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<td>DOD: CJ Ops Op HORIZON – Anti-poaching</td>
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<td>115.</td>
<td>15 Feb 12</td>
<td>National Youth Development Agency</td>
<td>Presentation/minutes</td>
</tr>
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<td>116.</td>
<td>16 Feb 12</td>
<td>AMD work session</td>
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<td>16 Feb 12</td>
<td>UK Reserve Force Policy</td>
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<td>Department of Science &amp; Technology</td>
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<td>Presentation</td>
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<td>Denel – Cyber-Security 21</td>
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<td>DOD: Chief Director Transformation Management</td>
<td>Presentation/minutes</td>
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<td>122.</td>
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<td>DOD: Financial Management Function, Chief Financial Officer</td>
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<td>123.</td>
<td>23 Feb 12</td>
<td>Defence Intelligence</td>
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<td>IHL ICRC Discussion</td>
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<td>DRC work session – Kedar Lodge</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
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<td>126.</td>
<td>07-16 Mar 12</td>
<td>Resource Group drafting session at Fleet Command</td>
<td>Work session</td>
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<td>07 Mar 12</td>
<td>DOD: Military Police Agency Presentation</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
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<td>128.</td>
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<td>Meeting with the Institute for Security Studies (ISS)</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
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<td>09 Mar 12</td>
<td>MOD work session – 4 SF Regt</td>
<td>Work session</td>
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<td>Work session</td>
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<td>Work session</td>
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<td>132.</td>
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<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
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<td>20 Mar 12</td>
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<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
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<td>136.</td>
<td>22 Mar 12</td>
<td>Minister of Finance on Accounting Officer function</td>
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<td>137.</td>
<td>24 Mar 12</td>
<td>MOD on Accounting Officer function</td>
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</tr>
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<td>25 Mar 12</td>
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<td>Work session</td>
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<td>27 Mar 12</td>
<td>Commission on State-Owned Enterprises (Chairperson)</td>
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<td>MC briefing</td>
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<td>Army Work Group</td>
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<td>National Youth Service</td>
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<td>Military Police</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
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<td><strong>PUBLIC RELEASE OF THE CONSULTATIVE DRAFT</strong></td>
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<td>151.</td>
<td>12 Apr 12</td>
<td>Ministerial public release of the draft consultative Defence Review document</td>
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<td>12 Apr 12</td>
<td>Defence correspondents</td>
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<td>No.</td>
<td>Date</td>
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<td>16 Apr</td>
<td>Peace and Stability Committee</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
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<td>154</td>
<td>17 Apr</td>
<td>Parliamentary Study Groups</td>
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</tr>
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<td>17 Apr</td>
<td>Cape Town correspondents</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>156</td>
<td>18 Apr</td>
<td>Joint meeting with Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) and Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans (PCD&amp;MV)</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>157</td>
<td>21 Apr</td>
<td>Imbizo – KwaZulu-Natal – Tongaat</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
</tr>
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<td>158</td>
<td>23 Apr</td>
<td>Armscor Management Board</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>159</td>
<td>24-25 Apr</td>
<td>Institute for Strategic Studies – round-table public participation</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160</td>
<td>02 May</td>
<td>Denel – Board feedback</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>03 May</td>
<td>Centre for Conflict Resolution – round-table public participation</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
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<td>04 May</td>
<td>Civic Education – CHR Development</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
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<td>05 May</td>
<td>Imbizo – North West Province – Ikageng</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>164</td>
<td>07 May</td>
<td>Denel Management Committee</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165</td>
<td>8-9 May</td>
<td>ACCORD – Durban – round-table public participation</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>166</td>
<td>09 May</td>
<td>ANC Study Group Portfolio Committee</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
</tr>
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<td>167</td>
<td>10 May</td>
<td>DRC engagement with the JSCD</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>168</td>
<td>11 May</td>
<td>Religious Advisory Board</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>169</td>
<td>17 May</td>
<td>Budget Vote</td>
<td>Speech &amp; media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170</td>
<td>22 May</td>
<td>Defence Reserve Board</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
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<td>171</td>
<td>23 May</td>
<td>Development Agenda</td>
<td>Work session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>172</td>
<td>24 May</td>
<td>Indonesian delegation</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
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<td>173</td>
<td>25 May</td>
<td>Denel Excom</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174</td>
<td>26 May</td>
<td>Imbizo – Eastern Cape – Dimbaza</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>28 May</td>
<td>CHR Civic Education</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
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<td>29 May</td>
<td>SA Army extended command cadre</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>177</td>
<td>29 May</td>
<td>University of Free State public participation</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>178</td>
<td>29 May</td>
<td>Public participation programme (PPP) with soldiers at Tempe Military Base</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
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<tr>
<td>179</td>
<td>30 May</td>
<td>USA Deputy Secretary for Defence</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180</td>
<td>30 May</td>
<td>Wits University – PPP</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181</td>
<td>31 May</td>
<td>Military Command Council</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>182</td>
<td>01 Jun</td>
<td>Engagement with AMD and defence industry</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>183</td>
<td>04 Jun</td>
<td>Armscor Board</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>04 June</td>
<td>SA Defence Force Association</td>
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<td>Land Reform Imbizo</td>
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<td>SG</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
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<td>09 Jun</td>
<td>Imbizo – Bushbuckridge, Mpumalanga – Hoyo-Hoyo High School</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>External/PPP</td>
</tr>
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<td>12 Jun</td>
<td>Imbizo – Upington, Northam – PPP</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>External/PPP</td>
</tr>
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<td>13-22 Jun</td>
<td>Special Forces Brigade inputs to Defence Review</td>
<td>Presentations &amp; submissions</td>
<td>MCC consultation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>SAAF Inputs to Defence Review</td>
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<td>SA Navy Inputs to the Defence Review</td>
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<td>21.</td>
<td>Military Police Agency/Provost Marshal General</td>
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<td>CSIR – Defence, Peace and Security</td>
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<td>Inputs from MCC</td>
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</tr>
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<td>32.</td>
<td>C Def Int</td>
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<td>23 Jun</td>
<td>Imbizo – Limpopo, Polokwane – Aganang Community Hall</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>External/PPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Jun</td>
<td>Foreign Defence attachés – PPP</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>External</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Jun</td>
<td>Interim Defence Service Commission</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Jul</td>
<td>Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University – PPP</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>NGO &amp; academia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Jul</td>
<td>Briefing to newly appointed MOD, Ms Mapisa-Nqakula</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>Ministerial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Jul</td>
<td>Gordon Institute for Business Studies (GIBS) – PPP</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>Academia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-28 Jul</td>
<td>Defence Review training seminar – Cape Town</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>External &amp; internal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jul</td>
<td>Defence Matériel</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07 Aug</td>
<td>Defence Review Committee engagement with CSANDF</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08 Aug</td>
<td>Work session with MCC on inputs to Defence Review</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Aug</td>
<td>Imbizo – Kliptown, Soweto</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
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<td>16 Aug</td>
<td>Developmental Agenda seminar – Mapungubwe Institute</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>Academia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 Aug 12</td>
<td>Chairperson meeting with CSANDF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>27 Aug 12</td>
<td>DRC work session</td>
<td>Work session</td>
<td>Internal</td>
</tr>
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<td>27 Aug 12</td>
<td>Chairperson + 1 meeting with Rheinmetall</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
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<td>28 Aug 12</td>
<td>Mr John Job – Reserve Force Council meeting with DRC</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>External</td>
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<td>29 Aug 12</td>
<td>Briefing to Denel Board</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-31 Aug 12</td>
<td>Implementation matrix</td>
<td>Work session</td>
<td>Internal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07 Sep 12</td>
<td>CSANDF</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Sep 12</td>
<td>Secretariat Council</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Sep 12</td>
<td>Debrief industry – arranged by AMD</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-15 Sep 12</td>
<td>Western Cape Imbizo</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>External/PPP</td>
</tr>
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<td>17 Sep 12</td>
<td>Chairperson meeting with MOD and CSANDF at Waterkloof</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>Ministerial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Sep 12</td>
<td>Defence Reserve Board</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Sep 12</td>
<td>Work session with Editor</td>
<td>Work session</td>
<td>Resource Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-21 Sep 12</td>
<td>AAD engagements</td>
<td>Discussions</td>
<td>Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Sep 12</td>
<td>Engage with MCC at Peace Mission Training Centre, Thaba Tshwane</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04 Oct 12</td>
<td>DOD environmental scan</td>
<td>Seminar</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
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<td>09 Oct 12</td>
<td>Resource Group and Chairperson meeting with Sec Def</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
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<td>10 Oct 12</td>
<td>Sri Lankan Sec Def</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>External</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Oct 12</td>
<td>UK High Commissioner</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>External</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Oct 12</td>
<td>DOD PSAP</td>
<td>Seminar</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Oct 12</td>
<td>MOD briefing</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>Ministerial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Oct 12</td>
<td>Armscor Board feedback on final draft</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Oct 12</td>
<td>Editor work session</td>
<td>Work session</td>
<td>Resource Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Oct 12</td>
<td>SANDF Restructuring Committee</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Oct 12</td>
<td>Secretariat Nodal Point input</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Oct 12</td>
<td>Special Forces inputs</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Oct 12</td>
<td>MOD DRC engagement</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>Ministerial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01 Nov 12</td>
<td>Editor meeting to confirm progress</td>
<td>Work session</td>
<td>Internal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01 Nov 12</td>
<td>DDSI costing discussion</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>Internal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02 Nov 12</td>
<td>Follow-up Meeting with MOD</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>Ministerial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04 Nov 12</td>
<td>AMD discussion on Industry Chapter</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>Industry</td>
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<td>05 Nov 12</td>
<td>DOD induction seminar</td>
<td>Seminar</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
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<td>12 Nov 12</td>
<td>Briefing to IBSA delegates by Resource Group at CSIR</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>External</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Nov 12</td>
<td>DRC meeting to discuss progress</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>250.</td>
<td>23 Nov 12 Meeting with C Def Mat and AMD on Chapter 15</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>DOD</td>
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<td>251.</td>
<td>27 Nov 12 Attend final presentation by the Executive National Security Programme (ENSP) course</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>252.</td>
<td>28 Nov 12 Briefing to Def Res planning session</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>253.</td>
<td>29 Nov 12 End-year function</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>254.</td>
<td>03 Dec 12 SANDF Restructuring Committee</td>
<td>Work session</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>255.</td>
<td>04-07 Dec 12 Peacekeeping seminar at Clingendael Institute</td>
<td>Seminar</td>
<td>External</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>256.</td>
<td>11 Dec 12 Chairperson attends graduation ceremony Military Academy as Keynote Speaker</td>
<td>Keynote address</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### FINALISATION & APPROVAL PHASE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>257.</td>
<td>17 Jan 13 Meeting with CSIR delegate – benchmarking from CSIR on PPP</td>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td>Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>258.</td>
<td>17 Jan 13 MOD engagement on approval process</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>Ministerial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>259.</td>
<td>18 Jan 13 DRC meeting to discuss way forward</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>Internal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260.</td>
<td>23 Jan 13 DRC meeting with the Armscor Management Board</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261.</td>
<td>24 Jan 13 Presentation to Denel Exco on final draft</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>262.</td>
<td>25 Jan 13 Meeting with Ambassador Lembede of West Africa Desk, DIRCO</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>External/DIRCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>263.</td>
<td>25 Jan 13 Meeting with AMD CEO</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>264.</td>
<td>30 Jan 13 Head of Communications on Corporate Communication</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>265.</td>
<td>06 Feb 13 DRC work session</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>266.</td>
<td>07 Feb 13 Chairperson meeting with MOD advisors</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>Ministerial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>267.</td>
<td>12 Feb 13 Feedback to Plenary Defence Staff Council (PDSC)</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>268.</td>
<td>13-14 Feb 13 Chairperson invited to Opening of Parliament</td>
<td>Attendance</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>269.</td>
<td>14 Feb 13 Special DRC meeting with PDSC in Cape Town</td>
<td>Work session</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>270.</td>
<td>15 Feb 13 DRC engagement with the Log Work Group</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271.</td>
<td>18 Feb 13 ENSP presentation</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272.</td>
<td>18 Feb 13 Command and Control Work Group</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>273.</td>
<td>20 Feb 13 Special PDSC and DRC meeting at SAAF College to discuss outstanding issues on Accounting Officer and Logistics</td>
<td>Work session</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>274.</td>
<td>20 Feb 13 Chairperson and Resource Group meeting with MOD in Cape Town</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>Ministerial</td>
</tr>
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<td>275.</td>
<td>21 Feb 13 Chairperson and Resource Group debrief on decisions taken on 20 Feb 13</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
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</tr>
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<td>No.</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<td>276.</td>
<td>22 Feb 13</td>
<td>Chairperson Debrief Committee on decisions taken and way forward</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>277.</td>
<td>25 Feb 13</td>
<td>Resource Group briefing to the Peace and Stability Committee of ANC at Luthuli House</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>278.</td>
<td>25 Feb 13</td>
<td>Resource Group meeting with Command and Control Work Group of PDSC</td>
<td>Work session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>279.</td>
<td>04 Mar 13</td>
<td>Special MOD work session with PDSC on outstanding issue of Accounting Officer &amp; PDSC endorsement of the document</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
</tr>
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<td>280.</td>
<td>05 Mar 13</td>
<td>DRC brief JCPS DGs at Koepel on final 2nd draft</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>281.</td>
<td>26 Mar 13</td>
<td>DRC meeting to discuss way forward to planned meetings with Cabinet Cluster Ministers, Cabinet, Portfolio Committee</td>
<td>Work session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>282.</td>
<td>15 Apr 13</td>
<td>DR presentation to DOD Work Session</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>283.</td>
<td>17 Apr 13</td>
<td>Accountability presentation to DOD Work Session</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>284.</td>
<td>25 Apr 13</td>
<td>JCPS Cabinet Committee</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>285.</td>
<td>30 Apr 13</td>
<td>Cabinet Memo: Note work in progress</td>
<td>Cab Memo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>286.</td>
<td>08 May 13</td>
<td>French Ambassador engagement on Mali</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>287.</td>
<td>21 May 13</td>
<td>SA Army Command Council info brief</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>288.</td>
<td>24 May 13</td>
<td>Defence Budget Vote Speech – Parliament</td>
<td>Attendance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>289.</td>
<td>28 May 13</td>
<td>Navy Command Council info brief</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>290.</td>
<td>10 Jun 13</td>
<td>Armscor Management Board</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>291.</td>
<td>10 Jun 13</td>
<td>Committee progress meeting</td>
<td>Work session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>292.</td>
<td>11 Jun 13</td>
<td>Logistic-Through-Life Work Group</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>293.</td>
<td>25 Jun 13</td>
<td>SAMHS Command Council info brief</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>294.</td>
<td>11 Jul 13</td>
<td>SAAF Force Design</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>295.</td>
<td>16 Jul 13</td>
<td>SAAF Command Council info brief</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>296.</td>
<td>31 Jul 13</td>
<td>SF Command Cadre info brief</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>297.</td>
<td>31 Jul 13</td>
<td>DRC preparation for Commander-in-Chief briefing</td>
<td>Work session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>298.</td>
<td>01 Aug 13</td>
<td>Joint Maritime Committee brief on policy process</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>299.</td>
<td>01 Aug 13</td>
<td>Informal engagement with National Planning Commission</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300.</td>
<td>05 Aug 13</td>
<td>Finalisation of briefing to the Commander-in-Chief with MOD</td>
<td>Work session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301.</td>
<td>06 Aug 13</td>
<td>Briefing to the Commander-in-Chief</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>302.</td>
<td>07 Aug 13</td>
<td>Actions post-Commander-in-Chief briefing</td>
<td>Work session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>303.</td>
<td>08 Aug 13</td>
<td>Ops Staff Council info brief</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
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<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
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<td>12 Aug 13</td>
<td>Briefing to the Defence College</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Aug 13</td>
<td>Scoping new work with Chairperson</td>
<td>Work session</td>
<td>Internal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Aug 13</td>
<td>Defence Review &amp; Estimator Model briefing to Armscor DDSI</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>Armscor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Aug 13</td>
<td>Defence Review &amp; Estimator Model briefing to Deputy Minister of Defence</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>Ministerial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Aug 13</td>
<td>Defence Review &amp; Estimator Model briefing to National Planning Commission representative</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>External</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Aug 13</td>
<td>Feedback to Chairperson on adjusting Estimator Model to new trajectory</td>
<td>Work session</td>
<td>Internal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Aug 13</td>
<td>Defence Review &amp; Estimator Model briefing to the Policy, Strategy and Planning Division</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03 Sept 13</td>
<td>Feedback to SANDF Restructuring Committee</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05-07 Sept 13</td>
<td>Committee feedback and planning session</td>
<td>Work session</td>
<td>Internal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Sept 13</td>
<td>Defence Review &amp; Estimator Model briefing to the Human Resources Planning Board</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Sept 13</td>
<td>Committee feedback on chapter updates and 2nd Commander-in-Chief presentation</td>
<td>Work session</td>
<td>Internal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Oct 13</td>
<td>Defence Review &amp; Estimator Model briefing to the Defence Attaché Course</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Oct 13</td>
<td>Review of the new Chapter on the Defence Strategic Trajectory</td>
<td>Work session</td>
<td>Internal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Oct 13</td>
<td>Brief presentation on the Defence Review to ‘Club 24’ at the Rand Club</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>External</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Oct 13</td>
<td>Defence Review &amp; Estimator Model briefing to the Army Council</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Oct 13</td>
<td>Defence Review &amp; Estimator Model briefing to the Army Monthly Think-Tank</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Oct 13</td>
<td>Defence Review &amp; Estimator Model briefing to the Human Resources Division</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Oct 13</td>
<td>Defence Review &amp; Estimator Model briefing to the Navy Command Council</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Oct 13</td>
<td>Defence Review &amp; Estimator Model briefing to the Air Force Command Council</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Oct 13</td>
<td>Defence Review &amp; Estimator Model briefing to CCS and the DOD Planning Board</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05 Nov 13</td>
<td>Defence Review &amp; Estimator Model briefing to the Navy Strategy Session</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06 Nov 13</td>
<td>Defence Review &amp; Estimator Model briefing to the Special Forces Command Cadre</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06 Nov 13</td>
<td>Meeting with French Ambassador on the new French White Paper on Defence</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>External</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
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<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>327</td>
<td>11 Nov 13</td>
<td>Defence Review &amp; Estimator Model briefing to the Secretariat Council</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>328</td>
<td>11 Nov 13</td>
<td>Defence Review &amp; Estimator Model briefing to the Reserve Force Council</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>329</td>
<td>12 Nov 13</td>
<td>Defence Review &amp; Estimator Model briefing to the SAMHS Command Council</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>330</td>
<td>12 Nov 13</td>
<td>Discussion between the Chairperson and the UK Defence Attaché</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>331</td>
<td>14 Nov 13</td>
<td>Defence Review &amp; Estimator Model briefing to the Defence Reserves Division</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>332</td>
<td>27 Nov 13</td>
<td>Defence Review &amp; Estimator Model briefing to the MCC</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
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<td>Defence Review &amp; Estimator Model briefing to the CSIR (DPSS)</td>
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<td>23-26 Oct 12</td>
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<td>Revisit of Terms of Reference and Admin Procedures</td>
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<td>28-29 Jan 13</td>
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<td>Resource Group finalise 2nd draft for distribution/handling over to MOD</td>
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<td>Resource Group refinement of document as follows: main document, Chapter 11, Chapter 15 and finishing touches</td>
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<td>Drafting of new Chapter: Defence Strategic Trajectory</td>
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<td>Editor provides detailed editing inputs</td>
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**DEVELOPMENT ‘ESTIMATOR MODEL’ DECISION SUPPORT TOOL**

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<td>Resource Group meeting with subject matter experts on logistics, costing</td>
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<td>Estimator Model presentation to SANDF Restructuring Committee</td>
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<td>Estimator Model briefing to the SAAF Executive Council</td>
<td>Briefing</td>
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## Annexure C

### Public Submissions Made on the Defence Review

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<tr>
<th>SER</th>
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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Brig Gen (rtd.) George Kruys</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Anthoni van Nieuwkerk and Koffi Kouakou</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Capt Robin Kilby</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Chris Greyling</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Chris Heyns – NOVO Power</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Coen van Wyk</td>
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<td>Col Bob Janssen</td>
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<td>Col Riaan Louw</td>
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<td>Gisela Weinman</td>
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<td>Dr Janet Cherry – NMMU</td>
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<td>Dr John Job</td>
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<td>Dr Gavin Bradshaw – NMMU</td>
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<td>Karel Nel – Armscor</td>
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<td>Libhongo Ntonkonkolu – East Cape Development</td>
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<td>36.</td>
<td>I2B Logistics</td>
<td>Group/organisational Submissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>Solidarity – Defence Industry Comments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38.</td>
<td>Christian Advisory Board</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39.</td>
<td>MK Military Veterans – North West</td>
<td></td>
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<td>40.</td>
<td>Cease Fire Campaign</td>
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<td>41.</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>42.</td>
<td>AMD</td>
<td>Defence-related Submissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43.</td>
<td>SA Sea Cadets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44.</td>
<td>Armscor Board</td>
<td>Military council Submissions</td>
</tr>
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<td>45.</td>
<td>Armscor Management Committee</td>
<td></td>
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<td>46.</td>
<td>CSIR – Defence, Peace and Security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47.</td>
<td>Reserve Force Council</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>48.</td>
<td>Reserve Force Council – Military Discipline Bill</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SER</td>
<td>CONTRIBUTOR</td>
<td>REMARKS</td>
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<tr>
<td>53.</td>
<td>SA Military Health Service</td>
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<td>54.</td>
<td>SA Military Health Service – National Specialised Capabilities</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>55.</td>
<td>SA Special Forces</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>56.</td>
<td>Joint Operations</td>
<td></td>
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<td>57.</td>
<td>Further J Ops Input</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>58.</td>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59.</td>
<td>Human Resources – Training &amp; ETD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60.</td>
<td>CMIS – IW/ICT</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Logistics</td>
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<td>Chaplain General</td>
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<td>Provost Marshal General</td>
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<td>64.</td>
<td>Defence Intelligence</td>
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<td>65.</td>
<td>Adjutant General – Legal</td>
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<td>66.</td>
<td>Defence Reserves</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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**DEFENCE SECRETARIAT SUBMISSIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SER</th>
<th>CONTRIBUTOR</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>67.</td>
<td>Defence Secretariat Council Specific</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68.</td>
<td>Policy and Planning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69.</td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70.</td>
<td>Defence Matériel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71.</td>
<td>Defence Estate Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72.</td>
<td>HODSCI – Supply Chain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>73.</td>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td></td>
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**TOPIC SPECIFIC SUBMISSIONS**

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<th>SER</th>
<th>CONTRIBUTOR</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>74.</td>
<td>Procurement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75.</td>
<td>Defence Heritage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76.</td>
<td>Developmental Agenda</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Perennial Defence Questions

1. All governments across the world face similar questions when attempting to identify their national defence requirements:
   a. What is the nature of the current and future security and defence environment?
   b. What international role does the country aspire to?
   c. What regional and continental role does the country aspire to?
   d. When and how should ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power be deployed, including military power?
   e. What work will accordingly be required of defence?
   f. What must defence be able to at a stretch?
   g. What should defence not do?
   h. When required to do all things at all times, which tasks could be done in alliance with other countries and what capabilities will be required as a result?
   i. What risks must government be prepared to take, since government cannot insure against every imaginable risk?
   j. Consequently, how much is the nation prepared to pay for security and the resources defence requires?
   k. How should defence be structured, organised and equipped to best fulfil requirements within resource constraints?

National Defence Intent

2. An analysis of the above questions is intended to lead to a common understanding of the level of defence required by the country, of a realistic national defence requirement and how it is to be satisfied – a National Defence Intent. The essential elements of this are an understanding of, and agreement on, what is expected of defence, how this is to be achieved and what broad capabilities this would require. These are captured, expressed and elaborated on in the Defence Review, which is government’s highest-level policy statement on defence.

The Defence Review

3. The Defence Review must express government’s intent for defence in a way that enables lower-level defence planning. As such it must:
   a. Highlight key aspects of the environment impacting on defence – the context for defence planning;
   b. Outline South Africa’s national security policy – a vital governance factor in defence planning;
   c. Discuss the mandate, missions and roles of defence and the priorities accorded to various tasks in order to support national security policy – statutory and policy governance factors;
   d. Define the defence outcomes to be pursued in terms of national security policy – the ends of defence;
   e. Detail the corresponding strategic defence concept and strategic capabilities – the Ways and Means of Defence;
   f. Give strategic guidelines on all of the above for lower-level defence planning.

4. It is only when defence intent has been unpacked to the level of detail where the resource and cost implications become visible, that it will become evident whether the stated level of intent is feasible, or not. If the allocated or anticipated resources are insufficient to establish and sustain the capabilities required by the stated defence intent, adjustments to the defence requirement, the defence concept or the resource allocation, or a combination of these will be required to establish a balance between intent and resources.

ESTABLISHING THE LEVEL OF DEFENCE AMBITION

5. The level of defence ambition is an expression of national security policy and government’s foreign policy, understood within the context of the defence mandate, as derived from the statutory framework governing defence, particularly the constitutional functions of defence. All these factors form the governance framework within which defence ambition and the corresponding defence requirements must be determined.
6. In addition, the level of defence ambition and requirement is context-dependent. This comprises the geostrategic setting for defence, as derived from environmental analyses and intelligence appreciations, and scenarios at a strategic and defence level.

7. Subject to the governance factors and within context, defence intent comprises three broad issues:
   a. Defence outcomes – the objectives to be pursued by defence – the ENDS of defence.
   b. Defence mission, strategic goals, tasks and concepts – the WAYS of defence.
   c. Defence capability requirements – the broad capabilities and force levels required to and achieve the outcomes – the MEANS of defence.

8. The defence mandate derived from the Constitution is a general statement of purpose, covering the full spectrum of possible defence employment. The functions listed in the Constitution stipulate the purposes for which the Defence Force may be employed. This needs to be qualified in the light of environmental circumstances and the national security policy, government priorities and the availability of resources.

9. Defence will thus not be expected to become involved in every possible contingency. Involvement in many contingencies will be discretionary and complete categories could be eliminated as a matter of policy, based on their extreme unlikelihood, resource constraints, government priorities or other considerations. The defence outcomes are a function of the sub-set of contingencies defence will be expected to deal with and reflect the ends government wishes to achieve through defence involvement in the selected contingencies.

10. The defence concept broadly describes the way by which the defence outcomes will be pursued. It includes the priority accorded to various contingencies or classes of contingencies, guidelines on concurrency and whether capabilities must enable an autonomous or collaborative response (either bi- or multi-lateral).

11. The defence capability requirement is a statement of the level of operational capability that would be required by or committed to a particular contingency or class of contingencies, in accordance with the defence outcomes and defence concept. Since it involves broad classes of threat, within hypothetical futures, only broad statements of requirement are possible. These will nevertheless give valuable guidance to lower-level defence planning.

12. The level of defence ambition is thus contained within the Defence Review and elaborates on the types and objectives of operations, missions and tasks envisaged in selected situations, broad guidelines concerning the conduct of such operations, including guidelines concerning concurrency, and the capabilities required for such operations. It is a vital high-level policy guideline for all defence planning and must be the subject of consensus between government and defence, and of great importance within defence itself.

13. While the future is inevitably shrouded in uncertainty, it is impossible to plan defence capabilities without some idea of how the future might develop. The first stage of this work is therefore to review national and defence intelligence appreciations and environmental analyses to determine the main characteristics and trends that are observed in the environment. This work reflects on relevant environmental characteristics and trends at the global, continental, regional and domestic levels.

14. The characteristics and trends identified during the environmental analysis give an indication of possible future developments but cannot accurately predict the future. The way in which trends develop and the interaction between factors inevitably introduce uncertainty. Even if the environment remains relatively stable, the future can therefore develop along a spectrum of alternative pathways. This will impact on defence requirements. Defence planning must therefore take account of alternative futures.

15. The use of scenarios is an accepted way of accommodating and preparing for such alternative futures in a planning process. Scenarios are purpose-specific and are constructed around those drivers affecting the issue under investigation. Strategic scenarios reflecting relevant trends and possible high-level developments identified in the environmental scan were therefore written to create alternative contexts for deliberations on defence capabilities.

16. Strategic scenarios were developed to reflect the emerging environment. These are:
   a. Status Quo – A Continuation of the Current Trajectory.
   c. Regression – A Pessimistic Future.
17. Each scenario was developed in summary and detailed format to sketch various contexts within which events requiring a defence response could occur. The scenarios are dealt with in detail in a separate report.

18. It is important to note that the futures described in the scenarios are entirely hypothetical but were considered plausible in light of current environmental analyses and intelligence appreciations. They were not predictions, ie statements regarding what will happen within some bounds of probability, but are statements about the spectrum within which the future might develop. They also did not include extreme events that would dramatically alter the defence landscape, such as a melt-down of the global political and/or economic system, catastrophic long-term environmental disruption or widespread and hostile major power involvement in Africa.

19. Extreme events are not impossible. The most extreme – major meteorite strikes and eruptions of mega-volcanoes that affected all life on Earth – have occurred in geological time and are possible, even probable, in the future. However, such events alter the security landscape to such an extent that the “rules of the game” are redefined. A direct major power threat to South Africa would be such an event, implying a significant strategic re-alignment. While it is valid to ask “what if?” regarding such events, planning that is actually implementable within available resources must proceed from more constrained visions of the future. The above scenarios represent such a vision.

Consequent Defence Scenarios

20. Events requiring the deployment of military forces do not occur in a vacuum. The strategic scenarios provide context to such events. Levels of threat involving combinations of target and source, compatible with the strategic scenarios, are therefore identified to describe plausible manifestations of events or conflict that might occur within the particular strategic scenario. The spectrum of plausible contingencies represents a defence scenario compatible with the strategic scenario.

21. This two-step approach, working from strategic scenarios to compatible defence scenarios, is not unique to South Africa. References to a similar approach have been found in literature regarding the Australian, Swedish and Bulgarian defence planning processes.

22. To illustrate the relationship between scenarios at the strategic and defence levels: Given a strategic scenario of relative political stability, advancing democracy and economic development at a regional level – the Africa Arising scenario – a state-based threat against South Africa is highly unlikely but overt armed conflict might still be possible in parts of Africa. Similarly, within the same strategic scenario, an intra-state defence scenario of general civil conflict in South Africa is highly unlikely, but general threats to human security will still exist and might be a serious threat to some countries.

23. Each contingency implies a possible level of military involvement, including SANDF involvement. Potential SANDF involvement could thus include participation in multilateral peace missions, direct defence of South Africa, an autonomous intervention, and so forth. During the process the motivations and qualifications relating to each contingency and the possible modes of SANDF involvement should therefore be noted.

24. The collection of such plausible contingencies comprises the defence scenario for the corresponding strategic scenario. The same process of analysis is thus conducted for each strategic scenario.

DEFENCE AMBITION FRAMEWORK & METHODOLOGY

25. The defence intent framework is a mechanism to give structure to the deliberation of defence requirements. In the absence of such a structure it is extremely difficult to coherently debate the complex relationships between all the factors that will influence a decision on defence capabilities. Deliberations can easily zoom in on a highly unlikely worst-case scenario or some pressing current concern, to the exclusion of many important but less dramatic contingencies. A framework such as this makes it possible to trace a logic in terms of the whole picture.

26. The framework consists of two sub-frameworks, one designed to investigate the inter-state dimension, the other the intra-state dimension. Each sub-framework lists a spectrum of possible threats, from those that involve low levels of violence or threats of natural origin, to those involving extreme violence such as civil war within a country or total war between states. The second dimension of the frameworks lists the locus or focus of a threat and, in some cases, whether the source would be African or non-African. A combination of a particular level of threat and a focus/source combination describe a contingency that may require a defence response.

27. The framework is used in the first place to identify possible defence contingencies that would be plausible within the strategic scenarios. The set of contingencies compatible with a strategic scenario represents the corresponding defence scenario. Each contingency must be considered in terms of the possible defence response, the scale of the response, the priority accorded to it, and various other factors to enable a decision on whether provision for such a contingency should be included in the Strategic Intent. These deliberations will determine where the focus of defence effort should be, what level of capability would be required and what provision should be made for future develop-
DETERMINING THE LEVEL OF DEFENCE AMBITION

28. While the conceptual approach and the output of the process must inevitably be presented to defence principals and decision-makers, there is a risk in exposing the finer mechanics in a forum where conditions preclude discussion in sufficient depth to create a full understanding. People are very likely to differ on or misunderstand aspects of the structure, definition or content of a framework or model. Understanding and agreement that have taken days or weeks to achieve among staff intimately involved in developing and using such a tool, cannot be created in minutes. If the presenter is not totally au fait with the tool and the content and/or is not given sufficient time to properly explain, misconceptions will inevitably be formed. Once formed, such misconceptions are very difficult to correct and can undermine the credibility of the entire exercise. This is not just true of this framework, it is a reality that should be borne in mind when any complex analysis is presented to decision-makers.

29. This is emphatically not a mechanistic, paint-by-numbers process. It requires high levels of judgment and important decisions on strategic guidelines for further planning, but in giving structure to deliberations on intent, it will contribute to convergence on this key issue.

INTER-STATE FRAMEWORK

30. The inter-state framework reflects the spectrum of possible scenarios for inter-state threats and is intended to facilitate discussion on an appropriate South African defence ambition regarding such threats, whether they involve South Africa, its external interests, other African countries and/or non-African states. The levels of threat included are as follows (verbatim from Figure D-1):

a. **Political and Economic Conflict:** Alliances, propaganda, economic and political cooperation/sanctions, military cooperation and/or assistance. Conflict management through negotiation, mediation, arbitration.

b. **Sub-National Conflict:** Boycotts, seizures, violations of territorial integrity, assassination, acts of terror, sabotage, hostage-taking, state-sponsored plundering of resources, training, advice and military assistance.

c. **Overt Armed Conflict:** Sporadic armed clashes, skirmishes, raids and temporary incursions by conventional forces. Limited ends rather than major change in status quo. (Examples: Libya-Egypt 1977, Mali-Burkina Faso 1985, Mauritania-Senegal 1989-91).

![DEFEENCE INTENT FRAMEWORK](image)

Figure D-1: Defence Intent Framework: Inter-State Dimension
d. **Limited War:** Protracted, sustained operations by conventional forces, partial/temporary invasion, intent to affect significant change in status quo such as regime change or annexation of territory. (Examples: Ogaden War 1977-78, Ethiopia-Eritrea War 1998-2000).

e. **General/Total War:** Full mobilisation, war in all dimensions, intent to invade, occupy and conquer, complete change in international order. (No examples globally since WWII).

31. The above threats may be directed at:
   a. South Africa.
   b. South Africa’s external interests.
   c. Another African country.
      i. SADC.
      ii. Non-SADC.

32. The source of threat may be African or external. The reason for this distinction is that the defence capability and logistical implications of inter-continental force projection are considerable, implying a superpower or coalition of major powers as source.

33. The framework is depicted in Figure D-1.

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### INTRA-STATE FRAMEWORK

34. The structure of the intra-state framework is conceptually identical to that of the inter-state framework. The rows in the table describe various levels of potential threat to security, from low-level threats of both natural and human origin, to full civil war. The threat spectrum is as follows (verbatim from Figure D-2):

a. **Threats to General Human Security:** Natural and human disasters, crime, breakdown of essential services, plundering of resources, mass migrations, large numbers of illegal aliens, refugees, protests, civil disobedience/unrest.

b. **Civil Threats to Constitutional Order:** Violent protests, sporadic communal violence, mass civil disorder, uncontrolled organised crime, breakdown of law and order.

c. **Sub-state Threats to Constitutional Order:** Systematic low-key violence by non-state groupings including terrorism, assassination, hostage taking, seizures, sabotage, piracy.

d. **General Civil Conflict:** Widespread communal inter-group violence and civil disorder. (Examples: Kenya 2007-2008, Jos, Nigeria 2010).

e. **Insurgency:** Armed rebellion, revolt or insurrection to weaken or gain control of the state. (Examples: Uganda-LRA 1987, Tuareg Rebellion 2007-2009)

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![Figure D-2: Defence Intent Framework: Intra-State Dimension](image-url)
35. Threats may involve South Africa, SADC and non-SADC states, South African interests in such states, and non-African states. The framework is depicted in Figure D-2.

36. As before, the framework is used to map defence scenarios considered plausible within the higher-level context, and to identify the scenarios that should be included in the deliberation of South Africa’s level of defence intent.

RISK ASSESSMENT

37. The selection of the contingencies to be addressed in the defence ambition requires the prioritisation of plausible contingencies according to a consistent set of criteria. A risk model developed for the purpose of assessing strategic niches in the defence industry was adapted for this purpose. The risk associated with an event is typically defined as the probability of the event, multiplied by some measure of the impact of the event. In essence this describes the approach used in the risk model.

38. The probability of a contingency is related to the scenario with which it is associated. So, for instance, it seems logical that the probability of armed conflict between countries would be higher in the pessimistic scenario mentioned earlier, than in the optimistic scenario. However, a scenario is not a prediction and even if it were, it would be impossible to predict the probability of a future event with precision. The estimates of probability used in the model are therefore not only first-order judgments of absolute probability within the context of the particular strategic scenario, but should reflect a judgment of the likelihood of occurrence of each contingency relative to the other contingencies.

39. The potential impact of each contingency is assessed using the following criteria:
   b. Impact on the economy of the region.
   c. Human impact in South Africa in terms of death and displacement.
   d. Human impact in the region in terms of death and displacement.
   e. Impact on South Africa’s territorial integrity.
   f. Impact on South Africa’s international standing.
   g. Impact on morale in South Africa.

40. A scale is used to measure potential impact in terms of each criterion. This scale is also expressed as numerical scores that enable the computation of average impact across criteria. Risk is then expressed as the product of probability and impact.
The assessments are plotted graphically to enable a visual comparison of the relative probability, impact and risk of various contingencies. Figure D-3 is an illustration of such a graphic.

41. According to the definition of risk as the product of probability and impact, contingencies having both a high probability and a high impact are high-risk contingencies. These would occupy the upper-right sector of the graphic, as illustrated by Contingency 1 in Figure D-3. Contingency 3, on the other hand, has a very high impact but such a low probability that it falls in the low risk sector. For the purpose of the illustration, high-, medium- and low-risk sectors are indicated but this illustrates the general principle. In practice the decision on exactly where the boundaries should lie, while still following the principle, is a matter of judgment. The position of a contingency represents its absolute risk. The size of the circle represents the risk of the contingency relative to Contingencies 2 and 3. In combination these give an indication of the absolute and relative priorities contingencies should enjoy. Since hypothetical future events are being considered, this can obviously be nothing more than a judgment of the potential order of magnitude of the impact of a type or category of contingency.

42. The changes in the positions of the contingencies under the various scenarios give a useful indication of possible developments and priorities. This information is used to define the assessments in the defence intent framework. In any single scenario, higher risk contingencies would normally assume higher priority. However, when multiple scenarios are considered, contingencies that may constitute a low risk in one, might justify a higher priority. Interactions between contingencies should also be considered since work invested in some contingencies could have the effect of reducing the probability of occurrence of others. In yet other cases, the decision might be taken to merely monitor risk indicators related to a scenario or contingency, using a change in those indicators as a trigger for measures to deal with or contain an emerging situation.

43. However, it cannot be over-emphasised that the scenario analysis and risk assessments are not assessments of or predictions regarding actual anticipated events. They are mental exercises that are intended to help participating staff think through the spectrum of possible futures in a structured, logical manner, so that they will better understand what the future might hold and will therefore be better prepared to make recommendations regarding future defence requirements. It is, essentially, a way of improving judgment.

ANALYSIS OF SCENARIOS

THE OPTIMISTIC TRAJECTORY ‘AFRICA ARISING’

STRATEGIC SCENARIO

44. Despite the economic and military rise of the East, it maintains healthy relations with Western countries marked by a reduction in political tension in order to maintain good trade relations. The UN Security Council has provided Africa and South America each with a de facto permanent seat, allowing the interests of developing nations to be better represented. This places reconstruction and development in Africa much higher on the UN agenda and creates more urgency and commitment in the UN, the World Bank and among EU donors and agencies to become more closely involved in assisting poor and conflict-stricken African countries.

45. Within the AU and regional economic communities (RECs), African states unite more closely to protect and promote common continental and sub-regional political, economic and security interests given the high demand for Africa’s natural resources. The number and intensity of intra-state conflicts continue to decline as in the rest of the world. Donors also start to invest more in demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform which were underfunded for a long time.

46. Africa maintains its record economic growth rate with booming prices in commodities such as oil, gas and coal, which has enabled Africa to make significant progress in its strive towards achieving the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs). Reforms in many African countries towards building more mixed economies in sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing, reduce reliance on income from such commodities. More scientific ways of farming enable Africa to largely avoid food security crises, despite water scarcity and droughts caused by climate change. Africa’s overall economic growth reduces economic inequalities within and between countries.

47. Most African countries have a growing middle class as social mobility is improving. Economic growth is also allowing African states to significantly improve their education and health systems. Africa maintains its general trend towards civil and political freedom.

48. The exponential growth in cell phone use in Africa is en-
abling various civic groups in Africa to mobilise around common interests for elections and to hold their governments more accountable, which results in improved governance and democratisation. Large-scale infrastructure projects are improving connectivity and trade between African countries and improve the export of goods to other continents. It also enables a freer movement of skilled and unskilled labour within and between RECs.

49. In summary, the strategic scenario is characterised by a stable international system, relatively rapid but uneven economic growth and political development and high levels of African cooperation with growing participation in global economic and political affairs. There is relative peace and stability, with sporadic but decreasing conflict in some countries. Solidarity, constructive engagement, development and participation in and through international institutions are the order of the day. There has been significant improvement in human development and progress toward African Renaissance ideals.

**DEFENCE SCENARIO: INTER-STATE**

50. In this strategic scenario the possibility of high levels of armed conflict between states and involving African states, particularly SADC states, is considered much reduced. Plausible defence contingencies comprising the defence scenario are depicted in Figure D-4.

### Threat Directed at South Africa

51. Apart from peacetime interaction and political or economic rivalry between states, any overt armed threat against South Africa is considered implausible. The only plausible threat is at the level of sub-national conflict but is highly unlikely and if it were to manifest, would be very limited and localised. The exception is a cyber threat that will be present in varying intensity in every scenario. Limited war against South Africa is not considered plausible or probable in the context of the optimistic strategic trajectory.

### Threats to External Vital Interests

52. South Africa’s vital interests may include matters related to food and water security, energy security, security of trade, strategic lines of communication and communication hubs, threats to South African territory abroad and threats to the life or property of South Africans abroad. Direct state threats to vital interests, although plausible, are unlikely in an optimistic trajec-
Determing the Level of Defence Ambition

If such threats were to manifest, they are likely to take the form of sub-national threats such as seizures or occupations of external assets or territory. On the other hand, conflict between other states could indirectly threaten South African interests in those countries.

**Direct Threats against SADC and the Continent**

53. Political and economic rivalry/competition in SADC and on the continent will be a reality in any scenario, although in the optimistic scenario there will be a greater tendency towards cooperative relations between states.

54. In the optimistic scenario conflict involving African states is not expected to escalate beyond sporadic/limited overt armed conflict. This may involve actions instigated or supported by external actors to secure access to resources. Limited war would not be expected.

**International Conflict**

55. It is considered plausible that even on the optimistic trajectory international conflict to the level of limited war may occur somewhere on the planet. Political dynamics and set foreign policy goals will determine the level of South African participation, if any, in the resolution of such conflict.

56. The risks associated with inter-state contingencies involving South Africa and SADC states are depicted in Figure D-5. In the initial analysis that is described in this annexure, the risks for the rest of Africa and beyond were not assessed. However, while the probability of inter-state conflict elsewhere on the continent may be higher than in the SADC sphere, the impact on South Africa will be lower. The risk for South Africa may therefore arguably be similar.

57. In the optimistic strategic scenario higher impact defence contingencies have such low probabilities, and higher probability contingencies such low impacts, that the risks associated with both sets are low. Relatively speaking, however, the highest risks are associated with the possibility of sub-national conflict involving a SADC state or states (implying possible SANDF involvement in peace missions) or peaceful political and economic interaction and rivalry (implying SANDF support to other departments and defence interaction with other states).

**DEFENCE SCENARIO: INTRA-STATE**

58. In the optimistic strategic scenario the intra-state threats to Southern Africa could generally be expected to be limited in scope and severity. In the wider African environment more
severe threats are considered plausible, while at a global level anything remains possible – despite conditions of general peace and progress, there will still be individual countries that may implode. The intra-state defence scenario is depicted in Figure D-6.

**Threat to South Africa**

59. In the optimistic strategic scenario the only intra-state threats are general threats to human security. There is no overt internal threat to the constitutional order.

**Threat to SADC States and/or South African Interests in Such States**

60. Internal threats to the level of sub-state threats to the constitutional order are considered plausible within SADC. These would generally be dealt with as a purely domestic matter but may on occasion require multilateral countermeasures. Where such threats constitute a threat to South Africa’s vital interests, autonomous action may be required in exceptional circumstances.

**Threat to Non-SADC States and/or South African Interests in Such States**

61. Internal threats to the level of insurgencies are considered plausible in Africa beyond SADC. Low levels of threat would usually be dealt with as a domestic matter but where severe threats to security arise, these would generally be dealt with in a multilateral context as AU- or UN-mandated peace missions. Where such threats constitute a threat to South Africa’s vital interests, autonomous action may be required in exceptional circumstances.

**Internal Threats beyond Africa**

62. The entire range of internal threats to the level of civil war is possible. Low levels of threat would usually be dealt with as a domestic matter but where severe threats to security arise, these would generally be dealt with in a multilateral context by international coalitions or as UN-mandated peace missions.

**Intra-State Risk Profile: Optimistic Trajectory**

63. In general, the risks associated with intra-state threats to South Africa and SADC are low. In relative terms the most im-
important threats are associated with lower-order contingencies. The risk assessment is depicted in Figure D-7.

64. The most important threats to South Africa are expected to be general threats to security such as crime, natural and man-made disasters, breakdowns of essential services, the plundering of resources, protests, civil disobedience/unrest, etc. Even in the optimistic scenario protests could become violent, leading to limited communal violence and civil disorder. The risks for SADC are similar, although organised violence constituting a sub-state threat to the constitutional order may be possible in some states.

THE MIDDLE-ROAD TRAJECTORY
‘MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO’

STRATEGIC SCENARIO

65. The international system is a multi-polar world with continuing diffusion of power. There is increasing pressure particularly from developing countries to reform the UN Security Council, the G8, the IMF and the World Bank to reflect current international dynamics and to better represent the interests of the developing world. The US, the EU, Russia, China, India and Japan continue to play major roles, but with other states and other types of international actors occasionally rising to importance on various international issues.

66. Stable economic relations are considered more important than military or political-ideological concerns, but competition for access to natural resources and markets in developing regions, including sub-Saharan Africa, is creating political tension between emerging and developed economies. Prior to the international economic recession, Africa experienced relatively high rates of economic growth. African countries with valuable minerals and significant oil and gas reserves recovered well after the recession. Low-income African countries without significant infrastructure and industrial capacity, were less affected by the recession. On average, most African countries experience higher and steady economic growth rates, but on an insufficient scale to meet the demand for development on the continent. Inadequate economic growth causes slow progress with Africa’s general health status and human development compared to the rest of the developing world. There is uneven development in and between Africa’s RECs. Africa therefore made limited progress in terms of sustainable human development and achieving the MDGs. Africa’s high level of professional skills loss inhibits its potential for job creation, innovation and direct global integration.

67. Africa continues its general trend towards democratisation and respect for human rights, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Drawn-out intrastate conflicts in countries such as the DRC, Somalia, Uganda and Nigeria are difficult to stop and remain a problem in terms of peace and security on the continent. Yet the number of inter- and intra-state conflicts in Africa is declining together with the number of deaths in armed conflict. In this sense Africa has made progress towards a more stable and peaceful continent, but is largely dependent on UN/multinational peace missions in the Great Lakes as well as Sudan/Darfur and its neighbouring states, to prevent these regional conflicts from escalating.
68. The number of refugees in Africa’s conflict hot-spots is increasing at an alarming rate – creating tension between neighbouring countries about the burden that refugee camps place on their economies and security forces. Food security problems due to climate change and old farming methods are worsened by the large numbers of refugees and internally displaced people, as many people are unable to grow crops on a sufficient scale and therefore become dependent on international food aid.

69. Except for oil-producing countries such as Algeria, Angola and Nigeria, most African states invest very little in their armed forces, which creates a general decline in military capabilities and the ability of states to control their own territory. South Africa is a case in point, with a stagnant defence budget which is declining in real terms, high inflows of illegal immigrants and a low level of education among military professionals, which is eroding the SANDF’s image, credibility and standing in Africa. African militaries have become dependent on strong powers to take part in African peace missions, particularly for air transport and logistics.

70. While the AU has ratified many policies and resolutions, it struggles to provide sufficient early-warning and political intervention to prevent conflicts, making the AU reactive instead of pro-active. Due to a lack of resources and capacity, the AU also struggles to partner with foreign donors and development agencies for reconstruction and development on the continent. The lack of regional cooperation in the AU has resulted in the African Standby Force not reaching its set milestones and being largely unprepared for large-scale peace enforcement.

71. In summary, the international system is relatively stable. There is moderate to rapid but unstable economic growth in some African countries, stagnation or regression in others. Regional development is uneven. Generally there is progress toward peace, stability and democracy but some countries and regions are still afflicted by persistent conflict. Regional cooperation in support of AU ideals is limited. Human development continues to lag behind the rest of the developing world, impeding global integration.

DEFENCE SCENARIO: INTER-STATE

72. In this strategic scenario higher levels of inter-state conflict are possible than in the optimistic scenario but limited war involving South Africa or SADC is considered implausible due to the absence of plausible motivations and relatively limited military capabilities. The defence scenario is depicted in Figure D-8.
Threats to South Africa

73. The highest threat level against South Africa considered plausible under the current trajectory is overt armed conflict involving a contiguous state or an external source. This is purely because the capability to launch a strike or raid against South Africa exists, not because there is any real expectation of such an eventuality. On the contrary, the probability is considered to be very small. However, it is possible that unforeseen events could drive the security situation in a direction where an armed incident could arise. Armed conflict involving a remote African source is not considered plausible due to a lack of any credible motivation, the lack of capability to project and sustain forces over the distances involved, the need for complicity of a contiguous state and the absence of a historical precedent for aggressive force projection by any other than a major power against a non-contiguous state. A substantial geo-strategic shift would be required to render such an eventuality plausible.

Threats to South Africa’s Interests

74. As in the optimistic scenario, threats to South Africa’s interests, although plausible, are unlikely. If such threats were to manifest, they are likely to take the form of sub-national threats such as seizures or occupations of external assets or territory. On the other hand, conflict between other states could indirectly threaten South African interests in those countries.

Threats to SADC Countries

75. Threats to the level of overt armed conflict involving a SADC state or states are considered plausible on the current trajectory. This is an expression of current military capabilities and the general security situation within the strategic scenario, which makes it extremely unlikely that international tensions could escalate to a level where a limited war could occur.

Threats to Non-SADC Countries

76. On the current strategic trajectory it is considered plausible that tensions over latent issues that led to limited war between states in the past could escalate, precipitating new bouts of armed conflict. Limited war involving African states beyond SADC is therefore included in the defence scenario.

Threats to Non-African Countries

77. Limited war between states outside Africa is considered plausible. However, general or total war between states – essentially wars of conquest, which imply a dramatic change in the international system – is excluded.

Inter-State Risk Profile: Current Trajectory

78. The risks associated with the above defence scenario are illustrated in Figure D-9. As indicated by the arrows in Figure D-9, the probability of sub-national and overt armed conflict involving a SADC state or states has increased significantly relative to the optimistic strategic scenario, as has the probability of sub-national conflict involving South Africa. All the contingencies except overt armed conflict involving a SADC state or states remain low in absolute terms. Overt armed conflict (SADC)
has, however, edged into the medium risk sector. This implies the possibility of SANDF involvement in peace missions in the SADC region.

DEFENCE SCENARIO: INTRA-STATE

Threat to South Africa

79. As indicated in Figure D-10, the intra-state threats to South Africa in the current strategic scenario include general threats to human security and civil threats to the constitutional order. The latter could, for example, include violent protests, sporadic communal violence and civil disorder resulting from unsatisfied expectations.

Threat to SADC States and/or South African Interests in such States

80. On the current trajectory all levels of intra-state conflict, to the level of insurgency and civil war, are considered possible within the wider SADC. This implies the possibility of SANDF involvement in multilateral peace missions or autonomous action to protect vital interests threatened by such conflict.

Threat to Non-SADC States and/or South African Interests in such States

81. As before, all levels of intra-state conflict are possible within an African context.

Internal Threats beyond Africa

82. The entire range of internal threats to the level of civil war is possible.

Risk Profile: Optimistic Trajectory

83. In general, the risks associated with intra-state threats to South Africa are low but any level of threat could arise beyond South Africa’s borders, increasing in severity beyond contiguous states. The risk assessment is depicted in Figure D-11.

84. As indicated by the arrows, the probability of a number of contingencies is considered significantly higher than under the optimistic strategic scenario, increasing the risk associated with those contingencies accordingly. While most are relatively low impact contingencies, thus remaining in the low-risk sector de-
DETERMINING THE LEVEL OF DEFENCE AMBITION

spite the higher probabilities and relative risks, the higher-impact contingency – general civil conflict in a SADC state or states – has moved into the medium-risk sector. This, as indicated earlier, implies possible SANDF involvement in peace missions in SADC and/or autonomous action where vital interests are threatened by such conflict.

PESSIMISTIC TRAJECTORY
‘A PATH OF REGRESSION’

STRATEGIC SCENARIO

85. The international system is a turbulent and competitive multi-polar system with rising economic and military tension between strong powers. Cooperation within and between RECs is declining internationally including Africa, due to competition between states for access to dwindling energy sources and minerals to maintain their economic growth. The UN, AU and SADC have become largely ineffective in international affairs as member states fend for themselves. There is a strong shift to mercantilism as countries try to protect their industries against cheap imports by means of tariff barriers and other trade restrictions particularly in the North.

86. As strong powers try to compete for or maintain exploitation rights for fossil fuels and minerals in African countries, they increasingly turn a blind eye to unconstitutional changes of political power, human rights violations and economic mismanagement of African governments. Undeclared small arms and conventional weapons transfers to African governments often form part of contracts to obtain rights to exploit natural resources which exacerbates the proliferation of small arms on the continent. 87. A lack of solidarity, cooperative intent and security cooperation in Africa has aggravated the situation of inter- and intra-state conflicts on the continent. Border disputes over oil-rich areas have escalated into incidents of small-scale battles between neighbouring states.

88. As African countries try to cope with rapidly increasing populations and youth bulge, urbanisation and mega-cities, they spend less on maintaining and expanding their commercial and industrial infrastructure – resulting in the deterioration of much of Africa’s economic infrastructure. Most African states cannot keep up with the demand for essential services and policing in mega-cities. Organised crime syndicates and some international terrorist groups exploit this situation and expand their activities – becoming a threat to state security. There are also more incidents of inter-communal fighting between religious and ethnic groups competing for political power.

89. The military capabilities of armed forces in most African countries have deteriorated extensively and many have been reduced to militias that mainly protect the ruling elite and their economic interests. As a result, military interventions aimed at protecting foreign economic interests have increased. Incidents of piracy around the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea are increasing due to a lack of law and order on land – raising concerns about the impact on international trade.

90. Strong powers are making increasing use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) to protect their economic interests in Africa, without cooperating with international protocols for regulating the PMSC industry. Subsequently security sector reform is receiving less attention in Africa.
91. African countries are unable to feed their growing populations with internal produce due to climate change and continued subsistence farming. Africa therefore faces serious food and water security challenges and many countries are dependent on international food aid. The deterioration of security in many African countries results in the withdrawal of NGOs and UN agencies from the continent – leaving few organisations behind who are able to provide aid in both urban and remote rural areas.

92. In summary, the international system is turbulent with intense competition for global dominance and increasing economic and political instability at global and continental levels. There is widespread conflict within and sometimes between African states due to demographic pressures and competition for resources. Economic resources are severely strained. Solidarity, cooperative intent and collective security mechanisms have been eroded and have in some cases broken down. There is increasing military intervention by external powers to secure their interests, particularly access to resources.

**DEFENCE SCENARIO: INTER-STATE**

93. In the turbulent international environment sketched in the pessimistic strategic scenario, conflict to the level of limited war involving a SADC state or states, other African states and external powers is possible, as depicted in Figure D-12.

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**Threat Directed at South Africa**

94. Despite the turbulent environment, a crisis escalating to a limited war with another state would require the confluence of multiple causative factors. While this is plausible, the probability is considered low. If an armed threat were to develop, it is most likely to involve a contiguous state. An external attack on South Africa is plausible if, for instance, South Africa harboured factions that posed a threat to the vital interests of a major power or directly threatened such interests. This is highly unlikely as long as South Africa remains a pivotal state in the region and a responsible international actor. As before, the threat level for this has been kept at the level of overt armed conflict simply because the capability exists.

**Threats to South Africa’s Interests**

95. Threats to South Africa’s interests could arise within a conflict between South Africa and another state, or as a consequence of conflict involving other states in the region. This could manifest in any level of conflict, up to and including limited war.

**Threats to SADC, Non-SADC and Non-African Countries**

96. Threats to the level of limited war are considered plau-
sible within the pessimistic trajectory. This could include substantial external support to African belligerents or direct external intervention in Africa.

**Risk Profile: Pessimistic Trajectory**

97. In the pessimistic scenario the probability of conflict is significantly higher than on the optimistic or current trajectories, as indicated by the arrows in Figure D-13. The absolute risks are accordingly greater.

98. The relatively low impact of political/economic rivalry and sub-national conflict results in low risks despite moderate to high probabilities. Limited war and overt armed conflict involving South Africa or a SADC state or states, however, are higher-impact contingencies that move into the medium-risk sector as a

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**Figure D-13: Risk Assessment for the Inter-State Defence Scenario: Pessimistic Trajectory**

**Figure D-14: The Intra-State Defence Scenario: Pessimistic Trajectory**
result of increased probabilities within the pessimistic scenario. These are also the contingencies carrying the highest relative risks.

**THE DEFENCE SCENARIO: INTRA-STATE**

**Threat to South Africa**

99. As indicated in Figure D-14, the intra-state threats to South Africa in the pessimistic strategic scenario include anything up to an insurgency. This may be limited to some areas of the country and may not enjoy wide domestic support, but would require a significant contribution by defence to maintain law and order in the affected areas.

**Threat to SADC States and/or South African Interests in such States**

100. On the pessimistic trajectory all levels of intra-state conflict, to the level of civil war, are considered possible within the wider SADC. This implies the possibility of SANDF involvement in multilateral peace missions or autonomous action to protect vital interests threatened by such conflict.

**Threat to Non-SADC States and/or South African Interests in such States**

101. As before, all levels of intra-state conflict are possible within an African context.

**Internal Threats beyond Africa**

102. The entire range of internal threats to the level of civil war is possible.

**Risk Profile: Pessimistic Trajectory**

103. In general, the risks associated with intra-state threats to South Africa may include localised, low-level insurgency but any level of threat could arise beyond South Africa’s borders, increasing in severity beyond contiguous states. The risk assessment is depicted in Figure D-15.

**CONSOLIDATION OF ANALYSIS ACROSS ALL THREE SCENARIOS**

104. The preceding analysis sketched three scenarios at the strategic level. These were elaborated into collections of generic contingencies representing corresponding defence scenarios. The associated risk analyses were judgments regarding the probability and impact of those contingencies in the context of the strategic scenarios. All of this is a mental exercise designed to stimulate and structure thoughts about possible futures. Those futures are hypothetical but are considered plausible in the light of current environmental analyses and intelligence appreciations. They do not include extreme events that would dramatically alter the defence landscape, such as a melt-down of the global political and/or economic system, catastrophic long-term environmental disruption or widespread and hostile major power involvement in Africa.
105. There can be no guarantee that the future will play out within the constraints sketched above. However, it is impossible to plan in the absence of objectives and constraints — mathematically, optimisation of an objective function is only possible within given constraints. If either changes, the solution will change. So, too, with defence planning, where expectations of the future (including the funding to be allocated to defence) are vital constraints. If those expectations change significantly, re-planning is required.

106. The analysis as it stands thus implies certain planning assumptions and/or guidelines:
   a. Force planning within a constrained future.
   b. The management of risks outside that future by other means.
   c. Re-planning if events indicating a departure from that constrained future should develop.
   d. The use of the force-in-being to deal with extreme events until the Defence Review can be implemented.

107. However, defence capabilities must also support and enable the regional, continental and global role South Africa desires and is expected to play, ie defence must be configured and equipped to reflect and give expression to South Africa’s international status and its national security and foreign policies. Balance must be achieved between national ambitions, defence capabilities and defence funding.

108. As a starting point, planning assumptions/guidelines must be set within the constrained future of the scenarios. Since neither the optimistic nor the current trajectories pose any real challenges for defence, the following general guidelines are proposed:
   a. Contingencies considered plausible within the pessimistic trajectory will be set as baseline.
   b. Priorities will be set as follows:
      i. High- or medium-risk contingencies affecting South Africa or its vital interests.
      ii. High- or medium-risk contingencies affecting SADC and similar contingencies affecting the rest of Africa.
      iii. Low-risk, high-impact contingencies.
      iv. Peacetime defence interaction and support to government departments.
      v. Other contingencies.
   c. The SANDF force-in-being should be capable of dealing with high- or medium-risk contingencies.

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Figure D-16: The Inter-State Defence Scenario: Consolidated
d. Given sufficient warning and resources, the SANDF should be capable of expanding or adjusting to meet low-risk, high-impact contingencies. Early warning systems will be in place and resources will be allocated as and when required.

e. South African involvement in contingencies other than threats to South Africa or its interests will be discretionary within the context of peace missions or other multinational actions.

f. Force planning will make provision for concurrent activities to a specified level. Where that level is exceeded, higher risk contingencies will take priority.

g. Cyber security will be a ubiquitous requirement.

109. In addition to these general guidelines, specific guidelines will apply in determining the capability requirements for the inter- and intra-state dimensions.

CONSOLIDATED INTER-STATE DIMENSION

110. The consolidated inter-state scenario is presented in Figure D-16.

111. Specific guidelines applying to the inter-state dimension are.

a. As the leading state in SADC and in Africa, South Africa must be able to match the military capabilities of its peers. In terms of defensive capability, despite the absence of any military threat to South Africa from the region, this means that the SANDF must as a force-in-being at least be able to defend against a threat to the level of overt armed conflict from a neighbouring state. This capability should be the focus of a balanced, sustainable military force, able to meet other commitments.

b. The SANDF force-in-being should provide the basis for expansion to a level where the SANDF will be able to defend against a threat of limited war from a contiguous state.

c. No specific provision will be made for overt threats from non-contiguous African sources:
   i. There are no plausible causative factors or strategic motivations evident.
   ii. Globally there is no historical precedent for such action.

d. A threat to South Africa from external sources beyond Africa constitutes an extreme event that implies major power involvement. Due to the asymmetry this entails, the extreme unlikelihood of such an event and the limited resources available to the SANDF, the SANDF will not specifically make provision for such a threat. The risk will be managed primarily by other means.

e. The SANDF should be able to contribute to multinational peace missions to the level of peace enforcement in the context of inter-state limited war involving other African states. However, such involvement and the scale thereof are discretionary and will be determined by the specific situation. Criteria for such involvement and a predetermined maximum level of involvement are to be set.

f. Threats to South Africa’s interests will preferentially be dealt with at a multilateral level. However, the SANDF should have the capability for limited autonomous operations in defence of vital interests. Those interests and the maximum level of autonomous action are to be defined.

g. SANDF deployments beyond Africa will be exceptional, of limited scale and duration, and subject to other priorities. In general, threats to security closer to South Africa will enjoy priority.

h. Contingencies at the level of general or total war are excluded from the planning baseline due to the low probability and resource implications thereof. The development of such a scenario implies a major change in the international order, requiring re-planning of defence capabilities.

i. Participation in military diplomacy, assistance and other cooperative interaction will be a standing commitment in support of South Africa’s regional, continental and global role.
CONSOLIDATED INTRA-STATE DIMENSION

112. The consolidated intra-state scenario is presented in Figure D-17. As before, the focus of the force-in-being is on medium-to high-risk contingencies, although in its internal role even some low-risk contingencies may involve SANDF support to the SAPS and other departments.

113. Specific guidelines applying to this dimension are:
   a. The SANDF force-in-being should have the capability to fulfil the following short-term requirements:
      i. Assistance to the SAPS and civil authorities in dealing with general threats to security.
      ii. Assistance to the SAPS and civil authorities in countering low-level threats to security including civil threats to the constitutional order and sub-state threats such as terrorism and piracy.
      iii. The protection of South Africa’s external interests against direct or indirect threats. Threats to South Africa’s interests will preferentially be dealt with at a multilateral level. However, the SANDF should have the capability for limited autonomous operations in defence of vital interests. Those interests and the maximum level of autonomous action are to be defined (including maritime interests!).
      iv. Participation in multinational regional/continental peace missions occurring in the context of general civil conflict in a SADC state or elsewhere in Africa. Such participation shall be discretionary to a predetermined maximum scale and shall be subject to other priorities.
   b. In the longer term the SANDF shall have the ability to scale up to the following requirements:
      i. Assistance to the SAPS and civil authorities in countering a significant internal threat, including low-level insurgency.
      ii. Participation in multinational regional/continental peace missions to the level of peace enforcement in a civil war situation. Such participation shall be discretionary to a predetermined maximum scale and shall be subject to other priorities.